PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION CONFERENCE
GIVEN BY THE FRIME MINISTER THE RT. HON.
SIR ROBERT MENZIES _ AT CANBERRA ON SUNDAY,
19th JULY, 1964.
PRIME MINISTER Subject to your concurrence, I think the best thing
for me to do would be to make so-me general statements of my own
about this conference. Those statements may cover some of uhe
questions that you have in mind, but it will make, I think, for
coherence if I just say scmething on my own account first.
There are two things to be said about this
conference which is the ninth consecutive Prime Ministers' conference
that I have attended, The first is that there were eighteen Prime
Ministers or Presidents in attendance, There was a great variety
of views and, of course, that meant that the work of the Chair was
uncommonly difficult because there were eighteen of us all not
unwilling to say something about one p.: oblem or another and if we
were to get through, -chis required great patience on the part of
the Chairman, Sir Alec Home, and he certainly exhibited that
patience in a remarkable fashion. He was tactful5 he enlivened
the proceedings from time to tim3 with a little humour if things
threatened to become a little tense and he was, whenever firmness
was required on the part of the United Kingdom, admirably firm,
Everybody, I think, at the conference regarded his contribution
to the conference and to the result as quite outstanding. I think
it is very proper that that should be said.
Well, in comparing this conference with those
that have taken place in the past I am able of course to look
back over a fairly long period would say that the debates on
this occasion were more active, more forceful, perhaps in some
respects more assertive, than in the paste That was inevitable,
and not a bad thing. There was also, particularly on the part of
the newer members of the conference, a tendency to look for
majo*-ities. Every now and then, somebody would say, " I would like
to move such and such" and he would need to be cold that we don't
have resolutions or votes or majorities or minorities in a Prime
Ministers' conference. We meet to exchange our views with frankness
and to learn something from each other.
There is a disposition, and I pointed it out
myself more than once, to regard the Commonwealth Prime Ministers'
meeting as a sort of a sub-committee of the United Nations that
brings in all these United Nations techniques. Now that in my
opinion is no good. This is something quite different from the
United Nations and I think ultimately that view came to be accepted.
Now it would be foolish to pretend that there were
not periods in this conference which were periods of tension, where
sharp disagreement might have resulted in some sort of deadlock,
but these were surmounted. I don't know whether you surmount a
turning point, but still, don't hold me to a precision of language,
The first related to the problem of. Malaysia.
Now this, of course, has tremendous importance for us and I made a
number of contributions on this point, emphasising the importance
of Malaysia and emphasising the fact, which I said was beyond
question, that Malaysia was not only recognised by the Prime
Ministers themselves, because we had done that at the earlier
meeting, but had been recognised by and admitted to the United
Nations, and that Malaysia was therefore an independent country
within the Commonwealth, as entitled to the preservation of its
own political integrity and physical integrity as any other member
of the Commonwealth, or indeed as any other free nation in the
United Nations, and that we ought to say so, but above all things,
we ought to make it clear that the aggression against Malaysia was
to be condemned and that we supported Malaysia in her resistance
to it. Now that may seem simple enough but there was some
difficulty over it because some of those represented believed that
much might be done by negotiation with Soekarno or by negotiation
of a general kind. What I was emphasising was that although only
some members of the Commonwealth would find it within their power
to give military aid to Malaysia, at least everybody should give
moral aid to Malaysia, not only inside the United Nations but
round the world in the posts in which they were represented.
ltimately, we got a result or that which I -hcught pretty good
because after a good deal of discussion, it was agreed in t. u
communique not only and I am looking at the words of it that
efforts would be maintained to resist aggression from without or
subversion from within, but the conmunique then went on to say
" In this connection they ( that! s the Prime Ministers, all of
them) assured the Prime Minister of Malaysia of their sympathy
and support in his efforts to preserve the sovereign independence
ana integrity of his country,"
There was a good deal of discussion about the word " support" to
which there was opposition originally in some quarters. It was
made clear that support didn't necessarily mean kil. tary supporG,
of course. It might mean moral support for some people might
give their support diplomatically, others in other ways. Finally,
without labouring the matter, we had a unanimous agreement on the
words I have lust quoted and I am sure that this sent the Tunku
Abdul Rahman away with a good deal more comfore in his mind about
the attitude of the Commonwealth.
