TP~ 1~ I{ PTOF T~ IBWiNLhTTB I1 GIVEN BY TME
E'WL~ 1 Y'T,, H:' IbZITS CON T" T. C0' vUK) N K?. L I2f
MT CHAEL CHIL LTGT14 FOjI LLC 0i4 A3. SI'ATI-ONS
IC TFJiG -IOUT " J.. 1-ALI
PR3GRi, 2, Flv F I T-M-HD O'N STJI-DAY~, 22ñ T-H jU. NTE 9 62 ATD
DR 0 -T" CAST 01N JUNA'" Tumi -C
MIh. HARTO'N: First of all, Prime Minist( Lr? welcome back,,
PRLIME 1iIITER-. Thank you,
You l-eft this country expressing concern lor its
future,) and that you wanted tI-o be in places in1
many diff'erent parts of tiia3 world, to play an
active part in s~ eeing T;' h at you could do about that0
" low do you etr a* re you. mc-re or less. concerned
for its future?
P. M. 0 OhI i'm concerned, but L t-ein.., n the wh-. ole, more
optimi1stic th. ri I was and I sa y thaabl because,
politicallyqv. I am a Li-ttle better acquainted Wi. th
what th~ ey are after politically in connection with
Great1 3ritain 0inLfto Europe, and economically,
yes, I aninore opti1mistic., bacause 1 .6hI. 1 that in
botli countricJS our-case is botter uunderst Ocd"
QO ~ Now, ve have bcen to'ld on many, occasions that this
country stands to lose a great deal i. Lf sufficicnt
guarantees are not provi-dcd OCionwei: alii countries
if ritin oes c-n cr ih Coir.--aon iZa'et but-!-do w
-tand to vai r any thinng, do yuthj~ rk by 23ri Lish1
entry?
P I' 1 Oh, I don~ t put i. a' 1l. oe iq'ay. I thiink that2 on~
the faco ) f it.. we stand to leoseg For example, if'
G,--rat ? ritai', n we(. nt in and w: e lost citl-ir imm'odiat Aly,
or afte-:, a timo,. our pecrnC3oci certeain things
dried fruitI can-ned fruit2I mat-ters on w~ hich thec
United Kingdc. om mar-. ket is7 reall" y vi tal to us yes,
weO ioul I have thiings to lose., But one oan't deny
tr~ at trearc-, on -Lhe other hand t ho possi11bilities3
o f -aijnf tneCo, Mar: kc~ t develops as it is
hkoped JAt i-47 Rr-. r-itain goes i-' n arid Groat
Br . Ltain-r becomes 0Ccn2: oni: calIy srne se eut
aS Groat Britain hocpes to be, hnteeisi hoy
at any rate, an increasing oppor tI-urnity for us to do
blasinoss with. an incrocasing marLkotc"
Q. I th-in]-it is trueo to say t!-at one sees evidence
incroasing cplinion that you haeve perhaps overcstina Led
tho losses and bavontt emphaised enuhtheo -pos--. ble
gains ta this country, Do yocu t~ iirik~ thatis truc?
P. M4. I thU-Iiin. k that, in a. scnase, is a fair cc~ iunt3Bot
that's IarLJp-bcauseo we hnave bcc, p1. a-nl con,-ce. rned
to 01' 0CIAcSS the possibj. o. los-ses in or r o avuijl. d,
' incurring L'icri3vll not. b(: iJng-, in tooc m-ach of a
hUrrY to SI. Y tLt therfoe ' C3t gains,, And. let it
be rtmernbred tha so i', al. theagg, thexo hus be an
an occnctz: ic stu. Lngt in Europe wJIth. th---
existing Six, wehavrcn~ gained -In ooefr msa rkcet0
It~ s be.~ n rathnev dita,) pciutl. irg in 6h. at. VenVsu!
stll~ yc. ij corl troeat. ra as ic,: anvTIrg flg tat tihca:. e
mbaey ~ g~ a o swll s o gain moe corzco
oftepossi -1. e ~~ scr utCo~ c
Cul "* CCe 0 6
Now,, con3ae-rnlmcg Commonwealth ie of Whieh you spo -0
much. in B.: Ltai), bJuid you agree that -hcy7 v increased
what; Could almaost b~ called a ' Is-tandI-. offC" non~ m
iBriLtaints part t'vdsthe ttiaxt; you have gopt a
gVeatly increased voice of tfte Labor O0ppositiLon in the
Britisha Parliament, for one thing.
