N SPEECH BY iHE PRIME MINISTEi, THE RT. HON.
R. G. MENZIES AT' MAITLAND TO. IN HALL, ON
TUESAY 8 1 AUGUSL1961
Mr. M1' ayor, Mr. Fairhall, parliamentary colleagues and ladies and
gentlemen: I have spoken in this hall a fair number of times and I
don't remember a meeting like this beKore: on other occasions it
has been rather exciting. ( Laughter) YouI know it usually has
boon at election time and oddly enotgh at election time I
encounter quite a number of people who don't sooeem to care for me
very much. My mind goes back to one time oh, this mooting is
not like it when we wore having a moeting here in Decumber and
it was very hot and we had had a long hot day. I was being
" cartod around" if I may put it that -ay, by Allen Fairhall: we
had mado speeches here and theiro; we had fought with wild
beasts at Ephesus if I may put it in that fashion; and we
ended up with a very spirited meeting here. Uhon it was all over
I was so hot that I was about to melt and I had to get out into a
little economical car that he was driving and be driven to
Newcastle and the choice w-as between being stifled and getting
pneumonia. I opened the window and got pneumonia. ( Laughter)
It's as simole as that. I wasn't able to go on in the campaign
for another four or five days. And the result, I don't need to
.6ell you was that we had a record majority. ( Laughter)
But tonight is something of an experiment ' bcause I
suppose that six months Qgo a great number of people in
Australia had never heard the blessed words " the Coixion Market";
and as I have had something to do with thera over a fai yea. rs now,-
nd as tohe matter now begins to como to a head, I thought that it
night be an extremonly useful thing to say to thos. e who are
affectod by those matters, something of what they are about. So
I warn you this is not . oing to be a very controversial
political spooch. If you foel that it is bocoming a litlo dull,
you have my perfect permission to make a rude interjection.
( Laughter) Then we will got back again.
The words " Conmon 1Marke) t" are now filiar in our mouths.
They are obviously not very oll unde: rstood by e.. verybody because
I have heard in the last wouk or two earnest people 1Jhy
don't we h-vo an Asian Coin'en Mrket?" or " dhy don't we have a
Pacific Common Market?", . s a sort of counter-blast to a
European Common Market. Therofo:. thin, perhaps I ought to
begin by getting ri ght down to brass tacks on this matter ) nd
saying what a European Cnomon Markot neans. Life bucones a little
complex at this point because some people will talk about the
European Coummn Market and s: enc, with equal accuracy, about the
European Economic Comunity, and sone about the Meossina powers,
and some about the Treaty of Rome. All the szeo thins, you will
be happy to know.
that happened was that in March, 1957, six European
nations signed a T1reaty . with each other at Roiie hence the
Treaty of Rome. And the six wero Gnrany, France, Italy and what
we call the Benelux countries, BoiunL the Netherlands and
Luxobourg. A group of fairly small nations on the ust coast of
Europe and France, Ger:. any and Italy. And at that ti. o the
United Kingdor. declined to be in the party. Argunoents woere put
to and fro -s to , rhethe:-perhaps Greunt Britain shi-uldn't be one
of what would then be sjvon; whcther she shouldn't comne in on
the around floor, and negotiate herself for a Troaty whether
that turned out to be the 2reaty of RoEi or not. œ he British
Governo: ont of the clay decidod not to. dell today, soine four
yVars latu four and a half years later, they have decided to
no gtiato to go in. But what I want you to recebor is that at
that time they decided to stay out.
Now what was the object of this Treaty of Romn? It is a
very ronarkable story because at the beoginning of 1957 France was
in very poor shape, ocononically and politically. o, perhaps,
have forgotten that until Dc Gaullo ca: noe long as President and
gave stability to French governomnt they used to change their
Prime Ministers every six weoks or at the outside, every six
months. I know riany of you would think that an admirable idea.
( Laughter) Sometimes I think so myseif. But it wasn't until De
Gaulle came along that they had stability of Government.
xeonomically they were in a very poor way in 1956. Germany was
strong, not as strong as she is now, but had groim strong in the
years that had occurred since the war. And the six of thon got
together for reasons that I want you to have very clearly in
nind, and they made a Treaty about it it's a large thick
docunent. But it repays a lot of exarination. I am just going
to toll you the essence of it.