The other problem was the problem of Southern Rhodesia
and that perhaps is worth a little explanation. It was agreed
from the very beginning, and indeed it had to be, that the problem
of Southern Rhodesia and the accession to independence of Southern
Rhodesia was one to be handled by the Government of the United
Kingdom. It is, for this purpose, the colonial power and it must
deal with that problem in discussion with the Government of Southern
Rhodesia and any other groups in Sohthern Rhodesia who may be
brought into conference. Now that was important. This was a
problem for the United Kingdom. Well then, of course, there was
at once a division of view. I maintain what is apparently the
old-fashioned view that if Great Britain is accepted as the
negotiating power and the only one at the table competent to carry
on the negotiations, she ought not to be handicapped by a lot of
advice or as I put it myself riding instructions. Certainly
not to receive orders from a number of governments without the
responsibility or authority to deal with the matter.
The African countries, broadly, most of them took the
view that this was so important that they ought to have their
views recorded. Well, a very curious thing happened about that.
~ h had a little discussion as to whether these things ought to
be done in formal meeting, as if we were laying down the rules, or
in an informal meeting. So we had an informal meeting on Southern
Rhodesia. You must understand that there is a mystique about
things. If you sit in the big room and you have microphones in
front of you that's a formal meeting, and if you move into the
next room and you don't have microphones, that's an informal / 3
I
meting. These are things not to be understood readily by the
laity, So we went into the small room just the Prime Ministers
with one adviser, and we had a discussion about Southern Rhodesia
and views were expressed. One of them was that there ought to
be no independence on the part of Southern Rhodesia until there
was a provision for majority rule. In other words, until the
African had a vote as well as the European. The answer to that,
very simply, was that the United Kingdom Government had made that
clear long since and indeed it is implicit in the pesEit
Constitution of Southern Rhodesia. However, it never prevents
us from hammering away at a point to discover that it has been
conceded before we start, and the communique ultimately recorded
the fact that the United Kingdom had made this statement and that
it was received with approval.
In the second place, it was said that there ought to be
a constitutional conference. Well, no doubt, that is a very
sensible thing to have and it has usually occurred in the past
when territories or colonies have received their independence,
but whether we should say so in a communique is a different matter
because that might look liie an instruction, and I saw no reason
why we should be giving instructions to the only Government that
had to handle the problem. A very delicate problem because
there are very strong feelings in Southern Rhodesia which one
can understand and I am no great believer myself in giving what
may appear to be instructions to a negotiating party wiLich has
a very delicate negotiation on its plate. However, that is a
difference of approach. Ultimately in the communique., it was
set out as the view of some of the Prime Ministers and I would
say that it wasn't the view of every Prime Minister in substance
but some required that it should be stated in the communique
for their own good local reasons,
Then it was also said that the political p2isoners
because there are one or two of them who are in gaol or held
incommunicado in some way ought to be released. Now, of
course, that's an interesting matter. I woiJd think that if
you are going to have a negotiation with somebody he ought to be
out of gaol when you have it, but the question was whether the
communique should say that these people should be released.
Well, they are in prison under the order of the Government of
Southern Rhodesia. The British Government can't release them
because Southern Rhodesia is in full control of all these
matters herself and has been for a long time. All the British
Government could do would be to try to persuade the Southern
Rhodesian Government to let them out, at any rate for the
purposes of a conference. But that again seemed to me to be
a matter for the United Kingdom itself, depending on how their
negotiations with Southern Rhodesia were going.
I got into a little trouble over this. I was going
to say " I'm sorry to say" but I'm not sure that I am sorry to
say because I said thC.-' in the communique it ought to be made
clear that this was not a unanimous statement by Prime Ministers
because I did not believe in giving instructions or advice
publicly in a communique to the British Government on a matter
which was the British Government's business and not mine. Some
people present thought and offered to say that I was advocating
the imprisonment of political opponents. I regret to tell you
I took the opportunity of saying that I was one of the few at
the table who didn't imprison his political opponents.
Therefore my position was not to be misrepresented. However,
as you have seen in the communique, these particular views were
stated and as there was perhaps some attempt to misrepresent
my position, I have stated it here. I don't advocate the a e / 4
imprisonment of political opponents. I don't advocate not holding
a conference on a matter of this kind but above allthings) I do
advocate not cruelling the pitch for the man who hi: s to do the
batting on it in negotiations. However, the commuunique very
fairly states that that view was expressed. I just indicate that
it wasn't a unanimous one.