P IM., I don? t kinow that-I wouLd nco-_ ssarily ac. ee with that, Las
Iunder-stand it. T he Labor Op,) ositlon in the British
T'r~ iarent ha~ s propoun~ ded the Comrnnwealth J. ea and has
made it clear thiat i~ t docsn? t w-jant Commonweal intez-ests
to suffer. kid I havie no doubt thik thVi nt
genuine stat-ement, but at tho sampe time, Hugh Uzaitskell,,
who has expressed the 6ppositLon v ew, and who has been
accuced of sitrtig on the f;? nce-hasinr. ty merely
lbeen saying " Dor~ t aisk me to dEccidc, whetthec ive ought to
go in or not until T 1Yinow what the jprice Is, And the
pric that concerns me includes the price that tlie Contmon~-
wea1. thi may have to pay
11r0 Ppre Minister, T~ wonder if the irony of this appeals
-to you, the fact that your tr! ongest support is coming
perhaps in Britain fromn the LraboPat and that you, at
least on. some occasions, are arguing against somcthing for
whl-ich you personally must stand.,
P0M0 WellsT don't regard tnis ae,_ a par-ty matte". ort vr
strong support for My vievs on thlo Conservativexc side in
the House of CoiT-rinns, and T don' t want to have it thought
that lvinisters fC-, rm Mr(, MacrniLlan dowrn are Ios tile to oUl.
point of View. 01 thle co ,-arv, 7te r ey ~ SO. U
ofit, In. e sori Sp( erhaps oneo thing that isOt
adequiately . realised,~ T didcL.? t ral it mysulf until I
went this te and'that is t-hatb 1-Loer is no cloar-cull,
unanimous view on thi. iiattero in Lo) ndorn., T I eoreo a .1-very
strong fec-Iing, ix, the G -, oonmint thiat tera ara groat
pol~ tic J ntai' gong into ~ uoe Ith~ irk there
ares ton vi c s on t ie O-ppositi. en side to ex-actly thc
same effect. WheLon you cc. jme to the economic aspects of the
matter, balanc-ing thk.-irmmedlato againc; t the romote. or the
p-obDablo aga4ri-1t theo possible, then ycu can get a htind.-rea.
Q. Welln, Sir, 1 wun-dor if yucan talk about hat appcar
to be t1ii~ S fascina,'-ti,, g politi'cal ba!; tle whlichi is going on.
There av boon suggost-ions thAat the,-fecolings in 1Pa r i an
in Bo'nn. Dr., Adonauor and thc. Preside, 1-nt of F. r. ancQ Genoral
de Gaul log cro becomling harder -toxard. 3 British. orttry. that
therue is a. fooling th~ Cthau. they feel th-at th! ey can go;
alonie in. Europe,, FlrL Ud anything like this tiieroc:
POMWellI that's very inte-esting and it's ve-ry diffi cul. t for
oe 3At Je. tati; ' utid0. e o foma j . LT_ 01t aboCUt it_ L.
woul. d hLave thiouglt that' i f yo t ke th LAteBecL~
countries as thuy a-re cle teLow,. Cocunt>-' LS, WOUld bo
stroonaly pcjiti. Cal.: Ly in faVCu: Of I" rat. Brtain going in,
rr1a tL i. th.> tha , tl i-te ra r thlinlk t'ha t
. oir12, iany7 is., Tbub~ vcry hard 1to -toll, because Do,
Adanauozr and G.-ano. re. 1 C1_ au] Jo are pro Lty close ogter
Q, You wcu ~ i a-it--tha: roii1icis of tiso that the-re isn it a
tiossi: iiity thaLt Bonn and Pii r--ay say rVill 1 go it
alono", 0 1 0 0 / 3
3.
P. M, Well, they might. but I think that the rucial point will
be Paris and on'that I don't think there's any doubt that
General de Gaulle didn't look with any great favour on the
British coming in, He has his own ideas about the
position of France in Europe, particularly so long as he
has close association with Adenauer. My impression this
time was that although nobody could say that de Gaulle was
in favour of Great Britain going in, I don't think he is
so utterly hostile to it as he was perhaps a year ago,
In oti-er wo'e 1' Ihe'b a. fy , ben j
it's a movement in favour of them receiving Great Britain,
Qo Well, now, if that is one strong force at the bargaining
table, the American attitude is another one. How precisely
would you measure the American feeling about Britain going
into the European Common Market. I have seen only recently
a report which quoted the " highest authority" that the
Americans would regard it as catastrophic if Britain didn't
go in.