They decided that they would establish a Common Market,
moaning by that that after a period of years which boean by being
12 and right be a little more, but looks like being a little
less, but over a ' eriod of years, a short period of yoers, they
would achieve, as between thenselves, complete internal free
trade; and as between all of then and the rest of the world a
con.: on external customs barrier.
Now you see what this means? This cmans that the six
nations in Europe were setting out to put themselves in a
position, in relation to Europe, similar to that which is
occupied by the United States of America in its own country:
internal free trade and a common external custor. s barrier. And
the advantages that they saw in this, of course, were very great.
It meant that overy nation, Germany, France, Italy, whatever it
night be, would have unrestricted access to the raw naterials of
the others; it meant that France, which is a great wheat
producing country, could sell wheat into any of the other
countries without duty; it meant that raw materials for
manufacturing could be moved without duty from one country to
another; it meant a completely free interchange of labour, and a
completely free movement of capital. In other words these six
nations, including within themselves, many scors of millions of
people, an enormous industrial and agricultural strength, were to
become, cconorically, one co: nunity.
Now the moi: mnt that happened we became extremely
interested in Australia. I will develop for you, in a moment, the
reasons why. But before I do I just want to elaborate on this
Common Market, this economic corimunity, because if, and when
Great Britain joins it, no doubt the Scandinavian countries would
then join also, and you must realise that this is going to
represent an economic cormmunity of 250 million people, much
greater than the United States, greater than the Soviet Union,
And not a weak coumunity, in economic terms, because it contains
some of the groatest industrial power anywhere in the world.
So the first thing to aim at was a customs union with,
in due course, internal free trade. The second was to try to
have a cmmon agricultural policy. All those are set out in the
Treaty. They haven't yet worked out their comi: mon agricultural
policy. They were cdue to have a meeting about it beforc the end
of this year. And I think that one of the reasons why the
British Government has announced its intention to noeotiate is
that it wants to be in a p: sition to negotiate about the cormon
agricultural policy and I think that is v. y good, very good.
Beoc. use if the six negotiate a common agricultural policy I would
be fearful, myself, as to . what the results night be. In these
European countries, for rasons that one can understand,
historically, reasons of war and threatened starvation in tine of
war, they have adopted a policy of agricultural protectionism,
bolstering up the production from their own soil by subsidies,,
by certain price arrangements, by whatever it nay be, in order
that they ray provide as much of their own foodstuffs as they can
In point of view of world economics, not a very good thing; and
fron our point of view not a vry good thing. But that is what
they were aiming at in the Treaty of Rome when they established
the Conmon Market.
Now as to the present position in Europe let us
consider, for example, the question of wheat. In Germany they
produce wheat in the mst inofficio.. t fashion. You know we are
rather accustomed to think that the Germans are the model of
efficiency for everything. But they are not. They grow wheat
in little plots; their methods of wheat agriculture would make
any wheat farmor in Australia snile. But they do it in order to
produce as much cf their own food as they can. And in France
they have so encouraged the production of wheat that at this very
moment they have an exportable surplus. They look across the
Channel to Great Britain and they see there a market for their
own type of wheat, for their surplus of their own type of wheat.
Again if Great Britain goes into this Common Market, Denmark
will go in and Denmark is a groat producer of dairy products, a
magnificent producer of butter. It would seoo rather ironical,
wouldn't it, if we and Now Zoiland who, under a system of
Commonwealth preference, have had a preferred market in the old
country, found that the position was reversed: that we had to
pay a duty and that Danish butter went in free the complete
reversal of Commonwealth preferences. This is the kind of thing
that exercises our rinds and that exercises yours,
But one of the things in this Treaty of Rome is to work
out a cormmon agricultural policy, aimed at increasing production
that is one of the things said in the Treaty and at the
organisation of markots. I have r. ntioned to you that there is
to be a free movement of workers; I think I have mentioned to
you that there can be a free establishment of capital enterprises
from one of the European countries in another; there is to be
a European Investment Bank. And they have institutions, quite
formidable already, including an assembly of 142 people, a
Council of six, and a Commission which is a sort of executive
body, of nine. On top of all this there is to be a Court of
Justice to deal with the enforcement of the Treaty.
