STATEi4ENT BY THE 1RIME MINISTE ( RT. HON. HR. G. MNZIE;
IN THE HOUSE OF aEPRPESENTATIVES
1EDNESDAY 2_ 13TH SEPTEMBER 1 61
NUCLEAR. TEST
On 7th September I made some observations on the
resumption by the Soviet Union of nuclear bomb testing, and sai
that I might make a further statement this week. I should lie
now to trace in more detail the course of negotiation on thiz.
most important question, and to examine some of its
implications for us.
Eiarly Western Proposals Rejected by U. S. S. R.:
It was in July 1957, that the ' 4estern Pouers on the
Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmrament Commission first
proposed that a group of experts meet to devise an inspection
system to control the suspension of nuclear tests. T'he Soviet
Union did not respond.
The following month the Uestern Powers proposed the
suspension of nuclear tests for two years, during which time a
s; stem of international inspection could be worked out to ensure
that all future production of fissionable material would be used
solely for peaceful purposes. In making these prcposal, the
ifcstern Powers again called on the Soviet Union to join in expe: t
studies. The Soviet Union refused.
In November, 1957, these proposals woro endorsed by the
United Nations General Asserbly but the Soviet Union still
refused to discuss them.
Not until March, 1958, after Russia had concluded a
series of test-, and just before the start of a United States
series, did the Soviet Union announce that it would suspend tests
unilaterally for six months. The Iest pointed out that unilato7%--
declarations, without a system of inspection and control to
ensure that the declarations were being honoured, wero valueless;
and called again on the Soviet Union to take part in technical
discussion on the feasibility of devising an effective system
and the form it might taku. This time the Soviet Union agreed.
The Conference of Exp. Lrts lo7s:
So, in July and August, 1958, the first conference of
exports met in Geneva, The experts, including the Russian
experts, concluded that it was possible to devise a practicable
system for detocting violaticns of an agremont to sispend
nuclear weapons tests. The United Kingdom and the United States
thereupon announced that they wvere prepared to suspend tests for
one year from 31st Octobur, 1958, : n ce rtain conditions0 One
that negotiations should begin on that date for the conclusion
of a treaty on the suspension of tests under ffectivo international
control. Anothter was that Russia should not rosuilme
ts ting.
O _ oni. oEf-E Nozotiations, Octob 8:
The Conference opend at Geneva on 31st October, 1958.
On 1st November the very next day the Soviet Union oxploded
an atomic device. Two days lator it exploded another. Despite
this flagrant breach of faith, the United States declared that
would adhore to its undcrta1ing, provided the Soviet Union
refrained from further tcsting.
From that . time, noarly throo years ago, the
negotiations have continued, . with occasional adjournmonts and
they are still technically continuing: despite tho Sovio
rPsumption of testing they have still not formally been broken
off. Progress has been slow. From the beginning it was
apparent that Western and Soviet views on what constituted an.
adequate, reliable and acceptable treaty were very far apart.
But by painstaking porsistonce, with the United Kingdom and t.:
United States making every effort of compromise to break deadlocks,
the areas of fundamontal disagreement were perceptib:
narrowed. djournnent of Conference, December 1.960:
When the Conference adjourned in December, 1960, in tan
last days of the Eisenhower Administration, thore had been
adopted a preamble and seventeen articles of a draft treaty, an:'
two annexes. Important differences on issues of principle still
remained unresolved, but the progress which had already been
made encouraged the hope that with persoveiance agreemont could
yet be reached on the outstanding points. ' With perseverance~,
I have said: perhaps I should have added ' and with goodwill and
sincere endeavour'. For there were already by the end of last
year disquieting signs. Honourable ai-ners may recall that, as
I stated to the pe: ss afterwards, when I talked wi. th iMr
Khrushchev in N-, w York on 12th October, 1960, he oxprs-'~ d tihe
view that the suspension of nuclear tests was of diminishing
importance. Nevertheless the ! estern Po,, wrs, for their part,
continued their unremitting efforts to seek agroement.
Resumption of Conforence, March 1-61:
Presi. dent Kennedy, on assmiing office, ordoeed an
intensive review of the issues involved, and when the
Conference resumed on 21st March, 1961, a now set of proposals
was submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom.