P. M. Well, I don't want to engage in superlatives, but I came out
of Jashington, after very close discussions with the
President and a variety of the members of the Administration,
quite satisfied that they were very, very keen on Great
Britain going in. Indeed, I rather used this myself in
my discussions with them because I said " Nw, if they're
keen on Great Britain going in, they are not without
influence in Europe itself; if the British difficulty
about going in and appuaring to desert the Commonwealth
economic interests becomes manifest, then my card of
entry with the Americans is to say, " Look, don't make it
too hard. Don't make it so hard for Great Britain to
go in that she has to make this horrible choice between
Europe and the Commonwealth, because this would be, in
itself, a catastrophe. I think they understand that very
well and, therefore, I would describe their attitude, as
I found it, and after the discussions that we had, as being
one of great keenness for Great Britain to go in, of
knowledge that there's a limit to the price that she can
pay of an understanding that the Commonwealth does matter
to Great Britain and to the world and that, therefore, the
American approach must be one, not of dogma, but of
practical accommodation. Indeed, both the President
and the people in his Administration repeatedly said to
me " Our approach to this is quite pragmatic, it is not
do g-atic."
Qo Did you get the fooeeling that the Aerican attitude was so
strong that it would carry the day inevitably in Europe
for British entry?
P. M. ' Jell, I wouldn't be prepared to put it as high as that,
but I do believe that the American influence in Europe on
this matter will be considerable, and that, of course,
particularly has relation to France
Q. Sir, there seem to be two developing attitudes about the
nature of the European Common Market should it come to
pass. One is that it is an exclusive community which
looks inward upon itself and that the Common Market
countries the United States of Europe are selfsufficient,
or that it should be an expanding community
with interests donm as far as this part of the world,
Which do you think is uppurrnost? cc a a o
P. M. Well, I wish I knew the anser to that. The great
danger about the European Economic Community is that the
countries in it may become inward-looking, They may
become full of ideas of economic self-sufficiency.
They may say, " Well, now, the day will be a happy day
w. hen the new European Community, including Great Britain,
doesn't import wheat, but gets it all from within."
The French are, today, wheat exporters. Then they may
say, " Well, why should we be dependent on the rest of the
world for canned fruits, for dried fruits we can produce
them all ourselves for butter 0. Run right down
through the listo That is, theoretically, a danger,
And it may be, that for a while, that will be their
tendency, their temptation, but in the long run I think
that we have to remember that one of their great ends is
so to increase their industrial power tLeir capacity to
make and to sell to other people, thai they are not so
foolish as not to realise that they can't sell without
buying. And, therefore, in the long run, if they avoid
ultra-nationalistic self-sufficient economic policies,
we may hope that their activity with the rest of the world
will correspond to an activity on the part of the rest of
the world with them,
Q. I wonder can I press you a little bit. You said you
weren't quite sure which idea was uppermost in Europe at
the moment. Have you, as a last word, any real feelings
about which idea is the prevalent one at the moment?
P. M, Well, I would think, myself, that they were at present
rather on the self-sufficiency line,
Qd Which is not good for us?
P. M. Uhich is not good for us. and what we have to do is to
break that dowm, to make them more and more conscious of
the fact that if the rest of the world doesn't have a
market in their countries, then they cant have a market
in the long run in the rest of the world.
Qo Is it this to which you devoted the greater part of your
energies when you were in London?
PM, And a great deal of time in the United States itselfe
Very interesting on that mattier The Americans, they're
very big and we are relatively small, but one thing that
I kept coming back to or that they kept coming back to,
in my talks with them was " Look if Great Britain goes
into the Common Market, you, Aus ralia, and, we, America,
are both outside of it, and we therefore have a tromondous
common interest in getting the best possible access to that
Market for our own goods. If they become illiberal in
their economic policies, that's bal for both of us, Then
the joint coummuniqueo with President Kennedy here it
was WJe both indicated that we had this in common. We
hope they will have liberal policies, and we hope that
there will be increasing access for our goods into that
Market, That, I thought, was a good start.
Q, Now, Sir, the bargaining on behalf of the Commnonwalth has
been done at the moment by Bri. tain for the Commonwealth
countries in Europeo Mro Macmillan's position is somewhat
loss secure, one would have thought, losing by-elections
as he is, fairly frequently. Do you feel that this may
have, or did it have any offect on his powers to bargain
adequately at Brussels? C 0 0 C 0 0 0 Cl'
L
P. M, I don't think so. It is in the nature of things that
governments lose by-elections without necessarily losing
a seat, but it is a very rare event when a government will
increase a majority at a by-election, because at by-elections
people are able to chide the government without throwing
it out. We are very familiar with that. INow, I think
he will go ahead. He has a large majority. He is the
master of the timetable. He's not due to have an election,
if he doesn't want one, before the second half of 1964.