That took an awful lot of thrashing out, particularly
when we got to the communique because, very understandably, a lot
of the new African countries have commitments at home and they
have strong views in their ovmn countries and I, myself, had no
objection to them stating those because they needed to be understood
in their own countries, but I don't want my position to be
misunderstood either.
That reminds me that there was an interesting aspect of
this conference, You know, Prime Ministersf conferences are held
in private and all the papers th-at you receive~ and all the re cords
of the proceedings are heavily marked. " Private and Confidential",
but I found that in a great number of cases the speeches that were
being made were written and handed out even before they were
delivered which no doubt was very convenient from the point of view
of the London Press but seemed -to me to be a little difficul;* to
reconcile with having a private meeting, and as I don't read my
speeches at these conferences, there was nothing to hand out. Sc
if you read the London Press, you wou~ ld be hard put to find out
if I had said anything, but I said a good deal, but in private, in
a private conference.
Again, I don't com,, pILain about this. I think what we
have to understand is that this is a very different Commonwealth.
This is now a meeting of a large nuimber of communities axnd governmenL
s which have different histories and different ideras about
how these things ought to be done. We can't -impose our somewhat
old-fashioned views on these matters on new people. We have to
remember that the agitation about political independence these
emerging colonies has been hard and strong, that it continues after
they hav! e received their independence, and that political factors
persist to a degree which would be impossible for us to understand
because we have been accustomed to political independence for many
years and we realise that our main business relates to matters
other than the securing of independence from some colonial control,
but the newer ones are very much taken up with this matter still
and the result is that in a group of eighteen people, seventeen
of whom represent what were once colonial territories, we still
hear about colonialism and imperialism. W-yell, of course, everybody
who was there was there because in his particular case colonialism
had ended, and from a reasonable point of view, I didn't find it
necessary to discuss colonialism very much. It seemed to me to be
a matter of past history, but it still exists not only in their
vocabulary but in their minds.
The first thing that a Prime Minister of the old Commonwealth
has to adjust himself to is that although this is not his
vocabulary and these are not his ideas, they do exist and they must
be received and understood. Indeed it was one of the fascinating
things about this conference that although these matters give rise
to great passion in some of the countries concerned, and although
the debate was extremely vigorous in London, there was at no time
any personal conflict at all. The personal relations between all
representatives were extraordinarily good.
Another matter perhaps I ought to mention, because it
concerns us here. You will have seen in the communique that there
is a somewhat brief reference to China. Two or three of us had
devoted a good deal of attention to explaining the outward thrust
a 1
of China and the aggressive nature of Chinese communism and its
impact on South-East Asia. There was a tendency to brush this
aside, particularly on the part of the Africa-n countries because
it was-said that was cold wa-r talk and the cold war was an irrelevant
thing to the Commonwealth and Commonwealth considerations. This
is based upon some idea that the cold war is a sort c' domestic
conflict between the United States and Communist powers. Well, I
did my best to explain that matter; I am afraid not with very much
success. I even venture to say that if the Western powers had
not been successful in the cold war so far, we might not have been
sitting there having a conference. But I wouldn't have you take
that as the universal view. In fact, the reference, ' he nature of
the reference to China in the communique rather reflects -' Vhe
predominance, for this purpose, of the view that the cold war ought
not to be brought int-o our statem: nt and ought not -to be referred
to as a live issue. Well, that is not a matter that one argues
about forever bec ause I am pecrfectly free to state my views on the
cold war whether they are in the communique or not, and of course
the same goes for a number of the other Prime Ministers who -, e: e
there. Well, now, so far I have spoken to you about some of the
turning points in the conference, all of them happily resolved so
that we were able to get an agreed-upon document at the end which
was very good, but beyond that, I think that the Conference produced
some positive results.
Now take the Commonwealth Secretariat. It is quite true
that the form of the Secretariat isnit yet determined. The official
committees are to go to work to discover how you set up the
Secretariat. its functions are very broadly described in one
passage that some of you may have in your minds. I have it here;
" They therefore instructed officials to consider the best
basis for establishing a Commonwealth Secretariat which
would be available, inter Iaj. ia, to disseminate factual
information to all imember countries on matters of common
conceirn, to assist existing agencies ir the promotion of
Coninonwealth links in all fields, and to help to co-ordinate
the preparation of future meetings of Commonwealth heads of
government."
