SPEECH i3Y ' THE PRIME MINIS-TER AND 1INISTE'i
FOII EIr'ERNAL AFFIRS, THE RT. HON. R. G.
MENZIES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON THURFDAY THE 8TH SEPTE MBEl
Oddly enough, I had decided to accept that invitation
before I heard it. Beore proceeding to deal with some of the
statements made by the honorable member w; ho has just sat down
some of the things said from Yarra and some of the things sail
from East Sydney, I want to mention two or three particular
points that have been raised with a rare sense of relevance by
one or two honorable members, particularly my friend, the
honorable member for Lilley ( Mr. light), who inquired about the
discrepancies to be seen in the charges in the accounts for
postage, telegrams -and telephones, and in the following item
relating to courier service and diplomatic mails. it is
purely a matter of transferring dertain amounts from one head to
the other. If thle honorable member looks at the totals, he
will see that the total of thie two is substantially the same as
thne total of the two -for last year.
The honorable member for Lilley also said something
with which, if he will allow me to say so, I warmly agree. That
was that technical assistance is a side of the Colombo Plan
scheme which deserves increasing emphasis. I do agree with
that. I think that we must devote more and more time to w~ hat
I will call this increase in personal skill, the development of
the capacity of the receiving countries.
Somebody else I have forgotten who it was nowreferred
to the allegation that has appeared that the Netherlands
had adopted a new policy in relation to Netherlands New
Guinea. 4e made an inquiry about that, and we have been
specifically and officially informed that there is no change
in the Netherlands position; that, in point of fact, this
last statement that has had some publicity does not vary from
the position taken by Mr. Luns, the Foreign Secretary, in
February of this year, and which was at that time widely
reported. Having said t1~ at, I want to come back, not in
chronological order, but as I recall them, to three remarkable
speeches that have been made from the Opposition side of the
committee. I will begin, wiith proper courtesy, with the
honorable member for v4ills ( Mr. Bryant), who has just sat down.
He always fascinates me because, when he makes two speeches, I
am never quite sure whether he remembers, when making the
second speech, what he said in the first. His second speech
was one in which he went to some pains to establish that you
could be interested in a problem without knowing the answer, and
he did not profess to know the answer. I think that is a very
admirable attitude. But in his earlier speech, he knew the
answers to the problems of South Africa! What hie knows about
the internal problems of South Africa could be written on a
postage stamp, but there he is not troubled by those philosophic
doubts that assailed him in his second edition. At
that time he said: " The policies of South Africa are monstrous.
We all 3 now how wrong they are." He did not give us thne
benefit of his opinion as to how they ought to be changed, in
what way they ought to be changed, or what oughit to be done
about them. Obviously and I thinkc this does him no injustice
he thought the problem singularly easy to solve, I do not
think I am unfair in saying that because, if it were not
singularly easy to solve, he would not be comfortably solving
it from a green cushioned seat in Canberra thousands of miles
a~ ray. Therefore, I take it that in his first edition, in what
one might call the authorized edition, he found South Africa's
problem very easy to solve. The honorable member perhaps
might be invited to ponder over a few questions. Does he
believe in our immigration policy?
Mr. Bryant -do
MR. ME~ NZIES -The honorable member for -dlls. I am not
expecting him to answer now because these are questions on
which he will need to take advice, if he is wise, before he
gives the answers. Does he believe in Australia's immigration
policy? If he does not, he is oddly placed in the Labour
Party. If he does, why does he? Does he believe in it
because he does not want to have created in Australia multiracial
problems? is that the reason? It must be the reason.
He does not want to have set up in Australia the kind of
problem which could arise if we-bir oke down our immigration
policy, and which has existed, and in fact now exists, in the
Union of South Africa. Yet, if he is right, that is not a
difficult problem! Why believe in our immigration policy if
it could not matter less if we had a problem of mixed races
and of large communities of people of different basic races in
Australia? The honorable member says: " That is quite easy. I
know what I would do." I wonder whelther he does? I wonder
whether he knows what the answer is? I wonder whether he
realizes what an impertinence it is for people with no
experience of these problems or of the misery of these problems
to be getting up, blowing out their chests and telling another
country in the Commonwealth how it ought to manage its own
affairs? I want to say no more about that. It is a matter
that hie can chew over to his heart's content.
