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Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Transcript 9620

AN AUSTRALIAN REPUBLIC - THE WAY FORWARD HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Photo of Keating, Paul

Keating, Paul

Period of Service: 20/12/1991 to 11/03/1996

More information about Keating, Paul on The National Archive website.

Release Date: 07/06/1995

Release Type: Statement in Parliament

Transcript ID: 9620

PRIME MINISTER
CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HON P. J. KEATING, MP
AN AUSTRALIAN REPUBLIC THE WAY FORWARD
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
7 JUNE 1995
* Embargoed until 7: 30pm, 7 June
It is the Government's view that Australia's Head of State should be an
Australian that Australia should become a republic by the year 2001. Tonight I
shall describe the means by which we believe this ought to be done.
Honourable members will recall that to fulfil an undertaking given during the last
election campaign, on April 28 1993 the Government established a Republic
Advisory Committee to prepare an options paper which would describe the
minimum constitutional changes necessary to create a federal republic of
Australia. The Republic Advisory Committee was chaired by Mr Malcolm Turnbull and
comprised Dr Glyn Davis, Miss Namoi Dougall, the Hon Nick Greiner, Dr John
Hirst, Ms Mary Kostakidis, Miss Lois O'Donoghue, the Hon Susan Ryan and
Professor George Winterton.
I take this opportunity to thank them. They consulted widely throughout
Australia, carried out their work with dedication and energy and delivered to the
Government and to posterity a most valuable document.
In the eighteen months which have passed since the release of the Report, the
idea of an Australian republic has come to occupy a central place in our national
political debate: not only in this Parliament but within the political parties, in
major representative and community bodies, in schools and universities,
communities at large and, I daresay, around countless Australian dinner tables.
In the process many Australians have come to favour a Republic. Just as many,
perhaps, now believe it is inevitable.

Many may regret the prospect of change and be unsure about the means by
which it can be achieved, but recognise that sooner or later we must have an
Australian as our Head of State. That one small step would make Australia a
republic. Governments can wait for opinion to force their hand, or they can lead. They
can wait for the world to change and respond as necessity demands, or they can
see the way the world is going and point the way.
We are approaching the 21st century and the centenary of our nationhood. As
never before we are making our own way in our region and the world. For us the
world is going and we are going in a way which makes our having the British
monarch as our Head of State increasingly anomalous.
The fact is that if the plans for our nationhood were being drawn up now, by this
generation of Australians and not those of a century ago, it is beyond question
that we would make our Head of State an Australian. Any suggestion that the
British monarch should fill the role would not be entertained. This is not
because our generation lacks respect for the British monarchy, or the British
people, or our British heritage, or the British institutions we have made our own,
or our long friendship with the British in peace and war. On the contrary,
Australians everywhere respect them, as they respect The Queen. But they are
not Australian. It is so obvious, that if we were just now drawing up our
constitution, we probably would not even feel the need to say that the Australian
Head of State will be Australian it would go without saying.
That it does not go without saying today is an accident of history. We are
attached to Great Britain by long threads of kinship and affection which, to a
considerable extent, are embodied in the warmth of our regard for Queen
Elizabeth. Many Australians may well feel that to substitute an Australian for the
monarchy constitutes in some way a rejection of these ties. I think all of us can
understand these feelings.
But the creation of an Australian republic is not an act of rejection. It is one of
recognition: in making the change we will recognise that our deepest respect is
for our Australian heritage, our deepest affection is for Australia, and our
deepest responsibility is to Australia's future.
Nothing in the creation of an Australian republic will alter the facts of our
heritage and our affections. Indeed our relationship with Britain may well
become the more thoroughly " modern relationship" which the British Prime
Minister expressed a desire for two years ago. The development of a mature
and modern relationship will certainly not be inhibited by recognition of the truth.
We are friends with separate destinies to carve out in the world. We are not as
we once were, in a parent-child relationship.