Now this was a very interesting thing because back before the war,
I suggested a Commonwealth Se. retariat and later on, during the
war and shortly afterwards, this received no support. I felt that
we ought to have a small central body which could help to prepare
these meetings and see that we were well informed about each otherrs
problems before we met, There is nothing more exasperating than
to have somebody raise a problem in relation to his own country,
a country of which you know nothing and therefore you are in no
position to assess the significance of the problem. If all this
were done ahead and circulated, I think we would have better results
and perhaps better results in a shorter time.
On this occasion, this proposal was put forward by the
African countries themselves and received general approval, with the
result that work is being done to establish a Commonwealth Secretariat,,
When I look back and I recall that in a week or two before the
meeting there were gloomy prophecies that the whole thing would
break up, this meeting would be the last meeting indeed I was
very conscious of its difficulties -and dangers myself it is
very interesting to realise that one of the things that has come
out of the meeting is that for the first time in the history of the
Cor~ onwealth thqre is to be established a Secretariat whicha is based
on the proposition that the Commonwealth is a continuing thing
an enduring thing and that the machinery ought to be made available
9 9 a 9 */ 6
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to enable it to continue more effectively. That, I think, was quite
a remarkable achievement and a very powerful answer to the pessimists.
And in the second place, the Government of the United
Kingdom put forward a series of concrete proposals for mutual aid
in development, for a Commonwealth Foundation, for a medical
conference for a variety of matters of that kind, and these were,
in principle, completely accepted by the conference. I suppose
that if there hadn't been so much debate on Southern Rhodesia
and matters of that kind, a good deal mere discussion might have
occurred on these points, but at least it is interesting to note
that they were in principle accepted all round the table and that
machinery is in course of being established to work out these
matters so as to reduce them to sonme sort of concrete form. At
the present time, some of them are a little vague of necessity.
But I believe myself that a great deal of good will come
out of these positive proposals. That is anuther positive achievement
of the conference. I would like it, myself, to have pernaps
gone on further, but you know, in the present year of grace, if a
couple of Ministers come along as they did Mr. Heath came along
and Mr. Maudling the Chancellor of the Exchequer and they talked
about economic aid and economic development most of us had a
tendency to assume the posture of a fellow who is on the receiving
line which, as we were reminded once or twice, makes it a little
difficult for the United Kingdom which has its own problems of a
financial order. But at the same time, I think that when these
matters have been analysed and some of them go into effect, wo
will find that this has been a real step forward in having inside
the Commonwealth something that doesn't necessarily apply to other
people, some joint undertaking, some practice, some e:: peLience in
co-operative work between Commonwealth countries as such, which
can do nothing but good for the future.
Well, now, I am sorry to be talking so long on this
matter, but I think that if you don't mind I would like to tell
you that there are one or two things that are to be learned from
a conference of this kind. I know that I am in process of learning
them and I think that we will all have to learn them.
The first is that we must become accustomed to the fact,
for some little time, that the newer countries will continue to
hammer at matters which we regard as closed issues. I will just
mention one of them, this question of colonialism and imperialism.
I made an innocent enquiry at one stage as to whether it
might be thought fit the next time somebody passed a resolution
about imperialism if they said this means Russian imperialism,
Chinese imperialism and Indonesian imperialism. I think this
jeu d'esprit of mine wasn't altogether successful. But these
things will go on and I don't mind, and I hope nobody will mind;
they are the aftermath of what h. s been in some cases very
painful experiences and therefore one musn't be surprised to find
them manifesting themselves at a time when you and I would have
thought the issue had been concluded in favour of freedom.
And the second thing is this: That words don't always
mean the same thing. Well, we are familiar with that aren't we,
in some ways? But it comes as a little bit of a shock to realise
occasionally that a lot of expressions that are with us almost
cliches are completely misunderstood or understood in a different
sense. Fro example, in the communique you will see a reference to
" representative institutions" in Southern Rhodesia. The United
Kingdom Government had said that they would not grent independence
until fully representative institutions had been established. I
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think I can put my finger on that
" They welcomed the decision already announced by the
British Government that as in the case of other territories,
the existence of sufficiently representative institutions
would be a condition of the grant of independence to
Southern Rhodesia."
Well, one or two of my colleagues said, " But, we don't understand
that. We dcn't have institutions." You know, as if one were talking
about the Institution of Manlagement or something of this kind. This
is a simple illustration of how you can & o wrong. And therefore,
what's the use of talking about " rerresentative institutions?"
