PRIME MINISTER
E& 0 E PROOF ONLY
TRANSCRIPT OF A JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE BY THE PRIM( E MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA AND
THlE CANADIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER, MR JOE CLARK, PWTC KUALA LUMPUR,_
19 OCTOBER 1989
PM: At the outset, let me pay tribute to the work of the Committee of Foreign
Ministers on Southern Africa chaired by Joe Clark of Canada established at the
last meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Vancouver and the input
that they have made during that period has been very significant for us in
coming to the consideration of this matter at this meeting of the Commonwealth
Heads of Government.
The meeting has today considered the issue of South Africa and what we'ye
attempted to do is to consider that matter in the light of what we see as the
relevant developments since we last met. If I can put those briefly, those
developments are firstly, and most importantly, that the fundamentals of
apartheid in South Africa remain firmly in place. Institutional
discrimination, personified most particularly by the Group Areas Act, the
extremes of economic injustice and the state of emergency now in its fourth
year; and against that we observed that it would be churlish not to observe
that there have been some recent changes the reference by President De Klerk
about talk of reform, whereas up until the recent election there had been
horrifying and brutal repression of peaceful demonstrations. In very recent
times some mass demonstrations have been allowed to pass without incident and
of course the recent release of Walter Sisulu and seven other black leaders
and most recently there has been reference by the Constitutional Development
and Planning Minister of talks about talks, as he puts it, with ANC leaders.
It's in that context that we approached this matter and it was in that context
that in leading the discussion with my good friend Kenneth Kaunda, I developed
the five point proposal for what I believe should be the next steps to be
taken by the Commonwealth. I'd like briefly to go to those then ask Joe to
speak and then we can go to the questions.
The five steps that I suggested should be taken by the Commonwealth are these
firstly, there should be a strong expression of support for the principles
and approach in negotiating framework as outlined in the Harare Declaration.
Secondly, there should be a maintenance, without relaxation, of existing
sanctions. Thirdly, there should be a development of new forms of financial pressure on
South Africa, that is by seeking to intensify and extend the financial
sanctions in particular in two ways: by calling on all relevant banks and
financial institutions to impose tougher conditions on day-to-day trade
financing, in particular, through reducing the maximum credit terms to
days; and also secondly, to call on relevant Governments to make trade
credits harder to get by taking South Africa off cover with official
Government agencies for official trade government credit and insurance
purposes and that these positions should be embodied in a letter which should
be signed by the Chairman of the meeting and conveyed to all relevant banks
and financial institutions and governments and delivered as soon as possible.
If you like, within that third step, you could see that as the hard side of
it. If you could look at the other part as being the soft side there is some
indication that the IMF may be prepared to comtemplate the development of a
major financial package which would be of relevance to the development of a
new South Africa and that we could seek a discussion on the possibility of the
development of such an IMF package which would be contingent upon the
implementation of fundamental structural political reform calculated to lead
to the ending of apartheid.
The fourth step was to establish within a major research institution a unit of
specialist staff which should monitor and review and report upon South
Afrfca's links with the international financial community and report on the
impact of financial sanctions
And fifthly, that we should re-establish Joe Clark's committee, the Committee
of Foreign Ministers under his very able and effective chairmanship and to reestablish
that as an ongoing review mechanism to monitor developments and to
report with appropriate recommendations to the Commonwealth Heads of
Government. Now essentially, I have seen that as the next series of. steps that the current
situation demands of the Commonwealth. We believe it's a balanced approach
which recognises the continuing fundamental and objectionable realities of
apartheid in South Africa. It attempts to do what I've consistently said at
successive CHOGMS and which has been the position of the Commonwealth. I
repeated to the meeting today that we have never seen any purpose in sanctions
as such, that sanctions as I put it have been calculated not to bring South
Africa to its knees, but to the negotiating table. We have the position as
you know that we don't have to engage in our own intellectual processes and
sequential reasoning to come to the conclusion that sanctions have been
effective. We can rely on the words that came out of the mouths of the
Finance minister in South Africa and the late Governor of the Reserve Bank,
where they've said two things: That the sanctions have been cripplingly
effective, and that South Africa can only expect to escape from that
situation by appropriate political reform and so we are saying we. welcome the
indications of change but they haven't yet altered the fundamentals. We hope
that there will be a move now to the negotiating table. There are things that
the government can do there immediately without waiting for parliament to
assemble. Those things obviously include release of all political prisoners,
the unbanning of organisations, a commitment to no further executions for
political of fences. Those things can be done and then we believe we can move
into the second phase which is the legislative phase. The third phase then of
course is substantial negotiation leading to the new South Africa.