Now, Sir, it will be seen at once that these
arrangements of an economic kind will lead, inevitably, to
closer and closer industrial and economic association between the
European powers. And if Great Britain goes in I'll come later
on to the terms and conditions but if she , oes in, then of
course she will become more and more closely associated with then
in these fields.
Any amendment to the Treaty and this Treaty was nade
in March, 197, and a lot of water has gone under the bridge,
and a lot of advance has been rade in both Germany and France:,
economically, any amendment to the Treaty requires the
unanimous approval of all the Six. If any country wants to join
and Great Britain is now going to negotiate then she must
make an agreement with the Six, not with some of them, not with
most of ther., but with all of thor. Therefore any one European
power out of the Six can, by digging its hels in, insist on
terms completely unacceptable to Great Britain and the matter
will come to an end.
Now that, broadly, is the nature of the Cormm. on Market,
the Treaty of Rome, and it has, in the economic field, succeeded
enormously. I would just like to say to you that before the
Treaty of Rome was ever executed I had the great opportunity of
having long conversations with Chancellor Adonauer in Germany,
and with the then Prine Minister of France and there wore
different views expressed then from the ones that you will hear
now, because at that tir. o France was the weak nation, cconomicay,
and people said, " Oh, you must give France tine to recapture her
strength before you discuss anybody coning into the CDnmon Markct'.
Two years ago talking again to Adonauer, and talking, this time,
to De Gaulle in Paris, I found a conplete change in the
circumstances. Because France had become strong; and so strong
that I rather feel that she is not in a very groat hurry to admit
Groat Britain to this party. I don't know, but that is rather
the impression that I got.
Now there are two aspects of this matter, as to whether
Great Britain, the central nation in our Cormonwealth, the most
significant overseas nation in our economy, should seek to go in?
And if so, on what tcrms? Now I ar not going to endeavour to
answer the question " Should she go in?" I an not here to
pronounce any dogmas; and I'm not here to decide a problem for
Great Britain which Great Britain is immeasurably more competent
to solve for herself. After all people in London are not fools:
they know the people of Great Britain are not fools. They have
an enormous tradition of wisdom and good judgment. And they have
to thrash these matters out. All we can do from our end is to
say what we think, as Australians, and to carry out our simple
duty as a Government, which is to do the best thing that we can
for our own country and for our own people.
Quite obviously there are two aspects of this matter.
One is the economic aspect. What is going to happen to our
overseas trade? What do we suppose will happen to dairy products
and meat, and wheat, and sugar, and dried fruits, the whole gamut
of our primary exports, Uihich, apart from wool, represent of
course, our great contribution to international trade and
Australian solvency. We are concerned to see what happens to
those. That is the economic problem.
But there is another problem which is the political one.
I wonder if I could just say a few words to you about the
political aspect of this matter before I deal a little more
fully with the other.
There is nobody here, and least of all myself, who isn't
a great believer in the British Cormonwealth and in what it
stands for. We want to see it continue, we want to see it
strengthened, we want to see its voice in the world nore
powerful, and more and more respected. But we must face up to
this: that the Treaty of Rome is not just a merchant's bargain,
the Treaty of Rome has enormous political significance. You
can't have six nations trading together with no customs barriers
between then, a cormon external tariff, common industrial rules
existing, a Court to enforce then, you can't have all these
things without those countries becoming more and more united;
and as they become more and more united so they will more and
nore want to have a common foriegn policy to defend their cormon
domestic policy. This seems to me to be simple, and indeed,
almost elementary. That has not yet been fully conceded but I
firly believe it myself.
I was very interested to find that not long after I had
expressed these views in almost these terms to the
representative of the United Kingdom, the heads of State of the
six powers I will call then the Six had a meeting and issued
a communique. This is a rnarkable coranunique in my experience
because it said something. ( Laughter) I am an old hand at
communiques ( Laughter) I have had a finger in the pie about
dozens of then, both here and ovdrseas: this is the first one I
over knew that said something. I only need to tell you that I
had nothing to do with drafting it. But the communique stated,
on the 18th July, that the Heads of States and Governments were
convinced that only a united Europe is in a position, allied with
the United States and other free people, to neet the dangers of
the free world; that they wure deternined to develop their
political co-operation with the aim of European unification, For
this purpose they proposed to have regular meetings in order to
bring their policy into line and reach agreed views.