The people of modern Australia are drawn from virtually every country in the
world. It is no reflection on the loyalty of a great many of them to say that the
British monarchy is a remote and inadequate symbol of their affections for
Australia. And we can be equally sure that in the 21st century the British
monarchy will become even more remote from even more Australians.
Australia occupies a unique place in the world and makes a unique contribution
to it. Our destiny is in no-one else's hands but our own: we alone bear the
responsibility for deciding what the nature of our government and society will be,
what advantage we will take of our human and material resources, what kind of
place our children will inherit.
It is not a radical undertaking that we propose.
In proposing that our Head of State should be an Australian we are proposing
nothing more than the obvious. Our Head of State should embody and
represent Australia's values and traditions, Australia's experience and
aspirations. We need not apologise for the nationalism in these sentiments, but
in truth they contain as much commonsense as patriotism.
This is a point worth making: this republican initiative is not an exercise in
jingoism; it is not accompanied by the beat of drums or chests. It asserts
nothing more than our unique identity. It expresses nothing more than our
desire to have a Head of State who is truly one of us. It changes nothing more
than what is required to make clear and unambiguous our independence and
responsibility for our own affairs.
It is a small step, but a highly significant one. The government believes that at
this stage of our history it is a logical and essential one. And it can reflect that
stage in our history. An Australian Head of State can embody our modern
aspirations our cultural diversity, our evolving partnerships with Asia and the
Pacific, our quest for reconciliation with Aboriginal Australians, our ambition to
create a society in which women have equal opportunity, equal representation
and equal rights. In this decade we have a chance which few other countries
have; in declaring ourselves for an Australian republic, we can give expression
to both our best traditions and our current sensibilities and ambitions.
At present, under the Constitution, Australia's Head of State is The Queen and
her " heirs and successors in the sovereignty of the United Kingdom". Anyone
reading the Australian Constitution who is unfamiliar with the practical realities of
Australian government would assume that the role of the monarch was central.
In fact, the involvement of the British monarch in Australia's affairs is now very
limited. The Queen's role as Head of State is in most respects carried out by the
Governor-General. Of the responsibilities The Queen retains, the most notable
is her appointment of the Governor-General which, by convention, she does on
the advice of the Prime Minister.

We are not quite alone among the countries of the world in having as our Head
of State someone who is not one of our own citizens, but we are in a very small
minority and a majority of the countries in the Commonwealth of Nations are
republics with their own Head of State. Of the 185 members of the United
Nations, only 15 do not have their own Heads of State and 14 of those 15 are
former British Dominions.
The Queen of Australia is also Queen of the United Kingdom and 14 other
countries in the United Nations.
Notwithstanding that The Queen is Australia's Head of State and fulfils that duty
conscientiously, when she travels overseas she represents only the United
Kingdom. Her visits abroad often tend to promote British trade and British
interests they do not promote Australia's trade and interests.
This is, of course, right and proper for the Head of State of the United Kingdom.
But it is not right for Australia. The right Head of State for Australia is one of us,
embodying the things for which we stand, reminding us of those things at home
and representing them abroad. We number among those things fairness,
tolerance and love of this country. It is a role only an Australian can fill.
Each and every Australian should be able to aspire to be our Head of State.
Every Australian should know that the office will always be filled by a citizen of
high standing who has made an outstanding contribution to Australia and who, in
making it, has enlarged our view of what it is to be Australian.
In these and other ways, the creation of an Australian republic can actually
deliver a heightened sense of unity, it can enliven our national spirit and, in our
own minds and those of our neighbours, answer beyond doubt the perennial
question of Australian identity the question of who we are and what we stand
for. The answer is not what having a foreign Head of State suggests. We are
not a political or cultural appendage to another country's past. We are simply
and unambiguously Australian.
If only by a small degree an Australian republic fulfilled these ideals it would be
worth it.
Measured against other stages of our development it is a relatively simple and
modest undertaking. A hundred years ago, despite their rivalries and the
enormous distances which separated them, the Australian colonies came
together and created a nation. In the course of a century we have evolved from
a collection of British colonies; to a single nation of limited independence; to a
Dominion in the British Empire; to a sovereign nation in all respects bar one. In
the same century we have come through great trials of our collective courage
and ingenuity.