Ladies and gentlemen, as briefly as I think is appropriate and responsible,
I've attempted to give you the background of our thinking and the steps, which
I may say, have been supported by every speaker in the discussions, bar one
Joe.
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CLARK: Thanks Prime Minister, I presented this morning, really early this
afternoon, the report of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on
Southern Africa. That has been made public both I think, in the various
communiques issued in our meetings since we were established at CHOGM and also
the remarks that I made in presenting it were made public. That committee as
you may recall was intended to end at this CHOGM. As a result of the
suggestion of the Prime Minister of Australia there was a request that we
continue our work. That has been agreed and we will be continuing our work at
least until the next CHOGM. In summary I think it is fair to say that the
Heads of Government this morning noted the promise of reform from South
African leaders, want that promise kept and intend to maintain the kind of
pressure that has been proven to be effective in causing that promise to be
made. A major part of the work of the committee that I chair will be to
determine means by which we can maintain that kind of pressure and come to
some assessment of the degree to which the Government of South Africa is
acting on its promises to begin fundamental reform in the apartheid system.
This committee began at Vancouver with the responsibility to try to do some
drafting of a statement that could commend itself to Heads of Government. We
have been asked to do that again. At Vancouver, in the confines of the CHOGM
itself, the United Kingdom was a member of the committee that drafted a
communique to be considered by Heads of Government and the United Kingdom has
agreed again that John Major, their Foreign Secretary, will be a member of the
committee for the purposes of drafting recommendations that can be considered
at the CHOGM.
I ' would be naturally pleased to deal with questions that you might have
respecting the work of the committee. Let me just say one thing that perhaps
bends one of the rules of the CHOGH meeting. One is not supposed to make
reference to the comments that are made by others, but I think it worth
underlining a comment that was made by President Kaunda this morning, when he
made the point, and I think I am quoting him precisely, that to have Bob Hawke
and Brian Mulroney standing with black leaders of the Commonwealth on the
question of apartheid has, in Kenneth Kaunda's words, meant everything. It
has demonstrated, he said, to Afrikaaners that there need not be racism, that
there should not be racism. I thought that that was appropriate to
communicate to people interested in this issue outside the Heads of Government
Meeting because one of the characteristics of the Commonwealth is that people
from different continents and different conditions have been drawn together to
fight this evil system and together we have been able to make some
considerable progress.
CLARK: ( In French our translation) If there are any questions in French
the Australian Prime Minister will respond in French.
PM: Merci, monsieur
JOURNALIST: Mr Hawke, where will this proposal go, when, will it be discussed
and what do you expect to happen?
PM: Well, the formal discussion within the Commonwealth Heads of Government
meeting has now concluded. The Committee of Foreign Ministers that Joe has
just referred to will consider this issue and they will prepare drafts for
consideration, which process will commence at the retreat I imagine, and then
there will be an attempt to get a consensus: whether that is possible or not,
I.
an absolute consensus, we don't know yet. We will certainly try and do it and
then out of the retreat where those things will be considered, we'll have a
final communique which will entail the decision of the Commonwealth Heads of
Government. So that is the process ahead of us now, but may I say that on the
discussion that has taken place after Kenneth Kaunda and I introduced this
subject, there were contributions from seven Heads of Government in support of
the five proposals; there was one who wasn't in support and as far as we can
see, there is virtually total support for the proposal.
JOURNALIST: Can I ask what is the status of your five proposals because the
British side are saying that they are not aware that they have any and, can I
also ask, why as I understand it you did not mention them at the hour long
session with Mrs Thatcher this morning?
Pm: Oh, I see, well perhaps the amplification isn't too good because I have
already answered that question here, but for your benefit, I'll answer it
again I have said that the status is that we have had the discussion now at
the Heads of Government Meeting today and what is now their status is that
they will constitute the major basis of consideration by the Committee of
Foreign ministers which includes the Foreign Ministers of Britain and Malaysia
in addition to the other Foreign Ministers on the Committee and those
countries as I recall, correct me if I'm wrong Joe, are Canada, Guyana,
Australia, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
CLARK: Bingo.