Now that, I confess, didn't surprise oe. It has always
soomed to ne to be inevitable that a close, intimate, economic
association of this kind must ultimately produce cormon political
institutions and comon political policies. That is tremendously
important. It is probably enormously important for the world.
If you had a united Europe with all these nations in it, with a
cor. mxon policy, a canon voice, and that great European power
stood against the fr-ces of Cor. mLuniJm, this would give a balance
of safety to the world that it now doesn't possess. This would
be of tremendous significance to everybody. Therefore at this
point I make no comnent on it except to say that it would
involve great strength for the free world.
But, Sir, the question then arises as to what happens to
Great Britain in relation to the Cormnonwealth if Groat Britain
goes into that new union? After all, as I have said domestic
policies to which she would become party must be protected by
some comnon external policies. If the old country goes into the
European Cormnon Market, the European Community then I believe
that she will increasingly becone absorbed in the international
politics, the international views, the significance in the world
of this new union or new agglomeration of power in Europe, of
which she would form part.
I wouldn't have you believe that I think that because of
that the matter becomes unthinkable. All I have ever said about
it and I repeat it here is that I will take a lot of
persuading that the Conm onwealth will romain the sane if the
chief country in the Cor. monwealth is . bscroed into a European
political union. It may be a good thing that she should be; but
don't ask me to believe that the Conrm. onwealth will remain the
same. Because what happens now when you have a Cormonwealth
Prime Ministers' Conference? You go along and you agree or
disagree I seemed to have a lot of disagreements on my hands
last time but we meet and we talk to each other and we
represent our countries and the voice of Great Britain is the
voice of Great Britain, uninhibited by anybody else. When it
becomes, in a sense, the voice of Europe, well the position won't
be quite the same, will it?
You know, ladies and gentlemen, it is worth remoembering
that the secret of British history in relation to Europe was for
a long, long time this: she had a small country in the days,
the great days of the first Elizabeth a population of less than
half of what we hove in Australia today; she was a country of
great seafarers, a fertile country, a sober sensible country.
She maintained a position of dominance in the world right through
the 19th century after the Napoleonic wars by pursuing the policy
known as the " balance of power". And what was the " balance of
power"? The " balance of power" involved Great Britain keeping
out of entanglements in Europe, but putting her hand in when
necessary to prevent one nation from becoming overwhoelingly
strong. So she was able to rectify the balance in Europe.
Right through the 19th century, the greatest period of British
expansion in reality, the century of optimism, the century of
imperial growth, the balance of power was the policy.
Now the question has arisen, for decision, as to
whether Great Britain should abandon that policy, abandon it and
go in to Europe herself as one of the factors to be balanced
not as somebody from outside intervening when wise, here or
there, but as one of the Seven, as it would be then, all of thon
working together, arriving at their decisions and pronouncing
cormon conclusions. In the history of British foreign policy this will be
the most historic event for at least a century and a half. It
may be that it is right. I would * ive a lot, myself, to see a
united Europe, strong and cohesive, in the present state of the
world. But when I put to you the political implications you . ill
at once see how right it is for me to say, and feo other people
to say that the decision that will ultimately be taken on this
matter will be the most important decision ever taken by any
British country, except in time of war, a tremendous decision,
with far flung political consequences, international consequences;
and of course the economic consequences to which I propose to
turn. Now before I leave that aspect I ought to say to you we
have a lively interest in having a powerful Europe; we have a
lively interest in doing something to prevent the spread, the
incessant and insidious sproed of communist power in th, world
a very lively interest. All I say about the effoct, -:. o.: tically,
on the Cormmonwealth is that I have never soon any particular
virtue in shutting your eyes to something and protending that it
isn't happening. I am quite certain myself that the B:. itish
Co1mmonwealth will be something different, if this event happens,
from what it is today.
