FOR MEDIA THURSDAY, 23 AUGUST 1979
STATEMENT TO PARLIAENT ON LUSAKA CHOG. M
I sek lea. ve to report to this House on the Commonwealth
Heads of Government Mecting held in Lusaka from 1 August
to 7 August.
There can be no legitimate doubt in anyone's mind that this
was a critical conference in the history of the Commonwealth.
The way things turned out should not cause us to forget that.
Before the event responsible and reasonable people were
expressing serious concern as to whether the Commonwealth
would survive the conference. There was talk of a break-up.
This was r. ot altogether idle talk. Had the conference gone
badly, the institution would have been seriously maimed and
could have been destroyed. As it happened the conference
did not go badly, it went extremely well, and far from
breaking uo, the ComonJealth has emerged a stronger, iore
vital and ore cohesive body.
io-one who has followed events in Lusaka and certainly
no-one who was present there can doubt that the Commonwealth
is an institution which has rele vance, and a distinctive
function to perform, in the contemporary world.
It has sometimes been asserted and even oftener been implied
that this is a romantic and exaggerated view, that the
talking-shop, a dealer in myths and illusions. I believe
it is now clear that it is those who hold this view who are
the real romantics pessimistic romantics who refuse to
come to terms with a changing world and the changing forms
of influence and power.
The old Commonwealth could never have achieved what was achieved
at Lusaka. For at this conference, the Commonwealth took on
one of the most serious and sensitive issues in international
affairs today, an issue which has resiste d p ongd efforts
made by major powers, acting alone, to find a solution.
In a matter of days, real and substantial progress was made.
It seems perverse, therefore, to persist in the defeatist and
negative view that thit ins itution does not have the potential
continuing valble annd constructive role in world affairs.
of influence and power.
for a continuing valuable and~ constructive role in world a~: airs.
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The issue I refer to is, of course, the future of Zimbrabwe.
As anticipated, this issue was inevitably the central
preoccupation of the conference. It was approached with a
minimum of polemics, and with a detecrmination to find a
fair settlement acceptable to all parties.
In my response to President Kaunda's opening speech on the
first day I appealed, as I have done on previous occasions,
for a spirt of principled moderation and compromise which
would make it possible to bridge different positions.
In the event that spirit turned out to be the distinguishing mark
of the conference. It was the spirit of Lusaka.
That it was so was due, in particular, to the attitude
of three of the participants: our host President Kaunda;
President Nyerere of Tanzania; and the British Prime Minister,
Mrs. Thatcher.
I would like to take this opportunity to express my personal
admiration for the courage and vision of these three leaders.
In a situation where there were pressures on each to be
intransigent, to ask others to yield while remaining inflexible
themselves, all three rejected that path and chose the one
leading to genuine accommodation. It is greatly to their
credit and represented statesmanship of a high order.
The ritish Prime Minister, for her part, reaffirmed the
unqualified co'-mitment of her Government to the goal of genuine
black majority rule in Rhodesia. Much more importantly,
in her speech of 3 August, she recognised the validity of
the criticisms, made of the present constitution, of the
blcking power s enjoyed by the white minority, and of the
power vested in the various Service Commissions, which
together make it impossible for the Government of Bishop Muzorewa
to have adequate control over the country's affairs.
So long as these criticisms could be made. of the Constitution
one could not assert that genuine black majority rule exists
in Rhodesia. Such powers, which have not been included in
any constitution resulting from a legal transference of power
by Britain, deny Government powers which are fundamental to
a democracy or indeed to any responsible Government.
A Government which cannot control appointments in key areas,
or the activities of its armed forces, is not master of
its own house.
Mrs. Thatcher also accepted the responsibility of the British
Government to bring the country to legal independence on
a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community
as a whole will find acceptable. She undertook to present
proposals as quickly as possible to all the parties.
The leaders of the front line states show. ed an equally
admirable willingness to approach the issue constructively.