PM: Bingo, so we'll have in addition to those, now Malaysia and Britain.
They will consider these proposals coming out of the discussion today and as
everyone else at least heard me say, if you didn't, then that will be put in
the form of a draft that will be considered by the Heads of Government
initially, I believe, at the retreat and perhaps finally when we get back here
and then you will get to the decision by the Commonwealth. Now, you asked me
why I didn't put the specific proposals in my meeting with Mrs Thatcher this
morning. I did discuss the question of South Africa generally with her and
indicated what was no surprise to her that we wouldn't be ad idem on this
issue and we each, if not joyfully, as a matter of fact accepted that to be
the position and went on to discuss other matters.
JOURNALIST: ( inaudible in French)
CLARK ( In French our translation): The Australian Prime minister today
proposed certain steps which will be considered by the Committee of Ministers
during the following days in order to maintain the pressure of the
Commonwealth with regard to South Africa, in particular in the economic
domain. As far as the loans are concerned, and the decision which was
announced today by the Bank of South Africa, I have several things to say:
firstly it is natural that we are disappointed that such an accord was
reached, we are disappointed that it wasn't possible for us to retard the
decision but on the other hand, it is important to note that there is a heavy
burden which must be assumed by the Government of South Africa in the terms of
the accord with the banks, a burden which exists because apartheid exists. It
is another cost of apartheid. The second thing is that I believe that the
reaction of South Africa with regard to the loans demonstrates two things,
firstly the importance of the Commonwealth as Prime Minister Mulroney said
yesterday, there was a period recently when the South African Government
ignored, or tried to ignore the Commonwealth, which is no longer possible now;
they have planned their declaration to coincide with the current Heads of
Government Meeting and the second thing is that I believe that the decision
indicates the sense of vulnerability of the South African Government
concerning economic pressure.
JOURNALIST: Do you want the Commonwealth to set a deadline for reforms in
South Africa, and secondly if you do, what action will you take if the reforms
are not implemented within that time scale?
PM: I think it wouldn't be a fair description of either what I've said or
what I sense to be the reception of my position by the Commonwealth that we
have sought to set a precise deadline; but what I have suggested, which goes
to questions of timetable is that in recommending the re-establishment of the
Committee of Foreign Ministers I suggested that it would probably be
appropriate that they should meet next in approximately March or April of next
year. I said that because it seemed to me that by then, which would be some
six months after the election of the De Klerk Government, that that would be
time to see whether there was an intention to do those things which were
capable of being done by executive decision.
Let me repeat the major examples of those things that can be done by executive
decision. You can have by executive decision, and without the parliament
meeting, the release of political prisoners. You can have by executive
decision, the unbanning of organisations, representative organisations, and
you can have by executive decision, without the meeting of parliament, a
commitment to an end to executions for political ( in inverted commas) crimes.
Now it seemed to me and, as I sense it, my colleagues around the Heads of
Government table agreed with this that that sort of timing of meeting of the
Committee of Foreign Ministers made sense and that within that time those
sorts of things could be done. I said the second phase because I referred to
three phases that we would be looking at. That is the executive decisions;
secondly the beginning of the legislative program of dismantling the
fundamental pillars of apartheid. Also one would think that by something like
April of next year one would have been able to ascertain some indication of
legislative intention to act in those regards. Now because it seemed to us
not appropriate to be absolutely specific about exactly how much reaction we
want in that time because we want to be as reasonable in these things as we
can. If we put it in those terms to indicate the sorts of areas in which we
believe we could see executive action to give a broad indication of time when
we thought the ministers would be meeting, that in that sense it is
appropriate both in terms of the pressures that are being applied externally
and within South Africa and in terms of response by the regime in South
Africa. So we are hopeful that in that sort of time period enough would be
done for the Committee of Foreign Ministers to be able to report to the heads
of Government that there are positive responses. I concluded my remarks to my
colleagues by saying that I wanted to have a positive sort of note and said
that if indeed there are positive responses judged to be sufficient in their
dimension, then we should be thinking in those circumstances about the
relaxation of pressures, but that it was now premature to signify actual
trigger points; and that was therefore why I had as part of my proposal, which
as-I say, seemed to recommend themselves to my colleagues that we would ask
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the Committee of Foreign Ministers to accept that responsibility of assessing
reaction. JOURNALIST: ( inaudible)
PM: Well I've learned in a fairly long period in political life not to get
too carried away with hypotheses because I've never found prancing down
hypothetical paths terribly rewarding. In that sense I would rather say this,
that in fairness to the elements within the regime in South Africa who have
given some indications of change, as I said, I would rather say it is my hope
that they would see the essentially constructive approach that the
Commonwealth is talking about and that within that framework there will be
positive responses and so I don't go to the hypothetical situation that they
won't be.