I think at this stage I ought to say this to you. The
other day Mr. Macmillan, announced that the Government of Great
Britain was going to negotiate with a view to entering the
Cormon Market. That negotiation, of course, won't take place
next Tuesday. Things don't happen that way. The most
optimistic ostimate that I have heard as to the amount of tine
that would be occupied in the negotiations was eight ronths; and
when I pulled down out of the shelves the full text and annexuros
of the Treaty of Rome I car. e to the conclusion that negotiating
all of then might take a lot longer than eight months. But
anyhow that means that some tine next year, April, May, whatever
it may be, this matter will fall for decision.
We are interested fron the point of view of negotiation
in twto ways. In the first place a lot of these negotiations must
affect our export industries. There will be negotiations about
whether for example some Australian product is to pay a duty
while a European product runs free. In other words whether the
preferences that we have enjoyed are to be capsized and operated
in favour of a European country. These are great questions. And
we think, in Australia, that we in Australia are the only people
who are competent to argue about them. We know our industries.
And we have made it quite plain that we are not prepared to
leave to somebody else the defence of Australian dairy exports,
or of Australian cereal exports, or of Australian neat exports,
or sugar, or whatever it nay be. They are our lively concern.
The first duty of an Australian Government and it will
certainly be carried out by no is to defend the interests of
our own industries and to preserve the future of our own
country. ( Applause)
Well there will be several phases of this. Officials
have already been in consultation. There will no doubt be
further consultations on that, or some other level, before 1961
is out. There will undoubtedly be interventions by us in the
course of negotiations. Whether we are allowed to get -ito the
in.. or room or not is not something we can determine; but: we
will make an awful noise at the door, I can assure you, And we
will be there with horse fo) ot and artillery, meaning by ' horse"
a Minister or two, moaning by " foot" a couple of Heads of
Departments, and meaning by " artillery", as many competent people
representing industry as we can put our hands on.
But in due course the tine will cone when we will know
what are the best terms on which Great Britain can entor. And I
ronind you again: don't be too surprised about what happens
because unanimity is required on the part of the Six. If any one
of then says " You can't cone in and protect so-and-so's interest",
then Great Britain can't cone in. This is a natter of making a
negotiation with six nations all of whon have to agroe with each
other on everything before the negotiation cones to a happy
conclusion. When the negotiation has finished and Great Britain is
in a position to say " Well we have been able to do this about
neat", or " We have been able to do this about wheat", or " We have
been able to do this about butter" or whatever it iay be, then
no doubt at all, they will call a Conference of Connonwealth
Prime Ministers to come along to say " Yos", or Not that I
suppose if we all said " N1o" it would necessarily conclude the
natter; but I an perfectly certain that the weight of opinion in
Commonwealth countries would then be formidably felt.
Now we in iAustralia are a little rmre fortunate than
some; we have a broader oconomy. We can, in Austrqlia, take a
shock or two occasionally because the econony of this country
stands now, squarely on both fooG and we are really strong in the
economic world. But poor New Zeqland, to whom the export of
butter and dairy products is as important a-the export of wool
to us, stands at enormous risk in these matters; and I an
perfectly certain that Great Britain won't overlook that problem
because it is one of overwhelming importance to our sister
country. In the case of Canada, well Canada exports wheat and
therefore has a lively interest in that natter; Canada also
exports manuf::-ctured goods to the United Kingdon in large
quantities. I don't know what the answer to that problem is
going to be. Because one of the great objects of the European
Common Market is to develop European manufactures in order to
increase the competitive powers that they have in the world.
So fron our direct noint of view, we have interests in
certain export industries. have stated them categorically to
the Government of the United Kingdom; we expounded then to Mr.
Sandys when he was out here representing the Prine Minister for
this purpose; he knows exactly how we feel about these natters;
and he knows that so far as we are concerned we are not giving up
without a powerful struggle the preferential system of Conmonwealth
trade which h,; s meant so much to us, and I venture to
say has neant even r: oro to Great Britain. ( Applause)
But, of course, there is another interest that we have.
Great Britain happens to be a great market for us as you know.
The United Kingdon last year, 1960 I'r putting this in terms of
sterling sold to Australia œ 259m. worth of goods. It is worth
remembering that Australia is at present the greatest market for
British goods outside the United States of America. But in
Co. nonwealth terms we are the greatest customer, œ 259mf worth.