No, I think he'll go ahead and negotiate.
Q. With a freshening opposition in Britain to British entry
and negotiations for comparable outlets on behalf of the
Commonwealth taking place now not making as much progress
as I understand would have helped you, wouldn't you agree
that this may be a factor that the people in Brussels'
attitude might harden because of the British Prime
Minister's position at home?
P. M. I don't think so, myself, because I don't think that
anybody could answer dogmatically as to what the Prime
Minister's opponents would do. I don't moan his critics in
the Conservative Party but his political opponents, the
Labor Party. I don't think anybody in Europe could say,
" Jell, we could do a better deal with them, than we can
with Macmillan," because I don't think they can take an
easy position, either of them,
Qo Mr, Prime Minister, Sir, I wonder if I can put this to
you now, Supposing it comes to the worst, supposing
this country gets nothing but transitional agreements,
suppose comparable outlets cannot be negotiated, what do
we do?
PoMo eall, it divides itself into two parts. First of all, if
that turned out to be the position and we had, in September,
the Prime Minister's Conferjnce, I think this would be
very badly received by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers,
I don't see how it could be avoided. ' Je have our problems,
but you take Now Zealand New Zealand's problems, depending
so enormously on the products of farms, would be almost
intolorable, and I am perfectly certain that there would
be tremendous opposition on the part of the Commonwealth
countries. And if it turned out that the Commonwealth
countries all being confronted by an end of the present
pattern of Commonwealth trade by 1970, said, " We don't
approve, we disagree. Te disagree violently." Then, I
for one doubt very much whether a government of any party
in Great Britain would go in. But if a government of
whatever party in Great Britain went in, then I think there
would be a heavy blow dealt to the Commonwealth association,
and I think that so far as we are concerned, and other
Comnonwealth countries are concerned, we should have to
engage then in salvage operations. We, ourselves, would
have to devote our time, between now and 1970, to determining
what we can do to develop unexpected i. arkets for certain
commodities, what financial arrangenants we could make to
support the variety of interests. We are not going to
wander away from these industries. No industry like
dried fruit or canned fruit need suppose for one moment
that we are just going to dump it under those circumstances,
but the problne of how to support it will be, of course, a
very acute one. Je don't want to get to that problem if
we can help it.
Q. I was just wondering0 Obviously, I imagine, you have
second lines of defence to fal l back cn, You must have
given some thought to this to a policy should this come
to pass? o o0 3 o/ 6
P. M. That's right. But it's not orthodox practice to publish
your second lines of defence.
Q. There's been a lot of speculation that Japan might, in
such an instance, become almost a second Britain to this
country, and that you are busy now developing, on behalf
of this country, greatly increased trade relations.
PoM. We have been developing our trade relations with Japan,
After all, Japan, last year, was our biggest wool-buyer,
and Japan increasingly takes commodities from us, and
we from Japan. But there's no doubt about it that if
the old channels of trade begin to dry up, as they will
under this 1970 idea, then we must more and more not
hesitate to open up new channels of trade. If this means
that we'll do more business with countries with which we
now may have some reluctance to do business, well it will
mean that, because after all, the first duty of the
government of Australia is to the people of Australia and
to the industries of Australia.
Qo What would you say to those who perhaps see something
like realism in this: that when it comes to the fortunes
of 50 or 60 million people in Britain and perhaps the
fortunes of the whole of Europe, the fortunes of 10 million
Australians and 2 or 3 million Now Zcalanders are not
going to count for very much real. y?
P. M. Well, in a sense, that's intelligible, but don't forget
this: that the fortunes of the 50 million people in
Great Britain have boon very largely tied up with the
fortunes of a relative handful of people in Australia or
Now Zealand because, until the last couple of years, for
example, we in Australia, 10 millions as we may be, have
been the biggest customer of British goods in the world,
You could literally say that there are scores and scores
and scores of thousands of people working in factories
in Great Britain whowouldn't be working there but for
what Australia buys. These are very important factors.
Indeed, I pointed out when I was in London that the
Ai; erican market which happens at the moment to be the
biggest; all that's very satisfactory but if you
compared that market in actual terms, not per thousand of
people, but in actual terms, with the British market in
Australia, over the last thirty or forty years when we've
had this special preferential structure, Australia has
bought from Great Britain, in actual terms, œ 800M more
of goods than the Tnited States of Amnricao
QO But the pattern of trade with Britain has changed, and is
changing constantly, isn't it?