JOURNALIST: Mr Clark, you have been reported as saying that the rescheduling
deal . for South Africa ( was) a pretty tough one. Is that true? Is this the
sort of toughness you want the Commonwealth to impose on South Africa?
CLARK: Well, two or three things about the rescheduling deal. First of all,
we regret that there has been a multiple-year rescheduling. We had been
targeting for single year rescheduling and we regret that it happened this
early. we had hoped that we would be able to push that back. Those things
didn't happen. But there are two very important elements of this deal. One
is that there is an obligation on the part of South Africa to pay back a
billion and a half dollars in three and a half years. That is a very heavy
burden. It's a burden that would not be there if the apartheid regime were
not in place. It's another cost of apartheid. The other thing that we find
very interesting is that it's obvious that this announcement was timed to
coincide with the opening of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.
our conversations after the announcement with some of the banks involved,
indicate that the discussions occurred a couple, of weeks ago. The banks were
advised I am told yesterday morning that the announcement would be made
yesterday night. That indicates two things. One, that the Commonwealth
clearly has a continuing and important influence upon the decisions that the
south African Government takes, and the second is that the South African
Government is very sensitive to its vulnerability on the question of financial
links. That is one of the reasons that Canada welcomed the additional
proposals that were made by Prime Minister Hawke this morning and why we think
it will be helpful for consideration to be given to putting in place an
informal monitoring agency that can keep track in an objective way of South
Africa's financial relations.
JOURNALIST: Prime Minister, given that the banks have agreed to the much
quicker rescheduling than you hoped and more favourable terms is it likely
that they will agree to the kind of trade financial restrictions that you are
now proposing.
PM: Well, by definition, I can't give a definitive answer to that. I can't
answer for the banks, but let me in terms of providing the proper context, for
consideration of your question, make some additional points about the decision
that has been unilaterally announced by the regime in South Africa. Certain
of the facts., I think, need to be properly understood. The Reserve Bank of
South Africa-statement affects just 20.5% of the debt inside the net as it's
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called, the standstill net. In other words, there is still 80% of
billion remaining within the standstill net on which pressure could still be
applied and from our indications from our embassy in Pretoria we're told it
was fairly widely expected in international circles that the amount
rescheduled could have been greater. It's worth noting this, that within the
first six months of next year, 1990, there will be $ 2 billion outside the
standstill net which will be due for payment prior to the end of June 1990.
That's not affected by today's announcement, and there is no suggestion at all
even by the authorities in South Africa that the situation is other than that
severe costs are still being imposed upon South Africa by the international
financial community. In other words it can't in any realistic sense be seen
as any easing up of the pressure on South Africa. It demands repayment of as
much principle, of overdue principle as was demanded in the second
rescheduling, and at the same effective rate. It's important to understand
that it still leaves South Africa isolated from any new loans and are forced
in those circumstances to run a current account surplus to repay their
commitments under the agreement. Now as Joe has frankly said, we wish the
decision hadn't been made so soon and that instead of the multi-year
situation, it could have been an annual pressure on South Africa; but one
should also note, I might say, if you're going to get some understanding of
the context of this that there's a hump in bond repayments occurring; tha t's
for bonds that were raised before 1985, there is a hump in the repayment of
those bonds which are now starting to move to maturity and as I am informed,
there will be nearly $ 2 billion of that occurring in the next two years and
that compares with an amount of $ 400 million in the last 12 months. So I
suggest that if we're going to take your question about what other
possibilities there are in terms of what I put to the Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting, we shouldn't be understanding the position that now exists
as one of other than very severe stringency for South Africa. Now I believe
that in that context there is some possibility that there will be positive
responses to our suggestions for further financial pressure. It's not as
though the international financial community has said in the situation with
which they're confronted Oh we're so satisfied. with these small moves that
have been made by the new government in South Africa that we're just going to
remove the constraints they haven't done that and so I hope that there will,
in that context, be the sort of positive response to these initiatives that
we're asking them to take.