' We too:' 7% of all the United Kingdom sales abroad in 1960. And
the Connonwealth c: untrios, including Australia, took 42% of all
the British sales; and the six countries of the Common Market
took 14%. I will put that into . oro r . nm.. berablo terms: what
Great Britain sold to the Conmonwealth, including Australia, in
1960 was three times w. hat she sold to Germany, France, Italy,
Blgiun, the Netherlands and Luxeobourg the Six. That ! oeans,
of course, and Great Britain well understands this, that she has
enjoyed a Commonwealth iarket inmeasurably more important to her
than the market in Europe has been.
Well, suppose she . oes in. She will go in for one
cornanding oconomic reason and that is that it would give her
access to a hone market without tariffs intervening, a home
narket of 250 nillion people. This I can see quite plainly is
an argunent that has had groat cmpulsion on the ninds of my
friends in London: " To get into this hone market; to be able to
develop our export industry on the basis of this home market:; it
will put us in a position competitive with the United States of
America". But why can the United States of Auerica outsell
people around the world? Because she has a hone market with
internal free trade of 180 million people and access to all -he
raw naterials of a continent. Therefore I am sure they say
" This is the dominating factor; let us have the hone market and
everything will be well. Jo are in great econoric difficulties"
as indeed they are at present, as you know, -" let's get in to
this thing". Jell of course there is another side to the coin. If
they can sell free of duty to Gernany, Germany can sell, free of
duty, to then. That is thj essence of an internal free trade
system. And I have been wondering for r: yself I speak only for
ryself on this natter I have boon wondering whether some of
the industries in the United Kingdo could stand free trade
copetition by sooe of the industries on the continent.
You know, ladies and gentlemen, it is one of the
ironies of life you have all observed them that one of the
ways to get a completely up to date industrial establishment is
to be beaten in a -war. In the case of W. aest Gernany the Ruhr was
devastated, her heavy industries blasted practically out of
existence; and with the rcnarkable skill and enorgy and hard
work of the Gerrans they have cone back and all their iron and
steel works are quite modern, many of them erected with foreign
aid. With an iron and steel industry that is completely modern
I think they are going to be at some competitive advantage with
an iron and steel industry in the old country which is certainly
not modern for the most part, modern only in parts.
Well they have thought about that, I've no doubt. I'm
not going to have you believe for one moment that they are
incompetent to work these problems out for themselves they are
extraordinarily competent; they know far rore about then than I
do. All I want to point out to you is that there must have been
great questions to be answered in their own minds about these
matters before they decided to take the first step and
negotiate. Because if they are right, if the home market does
it, if their industries prosper, if their export capacity grows,
if their purchasing power increases, we will got the benefit
because as European purchasing strength, including that of Great
Britain, improves, we will have a better market than before. But
if they are wrong, well, it is not the kind of thing, I think,
in which you can make one error and then another and then oet
back. This is a tremendous and grave decision that will have
to be taken. One of the things that I want to make clear to you
is that they have not taken it yet. What they have decided to
do is to negotiate, to test out the ground, to see i'hat the
terms and conditions may be, to see how far they can protect
your interests and mine, the interests of Australia, Now Zealand
Canada, the British countries around the world. That is what
they are going to find out. But I thought that it would be very
necessary to tell you that we don't approach this problem, we,
your Government, in some sirple fashion and say, " Well, whatever
you say, that's all right". Jo approach this natter strong in
our omw dofence, strnmg in our own interests, strong to protect
Australia and its growth because if it turned out that some
decision was taken, adversely to our will or our desires, and
this affected one or two or three of our export industries, it
would be Australia that wuld have to pay the price.
