FOR PRESS 24 MAY 1977
GOVERNMENT POLICY ON NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS
The future course of world nuclear developnent and the regime
of international controls which should apply to such development
are currently subjects of great international interest. In the
past few w eeks for example, there has been an important statement
by-President Carter on nuclear energy in which he emphasised
the need to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons or explosive
capabilities without foregoing the tangible benefits of nuclear
power. Again, at their recent Su1mmit meeting, the H-eads of
Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,
West; Germany, France, Japan and Italy committed themselves
to increasing nuclear energy to help meet the world's energy
requirements while reducing the -risks of nuclear proliferation*.
They launched an urgent study'to determine how best to fulifil these
objectives. At the conclusion of the recent Salzburg Conference,
the most important international conference held in recent years
on all aspects of nuclear power, the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency referred to the agreement
of the meeting that nuclear power was a necessary and irreplaceable
source of the future energy supply to mankind for both the short
and the longer term.
It is clear th at there is widespread international concern to
establish a framework of control within which the benefits
which many countries see in the peaceful use of
nuclear energy can be safely realised. These are issues of
major inteornational importance i n their own right, but they / 2
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have an added significance for Australia because of our
potential as a supplier of uranium. They are issues on
which I have already written to President Carter and Prime
Minister Trudeau and on which the Deputy Prime Minister
and Australian officials have held detailed consultations
with the United States, Canada and other countries. They
are issues which have been under the closest and most
careful consideration from the moment -the Government took
office. In the present period of international reappraisal
of these issues the Government is determined that Australia
should play an active role with other countries in the
search for, and achievement of, joint solutions.
A proliferation of nuclear faL'ilities without adequate
protection against diversion of material to nuclear weapons
production or nuclear explosives would pose serious threats
to international stability and peace, obviously inimical to
Australia's interests and to global and regional security.
It was for this reason that in his address to the United
Nations General Assembly last September, the Foreign Minister
described the strengthening of measures to prevent
proliferation of nuclear weapons as a central and fundamental
area in which Australia looks and hopes for early progress.
This will remain the case whether or not Australia is
ultimately to become a major exporter of uranium. The
safeguards policy which we will follow is, in our view,
appropriate for any country to follow whether it be a uranium
supplier or consumer. I make clear from the outset that the
term safeguards is used here to denote the whole range of
measures used to provide assurance that nuclear material supplied
for peaceful purposes is not mis-used for non-peaceful or
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explosive purposes.
the Government fully accepts that if it were in
future to permit new uranium expqrt from Australia, this
would carry with it added responsibilities. Against the
background of these international responsibilities the
Government accepts that uranium is a special commodity,
the export of which would involve important considerations
of a kind not involved in the export of other commodities.
This implies a requirement for selectivity in the choice
of customer countries and the closest attention to ensuring
adequate safeguards. It is not the Government' s view that
safeguards should be regarded as something to be balanced
against commercial considerations. We view adequate
safeguards as a fundamental pre-requisite of any uranium
export which we would also expect responsible customer
countries for Australian uranium readily to accept.
It will be recalled that, following the release of
the First Report of the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry,
the Government announced in the House on 11 November 1976
that it supported the Inquiry'Is view on the need f or the
fullest and most effective safeguards on uranium exports.
The Government also stated that it was carrying forward
more detailed consideration of safeguards in order to
further develop a national policy on this subject.
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The announcement of a policy at this stage, of
course, in no way preempts a decision on the question whether
any such new contracts for the export of uranium will be
permitted. As the Government has repeatedly emphasised, this
remains a matter for consideration following receipt of the
final report of the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry.
However, as the Foreign Minister said in the Government's
foreign policy statement in the Parliament on 15 March 1977 the
Government would be remiss if it did not address itself to
safeguards questions in the meantime. That the Government has
taken certain decisions on safeguards policy at this stage
reflects its determination to ensure that an established framework
of policy exists so that any new uranium exports take place
under the most carefully considered and responsible conditions
possible. The Government wishes to avoid a situation in which
decisions may be required on new uranium marketing at some poInt
in the future without the benefit of a clear policy on the ground
rules to apply so far as safeguards are concerned.