JOURNALIST: Prime Minister To what extent do you believe that a clear
signal from Britain that it didn't support the financial sanctions was a
signal to the banks to come some of the way to relieving the burden on South
Africa. PM: Well I simply can't make a judgement about that. I guess the only
intelligent thing that one can say in those circumstances is that if the
positions of Government were going to have any impact at all, then a
relatively benign attitude by the Government of the United Kingdom must have
been advantageous to South Africa rather than not. That's the sort of
intelligent assessment one could make, but I can't assert it as a fact.
JOURNALIST: Can I ask a question on Hong Kong affairs? Mrs Thatcher has
already said that the Beijing has already destroyed the confidence of Hong
Kong people.. What do you think the Commonwealth and all the Commonwealth
countries and your two countries can do to give help to the Hong Kong people?
PM: Well I would think that there may be some more discussion about that
particular issue in the retreat. When the Heads of Government yesterday
discussed the world political situation there was reference to developments in
China and Hong Kong. I would think that there would be some more discussion
about that at the retreat and there will be some reference to it in the
communique. As to what my Government can do and Joe, of course, can speak for
his, I think the sorts of things that we have got to try to do is to give
confidence to the people of Hong Kong that we understand the apprehension that
they feel in the light of the developments since 4 June. That is a perfectly
understandable apprehension. They were prior to 4 June faced with a position
where they thought that understandings had been reached. Not merely formal
understandings out of the negotiations between the Governments of the Uni. ted
Kingdom and the Peoples Republic of China but more importantly in a sense the
actual formal arrangements that had been made, a sense of confidence that
their interests were well understood and were going to be properly protected.
one can understand the apprehension that has arisen since then. So these are
the things that we ought to be doing. One, to make it quite clear to the
Government of the Peoples' Republic of China that what happened on, leading up
to, and subsequent to 4 June is not acceptable and will continue to be
repudiated. Secondly, and this is a task of delicate government if you like.
At the same as those things are made clear, also it doesn't make sense in the
interests of the people of China or of the people of Hong Kong to say that we
are going to cut off contact with China. We need to maintain contact
particularly in ways which will enable contact into the people of China so
that some confidence can be given to them that there is an alternative way
further in the future than the repressive actions that have been taken in
June and which have been continued since. So that is as far as China is
concerned. If we can get an understanding in China of the unacceptability of
the sort of action that occurred then and that the capacity of China to reap
the benefit of economic cooperation with the rest of the world is not
unrelated to the way in which they behave in regard to the people of China and
of Hong Kong then that is important to the people of Hong Kong if that
position can be established. Now as far as Hong Kong itself is concerned both
Canada and ourselves have significant immigration programs, and speaking for
myself, I can say to you that in the last year we took from Hong Kong just
under 10 000, I think it was 9760 people from Hong Kong and just over a third
of those something over 3000, came into the business migration program
category. So we have in our case, as I think Canada, does of being open to
immigration from Hong Kong and I would say that we will continue-to have an
immigration program in which there will be a place for people from Hong Kong
and if a situation occurred which I hope will not, where there was some
disastrous development-in terms of the relationship between China and Hong
Kong, then on our past record I guess it could be expected that we would take
account of those circumstances.
CLARK: our position is roughly the same as that of Aust * ralia. our emphasis
with respect to Hong Kong, as I had a chance to review it with some
journalists a couple of nights ago is precisely on trying to build up the
sense of confidence of the people that the conditions anticipated in Hong Kong
when the agreement was signed and the conditions prevailing prior to the
events in Tiananmen Square would continue. : 3
JOURNALIST: To return to loans, as we understand it, South Africa has now
repaid
CLARK: What newspaper are you with Abdul?