As Australian democracy and society have evolved and developed, the practical
character of Australian government has dramatically changed. For example, in
the 1930s the Governor-General ceased to be the representative of the British
government in Australia and became the representative of the British monarch
alone. In the same decade it was accepted that the British monarch would act
solely on the advice of the Australian government not the British government
in relation to Australian matters; and Australia assumed responsibility for its own
external affairs which had been previously the responsibility of the British
government. In 1930 for the first time, an Australian became Governor-General.
With the abolition of all remaining rights of appeal to the Privy Council in
London, in the 1980s Australian courts became the ultimate arbiters of
Australian law. Also with the passage of the Australia Act, the Parliament of the
United Kingdom relinquished the last vestiges of its power to make laws applying
to Australia.
In every instance, there was controversy. Today it is hard to imagine why the
changes were opposed.
And we are better for the changes. In the 1990s we are stronger, richer and
better placed in the world than ever before. At every stage in our development
there have been hesitations, but in the end we have always recognised
necessity and where our interests lie. If at times we have been cautious about
taking large steps forward, it cannot be said that we have taken any backwards.
That is what we seek with the republic: a small but important step forward the
last step in a process which began one hundred years ago. We think it is time to
embrace the necessary change.
We therefore intend to ask the Australian people if they want an Australian
republic with an Australian Head of State.
The change we propose has very limited implications for the design of
Australia's democracy. It is the so-called " minimalist" option. All the essential
Constitutional principles and practices which have worked well and evolved
constructively over the last hundred years will remain in place.
I stress that these proposals represent the Government's preferred position. We
do not suggest that it is the only position and not open to change. But it is a
position reached after careful consideration of the Advisory Committee's report,
and we believe it to be a wise position that will stand the test of time.
" Commonwealth" is a word of ancient lineage which reflects both our popular
tradition and our Federal system, and we propose that the Australian republic
retain the name " Commonwealth of Australia".

Under the proposals the role of the House of Representatives and the Senate
will remain unchanged, as will the role and powers of the States. We will still be
a Federation. In virtually every respect, our governmental arrangements will be
exactly the same as they are now: the day to day handling of national
government will remain with Ministers led by the Prime Minister; the Cabinet will
continue to deal with the major issues; and Ministers will continue to be
responsible to Parliament and the Australian people.
Our membership of the Commonwealth of Nations headed by The Queen will not
be affected.
None of these things will change, but we will have an Australian as our Head of
State, and we propose that he or she be described by the term " President of the
Commonwealth of Australia".
The President will perform essentially the same functions as the Governor-
General. As with the Governor-General, except in the most exceptional
circumstances, these functions will be carried out on the advice of the
Government of the day.
A former Australian Governor-General, Sir Zelman Cowen, made some remarks
last week which I think bear repeating. They echoed those of a predecessor of
his, Sir Paul Hasluck; and in fact I should think they contain a sentiment common
to every Governor-General since Federation. Sir Zelman described the
Governor-General's role as " the highest single expression in the Australian
governmental structure of the idea that all Australians from all parties and all
walks of life belong to the same nation".
An Australian Head of State would perform precisely this unifying role; and, it
follows, would need to be of the same stature and integrity as we seek in our
Governors-General.
A significant element of the Head of State's role is symbolic; performing
ceremonial duties around the nation and abroad. This is the public aspect of the
office: the means by which the Head of State represents Australia and, by his or
her example and encouragement, provides national leadership.
The Head of State will also continue to perform the formal administrative duties
given to the Governor-General by legislation and which are undertaken on the
advice of the Federal Executive Council. The Head of State's duties here
include formalising government regulations and appointing public officials.
The Head of State will assume the Governor-General's constitutional duties,
most of which are, by convention, performed in accordance with the advice of
the government of the day. These include summoning and dissolving the House
of Representatives and the Parliament as a whole and issuing writs for Federal
elections. The Head of State will also take over the Governor-General's role as
titular Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