The Government has long recognised the desirability
of defining a comprehensive policy on safeguards. It would
not be desirable for safeguards requirements to be left to ad
hoc decision as this would not afford the strong and clear
support for international efforts to strengthen controls against
nuclear weapons proliferation to which the Government attaches
major importance. Australia is a potentially significant
supplier of uranium, but if we are to play the part which this
potential gives us the opportunity to play of contributing
effectively to international efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation
regime, it is desirable that uranium importing
countries and other nuclear supplier countries alike know
where Australia stands on the matter of safeguards.
the r~ safe,. guar-12 are sys~ tems cof
nuclear-material. 0 an'-facilities de6igned to verify that.
di. ver.;. cn d-O'ES oo . ake plac-e from pea~ ceful to ncn-peacefijI
or exp~ 1;--Le p~ o~~ The majcr SyStEMS; Of inLz: rnaticna1.
safeg-oarols a-E. . adrini-Ler( e. d by thez international Atomic
Energy Agency. Ir. a bioader : sense, S~ afeguards fo.-r future
Australian Urani.; um exports ; kould comprise, a~ s wellI as the
appli.-c--ti;. ir,. ter-ati., E:. al. safeg-oard2 4 this strict sense,
the 5-aecAririg from impor-t2-ng oc(' i. tries cfadequate assjr-ances,
regardi-hg t-lew--se nAc*--trol of . upplied ruclear material
and the ccer-: 1ulico,-r of bind. ing arran gemenc3 to give effect tosuch
asaceI-n ' beth ser. es -as mpechanisms for verification
and as aactc-r. 6j ofldzti. 0m1n3 fo r rnuc: lear eaxports safeguards
arranerrent:; arc-EV-01N. Ing ~ t: t~ continually being
strenz sher~ ed,'~ f e ac-, d imp-c-v-.
A~ nLthis ~ cg'" i I wouald li. ke to anrnounce the
following specifi-c , Eietthsoe comprehensive safegiaards
polic-. y ~ hcitj' G r. me f s adopted. Th-e~ e cover:
the ureeri keEp poli;-Lde review;
C carefA: 1 s : eeic. n cf ' lgbeC'Ustfoomr e-Ursra nium;
. p ~ Wie fh eft-' ec. Ltive lnattrnat. I. onal Atomic
Energy Agency saleguardTh!;
o bilete-ral agreeme-nrs with custotmer countries;
fallback ;;, afeguards;
prinr Aij. ralian: Guvernmerit consent in relation to
re-expir--t:, enrichment reprccessing;
physl. cal sc. urity;
0 safeguards prcovi ioins In ccrntracts; E.. nd
knternational and m,,. ILilat-eral efforts to strengthen
saf fguard s.
-First, it will be a basic feature of our approach to
recognise that the process of strengthening and improving
international safeguards arrangements is an ongoing one. Our
policy and safeguards arrangements must be kept closely under
review to take account of the future evolution of international
thinking on safeguards. In this regard the Government is
pleased that, as recently announced, Mr. Justice Fox has agreed
to become an adviser to me on policy matters relating to nuclear
non-proliferation and safeguards.
Second, should the Government approve further development
of the Australian uranium industry it will retain the
right to be selective in the countries to whom uranium export
will be permitted. The following minimum criteria for eligibility
to receive Australian uranium will apply. The Government
emphasises that these represent minimum conditions for countries
to be eligible to receive Australian uranium. The Government
makes clear that wider foreign policy considerations may also*
be taken into account, ' and that it reserves the right to
refrain from permitting export should this be appropriate in. the
light of such considerations. It does not, therefore, follow
that the Government would necessarily permit export to a
country meeting these minimum safeguards criteria.
