

PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION CONFERENCE
GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON.
SIR ROBERT MENZIES, AT CANBERRA ON SUNDAY,
19th JULY, 1964.

PRIME MINISTER :

Subject to your concurrence, I think the best thing for me to do would be to make some general statements of my own about this conference. Those statements may cover some of the questions that you have in mind, but it will make, I think, for coherence if I just say something on my own account first.

There are two things to be said about this conference which is the ninth consecutive Prime Ministers' conference that I have attended. The first is that there were eighteen Prime Ministers or Presidents in attendance. There was a great variety of views and, of course, that meant that the work of the Chair was uncommonly difficult because there were eighteen of us all not unwilling to say something about one problem or another and if we were to get through, this required great patience on the part of the Chairman, Sir Alec Home, and he certainly exhibited that patience in a remarkable fashion. He was tactful; he enlivened the proceedings from time to time with a little humour if things threatened to become a little tense and he was, whenever firmness was required on the part of the United Kingdom, admirably firm. Everybody, I think, at the conference regarded his contribution to the conference and to the result as quite outstanding. I think it is very proper that that should be said.

Well, in comparing this conference with those that have taken place in the past - I am able of course to look back over a fairly long period - I would say that the debates on this occasion were more active, more forceful, perhaps in some respects more assertive, than in the past. That was inevitable, and not a bad thing. There was also, particularly on the part of the newer members of the conference, a tendency to look for majorities. Every now and then, somebody would say, "I would like to move such and such" and he would need to be told that we don't have resolutions or votes or majorities or minorities in a Prime Ministers' conference. We meet to exchange our views with frankness and to learn something from each other.

There is a disposition, and I pointed it out myself more than once, to regard the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting as a sort of a sub-committee of the United Nations - that brings in all these United Nations techniques. Now that in my opinion is no good. This is something quite different from the United Nations and I think ultimately that view came to be accepted.

Now it would be foolish to pretend that there were not periods in this conference which were periods of tension, where sharp disagreement might have resulted in some sort of deadlock, but these were surmounted. I don't know whether you surmount a turning point, but still, don't hold me to a precision of language.

The first related to the problem of Malaysia. Now this, of course, has tremendous importance for us and I made a number of contributions on this point, emphasising the importance of Malaysia and emphasising the fact, which I said was beyond question, that Malaysia was not only recognised by the Prime Ministers themselves, because we had done that at the earlier meeting, but had been recognised by and admitted to the United

Nations, and that Malaysia was therefore an independent country within the Commonwealth, as entitled to the preservation of its own political integrity and physical integrity as any other member of the Commonwealth, or indeed as any other free nation in the United Nations, and that we ought to say so, but above all things, we ought to make it clear that the aggression against Malaysia was to be condemned and that we supported Malaysia in her resistance to it.

Now that may seem simple enough but there was some difficulty over it because some of those represented believed that much might be done by negotiation with Soekarno or by negotiation of a general kind. What I was emphasising was that although only some members of the Commonwealth would find it within their power to give military aid to Malaysia, at least everybody should give moral aid to Malaysia, not only inside the United Nations but around the world in the posts in which they were represented. Ultimately, we got a result on that which I thought pretty good because after a good deal of discussion, it was agreed in the communique not only - and I am looking at the words of it - that efforts would be maintained to resist aggression from without or subversion from within, but the communique then went on to say -

"In this connection, they (that's the Prime Ministers, all of them) assured the Prime Minister of Malaysia of their sympathy and support in his efforts to preserve the sovereign independence and integrity of his country."

There was a good deal of discussion about the word "support" to which there was opposition originally in some quarters. It was made clear that support didn't necessarily mean military support, of course. It might mean moral support for some people might give their support diplomatically, others in other ways. Finally, without labouring the matter, we had a unanimous agreement on the words I have just quoted and I am sure that this sent the Tunku Abdul Rahman away with a good deal more comfort in his mind about the attitude of the Commonwealth.