" Do you want institutions that will be represented?" You see?
And it had to be explained fromn our point of view that the
representative institution of a nation is parliament and that this
meant an elected body which would be concerned with the government
of the country. Well, it's wor~ h just tucking that away in tri3
corner of the mind.
And then it wan~ without its amusing aspects there
was a constant demand that in Southern Rhodesia there should be
one man one vote. And. I said, " Well that is, of course, an
expression with which we are very familiar in my country one man
one vote. This of course is the very d'-finition of democracy,
but with us i~ t means one free man, one free vote with a choice.
You can't have one man one vote in a one-party State." This
proposition of mine was reCeiv~ ed with horror, naturally, by one or
two or three people who hiave one-party States and to whom one man
one vcte if it means anything, means something quite different
from what we have in mind. I was hoping, as I told them, that this
might be cleared up so that Southern Rhodesia would know in which
interpretation the phrase was to be employed. But there again, we
must just accommodate ourselves to this.
It is very foolish to imagine that you are dealing with
eighteen democracies at this conference because you are not Tf
you were to say to us in Australia, " Let all parties except one be
prohibited," you would say, " Well no longer are we a emocracy" l and
yet that is the rule in some of the countries represented around
the conference table, and I always hiave to say to myself as I say
to you, it is not for us when we have granted freedom to a country
to determine what system of government it will employ. It will
adopt the system it likes best, and in the early days, particularly
of new countries, there is a greater tendency to authoritarian
control, to a strong central administration than there is in a
politically older country with an older experience of political
affairs. So that there are these things to be learned and to be
obtained out of the conference.
But going back to where I started, I would say that taking
it on the whole, taking the difficulties with the results, taking
above all the personal atmosphere that existed at the conference,
this conference was a success and although it of course doesn't
guarantee the future of the Commonwealth, it I believe, makes a
very strong contribution to the continuance of the Commonwealth and
I believe that as time goes on, Prime Ministers' Conferences will
be able to direct more and more of their time to matters of material
substance in relation to the well-being of the countries and
perhaps a little less time to these problems of political independence
which attracted a good deal of our attention on this occasion. e / 8
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Well, I am sorry to have taken so long over that. I am
now in your hands.
Q, Sir Robert how do you feel about the future of the
Commonwealth? There have been a lot of reports that the
Commonwealth won't succeed.
A. But this is what I've been saying. I think that the
Commornwealth has come out of this conference stronger than
a great number of people expected when the conference
met and I think that the omens are good but as I said at
the end of my remarks, the real test will come when we
concentrate more of our attention on matters of current
economic substance, for example, than we were able to do
on this occasion.
Q. Sir Robert Sir Alec Douglas Home has said that when the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers expressed sympathy and support
for Malaysia they were unanimous, but you hava been quoted
as saying that we got a pretty fair degree of agreement on
this subject, does this mean that you disagree with Sir
Alec?
A. Of course not. I don't see any inconsistency between. us.
What is stated here is unanimous. What is stated in the
communique is unanimous. I just went to the length of
pointing out that there were arguments on the journey,,
There was a little different emphasis on my part from what
there might be on somebody else's, differences of method,
but in the long run, yes, we got unanimity.
Q, Sir Robert, do you consider that you have reason to be
optimistic about the future peaceful relationships between
the coloured and white races in the world?
A, Yes, I saw no reason in this conferenco to become pessimistic
about that. I think that you put your finger on this
point and I think it i~ s worth emphasising that if we are
to avoid conflict " avoid" is perhaps not the right word
because it suggests that it is a liability I don't know.
But if there is not to be conflict inside the Commonwealth
for a start between the white races and the coloured races,
we will all need to get to understand the other man's
point of view a good deal better. That is one of the
values of these conferences. We will also need not to
assume that when we speak about certain matters in a certain
way that they are understood in the same sense by the other
man, There is a tremendous exercise in tolerance and
understanding to be engaged in here and I think we saw a
good example of it in this conference. Now I do' feel
at all pessimistic about that problem.
Q, Sir, you described the result of discussions on Malaysia
as pretty good but would you say that you were completely
satisfied yourself or that the Tunku was satisfied at
the expression of sympathy and support and no additional
material aid?