But I want to come back to a couple of speeches that
have been made in the course of these discussions, and which
really do deserve some attention. The honorable member for
Hume ( Mr. Anderson) made, as always, a speech in which he
valiantly expressed w-hat he had in his mind, and he was
attacked subsequently for what he had said. The honorable
member for Hume said that the U2 incident was not a failure and
that Khrushchev had net gained any propaganda value from it.
He was scoffed at later on by the honorable member for Yarra
( Mr. (; Cairns) who, though no doubt he is tho-most ardent of
Labour men, has a singular spiritual consanguinity with the
people who dictate the policy of the Kremlin. He never fails to
deliver that particular line, and he made a speech in which he
was prepared to say that the U2 incident was a co2. az 21 crash
in public relations for the i4estern world. In fact, he
appeared to me to take some pleasure out of his belief that it
was such a crash in public relations.
What effect the U2 incident has in terms of
propaganda depends on what side you are en. I am g; oing to say
something about it, because I was in London when this occurred
and I was able to discuss it both there and in the United
States of America,, Anybody who knows anything about these
things knows that it was Khrushcheov who wanted to have a
Summit Conference. It was he who put himself in the position
of the advocate and inviter.
1vir. Reynolds -What about Macmillan?
kv1R. MENZIES -He was keen on it: but after some to and fro and
some hesitation, an agreement was secured by do Gaulle and
Eisenhower that they would attend a Summit Conference in Paris..
As sensible men, they got together. They threshed out their
general problems and arrived at what I shall call a broad
community of mind on the matters that had to be considered. At
that moment it appeared that Khrushchev, the great advocate of
a summit meeting, was determined to frustrate it. There was no
profit in it for him. He was going to meet three people whom he
could not divide and conquer. He was g oing to meet three
people again ' st whom the characteristic Commuunist technique of
theo past ten years would fail; and he must have been the most
3.
delighted fellow in the world I have always believed it
when they said, A U2 aircraft has come down. ' e have
captured the pilot. We now have evidence that the United
States of America is spying on us." I am perfectly certain
that Khrushchev was very pleased.
Mr. Clyde Cameron Why?
MR. MENZIES Because this gave him the excuse he was looking
for not to go on with that Summit Conference. I am not defending
the timing of that particular U2 flight for a moment.
Mr. Cairns Ah
MR. MENZIES You need not worry. I have told that to better.
men than you in the United States of America. I am not
defending the time of the flight, but what I am saying is
that this came to Khrushchev as glad tidings in the first
place until, of cours; he realized and was reminded by his
assistants that after all the thing had come down over 1,000
miles inside the frontiers of the Soviet Union, and therefore
the nuclear deterrent delivered by aircraft was more effective
against his country than he had ever conceded. Therefore, his
momentary joy was succeeded by a genuine passion, and that
genuine passion wras expressed when he spoke at his famous press
conference in Paris.
The honorable member for Yarra has said that this was
great propaganda for Khrushchev. Before anybody settles down
to that idea, let me put this to him: Nobody with his five
wits would believe that the Soviet Union does not engage in
espionage. Of course it does; it has the master spies of our
time. Does anybody believe that you can make a nuclear weapon
a deterrent unless you know at what target to fire? You don't
poop off to use that expression a missile at the map of
Russia. You have to aim it at a target, and it is one of the
oddities of the world today that on our side because after all
the United States of America is on our side anybody in the
United States of America may discover where all the installatiors
are and where the various firing points are, within pretty
narrow limits, by subscribing to the illustrated papers. As a
matter of fact Khrushchev pointed that out to a very
distinguished American last year a man who happens to be a
close friend of mine. Khrushchev said, " You ta~ k about open
skies! I do not need them. I have only to subscribe to your
journals. Do you think I am going to give away the advantage
I have by the secrecy of my installations? You must take me
for a simpleton." Therefore, of course I would have been
bitterly disappointed if aircraft had not beeoon spotting these
places and giving the rest of us in the world a chance of
survival in a global contest.