In the case of non-nuclear weapon states that -is
to say all countries other than the five existing nuclear
weapons powers recognised by the Non-Proliferation Treaty sales
will be made only to countries which are parties to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
Because of these countries' safeguards obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty this policy will ensure that
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the entire civil nuclear industry in such customer countries
is subject to effective safeguards to verify that nuclear
material, whether of Australian or any other origin, is not
diverted from peaceful uses. The Government is aware that
work has recently been underway within the International
Atomic Energy Agency on a new system of equally stringent
safeguards to cover the entire nuclear industry in non-.
nuclear weapon states which are not parties to-the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. It will be following progress on this
matter and the implications which it may have for our policy.
Regarding existing nuclear weapon states, they
are not obliged under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to
renounce nuclear weapons or accept international safeguards.
They retain the right to use nuclear material for weapons
as well as peaceful purposes. Even so, Australia would
want to have assurance that nuclear material we may supply
for peaceful purposes is not diverted to military or
explosive purposes. We will therefore export only to nuclear
weapon states which give Australia this assurance and accept
that the uranium we supply be covered by International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards. In this respect the Government's
policy introduces a requirement additional to those
recommended by the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry in
its First Report. / 8
8-
G iomr.~ ensure that if a
deci ! icn ist-k2t*:--Lr ' i1*.-' IPLi. m export, Ifeli ce
will be. fovered by Inter!' at-icrnal At..-; ric Enoergy Agency safegLards
fro-m the.-time, it. lea-ve3 AM. st. ralian ownErship. Aci
matter: 3 stand, wh. ile safeguardD applied' urder the Non-
Pro li~ fert Treaty require ncotificator. of transfers of
yellcwcake, the full irt~ nsiity-of such safegGards -only commence,,
to apply latEr in the ftlel cycle. Accordingly, it w. Ill be
the Gormrtspolicy Chat any f-LL. re s2alEs3 ar. ngements
for cixprts A A straJ Lar_ jrariLLum Tcidbe :? uch that. the
uranium~ wil 1. in~ a D-ip. v+ hi 2h attr-at.-s full Inlrtzrnratio ral
Atomi. L Energy Agency si~ aEguarcds by tte Lime it leaves
Australian cuwersh. F'y~~ h~ Autt. r'Ui. st will rc-qUre the prior conclusion
of b : Iaera1lATr bet-w( r. Llrme Ati:, tralian Government arnd
ccuntri c s wsI tcJmp.-. rL Aus r. il1an urarlum unciLer any futr._ e
contra, ts. These bilateral. agreeme-t~ nt will pro.-. vide a framewo--k
for dir--ect and bIr~ d7. ng a~ r: esby importing countries to
the Au_-trallnn 7e2: mL-ift Lfi reLati. D-to the e an~ d Control
of uraxiL-_ m. sulppl-ied by Ac. i. ralia o~ r n~ l&' m-. erial derived
frcmit3' I~ e Th f~~ mer. La u~ err. akin~ gs the Governmert wll
wish tc it-tair-Eromurm tpt~ gco-, ntries in such bilateral
agreements are OIL rir: J~ lear nute-r-al 3upplled by -Austra. ia for
peaceful pirpcises -r nwiclear material derived frcm its. uSc will
not be diverted Lo militar-y or exploI. sive piirposes arid that'
Internat-iomal3 At-ori: Energy Agenc,: y safeguardsc will apply to
verify compliace~ with this im,. dertaking. Au3tralia would
seek to arra~ qze w. h iurimpoxtirng co-antries regular
expert-level cor. ultat-: onc_-LC, Fatisf~ y ourselves of thes:: 6000/ 9
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implementation of the provisions of bilaterial agreements. In
line with the positions taken by the United States and Canada
Australia would retain the right to. cease supply of uranium to
any country which breached safeguards undertakings.
