PRIME MINISTER.-,.-.*
P~ or MDtI MNIDAY," 6. APPIL, 1981:-
rOUIND
The Sovieto Uniou~ and -its Warsaw Pact -associates are exerting
I: pressure. on) rol'and and. hlave. adopted -a most intiinidatoxy
mmi Ii-i tary postUre*. The -clock of the Polish crisis is-ticking
co ejune., of_: the utmost, grav'ity. are not to be set in t ri.
17Thov vurtnamlean t continues. to deplore the, Soviet Union. r,-
tactics'of iimidain. At thle * same time we. rececjnisd that
-as compared withf its. behivioue4 -towarsAgaita n ale
towards Czechoslovakia# Hungary and Fast-Germany, tile Soviet*
Uni on haS up tp,, On s'h own . res trai1nt,.-I mc ke . th i S.' tatc ment row
-bCau i-iywllb ht tile Soviet Union in recent clays) a-r~
embar)}, ed onl a coure'e. which: may-puittt. h at-reitraint ia'e
Sovie restraint: has no doubt-: been the result of prudential
Government ) elieves-that those reasons of prudence have been
and continuie to be well. f oxirced. We ask tOat the1 Soviet Government,
in its. ownl interests and in the intereat-of world peace, continue.
to Ojve thiemj the fullest weight In its deliberation.
A Soviet attack-on Poland or thle instigation of massive internal
repression-. wouid poison Bast-West irelations. Detente couldl not
* be neotin atedl over the blood of the Polish people.' The political
aanndd -Secoovnioemt ics-o ccoiesttys ifso( rra yt he Sovienet Uniorne nwt. o sutldra ibne. veTrye. e fhce~ avy,
within the Warsaw-Pact region~ would be incalculable,. as the
War saw -Tyeaty -Orqani sat im was -exposed ae. not merely anl allizince'-
-against the Wcst but as one of isolated* and unppIular, government-F
-* against their: own nzations. The ncm-alicjned countries of -the world
would draw their oi'ni conclusions ribout thle danger of association
. with the Soviet Union.
Apart froma all this, an clemient of p-rOfoundC instability an) d
teinsion would b5& oreatod~ in tile cen~ tre of E~ urope,. Still the mnost
sensitive'stratecljic region Jin thle World.
On 29 March, the Toss News Agency, Mocow, said;
" Only thle Poihleaderiship,: and not Washington, Ila$ the..
right to dcterynine what measures are necessary to be tak~ en*
to solve* the internal problemis in Volan1.-In Wa sh ingtont
they should know tbat-this is doubtless a-prerogative of.
VP o1. n d a nd ofPolandl alone."
2-
what. Is being ' asked: of
that it rccfniSo' the
tile -word' 1! Moscow. I! is st
first sentence readls:
MOSCOW, -has the right -I
' to -be -taken'to ' solve' ti the Soviet Government is no miore than"-'
valldity of these. sentences if
ibst ituted for " Wa shington", and-i the
" Only the Polish-leadership,. and not!
. o determnine what measurosA are necessary
) e internal problems in Poland".
' I. * As things -are. it is the possibility of-a Oirect or disgoised
soviet . mil itary intervention, -not an American one, which.
oa~ ehse ola oilsis& to-threiaten ' th). e pe ace v.
' jhe-people: of: Voland are seekinc a peacef ul and durable'
compr-oisca aonc thmTvs ihey must be given that-elahce.
A~ ny attempt to use force to prevent moderate, responsible. ehange,-;
in a situa-tion wihere cxistinq f'arrangeenits; have pianifestly
faieidl l nt rsul:. in stability but in an ultimate ' explosion-
* involving inore than Polandl itself. -I ask -again that the-
Soviet Go. verinfent, ' which hf-s Studied the d~ ynamics of chanqce
* closely over-the years.,. ponder-the truth of this.
Ovtin attei~ r there i~ s A substantial* coincidende of-viewsD batween.
the ' major, Australlaw'' ) rt'e8 L eader.-of the Opposition7
bas spokeni vecry eOearly of theloutrage the 1Pedera. Parliamentary
Labor Party wouild feel if there. was. an armed intervention by.
th'oviet Unoand of -the -irreparable damagie to the.-
process of ' deteiAt-' which* would result.
I wiish1 to ex)) reas the PAustra3 ian' eoplO's symipathy, ' concern
and support for the people of Poland at this time ' of triil.
000-