In line with actual practice, we propose that the Constitution be amended to
make clear that the Head of State will exercise these constitutional duties on the
advice of the government of the day.
Finally, the Head of State will retain those very few powers now held by the
Governor-General which, in the most exceptional circumstances, may be
exercised without, or possibly contrary to, Ministerial advice.
These are the so-called reserve powers. The Republic Advisory Committee
identified these powers as: the power to appoint the Prime Minister; the power to
dismiss the Prime Minister and therefore the government; and the power to
refuse a request by the Prime Minister to dissolve one or both Houses of the
Parliament. The Committee made the point that there are a number of principles or
conventions underpinning our Westminster style of government and the practical
operation of our Constitution. These principles, which are not currently set out in
the Constitution, determine whether the circumstances exist for the Governor-
General to exercise a reserve power and what action would be appropriate.
Theoretically, it would be possible to fully codify or write down these
conventions, assuming one could foresee all the contingencies they might be
required to meet. I have no doubt that a great many people would like to see the
Head of State's discretionary, or reserve, powers tightly defined as they are, for
example, in the Irish Constitution so as to oblige the Head of State to act in
accordance with express rules in the Constitution, or Ministerial advice, in all
circumstances. The question is, then: should the reserve powers which are imprecise and
governed by precedent and convention be codified? Should they be
delineated, cut down or specified precisely in our Constitution, or should they
remain as they apply now, by unwritten convention?
The advantage of codifying the conventions, whether in whole or in part, would
be to bring a degree of clarity and certainty to the options open to a Head of
State in different situations.
However, after careful consideration, the Government has formed the view that it
is probably impossible to write down or codify these powers in a way that would
both find general community acceptance and cover every possible contingency.
As the system evolves there needs to be some capacity to respond to
circumstances quite unforeseen today. Tightly defined rules can themselves
have unforeseen consequences.

Were we to try, by Constitutional amendment, to set down precisely how the
reserve powers should be exercised by the Head of State, those amendments,
even if intended to be otherwise, could well become justiciable that is capable
of being adjudicated by the High Court of Australia and required to be
adjudicated by the High Court.
Hence, codification would be likely to result in fundamental change to our system
of government and alter the status of the High Court in relation to the Executive
and the Parliament. Over time, Justices of the Court could well be drawn into
arbitrating purely political disputes whose resolution should ultimately be in the
hands of the electorate. The Court would thus be exposed to public pressure
and, in the inevitable event that a party to a dispute was unhappy with its
resolution, the standing and impartiality of the Court could be called into
question. For these reasons the Government believes that, on balance, whatever the
immediate attraction of this course might be, it would not be desirable to attempt
to codify the reserve powers; and that the design, processes and conventions at
present governing their exercise by the Governor-General should be transferred
to the Australian Head of State without alteration.
We are aware that with this option, there is a risk that Australian governments
may occasionally find themselves in conflict with a Head of State who exercises
political judgment without regard to the conventions. We are also, of course,
conscious of the possibility of a repetition of the events of 1975, when a
government possessing the confidence of the House of Representatives was
denied supply by the Senate. But the question of the Senate's powers over
supply is a very different issue from that of establishing an Australian Head of
State. It is an issue that deserves to be addressed, but it doesn't need to be
addressed at the same time.
If these reserve powers are to be given to a new Head of State, it is critically
important that the authority and source of the Head of State's power is consistent
with the national interest and the continued effective operation of our political
system. There has been considerable debate in the community about how the Head of
State should be chosen. As things now stand, the Governor-General is
appointed by The Queen acting on the sole advice of the Prime Minister.
It is clear that most people believe the Prime Minister should not have such
exclusive power in appointing an Australian Head of State. The debate is
principally between those who support popular election and those who favour
election by the Parliament.