JOURNALIST: Anti-Apartheid News, London. As we understand it, with the
rescheduling of the loans, South Africa is not in default and therefore with a
release possibly of another political prisoner it can go on the open market
for new loans. I wonder if Prime Minister, with your five points if you could
add the appeal to the international financial markets not to grant any new
loans to South Africa because that would obviously be one way to repay all the
other debts to these nations.
PM: Well that's clearly our position, that we are advocating no new loans, it
has been consistently the position.
JOURNALIST: But the British Government doesn't support it, so if you could
add it, that would be a test as to whether they would make this appeal to the
international monetary market.
PM: A test for whom?
JOURNALIST: A test for the United Kingdom which is a member of the
Commonwealth as well.
PM: Well, I mean I'm not here to speak for the United Kingdom. That is
something that I don't wish to do and I'm certain that as far as Mrs Thatcher
is concerned nor does she wish me to. All I can say is that it is the
intention of myself and all others who have spoken to have a position in
which, by communication to all relevant banks and financial institutions and
government agencies it will be made explicit what our position is which
includes no new loans. Now that will be made clear by letter and I have
expressed the hope that the Chairman of the meeting will be able to express
that view on behalf of all governments. Now I've had cause to say before that
I tend to have a bet occasionally, I wouldn't like to bet strongly on the
outcome of him being able to speak for every single member.
JOURNALIST: Mr Hawke, in September the Committee of Experts from your country,
Canada and India reported that they had met 12 or 14 banks and the banks, to
quote Mr Clark, agreed that they would be seeking the highest possible
interest payments and the fastest possible repayment of capital. -In the light
of the banks' failure to do that with the 20%, did the heads of government
talk about how to induce or otherwise encourage the banks to come closer to
the promises they're making?
PM: Well there'll obviously be some further discussion on this issue at the
retreat but in the proposal I've put, the outline there of course is that we
should actually now communicate directly with every one of the relevant banks
and financial agencies. Now whether in fact that actual letter may be
followed up in other ways by personal representations being made by a person
or persons on behalf of the Commonwealth is a matter which has yet to be
discussed and decided.
JOURNALIST: That sounds like sending a letter Mr Hawke could you be more
serious?
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PM: Well would you like us to send in the Navy, the Army or the Air Force?
Now, let's be realistic. What we have done is something which has produced
very significant results and so in case you have any doubts about that, as
though we're just passing pious resolutions without any results, let me just
do some quotes to you which are additional to the very effective quotes that
were made here by my f riend Brian Mulroney yesterday. These were a couple of
quotes that I made to my colleagues today. I read first of all from the
Ovenden/ Tony Cole book, page 182: As recently as the 23rd of May this year
the South African Minister for Finance admitted to an audience composed of
representatives of the South African Federation of industry that South Africa
had been operating abroad on a cash basis for 16 consecutive quarters and that
he wondered whether any business enterprise could have existed in a similar
way. He also revealed that South Africa had been close to closing its foreign
exchanges in December 1988 and it might have to take this course of action in
June 1989. He concluded by appealing to business to hang on " until we get our
politics right".
Further quotes from the late Governor of the Reserve Bank Gerhard de Koek on
the 9th May in which he acknowledged in a public speech that international
pressures, particularly financial pressures, had crippled South Africa's
ability to deliver sustained economic growth. A trend, he said, which could
not be reversed, this had crippled their economic growth, which could not be
reversed without " adequate progress in the field of political and
constitutional reform". So the rather slick, if I may put it to without
offence to you I hope, the slick assumption that all that is involved is
writing letters in what we're doing in the area of pressure is simply not
brought out by the facts. These are not my statements. They are not Joe
Clark's statements. These are the statements of the South African Minister of
Finance and of the late Governor of the Reserve Bank. That is, that the
financial pressures, not just the writing of letters, but the financial
pressures, have brought about two things the crippling effect upon the South
African economy and more importantly, secondly,-that in those circumstances
that they understood the only way they were going to escape from those
pressures was by political reform. So the easy way of saying you're going to
do more than writing letters is simply not brought out by the facts. What has
happened has brought about those results and there is no reason to believe
that if the rest of the Commonwealth continues to show the determination and
imagination that it has to this point, that we can't continue and increase
those results.
ENDS