Fifth, the Government takes the view that nuclear
material supplied by Australia or nuclear material derived from
its use should remain under safeguards for the full life of
the material in question or until it is legitmately removed
from safeguards. In line with this basic principle the Government has
decided that bilateral agreements with non-nuclear weapon states
should make provision for so-called fallback safeguards. I have
already made clear that Australia would not be prepared to export
uranium to such countries in the absence of International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards applied under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. However, the question arises of ensuring the continued
safeguarding of material already present in an importing country
should safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty at some
stage cease to apply in that country. There should be provision
under the bilateral agreements for the continued application of
international safeguards in such circumstances. Further, the
bilateral agreements should provide for Australia to make
alternative arrangements for the safeguarding of nuclear material
supplied by us in the event of international safeguards as such
ceasing to operate.
Moreover, the Government feels it is reasonable to ask
importing countries who will already accept International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards of comprehensive scope under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, to accept that, at the first fallback level
also, international safeguards should apply to all nuclear material,
not just that portion supplied by Australia.
Sixth9 t' -:: Gy-ernnE. n.*-c& on-: ider that it wc-uld he
an ur1, saLi~ fa,-t.') ry s1A. t-: ation ftr 1 : ppl ty Ausiria1La
to one ~ cr o r-. ciiear material de-ved from it-: us-: e, E~
be able to be x -' t-Kcrttd a third '. lUrLtl'y without the
opportunity ft-, r Autralia to satisfy itself that adequate
coctrCls w(' t, 1d apply ti-e Ltansfetred ma'e-rial arid thit.
the na3 i&-21i. t~ ni acceptable to us For this
rei. zor' tbc Gu:. irrtment L as dECideA that. bilateral agreemrnLS
wiihu~ rrm.~ prnc rcin * cxmtn Jiobcld wakKeC y trans3fer-of
suppli ed mater Lal. to a. third p. arty cortinge;-nt co. the prior
coni3er~ t f the Au-. itra'liax G' vwrnmnlEt This jTVlsion will
give Aulstratia. the ec-qs-i ng that our safeguards
rc-qui:-mert-. a e rre.. .* vr t-r~ n,--ffer. c-f the
uranium we : ri or :~: ermater Lal dcri-ied frc-m it.
wcr, Ald e that Australian uranium
supplied to cth, r c'stc: r. r pe.-cref. Ll us~ es ner. t be enrjched
bey-.-nd 20% iu> 3 u-i. hm) ut, P-rx rr A~~ aPr 0 Th ic
provisic. n I~ n iir..! A the adrpted b~ y other ruc1ear
supplier TI-e fig-i! r ef. 20% . e-n chosen as
reptE* Et2 a . g enl-tcr. 1-hrrentL belzow the praz ticai
rLeqL,. ir( I. rrfln-, ! or at i.. lear -xpl.? ive, while being above the
er~ rizrn1n -2-el req' 3ired for most peaceful uss, excepting,
for example, somE rcearch an-d radic-Lsotope producztion
reacto-) rz-, for hi. h. prL. 9 to En----zh to the ne.: essary
level -w-ould reeCl r~ co be rbtained. In res; pect of this requirement
alsq, th -pos. ext;--ds beyc.. nd-the
recommendatica:-jz maje by th) e Rarge. r Ur-anium Enrxironner. tal
Inquiry i-r it. E-F-Lrst Raport,
11
__~ jjh the Gov. errmeit is aware of the iThterest of
some co-antr-^ E3 1. i ter-p:.-rg'fpel. rw1. 2 to
meet their anticipated future fuel requirEments, and to
facilitate the ma. nagement of r. uclea-r material Eollrwirg its
u!, e inI ;. uclear reactor!,, At. thE present time the need for
rEprccessing and the cLtils cf an effective cont'rol regime
for this area o7f t. hE 2cla fuel cycle are the subject cf
close sturdy internationally. This is an area in which there
a-re E. nujmb-er-new ide&. and irnitlatives0 The Un~ ited States
has propo~ sed an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
Prograim to( 7' sc, varic~ us; rujclea-r fuel cycle,. in terms of
thei~ r iMpliC., 5. ti_._ IrfLS f& r prc'liferaLl., n co:. trol. There are also
such ideas as vari, us" schee for mjltinatimnal. control cf
reprocessing fac:. I'lities and for the management of spent fuel.
and plutoium., Th. e Governmi nt " E. ccme,,: these s'tudies and
COT-' ltainc. a-. c1 will. ik ttoo c'or-ribute actively and
cons truct. ve ly t5 relevant aspect(_-n of them such ae f-uel
supply srce andA waio. ta management.