I have told you that this is gJing to be quite a time
yet. If I survive the next election and I have already met
three people who think I will ( Laughter) if I survive the
next election and I am in rude health and strength, I nay be
there in the riddle of this argument. I just thought I would
like to let you know that I am not going along to any argunent of
this kind to be a " yes" man; I'm going along carrying the
greatest brief I Jver had in ny life, a brief for the export
industries of Australia. ( Applause)
Sir, while all that goes on we nust continue to do what
we have been doing, more and more actively as tine goes on,
seeking to expand our markets so that we won't have too many of
our eggs in one basket. There are perhaps great markets in the
world to be found, not only for Australian manufacturing, not
only for Australian primary industry, not only for Australian
mining, but for all of them, for every productive activity in the
country. I have a number of reasons for boin happy to come along
to Maitland but one of than was that you represent, in a sense,
a combination of all these matters: you are cheek by jowl with
one of the great stoel works of the world, one of the great basic
industrial undertakings of the world; you are in the middle of a
famous area for the production of primary product; I hope you
remember, from time to time, at dinner tine, that you are
sitting just below the most celebrated wine area in Australia;
and you are sitting alongside one of the great coal measures of
the country. We have been looking at all these matters in order
to stimulate markets. I am very glad to see that my colleague,
the Minister for National Dovelopment, Senator Spooner, is here
because he is all tangled up in this coal business. But the
business of exporting coal from Australia is one, I believe,
that can be developed out of all sight. In fact we know it can
and we are at this very moment in negotiation with the Government
of New South Wales to facilitate this through coal ports.
If it becomes necessary for us to go out nore and more
and to scour the world for people who will buy what we produce,
we shall go out and scour the world. But you know wo are old
fashioned people most of us, we have it in the blood: I would
fool terribly sad if anything happened to prevent us from trading
to that extent, at any rate, with the old country, along the old
preferential routes, to our mutual advantage and to the continued
good of the world. ( Applause)
4 Question Could we sell primary products to Asian countries below
cost by subsidising the producers?
Mr. Menzies Well, Sir, we would get into a great deal of international
trouble if we began to subsidise our exports, whether of
primary products or otherwise. One of our great problems, of
course, as you know is that we strongly suspect that there are
countries that do it now and that some of the goods that we get
into Australia are dumped at prices lower than the cost of
production. We have anti-dumping laws, but it is not always
easy to prove that they have boon dumped at below the cost of
production. But there is no future, if I may say so, in getting
into the copetition in the world for subsidising exports because
the greater the country the more successfully it can play that
game, and the more rapidly will the small one go to the wall.
( Applause).
Question If Groat Britain joined the Common Market adhered to
the Treaty of Rome without reservation, what would be the immediate
effect on our exports?
Mr. Menz es
Now that sounds like a simple question but it isn't
in reality. Where we have no current contract the irmmediate
effect on our exports would be very considerable. We would come
up against the customs barrier which would then extend to the
United Kingdom as well as to Europe and that would tend to damp
dovm the flow of our goods into Great Britain. In one or two
matters, of course we have current contracts. And when you say
" unconditionally" Air, do you mean abandoning current agreements
or allowing them to run out? Do you see what I mean? We have a
neat agreement. Well it has some years to go. It may be
that they would get an unconditional entry provided that that
contract was allowed to work its time. Well the immediate effect
on us then would perhaps not be very great. We have a sugar
agreement in cormmon with other Cormonwealth sugar producers and
that has some time to run. If Great Britain said " Well we will
go in unconditionally, but the sugar agreement must be allowed
to run its course" then for that time our export of sugar might
be maintained, although of course we would know that there was
a bad time coming in the future. We have a trade agreement with
the United Kingdom, but in most respects it can be terminated on
six months' notice. Well they might have to give six monthst
notice. You see what I am getting at is this: that where we have
no benefit of contract an unconditional adheience to the Treaty
of Rome would be immediate and damaging in its impact on our
exports. In certain other cases it might be a postponed impact
while contracts ran out. But although I answered that question
I am bound to tell you this that I do not think for one moment
that Great Britain will adhere to the Treaty of Rome unconditionally.
( Applause)
Question Mr. Prime Minister if B-itain accepts all the implications
of the Coion Market what would happen with the general
agreement on trades and tariff that now exists?
Mr. Menzies Well, Sir, if I may say so it is a very good question
and it is one that we have been putting to ourselves, because it
takes a lot of working out as to how to reconcile the general.
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GITT, as we call it, in a familiar
fashion it takes a lot of working out to reconcile GATT
with all its rules for international trade with this new complex.
Theref'ore I have no dogmatic answer but it is one of those things
that we are certainly having vory much in mind. There are va~ rious
aspects of this: there is GATT: there is the position of'
sterling and the sterling area: there is the position of our own
sterling holdings. All these things are merely thought about; in
the general at present: that they have to be got down to and
given close study, close examination. We will find in due course,
over the next few months, that there are aspects of this matter
that so far ia have not thought of that ought to be thought of'
and worked out. And you do very well to draw attention to that
one, ( Applause)
Question if Britain accepts all the implications of the Cormon
Market what becomes of the policy of preforential trade within
tUhe &-pire?