In his speech on the Zimbabwe debate, President Nyerere
recognised that an advance had been made in recent months. / 3
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while rejectinc~ the vanlidity of CXLtlr ons t. itiolnal
Lramowt hich allL white minrjr it-, to con'tr ol the
levers of powder, hie acccoted tolat a 6~ e,' o~ rdL. tui
was riot inconnpatible with special provisionz for the w'il-tc
minority in the form of reserved " cLseverou of
proportion to the numbc) rs involved". eO recocgnised t~ hat
a ceasc-fire a precondition for free and Cair eluctions.
Beyond -this, President Kaunda and President Nv" erere, showe.-d
a re--traiit and patience, and3 a confiCdence in the
British which were an cstilelement in creacing
the trust neceSsary for aurement and prcgress. They were not
in th-e bu_-sz" ness of conf] rontat ion and ooint-scoring.
Let m2 sa-y. son. ething about the nart A,, ust-ralia played in the
ne,-oaiation' of" t-he Zim,: babw,. e iSsue. in therz periJoQ leadinig up
to the conference anC dur-inu it, we hadc extensive contacts
both direct-ly and by letter wi4th the principal parties.
S'hort ly bef-o re the cor-Pez-ence I had talks w-. ith 1,11s. Thatcher
here in Cbraand in-z,-edi ate1y be-fo-re going to Lusaka I
visited N-ige-ri-a-a key African state to talk with
General-Ob-asanjo, the leaderl of': the eealmilitary government.
The FCorei. n %' in4 ster had separate talk s %-with the British
an, rsentatives of the -duzorel., a Government and
suseuen>.' ithleaders of' the Tanzanian and Kenyan
Dur i.-g Ccn-erence of course, we had extensive discussions
vit-l all thne narties iresent the;-Patriotic Front.
In all these talk' s we exoressed' the view,. that,, whatever else,
the Arlelections had b'roken a Jlog-j ar and created conditions
for ri-oveii. nt. 7,1e maintained that further consti tutional
chances in the direction of greater A-fricanisation were
essential.
Wie emphasised that a precondition for a successful,
settlement w,, as that it should b) e acceptable to a significantLl
number of African states. IWVe stressed the need to bring
the wvar to an end.
The invitation to give the first response to President Kauna's
opening ad" dress gave me teopportLunity to put Australia's
vie-is to the conference very early. I stressed the neod to
bear in mind the positive elements of agreement which existed
among those present, the fact that we essentially agreed on
ends and differed only on means.
I stressed also that recent events had created an opportunity
for advance by introdlucing a new element of flexibility and
movement. And, as I have said, I made as strong a plea as
I could'for moderation and comoroinise.
During the weekend of 4-5 Auciust, and following the openln;
of the debate on the Rhodesia issue on Friday, 3 Augus: t,
a small consulting group of si> X Headcs of Governrment was set
up to try to reach an agreeme-n. ./ 4
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Australia was a member of that group. The group reached
agreement and drew. up a coTmmunilcue on Southern Africa, which
was subsequently accepted by other H-eads of Government.'
The communique made nine points: The Heads of Government
-confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine
black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe;
-recognised, in this context, that the internal
settlement constitution is defective in certain important
aspects; fullyaccepted that it is the Constitutional responsibility
of the British Government to grant legal independence to
Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;
recognised that the search for a lasting settlement must
involve all parties to the conflict;
were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such
a settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe
and their neighbours;
acceped that independence on the basis of majority
rule recuires the adoption of a democratic constitution
including appropriate safeguards for minorities;
-ackn7owledged that the government formed under such
inSadne oendence constitution must be chosen through
free and fair elections, properly supervised under
British Government authority, and with Commonwealth
observers; welcomed the British Government's indication that an
appropriate procedure for advancing towards these
objectives would be for them to call a Constitutional
conference to which all parties would be invited; and
-consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective
to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and an end
to sanction,; as part of the process of implerent-: i. on
of a lasting settlement.
These nine points do not amount to a settlement of the Zimbabwe
situation. Neither the Muzoreua government nor the Patriotic
Front ZANU and ZAPU were parties to the discussion, and a
settlement will require their agreement.