P. M. Yes, but not all that materially. We still remain the
second greatest customer. She remains our largest
customer, overall. There is a mutuality about these
things the preferences given to British trade passing
into Australia and our preferences in the British market,
and I don't think the people of Great Britain will ignore
this. They don't want to ignore it. There are still
many, many thousands or millions of people in Great
Britain who are conscious of the Commonwealth.
QO On the other hand, again, there are those who would say that
the realities of this are bargaining powers. Much as
you talk, you still come down to bargaining. How big a
bargaining power are British preferences which this country
has in its possession nolw? 0 0 a 0 7
PM! o Well, they are a bargaining point. How big they are
depends entirely This is rather a psychological problem.
If the negotiators in Great Britain feel that their advantages
in going into Europe economically are so great that
they will outweigh any losses that they might incur elsewhere,
then they will go in, and when you come to discuss
these economic problems, I find the greatest difficulty
in getting any two people to agree. I spoke to one or
two of the most prominent men in Great Britain, actively
engaged whose attitude was, "' Jell, the economic argument
is .0/ 56" and that's why I believe first, that the British
negotiators, Mr. Heath, in particular, who is a very able
man I had known all the others over many years, but
hadn't known him, really, before and I think he's doing
his best on this matter. He will want to achieve a result,
but I don't think that he will want to report to his Prime
Minister that the best deal that can be presented to the
Prime Ministers in September is one under which the existing
Commonwealth pattern of trade disappears in 1970.
Qo Now, have you given any thought, sir, to this whole idea
of customs unions which seem to be fashionable now and,
again, people are talking about a customs union, a much
closer association between Australia and New Zealand.
Have you any comment on that?
P. M. e0ll, I quite agree with you that customs unions are
fashionable. It's occasionally overlooked that the
United States itself is a customs union, and so are we,
in the Commonealth( of Australia) as we have complete
internal free trade and a common external tariff, The
problem of developing some such thing with Now Zealand
will become really quite an interesting one if it turns
out that our present positions in the British market fade
out by 1970, which assumes that that's the best term that
can be got and that the British Government agrees with it.
Then it would become a practical probljm. But, really,
I would hope to be delivered of having to solve it. You
seo, in the ultimate, we say, " Jell, let's have a common
external tariff. We will form a customs union." That
connotes internal free trade. And that moans Now Zealand
butter passing without duty into Australia Well, I think
the dairying industry in Australia might have something
to say about that. And so on.
qo This raises many other things. The pressures that are
bound to fall upon this country must get greater, I imagine
you would agree with that. Do you envisage a more planned
economy, a more directed economy for this country over the
next few years?
P. M, The word " planning", of course, is a rude word. You know
wh-at mean. There are those who dogmatically are for it,
as such, and against as such, but if the word " planning"
meant that we must increasingly, and particularly with
those possible economic difficulties that we must
increasingly try to determine in Australia what our rate
of population growth ought to be, what degree of expansion of
secondary industry so vital to population growth ought to be,
what the uosition of the primary industries ought to be, in
terms of production and nmrket, what the tertiary industries
ought to be. not laying it down in some'theoretical ' dog r,
but trying to work out, in terms of expansion and growth,
what the best. rate of expansion and growth would -be'-in each
of these sectcrs and then sit down to say " iJhat ought . re.
to do to bring t-ot about?" if you'mean that by planning,
then you can put me down as a planner. 0. 0/ 8
One final word, sir, and I think we will have to be quick.
Some of your comments in 3ritain that this country was
British to the bootheels, that we ate the Queen's men in
Australia have drawn a lot of comment. The " Observer" in
London said that you were a brilliant and eloquent advocate
of something which was dead and gone forever. I wonder if
you wouldn't agree that perhaps now Australians are
particularly feeling their isolation, geographical and
otherwise. What would you say to reassure them, those who
feel like this, that they are not right?
P. M. Well, I didn't have the advantage of reading any of these
comments, but you see, like you, I happen to be a subject,
and a very happy one, of the Queen. I am a royalist, I
am a monarchist, we all are in Australia.
Q. Do you think that some of our post-war migrants are?
P. M. Well, if they're not, I am sure their sons will be and
their daughters will be. Thatts what i mean by being
British. W e are within the allegiance, we are British,
in my case and yours, to the bootheels, and in the case
of some people perhaps, as you suggest, to their children's
bootheels. This is, to me, a tremendously important
thing. It means that we will not get into a state of
economic strife a3 hastily as wo otherwise would. It
means that we have our instincts, our allegiance and
deepest feelings in common, and if that's a dead cause,
in the eyes of the London " Observer", then i am happy to
say that the " Observer" doesn't represent my opinion or
the opinion of most people in Australia.