A. Oh, I didn't anticipate that there would be material aid
promised by everybody. What I was after was to get beyond
the point of mere sympathy to a positive expression of
support. That support, as was said at the time, might
in the case of Australia and the United Kingdom and New
Zealand, be military and financial. In the case of somebody
else, it might take a financial form. In the case of
most, it might take the form of being active in and around
the United Nations in presenting the case for Malaysia.
In other caces. it r4iht be don. e thln. ugh diplomatic action
to try to persuiade Soeka':: no, for example, to pull his
troops off. Each one is to employ his own method.
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Qo Has the fresh supply of Soviet arms, the Soviet arms
agreement altered this picture at all, Sir, in your mind?
A, No. That picture is as I have just stated and I wouldn't
want to alter it.
Q. Did any countries in addition to Britain, Australia and
New Zealand indicate that they would assist Malaysia
materially.....
A. I would prefer not to answer that one.
Qo As a European nation close to Asia, is Australia satisfied
that Britain and the United States still suppor-our
general Asian policy?
A. Yes, I am, we are, and I am told that at the ANZUS meeting
this was confirmed, I don't lknow, at first hand.
Q. Did you seek from President Jchnson the declaration that
I understand has cone from ANZUS of support for Malaysia?
A. Look, when I was there, in discussions with both the
President and Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, I was at
pains,.... I wasn't anticipating the ANZUS meeting oecause
my colle ague was going to that, but I did want to know
first whether C, s; atment on the ANZUS pact in the
Parliament, which was one made with great care oas accepted
by them, and the answer was yes, it was accepted by them
completely and so far as tne State Department was concerned,
it had circulated it aml ong its people as a definitive
statement of the position, There is no ambiguivt between
us at all,
Q. Does the Australian Government intend any representations,
diplomatic or otherwise, to the Russians in protest againist
their intervention in this Malaysian dispute?
A. I don't know, I have only just got back home. I have not
even had a chance to discuss that matter.
Q. Sir, speaking of President Johnson, does his probable
visit to this country depend on his re-election in November
or upon some other issue?
Ao Well, let me make a profound remark. He won't come before
November, I think that's certain. If he does win the
election, I think he'll come during his new term. If he
doesn't win the election then he will not come as
President of the United States. ( Laughter)
Q. Sir Robert, in your discussions with President Johnson,
was there any mention made at all of greater Australian
participation in South Vietnam?
A. No.
Q. Were you hoping there would be some censure of Dr.
Soekarno's actions in Borneo and against Malaysia
generally? That there would be criticism as well as
support for the Tunku? That they would criticise Dr.
Soekarno?
A. Well, I'm a bit of an optimist but I knew that that might
be playing it a little hard and therefore what 1 wanted
to get as far as I was concerned and speaking also for
the Tunku was a positive statement of support for him and
what he is doing. I think that involves a criticism 0
10
because you can't uphold the defence against aggression
without condemning the aggression by implication. But
there are people who are a little nervous about defining it.
I am always satisfied with the substance.
Q. Sir, as a result of these past arduous few weeks, can you
see any prospect of any political settlement appertaining
to Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, end the Indo-China region in
general?
A. That's a question I don't think can be answered. I don't
despair of it. I think it is intensely difficult, I think
it is going to take a long time and it will be affected,
of course, by a number of other circumstances, including
some of the military factors in Vietnam. But I wouldn't
want to make a pronuncJ. amento on that one,
Q. In a military sense,~ would you describe it now as grave, Sir?
A. Well, that's your word. I think it is serious. Yes,
seri9us.
Q. Did you form an assessment, Sir, of the degree of lamerican
determination in Vietnam? How determined are they to
maintain their position there?
A. I think they are very determined to maintain it. Of course,
all this is on the assumption that the President remains
President. I don't uimow what will happen in the alternative.
I'm still reading the papers.
Q. Would you say that these declarations of lamerican and
British Commonwealth support for Malaysia were the principal
objectives of your trip overseas, Sir?
A, Not necessarily the principal, but it was one matter that
was very prominent in my mind and about which I spoke
perhaps more than on any other single topic. If that's
what you have in mind, I feel very strongly about it.
Q. Are your talks with the Tunku, Sir, likely to result in a
consideration of further material aid by this country for
Malaysia?
A. I didn't have any discussion with him about that, As a
matter of fact, we were all due to have a talk in London
on the afternoon of the Thursday, but we went on talking
instead in the conference. We were supposed to finish our
communique by one o'clock on Thursday and then I was to have
some further talks on other matters, but we sat until nine
o'clock at night, after which none of us was fit to talk
to anybody about anything.