Mr. Menzies The question is: ' If Great Britain accept, 3 all the
implications of the Comm. on Market' you mean goes mn unconditionally
? what becomes of preferential trade within the Corironwealth'.*
Well I would thinkc that we would have to talk about it
from then on the in the past tense, because it is quite clear to
me that if our preferences, which have given us our market, for,
our primary products in Great Britain, disappeared and were
converted, on the contrary, into preferences for European countries,
our competitors, then I don't think anybody would suppose
for one moment that the British preferential tariff in our
customs schedule would continue to exist.
2uestion If Britain does eventually join the Common Market could
we join?
Mr. Menzies The question this tim~ i is whether we could join thae
Common Market. Now I just want to say this to you: I asm not un~-
willing to take on a few unpopular causes fromi time to time but
I would hate to have to say to the Australian secondary industries
that I had entered into a Commion Market which gave every
European industrial power free trade entry into Australia with
its manufactured goods. I would not only be kicked out, but I
would have to catch a new ship out of the country as fast as I
could. ( Laughter, applause)..
Question Would a threat by all the members of the Commonwealthi
to withdraw from the sterling area carry any weight with Britain
as a lever to get her to stand by us?
Mr. Menzies Well, frankly, Sir, I don't think so, I don't think so.
It is very, very complex question this question of the relationship
between the sterling area anl the non-sterling area and as
you already know probably, there are quite special rules that
apply to British sterling held in European countries in terms
of convertibility into dollars. It is a very complex problem.
But first I don't think you could get any such general request:
second I an not at all sure that I would be interested in making
one; third I don't think that even the hint of such a thing
would materially affect these negotiations. ( Applause)
2Question If Great Britain went in to the Commaon Market whiat
would be the circumstances that would enable her to withdrawi?
Mr. Menzies I can't really tell you the answer to that off hand. I
htavo been a little puzzled about it myself. But if it takes
unanimity of agreement to become a riember, then it may well be
it would take unanimity of decision for one member to leave. But
I have not worked it out. All I know is that in these great
affairs you ca' go into a great organisation and say to
yourself " Well if I don't like it I'll leave", 9 because in cold
practical fact it is too late to leave then. You have entered'
into a lot of arrangements; you have had your industries adjusted
to the new state of affairs; you have become accustomed to
conducting your trade battles in a certain fashion. It not
very easy to reverse course under those circumstances. But if
you will allow me to say so on that particular point I really
can't give you a definite reply.
2uestion I would like to know whether Britain's entry into the
Common Market would have the effect of speeding up her changeover
to the decimal currency?
Mr. Menzies To bo perfectly frank I hiaven't the slightest idea. But
I don't imagine that it would, I don't imagine that it would.
After all if Britain goes into the Common Market she is going; to
have a nest of problems, matters to accommodate herself to and
I don't imagine that decimal currency would come very high on the
list. We have had a committee looking into it in Australia
everybody is in favour of decimal currency until you tell them
the size of the bill. ( Laughter) Then they say " Well that's
all right; you boys can pay it". And when I say that to the
Treasurer, he faints. ( Laughter) ( Applause)
Qustion What value would be the exports of primary products frorm
Australia to other countries than Great Britain? And what would
be the value of such exports to Great Britain.
Mr. Menzies Well, Sir, I am sorry I don't carry these figures in my
mind as I am sure you wouldn't expect me to. We have of course
substantial exports of primary products to other countries; and
of course very substantial ones to the United Kin[ gdomi. You are
right in saying that in any event we would need to expand our
narket-f for our primary industries around the world. And we will
do that anyhow because there is a limit, having regard to our
growth and development in Australia, there is a limit to the
extent to which we can find armaa2ket in one country and not in
others. We are actively pursuing m~ arkets in other countries. We
have a very elaborate Trade Cormmissionor service which is constantly
looking for markets and, as you know we have had trade
missions of a variety of kinds g~ oing arounl to different countries
in the world, not without success. I here that more and more
we will diversify the markets for our -oods. ( Applause)