The other problem was the problem of Southern Rhodesia and that perhaps is worth a little explanation. It was agreed from the very beginning, and indeed it had to be, that the problem of Southern Rhodesia and the accession to independence of Southern Rhodesia was one to be handled by the Government of the United Kingdom. It is, for this purpose, the colonial power and it must deal with that problem in discussion with the Government of Southern Rhodesia and any other groups in Southern Rhodesia who may be brought into conference. Now that was important. This was a problem for the United Kingdom. Well then, of course, there was at once a division of view. I maintain what is apparently the old-fashioned view that if Great Britain is accepted as the negotiating power and the only one at the table competent to carry on the negotiations, she ought not to be handicapped by a lot of advice - or as I put it myself - riding instructions. Certainly not to receive orders from a number of governments without the responsibility or authority to deal with the matter.

The African countries, broadly, most of them took the view that this was so important that they ought to have their views recorded. Well, a very curious thing happened about that. We had a little discussion as to whether these things ought to be done in formal meeting, as if we were laying down the rules, or in an informal meeting. So we had an informal meeting on Southern Rhodesia. You must understand that there is a mystique about things. If you sit in the big room and you have microphones in front of you, that's a formal meeting, and if you move into the next room and you don't have microphones, that's an informal

meeting. These are things not to be understood readily by the laity. So we went into the small room - just the Prime Ministers with one adviser, and we had a discussion about Southern Rhodesia and views were expressed. One of them was that there ought to be no independence on the part of Southern Rhodesia until there was a provision for majority rule. In other words, until the African had a vote as well as the European. The answer to that, very simply, was that the United Kingdom Government had made that clear long since, and indeed, it is implicit in the present Constitution of Southern Rhodesia. However, it never prevents us from hammering away at a point to discover that it has been conceded before we start, and the communique ultimately recorded the fact that the United Kingdom had made this statement and that it was received with approval.

In the second place, it was said that there ought to be a constitutional conference. Well, no doubt, that is a very sensible thing to have and it has usually occurred in the past when territories or colonies have received their independence, but whether we should say so in a communique is a different matter because that might look like an instruction, and I saw no reason why we should be giving instructions to the only Government that had to handle the problem. A very delicate problem because there are very strong feelings in Southern Rhodesia which one can understand and I am no great believer myself in giving what may appear to be instructions to a negotiating party which has a very delicate negotiation on its plate. However, that is a difference of approach. Ultimately in the communique, it was set out as the view of some of the Prime Ministers and I would say that it wasn't the view of every Prime Minister in substance but some required that it should be stated in the communique for their own good local reasons.

Then it was also said that the political prisoners - because there are one or two of them who are in gaol or held incommunicado in some way - ought to be released. Now, of course, that's an interesting matter. I would think that if you are going to have a negotiation with somebody he ought to be out of gaol when you have it, but the question was whether the communique should say that these people should be released. Well, they are in prison under the order of the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The British Government can't release them because Southern Rhodesia is in full control of all these matters herself and has been for a long time. All the British Government could do would be to try to persuade the Southern Rhodesian Government to let them out, at any rate for the purposes of a conference. But that again seemed to me to be a matter for the United Kingdom itself, depending on how their negotiations with Southern Rhodesia were going.

I got into a little trouble over this. I was going to say "I'm sorry to say" but I'm not sure that I am sorry to say because I said that in the communique it ought to be made clear that this was not a unanimous statement by Prime Ministers because I did not believe in giving instructions or advice publicly in a communique to the British Government on a matter which was the British Government's business and not mine. Some people present thought and offered to say that I was advocating the imprisonment of political opponents. I regret to tell you I took the opportunity of saying that I was one of the few at the table who didn't imprison his political opponents. Therefore my position was not to be misrepresented. However, as you have seen in the communique, these particular views were stated and as there was perhaps some attempt to misrepresent my position, I have stated it here. I don't advocate the

imprisonment of political opponents. I don't advocate not holding a conference on a matter of this kind but above all things, I do advocate not crueLLing the pitch for the man who has to do the batting on it in negotiations. However, the communique very fairly states that that view was expressed. I just indicate that it wasn't a unanimous one.