Much hard work and delicate negotiating remains to be done.
But the significance of what has been achieved is enormous.
To appreciate this it is necessary to contemplate what the
position would ncr. be, had there been a failure tp reach
agreement. Both Southern Africa and the Commonwealth would be
facing bleak prospects. The momentum for change would have
been lost.
As it is, a very formidable and-diverse body of opinion has
been mobilised and unified, in favour of a particular process
of settlement. Given its nature, that body of opinion will.
require a serious response both from Salisbury and from the
Patriotic Front.
Before the con-furence, the-opJinliozi pre-_ vai lod in each of thc-se
cencres that time wsoilTei side, -LThaL tl-ecy could afforcl
to wa-iti and to resist IIth iew ,-ill 1De Kf F -c Ul t : f or them~
to inaintai. n that view now... It is verO)' erat ht for the
f ir st t ime i n P.,; 1nNY ye ar s thIie ii itiLa. t iv e hIi b c2e. n 5; eed b y th
forces of mdrto and -, caceful set'tlement arnd that-has buecn
done withlin the -frameworlk of the C mowatthat often
derided' Ir-stiti. tionr which continues Lo confoundA its critics
by pr'pirg its f nle1vance.
The si etrce that is onv\ isaged can bring p aacn r
a1 : ia to take t plar'. i n the commu, n it, of nations.
It ale.: o-nine cma,, jority rule, for a return Lo lec. g ality
for o" zettchnea x-: hi) te r,,, nori-' y, and' -or the ending of
wa r a. S: ntions. If achieved6, it will be acceptuble to
leadi. A" 4r icar: states, it will r=-move a fLester-ing sore w-. hich
has t) j _-eat--en e in fcc Southern' Pfri ca it-h both the poison
of ra ial w. 1ar a-cd great pow,, er conf lict.
Therelis nc cuarantee thla these things aill happen, that the
proces. s w,-ill s~ ce. Bu U T eli that the-re are reasonable
prospecas a: o: r-cess. I bz. lieve_ th,-is for t-iwo reasons, first
bDecau'Se thne z~ sOf seteetit envisages arc-essentially
right in thmevsIn that th~ y afc bas. e-d on the principles
that, thLerI. o imbab11We all the. people have therih
to chooe \ nc shell1-govern them'~, and that the olovernxmerit so
elected3 shul-ave reail controloe the aff--L: airs of the countr1
Seco-c--I beie -the chnc es o7 success are good because
such astlmr is in Terati-ns1 self: interest of_ the partizes
c on c c I s thne o nI . a y i n w,: h ic h th suff--e r ing-a nd0
blood shed end~ ured! by the people of Zimbab%. e can be ended.
If the settle-en does i-ot succec'u, the prospect is for an
intensification of: the -war,' a cgrea ter resort to Communist
arms, and greater turmoul,. for th hole of Southern Africa.
As far as the -whit-e ccounity of: tChat country is cond erned,
it can hope for-a stable and peace-ful e> istecnce, only as part
of a m t-rca aeuns o c iec. Conti_ 4nu_, inc! warfJare will
lead its ndaous. -i! gato Tihe PaL-iotic 1? roiit
can hope to " articipate in the governing of the country
on the bhasis of such asete n.
The Front-line states have an interest in ending the state of
war which fEorces them to accept sacrifices and threatens to
involve them directly in other-peon) le's conflicts. Britain
has an in-terest in ending a situation -which has perhaps caused
it more international embarrassmient than any other over the
last decade.
The international community at large can only benefrit fmoml
removing a potential source of confLlagration and great power
rivalry. Australia, as a member of the in-: ernational
community shares this concern for peace and stability in
Southern Africa, and, as a member -ofL the Ccommc-onealth, vwe
have a conce-rn with preserving its intecriy, and -with the
Commonwealth proving itself as a constructive and relevant
institution. G
T1he LusakLa confcrc-. nc. e has set a pi-occ,: ss in train. Vch a cJ~~
international body could ha'., e achieved this? It is Our'Sr~~
hope that thc i-rocro'o is conbL. Irnucd to a successfu" Ll cn~ i
If th-e Rhodesia issue occupiedC the centre of the stage Lt..
conference, it certainly did no-t monopolise attention. A Co:.
deal else was done besides, and for the information ofAnonourabl
e I table the final co-mmu-nique.