The Ccmt. sview is thl-at,, prior to a clearer
routcome eme-1gL2. g from K.' is za_ rent irtternatio-nal activity9
it would be p~~~~ fcr Ai~ stral2ia to Adopt a unilateral
position on ths detailed Lni-d. iteor~ ~ w hich we might be
prepared to agreetct reproceC3Esing, it anyv of nuclear material
suppii-ed by Australia. Ia order Lo effectively reserve
Australia's p( wsl-* ti. n on '-his mattrer -Eor the time being we would
wish to make prov2Kio,,. In bilateral agreemzn. nts with countries
importing Australian bran.: umn that any reprocezsing of nuclear
material 5-pplied by, Australi. a may z.-ilv take plaze-c with the
prior consent of the Australian Gov,; ernment0 This requirement
is add it~ imal 01h) e -reommEn~ ied by the R nger Uranium
o. o./ 12
12
Env~ Qm~~. 1 rqiiv F2. r'. t Rcpo-rt and1 reflIect-s
sim~ rlar e' t xp c. yih . qf\ñ l
relation to reproce:. iriz0
Nin~ th, tha Gc--etrnent would reqiuire ill ftur. e bilatexal
agrecments t-eaise fr; mn -Lr-ci'L., fl IMp) crulg countriEs th-at;
adeq-Oate hrIl s-curi-* ty W4 Jl 1. e riabntaived c--n their n-,.. clear
industries. In addit-Ln, wiF believE, tire agreerrents should
specify ccmp1.-~ ine with E-tar-t-ards of phyDLoal seCU. City ') aced,
at a minim-fJ, P T ~ i Inte-rational At; mi-' t,-Eriergy Agen,-zy rocmmendatio-
ris as Pre -tent-l dt3. f1irn U arJ -s pdatell from time t. o tim-re0
They sh,. uld : A. sc, mdke pc' fr ; r rxpert levc-1. : nitat icn
as necessa-iy p1.! 7?-ical1 L. se-: urity artrangement&'. These requ-irements
also t.-5an slate Thto cn rete polj.-y measuices concerns
expresS EAd hy the Ranger Uranilum Environmental1 Inquiry.
The in pir-t~' f r. hL: E pcvE o. in th e Gove-r--
ment' s safeguaids pclicy. re,. E! Ects ,, ux corice-rn that total rnuc*; Ea~ r
control shuild en~ ompa; s~ not jus3t oafeguards to ,-erLfy that
nuclea', material is nct ilzlydiverted from peaceful uce'r
by nat.-;.: nalGern..; m: rti. l uhriizb also; to
prote-cct rrr, n---t. EL E: al fr~: m illegsal u-2e by groups5 rr
individual s.
TF~ nth, the . abi~ rei of effective arrangements
f or safegu3rd-i e: rtial a matte--for Governmentsc an-d
for inter-Gcveir.. merital agr~ eent:, either bilateral or multLilar-eral.
Neverthele.! r 9 it is imp: r-tant to ern7-ure that the actual parties
to c:-mmerz,-al coAnrraz: t. F, whiich may be private erg ani satins
are also awari the : fg: rsohligat. ionr. to which their
transaction is subject, For thi.; -rea3on., alth:-ugh the Ranger
Uranium Envirl-me-nta1 1. nqairy tAin First Report did nri(; t m-3ke
a 0/ 1
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a recommendation on this matter, the Government has decided
that it is desirable that, as a standard practice, a clause
should be included in any future contracts for the export of
uranium from Australia noting that the transaction is subject
to safeguards as agreed betweenthe importing country and the
Australian Government.