That took an awful lot of thrashing out, particularly when we got to the communique because, very understandably, a lot of the new African countries have commitments at home and they have strong views in their own countries and I, myself, had no objection to them stating those because they needed to be understood in their own countries, but I don't want my position to be misunderstood either.

That reminds me that there was an interesting aspect of this conference. You know, Prime Ministers' conferences are held in private and all the papers that you receive and all the records of the proceedings are heavily marked "Private and Confidential", but I found that in a great number of cases the speeches that were being made were written and handed out even before they were delivered which no doubt was very convenient from the point of view of the London Press but seemed to me to be a little difficult to reconcile with having a private meeting, and as I don't read my speeches at these conferences, there was nothing to hand out. So if you read the London Press, you would be hard put to find out if I had said anything, but I said a good deal, but in private, in a private conference.

Again, I don't complain about this. I think what we have to understand is that this is a very different Commonwealth. This is now a meeting of a large number of communities and governments which have different histories and different ideas about how these things ought to be done. We can't impose our somewhat old-fashioned views on these matters on new people. We have to remember that the agitation about political independence in these emerging colonies has been hard and strong, that it continues after they have received their independence, and that political factors persist to a degree which would be impossible for us to understand because we have been accustomed to political independence for many years and we realise that our main business relates to matters other than the securing of independence from some colonial control, but the newer ones are very much taken up with this matter still and the result is that in a group of eighteen people, seventeen of whom represent what were once colonial territories, we still hear about colonialism and imperialism. Well, of course, everybody who was there was there because in his particular case colonialism had ended, and from a reasonable point of view, I didn't find it necessary to discuss colonialism very much. It seemed to me to be a matter of past history, but it still exists not only in their vocabulary but in their minds.

The first thing that a Prime Minister of the old Commonwealth has to adjust himself to is that although this is not his vocabulary and these are not his ideas, they do exist and they must be received and understood. Indeed, it was one of the fascinating things about this conference that although these matters give rise to great passion in some of the countries concerned, and although the debate was extremely vigorous in London, there was at no time any personal conflict at all. The personal relations between all representatives were extraordinarily good.

Another matter perhaps I ought to mention, because it concerns us here. You will have seen in the communique that there is a somewhat brief reference to China. Two or three of us had devoted a good deal of attention to explaining the outward thrust

of China and the aggressive nature of Chinese communism and its impact on South-East Asia. There was a tendency to brush this aside, particularly on the part of the African countries because it was said that was cold war talk and the cold war was an irrelevant thing to the Commonwealth and Commonwealth considerations. This is based upon some idea that the cold war is a sort of domestic conflict between the United States and Communist powers. Well, I did my best to explain that matter; I am afraid not with very much success. I even venture to say that if the Western powers had not been successful in the cold war so far, we might not have been sitting there having a conference. But I wouldn't have you take that as the universal view. In fact, the reference, the nature of the reference to China in the communique rather reflects the predominance, for this purpose, of the view that the cold war ought not to be brought into our statement and ought not to be referred to as a live issue. Well, that is not a matter that one argues about forever because I am perfectly free to state my views on the cold war whether they are in the communique or not, and of course the same goes for a number of the other Prime Ministers who were there.

Well, now, so far I have spoken to you about some of the turning points in the conference, all of them happily resolved so that we were able to get an agreed-upon document at the end which was very good, but beyond that, I think that the Conference produced some positive results.

Now take the Commonwealth Secretariat. It is quite true that the form of the Secretariat isn't yet determined. The official committees are to go to work to discover how you set up the Secretariat. its functions are very broadly described in one passage that some of you may have in your minds. I have it here:

"They therefore instructed officials to consider the best basis for establishing a Commonwealth Secretariat which would be available, inter alia, to disseminate factual information to all member countries on matters of common concern, to assist existing agencies in the promotion of Commonwealth links in all fields, and to help to co-ordinate the preparation of future meetings of Commonwealth heads of government."