Ons. of7 t*-e aor initiatives w%-as in the econom-, ic field, whr
Al: zzrzalia 3--=-osed a omonethgroup of e. perts to iiralle a
c c, -: DrC 2e ns study of factors restraining growth. We put
tih: nrcposal owrdin t-he cntext ofL th1 hitoi cLn
that h-ev 0nolded the world's e-conomily ove-r the past few,, 6ecaclos.
In the qua ftcr-1 cen tury a fte r the Secona Wor ld 1-ar). the world'
e>: perieiaced-a period of unprecedeonted econo-Mic growth. The
GDre~ art~~ 10o rloe ytewr ad created a huge
pent-cUo dem-and for consume-. r ODS. That, together w ith i) c
!-k--rsh--ll -Plan, the widesure~ ad adoption of Keynesian policies
and the raziD'C int4-1-0 juI-io of new technology, led to a
sustai-ned usvrg in economic ai-. owth ar& i real income in thc-
Oevelc-. ing countries as w,. ell1 as in the industrialised world.
In thCz-e z the mnaterial conditions of the mass of pol
in Wet-oieiswstransformed. utthe very success:.
of that Pr1ocess me.-ant that by,, the mid-196% ' s concdlitions wr
enn~ a ngadby the ear-. ly 1970 ' s the consumj-er boom was cl(-Ear~ y
.1c cown.
At thn e sam: Te -time, there emerged increasin~ g impediments to
enterpri se and investment. Higch inflation was becoming beilt
into0 the major e-conomies; uthrmoves to protection were
bu-greater restraints to trade. Governmeonts condi-tioned
to belevinq that Keynesian rolicieOs were the answer to all
problems Stubbornly continued to pursue-those policies, e~ ispite
the ons! Et of in-flation, encourag7ed by electorates increasi-ngly
accustomec to believing that governments could provide for) i all
needs.
The extraordinary grow., th of the period came to be taken for
granted. Increasingly, unrealistic demands were made on I
economies, particularly by -tradie union movements which calme to
exercise unprecedentecd power, and it became fashionable to
decry growth and to place impediments in its path.
An increasingly formiaabJle system-i of statutory road blocks
wer -plceidn the way of developmn-n ivsment. Very
demanding environmental laws, harsh trade practicecs legislation,
prices justification regulations, and thedeelpmntan
investment policies pursued by many countries have actecd as
impediments to economic growth. Mlany investmfient opportunities
which had been highly attractive twenty years ago now beca-, e
uneconomic. The result of all t-his is that in. recant years the growvth in
world trade has fallen to half of wha-t it Was in previo-us
decades, from eight percent to four pecn. A further con, Z.
to growth is slow rates of do'iclop-mcnt iJr a numnber of e'lcin
countries.
Australia' s exporien-Coe\ J the, n'uwlv InIdC ~ 1LI S i-. inc ciaY
hac: i; shown us th,. t. as Sloon as Lhey L-o._ 1X1f: eCono110i. cal 1, tr (: Cr
both ways gr v:\ er% rapid ly Dur;' 197h 0 howecr
it a. s d o f a c thechlne anc; o P!) or tu I of grca Lur t~
with ne%, ly inutil. sn countries Many, ma-or dvc e u ions:
beccuno fe,-arfuil anmd turned to qrcaLer protectionism..