The desire for a popular election stems from the democratic sentiment which all
Australians including all of us in this place share. However, the Government
has come to the view that if a new Australian Head of State were to be elected
by popular mandate, he or she would inherit a basis of power that would prove to
be fundamentally at odds with our Westminster-style system of government.
It should be recognised that a Head of State, whose powers derived from a
general election, would be the only person in the political system so elected. His
or her powers would be nominally much greater than those of all other
Commonwealth office holders, including the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, who
are, without exception, indirectly elected via large elected parties. With a
popularly elected President, potential would exist for the representative and
democratically elected parliamentary chambers, the repositories of the diffuse
power of Australian democracy, to be gradually diminished, while the
embodiment of the nation and great powers were vested in one person. That
would constitute a very dramatic and undesirable change to a system which
all of us agree has served us well.
Whatever differences of opinion may presently exist about the most desirable
mode of his or her election, I think there is a consensus that the Head of State
should be, in some sense, " above politics".
With this the Government agrees. The Head of State should be an eminent
Australian, a widely respected figure who can represent the nation as a whole.
This in fact has been the character of the role of the Governor-General and it
should be protected and retained in the role of a Head of State.
Popular election guarantees that the Head of State will not be above politics
indeed it guarantees that the Head of State will be a politician. As Sir Zelman
Cowen pointed out in his speech last week, a " direct election of a President
would ensure political outcomes"; and he went on to say that people like himself
and another former Governor-General, Sir Ninian Stephen, " would not have the
resources or inclination to contest such an election". We cannot have a Head of
State who is " above politics" if we subject candidates to popular elections we
will get instead politicians, political parties and political campaigns. And we will
get a Head of State with an authority unheard of in our political system and
discordant with some of the basic principles on which that system rests.
We therefore propose, as the Republic Advisory Committee suggested, that the
Head of State be elected by a two-thirds majority vote in a joint sitting of both
Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament on the nomination of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet. Such a joint sitting would be a unique occasion,
bringing together all the political parties, and both Houses of the Parliament, in a
spirit of bi-partisanship and cooperation. Obviously, before the vote was taken
the non-government parties would have to be consulted to ensure that the
candidate had their support.

It would be impossible for any government to dictate the outcome of this
process. A two-thirds majority vote of both Houses would require bi-partisan
support and ensure that the Head of State had the blessing of all the major
parties. The RAC report makes the point that a two-thirds majority in the present
parliament would require the votes of 40 more members than the Government
presently has. In fact, no government since World War II has enjoyed a twothirds
majority.
A Head of State appointed by both Houses would be subject to removal by both
Houses if it was the opinion of a two-thirds majority that his or her conduct was
inappropriate. This is why, given the difficulties of codification I have described,
and given that we believe the conventions governing the reserve powers will in
large measure need to remain with the Head of State, it is imperative that his or
her mandate does not flow from popular election, but from the representative
power of the House of Representatives and the proportional power of the
Senate.
The other brake on any wilful or misguided behaviour by a Head of State is that
the process of removal should not be contingent on a specified set of facts or
circumstances or conditions. The joint sitting would be unconstrained in its
actions or in its decision by being able to consider squarely the behaviour of any
incumbent.
A further inhibition to misguided or inappropriate behaviour is the proposal that
either House may, by simple majority, initiate a joint sitting to remove or censure
a Head of State.
The Government believes that, taken together the authority and source of the
Head of State's powers coming from the Parliament, removal by the same means
as appointment, and the capacity to censure these elements provide effective
counter-weights to the substantial authority vested in the Head of State through
the reserve powers.
In addition, in the light of the events of 1975, any Head of State determined upon
a controversial course of action would do so in the knowledge that he or she
would be confronted with the weight of public opprobrium, and will be at pains to
ensure that every course of action is both warranted and capable of being
defended.
The Government proposes that, consistent with the convention for Governors-
General, the term of office for the Head of State be five years, and that Heads of
State be permitted to serve one term only.
To prevent any attempt to influence Heads of State by offers of subsequent
employment, we propose that outgoing Heads of State not be permitted to
accept remuneration from the Commonwealth in addition to their pension until
five years have passed since their departure from the office.