Now this was a very interesting thing because back before the war, I suggested a Commonwealth Secretariat and later on, during the war and shortly afterwards, this received no support. I felt that we ought to have a small central body which could help to prepare these meetings and see that we were well informed about each other's problems before we met. There is nothing more exasperating than to have somebody raise a problem in relation to his own country, a country of which you know nothing and therefore you are in no position to assess the significance of the problem. If all this were done ahead and circulated, I think we would have better results and perhaps better results in a shorter time.

On this occasion, this proposal was put forward by the African countries themselves and received general approval, with the result that work is being done to establish a Commonwealth Secretariat. When I look back and I recall that in a week or two before the meeting there were gloomy prophecies that the whole thing would break up, this meeting would be the last meeting - indeed I was very conscious of its difficulties and dangers myself - it is very interesting to realise that one of the things that has come out of the meeting is that for the first time in the history of the Commonwealth there is to be established a Secretariat which is based on the proposition that the Commonwealth is a continuing thing, an enduring thing and that the machinery ought to be made available

to enable it to continue more effectively. That, I think, was quite a remarkable achievement and a very powerful answer to the pessimists.

And in the second place, the Government of the United Kingdom put forward a series of concrete proposals for mutual aid in development, for a Commonwealth Foundation, for a medical conference, for a variety of matters of that kind, and these were, in principle, completely accepted by the conference. I suppose that if there hadn't been so much debate on Southern Rhodesia and matters of that kind, a good deal more discussion might have occurred on these points, but at least it is interesting to note that they were in principle accepted all round the table and that machinery is in course of being established to work out these matters so as to reduce them to some sort of concrete form. At the present time, some of them are a little vague of necessity.

But I believe myself that a great deal of good will come out of these positive proposals. That is another positive achievement of the conference. I would like it, myself, to have perhaps gone on further, but you know, in the present year of grace, if a couple of Ministers come along as they did - Mr. Heath came along and Mr. Maudling the Chancellor of the Exchequer and they talked about economic aid and economic development - most of us had a tendency to assume the posture of a fellow who is on the receiving line which, as we were reminded once or twice, makes it a little difficult for the United Kingdom which has its own problems of a financial order. But at the same time, I think that when these matters have been analysed and some of them go into effect, we will find that this has been a real step forward in having inside the Commonwealth something that doesn't necessarily apply to other people, some joint undertaking, some practice, some experience in co-operative work between Commonwealth countries as such, which can do nothing but good for the future.

Well, now, I am sorry to be talking so long on this matter, but I think that if you don't mind I would like to tell you that there are one or two things that are to be learned from a conference of this kind. I know that I am in process of learning them and I think that we will all have to learn them.

The first is that we must become accustomed to the fact, for some little time, that the newer countries will continue to hammer at matters which we regard as closed issues. I will just mention one of them, this question of colonialism and imperialism.

I made an innocent enquiry at one stage as to whether it might be thought fit the next time somebody passed a resolution about imperialism if they said this means Russian imperialism, Chinese imperialism and Indonesian imperialism. I think this jeu d'esprit of mine wasn't altogether successful. But these things will go on and I don't mind, and I hope nobody will mind; they are the aftermath of what has been in some cases very painful experiences and therefore one musn't be surprised to find them manifesting themselves at a time when you and I would have thought the issue had been concluded in favour of freedom.

And the second thing is this: That words don't always mean the same thing. Well, we are familiar with that, aren't we, in some ways? But it comes as a little bit of a shock to realise occasionally that a lot of expressions that are with us almost cliches are completely misunderstood or understood in a different sense. For example, in the communique you will see a reference to "representative institutions" in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government had said that they would not grant independence until fully representative institutions had been established. I

think I can put my finger on that -

"They welcomed the decision already announced by the British Government that as in the case of other territories, the existence of sufficiently representative institutions would be a condition of the grant of independence to Southern Rhodesia."

Well, one or two of my colleagues said, "But, we don't understand that. We don't have institutions." You know, as if one were talking about the Institution of Management or something of this kind. This is a simple illustration of how you can go wrong. And therefore, what's the use of talking about "representative institutions?" "Do you want institutions that will be represented?" You see? And it had to be explained from our point of view that the representative institution of a nation is parliament and that this meant an elected body which would be concerned with the government of the country. Well, it's worth just tucking that away in the corner of the mind.