We ~ ee~ av~ e~ of this i~ n the $ 25 billion , ipent by Iesteril
an& 4s~~ Oio tni. c reon. wage anci cxpDa rt Sulba-idies the use of
voi:~ c;' retr. tagIThsents Dndt the conorla: o of
: s ard sS Tj~ j 5 is no'. onl1yj, s el1fish and wri. ong,
t lCol_ ih 6n sh o rt si g ht-ed eonmo Jics fo-0r the growth-j of
rkltinea oi econtr coul' well. be oneI of the keCys
to rL i c rate of n po\:: n beinng e-_ xpr lenced by
We r!) iva nations in the last q: re ofc the Lwenticeth
It 1 la-tocat the conditions whc cncrated and! f ue-lled tWl
grea c'rcw=,-th in th'ie last cqua-rter ce~ ntury have n o. 1ircl
disc oe rcent assessm-z-, ents by interna-tional orcganisza.! iors
for fl-h c terin outlook are -For acontinuation of sJlo! -rowth
or eve a-'-hrdterioration ijn growth prospocLs.
At 7 : c ofe Goe-rnt -! ocn-' sed a continuation of
slo-w. c~ rc'c t1 n the global econoi-iy% wo-uld. fu_, rther damage tht~ E:
pros-p-0; cs c-7 increasing livinrg standards in bo-th developed. and
d e loe) In 7 counmtries, and could have a Q v7erse effects i~ n their
Po_ a s; cial structur-es.
Theya~ z th-at there oudbe cons iderableI advant-ace in a
oa-.,-idrnotCmrowat exp-2rts that ~ focusses on thez
constra-nt's to ecnmcgr-owth andl structural change. in develope,), id
arid developingi nat'iOns, and ideontifisr. iicmaue
necessary to reduce these -cons traintS.
The grou-_ p is to report in time to assist Corunoniwealt-gcovTernrnc,,., ts
in their preparation for the specizl session of the' U. N. Generjal
Assembly in 1930, and the Govern-ment. has indicated to the
CcOlCo . s u is txerobieio ava-ilab) le to serve on the group.
I believe that Australia h as already set an exarrn. lE! in some areas
of the way thiat constraints on growth can be broken down. 1* Wheca ve
reac* ec inflation, and w-, e -, ill maintain our strong antk-i--in1fla : ionary
policy. We have increasedl company prof itability, imp-i. oved.
Australia's co: r,--titive position, andi strengjtheneid the dollar.
Under our foreicjn investmeont policy admrinis-tered by the Foreig.-n
Investment ReCview Board, last ye/ ar's priva-te foreign investmerib'L
was the highest sinice 1971-72, andl in the June quarter, $ 1.4 billion
prospcctive exponditure was approved.
All these help to redluce itho impediments to o-ur natoa deeopet
but there are miny other barric-rs to grow,, th withinl the global
omy I hope that the reporr il addresq itself to these
cons Lraintsf and recoa-j-end practical policios that can be pursu; a* c
in order to promote grokw. th of the -jorld economy.
. rhe, discussion of the Aus tralineoi inii c i-ve an
imiadc i l~: Heads of Lr-lsejtha toero~~ in crL'r i c
aLahnned-o-thpberoorlbd. lienmesiss , wea ndf aca e, ilinc.: L11o0 0 ia. Eus iloisnt eonf -racnad. liJusr:,-, iLms a ti a tnl. c
The eyes of the w,-orld were on the Cor:,, i cncalt h a t Lu s Eaka.
Tt facC, hjj-c~ tCst. It plassed' thaL tc'st a-' d in doin-so
prov---m-that it-ha; s the capaciL~ y to makec a Fma-jorcoribio
in intrntin-=-affairs throuch',-the res-t ofti cetir'
Onc c-the rslsof -hthLppun. sdain'a is that -the
me be s of h Cc:-m coTnw.; ea11thI illJ. 1 sh1a rec a nc-cor i-J. de, 2ric e a -IC~
as su-r anc,--I wh-i we ca-7n CoII,--vel a ciee, adC 1 amsr
that k'-.: Stre1a-ans will warm-welcom the fact. th~ at the ncet
Conr~:~ cthiledsof Government conference waill be held in
thlis cou--ntry. o 0 1)