One aircraft was apprehended, and of course the
friends of the Soviet Union seized on that. they said,
" this is terrible stuff." Only those who arc instinctively
predisposed to accept Soviet propaganda will fail to understand
the basic truth that on this occasion Khrushchev preferred to
score his debating point and frustrate the meeooting at the
Summit. He preferred that to the interests of ordinary men and
women all over the world who had hoped that out of the Summit
Conference there might come something at any rate some little
point settled, some gloam of hope, even some agreement about
nuclear experiments or a moratorium on Berlin. These are the
most tremendous issues in the world and these are things,
whether Khrushchev knows it or not, that sound in the ears, the
minds and the hearts of ordinary men and women all over the
world; and ordinary men and women all over the world will not
forgive him for taking his debating point and scattering a
meeting of the heads of governments to the wind.
4,
That is the first thing I want to say. The second is
this: The honorable member for Hume made some reference to the
cold war. He said we should try to win the cold war. By a
monstrous perversion of the words of a gallant and respected
gentleman in this House, the honorable member for Yarra said
that this meant that the honorable member for Hume anted to
convert the cold war into a hot war, Those wore the very
words of the honorable member for Yarra. I wrote them down at
the time. He said the honorable member for Hume wanted to
convert the cold war into a hot war. That was a diabolical
statement to make. If it had been made about a gentleman with
a career less clear and distinguished than that of the
honorable member for Humo it might have been a hurtful remark.
The honorable member for Hunc, of course, meant what we all
mean. je did not start the cold war. we are not responsible
for the preservation of tension in the world. There is not
one single cause of tension in the world that does not lie
squarely at the door of the Communist powers. : oI did not begin
the cold war, but, since it has been commenced, we must win it.
You win a cold war by maintaining every effort to remove
tension and by maintaining every effort to confer and to discuss
at any time. You win a cold war by maintaining every
effort to keep up your defences and your strength and by
maintaining every effort to keep your world friendships green.
That is what is meant by winning a cold war, The honorable
member for Yarra, by his contemptible perversion of what the
honorable member for Hume said, alleged that we want to win
the cold war by having a hot war presuimably a deterrent war.
Tlhere is another aspect of the speech made by the
honorable member for Yarra. He can always be relied on to put
the case of the free world in the worst possible way and the
case of the Communist powers in the best way. He is quite
famous for that. Consistent with that attitude of mind, he
said that the Comm: unist powers have taken the lead in
disarmament talks and in talks on the suspension of nuclear
tests.
Mr. Cairns That is right.
MR. MENZIES Of course, the honorable member continues to say
that. All Communist propaganda is repeated again and again and
the honorable member can be relied on to repeat it in this
place. His statement is utterly untrue. One has only to refer
to the l.. st meeting of the Disarmamont Commission at Geneva to
discover that at a time when the two sides, particularly in
relation to nuclear tests, were by no moans 100 miles apart a
good deal had been agreed upon and, with a little exercise of
control, other matters might have been agreed upon the
representatives of the Soviet Union walked out. They did that
because th. y know that on the next morning constructive
proposals by the estern powers were to be placed on the table
of the conference. These are the people who are honoured in
this place by the gentleman from Yarra as having taken the
lead in disarmament talks. I received a letter from Khrushchev
himself about this natter and I replied to hin. I was not
specially favoured in receiving the lettor, because I think
similar letters were sent to all other leaders of governoment.
No doubt my reply was frightfully old-fashioned, I am sure
that it would not get the slightest acco: mmodation in the mind
and judgeont of the honorable gentleman from Yarra. However,
I propose to read a paragraph or two. I said
" I deeply regret, howover, that the five Eastern
European countries represented at the ten-nation Disarmament
Committoe, led by the Soviet Union, have seen fit to walk out
of the Committee's meetings without waiting even to ho: r, let
alone discuss, the ! estern powers' considered views of your
proposals and the new proposals of their own, which it was
known were being prepared for early submission to the
Committee. I cannot see that the delegates' action will
help to further the general cause of disarmament,
I regret the latest development all the more because I
had been glad to note your assurance that your new proposals
had taken into consideration some of the views of other
Governments participating in the Disarmament Committee's work.
It had been our hope that careful study in the Disarmament
Committee would have justified the expectations raised by
news of your approach. We had hoped particularly that the
proposals would be followed by the elaboration of concrete
measures for control related to each stage of the
disarmament prograrme and effective from the very beginning
of the disarmament process, so that disarimament and its
control would proceed hand-in-hand.
That is not an unconstructive statement of our
policy. I continued
All these hopes have now been dashed.