And then - it wasn't without its amusing aspects - there was a constant demand that in Southern Rhodesia there should be one man one vote. And I said, "Well that is, of course, an expression with which we are very familiar in my country - one man one vote. This of course is the very definition of democracy, but with us it means one free man, one free vote with a choice. You can't have one man one vote in a one-party State." This proposition of mine was received with horror, naturally, by one or two or three people who have one-party States and to whom one man one vote, if it means anything, means something quite different from what we have in mind. I was hoping, as I told them, that this might be cleared up so that Southern Rhodesia would know in which interpretation the phrase was to be employed. But there again, we must just accommodate ourselves to this.

It is very foolish to imagine that you are dealing with eighteen democracies at this conference because you are not. If you were to say to us in Australia, "Let all parties except one be prohibited," you would say, "Well no longer are we a democracy" and yet that is the rule in some of the countries represented around the conference table, and I always have to say to myself as I say to you, it is not for us when we have granted freedom to a country to determine what system of government it will employ. It will adopt the system it likes best, and in the early days, particularly of new countries, there is a greater tendency to authoritarian control, to a strong central administration than there is in a politically older country with an older experience of political affairs. So that there are these things to be learned and to be obtained out of the conference.

But going back to where I started, I would say that taking it on the whole, taking the difficulties with the results, taking above all the personal atmosphere that existed at the conference, this conference was a success and although it of course doesn't guarantee the future of the Commonwealth, it I believe, makes a very strong contribution to the continuance of the Commonwealth and I believe that as time goes on, Prime Ministers' Conferences will be able to direct more and more of their time to matters of material substance in relation to the well-being of the countries and perhaps a little less time to these problems of political independence which attracted a good deal of our attention on this occasion.

Well, I am sorry to have taken so long over that. I am now in your hands.

Q. Sir Robert, how do you feel about the future of the Commonwealth? There have been a lot of reports that the Commonwealth won't succeed.

A. But this is what I've been saying. I think that the Commonwealth has come out of this conference stronger than a great number of people expected when the conference met and I think that the omens are good, but as I said at the end of my remarks, the real test will come when we concentrate more of our attention on matters of current economic substance, for example, than we were able to do on this occasion.

Q. Sir Robert, Sir Alec Douglas Home has said that when the Commonwealth Prime Ministers expressed sympathy and support for Malaysia they were unanimous, but you have been quoted as saying that we got a pretty fair degree of agreement on this subject, does this mean that you disagree with Sir Alec?

A. Of course not. I don't see any inconsistency between us. What is stated here is unanimous. What is stated in the communique is unanimous. I just went to the length of pointing out that there were arguments on the journey. There was a little different emphasis on my part from what there might be on somebody else's, differences of method, but in the long run, yes, we got unanimity.

Q. Sir Robert, do you consider that you have reason to be optimistic about the future peaceful relationships between the coloured and white races in the world?

A. Yes, I saw no reason in this conference to become pessimistic about that. I think that you put your finger on this point and I think it is worth emphasising that if we are to avoid conflict - "avoid" is perhaps not the right word because it suggests that it is a liability - I don't know. But if there is not to be conflict inside the Commonwealth for a start between the white races and the coloured races, we will all need to get to understand the other man's point of view a good deal better. That is one of the values of these conferences. We will also need not to assume that when we speak about certain matters in a certain way that they are understood in the same sense by the other man. There is a tremendous exercise in tolerance and understanding to be engaged in here and I think we saw a good example of it in this conference. Now I don't feel at all pessimistic about that problem.

Q. Sir, you described the result of discussions on Malaysia as pretty good but would you say that you were completely satisfied yourself or that the Tunku was satisfied at the expression of sympathy and support and no additional material aid?

A. Oh, I didn't anticipate that there would be material aid promised by everybody. What I was after was to get beyond the point of mere sympathy to a positive expression of support. That support, as was said at the time, might in the case of Australia and the United Kingdom and New Zealand, be military and financial. In the case of somebody else, it might take a financial form. In the case of most, it might take the form of being active in and around the United Nations in presenting the case for Malaysia. In other cases, it might be done through diplomatic action to try to persuade Soekarno, for example, to pull his troops off. Each one is to employ his own method.