As an additional step to ensure that the office of Head of State is not politicised,
the Government proposes that serving and former parliamentarians
Commonwealth, State and Territory be excluded from candidature until five
years have passed since their departure from parliament.
There are other detailed issues that will also need to be addressed. For
example, arrangements for unexpected vacancies would broadly mirror those
currently in place.
It is not our intention that the Government's proposals should affect the
Constitutions of the Australian States. It would be up to each State to decide
how in future they would appoint their respective Heads of State. It is
reasonable to expect that if the Australian people opt for an Australian Head of
State, the States would follow suit. But the question would be for each State to
decide. In this regard, we were interested that a committee commissioned to examine
the issue by the West Australian government concluded that, if the minimalist
approach proposed by the Republic Advisory Committee were to be adopted, the
position of the States within the federation would not be substantially affected.
The Government is ready to have senior Commonwealth Ministers brief State
governments on the proposals and we sincerely hope that all State Premiers will
make constructive contributions to the public debate.
The Government puts forward these proposals to provide a basis for considered
public discussion. The Australian Constitution cannot be changed in any way
without a referendum, and to succeed at a referendum a proposed change must
win the agreement of a majority of voters in a majority of States and a majority of
voters overall.
The Government proposes to put the question of a republic to the Australian
people some time in 1998 or 1999. Acceptance at the referendum will mean that
Australia can be a republic by the year of the centenary of Federation, 2001.
Before the referendum, there will be extensive consultation with the people of
Australia. But it should be clearly understood that nothing we can devise in
addition to the due democratic processes will match those processes in the
information they provide, the debate they stimulate or the power they give the
people. The passage of the Referendum Bill through both Houses of the
Commonwealth Parliament will be followed by an extensive campaign in which
arguments for and against a republic will be put. And the people's vote and the
people's vote alone will decide the issue.

In short, the Constitution requires that the Parliament, the nation's representative
and deliberative body, alone can formally determine the proposals to be put to
the people in a referendum. I stress this point. The Parliament alone can
formally decide what is put in a referendum. At most, any suggested convention
can only be a consultative device and, in obvious ways, an elitist one.
There have been calls for a constitutional convention, but the limitations of that
procedure should be understood.
There were six Constitutional Conventions between 1973 and 1985 followed by
a Constitutional Commission. It is not unfair to say that they were unproductive.
And any future convention not limited to the issue of the republic and the Head
of State, would be a convention going over the same old ground as all the others
before it.
Some people have drawn comparisons with the consititutional conventions of the
1890s, but there is an essential difference between those and any current
proposals. Here, we are attempting a modest change to the Constitution in the
1890s they were attempting to write it. And among the things they wrote was the
requirement that any change to the Constitution must be submitted to a
referendum. That is the democratic obligation we are under today.
The 1890s conventions were proponents of change they were concerned with
one question how to create from the separate Australian colonies one
indissoluble Commonwealth of Australia. So would any convention on the
republic need to be a proponent of the republic, and concerned only with one
issue the best means by which the people of the Commonwealth of Australia
can have an Australian as their Head of State.
The detail of the changes we propose may at first glance obscure the meaning of
them. The meaning is simple and, we believe, irresistible as simple and irresistible as
the idea of a Commonwealth of Australia was to the Australians of a century ago.
The meaning then was a nation united in common cause for the common good.
A nation which gave expression to the lives we lead together on this continent,
the experience and hopes we share as Australians.
The meaning now is still a product of that founding sentiment it is that we are
all Australians. We share a continent. We share a past, a present and a future.
And our Head of State should be one of us.

Transcript 9620