It was with concern that I noted in your letter the
statement that the Soviet Government doubts whether the
Western Powers represented in the Disarmament Committee
really want disarmament; and I see that similar statements
have been made even more forcibly recently by the Soviet
delegate in Geneva. The policies followed by the Western
Powers since 1946, including their record in the many
disarmament conferences held over that period, are, however,
sufficient to dispel any such doubts. For my own part, I
am convinced from my experience and contact with Iestern
Leaders over the years that these doubts are entirely
misplaced. I am certain that the Western Powers, no less
than Australia, stand ready to work out measures leading
toward general and complete disarmament under effective
international control, which was the aim of the unanimous
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly last year."
I venture to suggest that my reply represents the honest view
of Australians on this matter. The other view is the view of
Khrushchev. I now propose to say a word or two about the views
of the honorable member for East Sydney ( Mr. ! Ward). He is
firmly of the opinion that Cormunist China should be
recognized. He believes that recognition of Communist China
would go a long way towards solving the problems of Asia. I
wonder what reason he has for that belief. Oddly enough his
attitude on this matter is completely academic because, in
effect, he is saying that here is a country that has a
settled government a government in authority. He says that
the country has all the earmarks of one that is entitled first
to recognition do facto and secondly to recognition de juro.
Ho asks why we do not recognize Communist China. W1ll, if
the matter were as simple as would indeed be simple.
But the honorable member must know that you , will get nowhere
with Cormunist China by recognizing it unless you recognize
also Communist China's control over Formosa. That is the
simple truth of the matter. The United Kingdom Government
years ago, when my friend Lord Attlee held the reins of office,
recognized Communist China and has had some kind of diplomatic
post there, but that has not had the slightest effect. That
recognition has not made the slightest difference to United
Kingdom relations with Communist China because Cormunist China,
being a Communist power, being devoted to an expansion of its
jurisdiction and being, as all Communist powers . re,
imperialist in its quality, must have Formosa. I have heard.
people say that Communist China should have Formosa. I do
not want honorable members opposite to tell no that Chiang
Kai-Shek says that mainland China and Formosa are one
country. I am not interested in that. What I am interested
in is the fact that 10,000,000 people live on Formosa. A
groat many of them live there because they object to living
under Communist rule. The simple truth of the proposal that
we recognize Communist China is that we must also advocate a
course of policy that will hand over those 10 million people
now free into Communist control. I invite honorable members
to consider what that would mean. Nothing short of that
would be of any interest to Communist China. What would it
mean? First, it would mean, of course, the complete destruction
of Seato. There are some people people who did not
have the responsibility for negotiating the South-East Asian
Treaty who think nothing of that organization. ' o think
something of it. Je think something of a treaty which results
in the United States of Amer' Great Britain, France,
Pakistan, New Zealand and Australia, the Philippines and
Thailand, standing side by side. But if, cynically, we wore
prepared to hand over Formosa to the Communists in China, what
effect would that have on the protocol countries Laos,
Canbodia, Thailand, South Vietnam and Malaya? They would say,
" Woll, if you can give away 10,000,000 people in Formosa, you
can give away 10,000,000 people somewhere clse". It would
utterly destroy the whole basis of confidence on . which Seato
rests. I said so at the ministorial conference of Soato in
Washington, with the unanimous approval of all -he ministors
there present. There would be another effect of saying to Commuunist
China, " You may have Fornosa", quite apart from its effect on
the general defensive structure of the Pacific. Such a move
would represent the greatest diplomatic triu ph, produced by
voluntary concession, in the post-war history of communism.
What its effect would be i. any of the Asian and South-East
Asian countries I leave to anybody's imagination.
When people venture into the field of foreign affairs
I suggest to them that they should take a vow that before
going to bed each night they will have a good, long, thoughtful
look at the map and try to real izo whe-ro we live and whore our
friends live. I have spoken at rather greater length than I
intended, and I daresay that most of what i have said and what
I have been answering is completely out of order. After all,
as honorable mmnbor for Coranga:. te ( Mr. Mackinnon) reminded
us yesterday, we are debating the Estimates. But since these
matters have been raised, and since there is a chronic
disposition on the part of honorable members opposite to
believe that the Governmont has no point of view, I have stated
the Government's point of viewnl hope, most unambiguous
terns.