- Q. Has the fresh supply of Soviet arms, the Soviet arms agreement altered this picture at all, Sir, in your mind?
- A. No. That picture is as I have just stated and I wouldn't want to alter it.
- Q. Did any countries in addition to Britain, Australia and New Zealand indicate that they would assist Malaysia materially.....
- A. I would prefer not to answer that one.
- Q. As a European nation close to Asia, is Australia satisfied that Britain and the United States still support our general Asian policy?
- A. Yes, I am, we are, and I am told that at the ANZUS meeting this was confirmed. I don't know at first hand.
- Q. Did you seek from President Johnson the declaration that I understand has come from ANZUS of support for Malaysia?
- A. Look, when I was there, in discussions with both the President and Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, I was at pains..... I wasn't anticipating the ANZUS meeting because my colleague was going to that, but I did want to know first whether my statement on the ANZUS pact in the Parliament, which was one made with great care, was accepted by them, and the answer was yes, it was accepted by them completely and so far as the State Department was concerned, it had circulated it among its people as a definitive statement of the position. There is no ambiguity between us at all.
- Q. Does the Australian Government intend any representations, diplomatic or otherwise, to the Russians in protest against their intervention in this Malaysian dispute?
- A. I don't know. I have only just got back home. I have not even had a chance to discuss that matter.
- Q. Sir, speaking of President Johnson, does his probable visit to this country depend on his re-election in November or upon some other issue?
- A. Well, let me make a profound remark. He won't come before November, I think that's certain. If he does win the election, I think he'll come during his new term. If he doesn't win the election, then he will not come as President of the United States. (Laughter)
- Q. Sir Robert, in your discussions with President Johnson, was there any mention made at all of greater Australian participation in South Vietnam?
- A. No.
- Q. Were you hoping there would be some censure of Dr. Soekarno's actions in Borneo and against Malaysia generally? That there would be criticism as well as support for the Tunku? That they would criticise Dr. Soekarno?
- A. Well, I'm a bit of an optimist but I knew that that might be playing it a little hard and therefore what I wanted to get as far as I was concerned and speaking also for the Tunku was a positive statement of support for him and what he is doing. I think that involves a criticism

because you can't uphold the defence against aggression without condemning the aggression by implication. But there are people who are a little nervous about defining it. I am always satisfied with the substance.

- Q. Sir, as a result of these past arduous few weeks, can you see any prospect of any political settlement appertaining to Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, and the Indo-China region in general?
- A. That's a question I don't think can be answered. I don't despair of it. I think it is intensely difficult. I think it is going to take a long time and it will be affected, of course, by a number of other circumstances, including some of the military factors in Vietnam. But I wouldn't want to make a pronouncement on that one.
- Q. In a military sense, would you describe it now as grave, Sir?
- A. Well, that's your word. I think it is serious. Yes, serious.
- Q. Did you form an assessment, Sir, of the degree of American determination in Vietnam? How determined are they to maintain their position there?
- A. I think they are very determined to maintain it. Of course, all this is on the assumption that the President remains President. I don't know what will happen in the alternative. I'm still reading the papers.
- Q. Would you say that these declarations of American and British Commonwealth support for Malaysia were the principal objectives of your trip overseas, Sir?
- A. Not necessarily the principal, but it was one matter that was very prominent in my mind and about which I spoke perhaps more than on any other single topic. If that's what you have in mind, I feel very strongly about it.
- Q. Are your talks with the Tunku, Sir, likely to result in a consideration of further material aid by this country for Malaysia?
- A. I didn't have any discussion with him about that. As a matter of fact, we were all due to have a talk in London on the afternoon of the Thursday, but we went on talking instead in the conference. We were supposed to finish our communique by one o'clock on Thursday and then I was to have some further talks on other matters, but we sat until nine o'clock at night, after which none of us was fit to talk to anybody about anything.
- Q. You were reported, Sir, to have forecast a pretty sharp increase, I think of the order of fifty per cent., in Australian defence spending. Does this imply any new defence projects or is this the cost of.....
- A. Oh, this was the ultimate mount-up of the current programme. But, of course, past experience has shown that defence programmes are by no means static and these last changes we made were quite massive and I daresay there will be others in future.