Finally, as an important complement to the measures
I have outlined so far, the Government recognises the importance
of Australia contributing to constructive multilateral efforts
to strengthen safeguards. There is a need for what President
Carter has described as systematic and thorough consultations
in this area. We too consider that it is highly desirable
that there should be the widest possible consensus amongst both
nuclear supplier countries and nuclear importing countries on
the controls to apply to the world nuclear-industry. The
wider the consensus, the more effective these controls will be
as a barrier to nuclear proliferation. The more uniform the
views of the countries concerned, the easier it will be to
implement a properly effective regime of controls. It will be
an integral part of Australia's approach to safeguards to seek
to promote such a consensus.
In particular, we will seek to co-ordinate policy on
safeguards with other like-minded countries. As I noted at
the outset, I have already initiated an exchange of
correspondence with the President of the United States and
the Prime Minister of Canada expressing this wish, and extremely
valuable consultations have already taken place. The policy
I am now announcing incorporates the Government's consideration
of these consultations and represents a very similar approach to
safeguards to that adopted by the United States and Canada. More
generally, nuclear supplier countries have a special role
and responsibility in the ongoing development of safeguards / 14
14
and ACL.-: ali'a wLlI be ppzedto paf LI-Cpate with them i~ n
We will alcsr: conttirut-actach irnajr importance to
the e-' Fec-tiv,. e applicaticn of safegu~ ards by the International
AtcoIx'c Energy Agency, Via v. 11 S t , L. gate if t~ here are
specific. a-lreas in which Au; trali. cculd usefully assist the
Agency's ca~ pacity to apply -Increacingly effez-tive safeguards.
At. the prEeert ti-m the Guvert.-mernt sees a mlt-ilateral
apprac. h t oward-13 safegua-rd. s qu-estionis being espeacially
desirable fn one spE! cific area as well the Interrational N,-: clear
Fuel. Cycle Evaluation Program already menationEd; we would
wish to lend suipport to the development. of an international
convention on 01-e physical protection of nuclear material in
interrational transit. Als. o,, we wo-ald wish to explore with
other coLtnfrr-cs a. common. approa:. h Lac santjcns in the event
of a breach of supply coerditian.-O
The o~ f ~ tiTlnredptt olicy I have cutli-fned
are ca: E-(;. rUi . lct~ of cu-Lomir ti. appl-iration e.'
interrati.-jra! ofegi& q-Lds t. veri-fv that matEr. i. al supplied for
pca-efll--pjtrrpc. s; s i: 3 nc-L tr.--om the etTihrn of add-itional
safeit~ h. r ~ h hI~ tralagre. menr. s, and an active involvement
by Au 3LtaLP-a in internatiional efforts to upgrade safeguardF.
The poli.. v J-the re'sult of full. careful and devuailed
consideration of sa, f, e gi-uards by the Government. It builds on
the prelimiria-v klt-hink~ ng of th-e Government described in
testinc; ny to L-. e Rang er Uranium En' irunmer.' Ital Inquiry
year, as welul a& 2-the reccrrmendaticx-s of the Fir~ t. Report,-of
the Inq," iry itself. The policy has been the subject of
detailed cxrlangec of vLew-, with ,) ther countries both utrani-um
o0a0/ 15
impo-t. rs and major r-u. clear expotfer and relevant intermat1:>
rta1 i'gali-a'-. ions ludIng the 0 Inte: z-nair1n Atoic
Energy Ager. ;, y0
As a result the Gbvernment is satisfied that the
poli, y it has; decide4 upon represents a practical, reasonable
and effecLx'; F package of safeguards measures to seek from
counLr'ee wishing to r. mpo--t Lir. nium from Australia under any
future co-, itracts. It i fully in -rep with current internation.
I. Z-fo-rts to crrergthen safeguards. The policy goes
beyond a mere acceptance Aa!: tralia of our international
obligati'n:. as -a party to the Nc:. n-ProiPrferation Treaty and
constithuule3 a poli, ; y as stringent as that adopted to date by
any nuclear supplier country.