Q. You were reported, Sir, to have forecast a pretty sharp
increase, I think of the order of fifty per cent., in
Australian defence spending. Does this imply any new
defence projects or is this the cost of
A, Oh this was the ultimate mount-up of the current programme.
Buof course, past experience has shown that defence
programmes are by no means static and these last changes
we made were quite massive and I daresay there will be
others in future. a / 11
11
Q. Sir, will there be further consultations with the Tunku on
material aid for Malaysia, following his visits to Washington
and Canada?
A. You mean on the Prime Minister
Q. I mean more on the Government level.
A. Well, I can't tell you that. The officials are in constant
touch with each other. It usually comes up from the official
level.
Q. Would you be happy ' o see more moves towards another summit
meeting, Sir?
A. A summit meeting about Malaysia?
Q. Yes sir.
A. Well, you know, a summit meeting which takes place between the
President of Indonesia who doesn't admit that Malaysip exists
'. out who, strangely enough, then offers to crush it, and at the
same time maintains active trooos on Malaysian territory, seems
to me to be a funry kind of summit meeting. If a summit
meeting could be preceded by a statement that his military
aggression would cease in fact and that his forces wo-uld be
withdrawn and that Malaysia would be recognised by him as it
is by every other country in the world could be a very useful
one. Not that the Tanku has anything lo withdraw. I don't
know what he would take to a summit meeting, but if it led
to a better mutual understanding, some element of friendship
with each other and with the Philippines, well, yes, a summit
meeting would be good. I very largely share the Tunku's views.
To be asked to go to a summit meeting when your territory is
under active military attack by the other parties, who persist
in it and who continue in it while the meeting is on. this is
a contradic. ion in terms. This is no kind of conference.
This would be only a kind of appeasement.
Q. Is it your impressicn, Sir, that Philippines support for
Indonesia has drifted away somewhat from its former position?
A. Well, I haven't been in the Philippines, except the other night
on the airport, so I wouldn't know.
Q, Sir Robert, did you feel that there was a fee ing of sympathy
by the African leaders on the Malaysian question or were they
too preoccupied with their own problems?
A. Oh, no, they sympathised with it. They know that independence,
the preservation of your owm integrity is just as much essential
in Asia as it is in Africa. I'm sure they know that because
I took the opportunity of saying it a few times. But I think
that's quite right. They vary of course.
Q. Sir Robert, getting away from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers'
discussions and Malaysia for a moment, did you take an
opportunity in London to discuss the possibility of another
Royal Visit next year?
A. No. You mean a visit by The Queen?
Q. By The Queen.
A. No.
,12
Q. Sir Robert, did the Common Market raise its collective head
at the conference at all?
A. No. Ted Heath attended the conference but I think lie got
out unscathed without any discussion on the Common Market.
Q. Would you say that Britain's entry into the Common Market
is dead?
A. No, out I think it sleeps.
Q. Sir, did you raise the question of a visit by some important
personage for Anzac Jubilee next year?
Yes, I have had that under discussion but there is nothing I
can say about it yet, but we will have one.
Q. Did any of your Commonwealth colleagues, Sir, make any
overt or covert cracks about Australia's immigration laws or
policy?
A. No.
Q. Have you, Sir, examined the position of a successor to
Lord De L'Isle?
A. Oh no, that's a long way off. No discussion of any kind,
directly or indirectly. That matter doesn't arise yet.
There is only one fellow who is out cf the picture and that
is myself.
Q. How do you feel about the Republicans' choice of a
Presidential candidate?
A. I have no comment to make. That's their business.
Q. Sir Robert, has there been any request from the South
Vietramese Government for bodies of troops rather than
military advisers?
A, Not that I know of, but you must remember that I've been
away for a month. I know of none.
Q. Some of Dr. Nyrere's Ministers are rather pro-Dr. Soekarno,
aren't they? Did he have anything to say about this?
A. Well, look, I don't want to be quoting what Nyrere had to
say on this. You have to remember that Tanganyika has now
entered into holy matrimony with Zanzibar and that Zanzibar
is very largely controlled by people who, if not communist,
are very much in that direction and therefore Nyrere is in
a position of some complica. tion, shall I sny, in this
matter. I found nothing unsatisfactory about his views
and when you ask me about his other Ministers, I don't know.
I didn't meet them.
P