- Q. Sir, will there be further consultations with the Tunku on material aid for Malaysia, following his visits to Washington and Canada?
- A. You mean on the Prime Minister.....
- Q. I mean more on the Government level.
- A. Well, I can't tell you that. The officials are in constant touch with each other. It usually comes up from the official level.
- Q. Would you be happy to see more moves towards another summit meeting, Sir?
- A. A summit meeting about Malaysia?
- Q. Yes sir.
- A. Well, you know, a summit meeting which takes place between the President of Indonesia who doesn't admit that Malaysia exists but who, strangely enough, then offers to crush it, and at the same time maintains active troops on Malaysian territory, seems to me to be a funny kind of summit meeting. If a summit meeting could be preceded by a statement that his military aggression would cease in fact and that his forces would be withdrawn and that Malaysia would be recognised by him as it is by every other country in the world, could be a very useful one. Not that the Tunku has anything to withdraw. I don't know what he would take to a summit meeting, but if it led to a better mutual understanding, some element of friendship with each other and with the Philippines, well, yes, a summit meeting would be good. I very largely share the Tunku's views. To be asked to go to a summit meeting when your territory is under active military attack by the other parties, who persist in it and who continue in it while the meeting is on, this is a contradiction in terms. This is no kind of conference. This would be only a kind of appeasement.
- Q. Is it your impression, Sir, that Philippines support for Indonesia has drifted away somewhat from its former position?
- A. Well, I haven't been in the Philippines, except the other night on the airport, so I wouldn't know.
- Q. Sir Robert, did you feel that there was a feeling of sympathy by the African leaders on the Malaysian question or were they too preoccupied with their own problems?
- A. Oh, no, they sympathised with it. They know that independence, the preservation of your own integrity is just as much essential in Asia as it is in Africa. I'm sure they know that because I took the opportunity of saying it a few times. But I think that's quite right. They vary of course.
- Q. Sir Robert, getting away from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' discussions and Malaysia for a moment, did you take an opportunity in London to discuss the possibility of another Royal Visit next year?
- A. No. You mean a visit by The Queen?
- Q. By The Queen.
- A. No.

- Q. Sir Robert, did the Common Market raise its collective head at the conference at all?
- A. No. Ted Heath attended the conference but I think he got out unscathed without any discussion on the Common Market.
- Q. Would you say that Britain's entry into the Common Market is dead?
- A. No, but I think it sleeps.
- Q. Sir, did you raise the question of a visit by some important personage for Anzac Jubilee next year?
- A. Yes, I have had that under discussion but there is nothing I can say about it yet, but we will have one.
- Q. Did any of your Commonwealth colleagues, Sir, make any overt or covert cracks about Australia's immigration laws or policy?
- A. No.
- Q. Have you, Sir, examined the position of a successor to Lord De L'Isle?
- A. Oh no, that's a long way off. No discussion of any kind, directly or indirectly. That matter doesn't arise yet. There is only one fellow who is out of the picture and that is myself.
- Q. How do you feel about the Republicans' choice of a Presidential candidate?
- A. I have no comment to make. That's their business.
- Q. Sir Robert, has there been any request from the South Vietnamese Government for bodies of troops rather than military advisers?
- A. Not that I know of, but you must remember that I've been away for a month. I know of none.
- Q. Some of Dr. Nyrere's Ministers are rather pro-Dr. Soekarno, aren't they? Did he have anything to say about this?
- A. Well, look, I don't want to be quoting what Nyrere had to say on this. You have to remember that Tanganyika has now entered into holy matrimony with Zanzibar and that Zanzibar is very largely controlled by people who, if not communist, are very much in that direction and therefore Nyrere is in a position of some complication, shall I say, in this matter. I found nothing unsatisfactory about his views and when you ask me about his other Ministers, I don't know. I didn't meet them.
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