These proposals, which incorporate important concessions to
Russian positions, were:-
1. To reduce the number of on-site inspctions in each of the
nucljar countries fro~ m a fixed figure of twenty to a
possible twelve, depending on the number of suspicious
seismic oeJnts;
20 To reduce the number of control posts on Soviet tor: itory
from twenty-one to nineteen;
3, To extend from twenty-soven months to three years the
proposed moratorium on snaller underground tests and the
associated research prograrir.' oz,
4. To institute a ban on all nuclar woapons tests at high
altitudes and in outer space;
To ask Congress for legislative authority to permit Soviet
inspection of the internal mechanism of the nucloar device;
used in the seismic research and peaceful uses progrcammes:
6. To accept the Soviet request for veto over the annual bud,-,
of the control organization;
7. To accept the Soviet demand for a parity of seats between
' icstern and Soviet bloc States on the top Control
Commission an arrangement which would give the Soviet
Union a voice in guiding the control system equal to that
the United States and the United Kingdor combined, and
which would be unprecodented in an international
organization.
Then on 18th April, building on the agreements already
reached and incorporating these now proposals, the United States
and the United Kingdom tabled a complete draft treaty for the
suspension of nuclear weapons tests.
Soviet Reversal The Soviet reaction was ominous and disheartoning. Not
only did the Soviet Delegate, Mr. Tsarapkin, return to the
conference table without constructive proposals, making it clear
that the Soviet Union had not used the three months' adjournnont
to seek ways of resolving points of difference, but he even went
back on an agreement which the Soviet Union had made over a year
previously. He insisted that, instead of having, as had boon
agreed, a single neutral administrator as chief executive officer
of the control organization, there should be established a
triumvirate of administrators, one from the Soviet group, one
from the western powers and one from the ' neutralists', who
would be required to reach their decisions unanimously. Each
member would therefore have a veto. This is the so-called
' Troika! principle which the Soviet Union put forward at the last
Geniral Assembly of the United Nations to replace the office of
Secretary-General. It would give the Soviet Union the power to
prevent any inspection by the control organization of m-uspected
breaches of the treaty by the Soviet Union,
Konncdy-Khrushchev Moeting in Vienna:
This uncompromising, retrograde attitude was
continued by Mr. Khrushchev when he met President Kenneoly in
Vienna. The Russian ' Aide-nemoire' or memorandum of 4th June
reiterates this new Soviet contention that " there do not and
cannot exist neutral men". I call it " now" advisedly, because in
January of last year, Mr. Tsarapkin, the Soviet negotiator said
at the Conference: " Out of the three thousand million human
beings on earth we shall always be able to find someone on whor
you and we can agree". And the following month he said: " In
neutral countries it will always be possible to find a person, a
really neutral person, who can be used for the job of carrying
out the duties of administrator". And in June, 1960, he said:
" It will always be possible to discover in the world a person
acceptable to both sides for nomination for the post as
administrator". The Vienna Memorandum also proposed that the
negotiations on the suspension of nuclear tests should be merged
with discussion of general complete disarmament. That is to say,
the Russians proposed that the measure of agreement which had
been so painfully won through nearly three years of patient
negotiation should be tossed back into the molting pot. They
proposed that agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons
tests, which is, despite its complexities, a relatively simple
operation, should be made dependent upon achieving agreement on
the much vaster and the infinitely more complicated question of
general and complete disarnament. This Memorandum also
disclosed the hollowness of the much vaunted offeo to accept
unconditionally any proposals of the ! estern Powers on control if
they would accept the Russian proposal on general and complete
disarmament This Memorandum makes it plain that the Russians
wrill accept control and inspection only after disarmament has
been completed because " as long as states maintain their Armed
Forces, no control can be free from intolligenceo When Armed
Forces are abolished and ari,. an: ents destroyed, then only control
will not be connected with intelligence".
The Memorandum further suggests that the policing of a
disarmed world w-ould be through natbi:, nal contingents ( in other
words there would be no standing international force) which
" could be used through the Security Council" ( that is to say
they would be subject to the Russian veto). In addition, " all
the main groups of States should, of course, be equally
represented on the cormand of such international forces" ( that
is to say they would be under a ' troika' command which would
give the Soviet Union the power of veto over the day-to-day
operations of the forces).
United States Reply:
The United States replied to this Memorandum in a
Note of 17th June. This Note patiently rehearsed the substantial
concessions which the WIest had offered since the talks resumed,
pointed out the objections to the Russian proposals, and drew
attention to the wider consequences for which the Soviet Union
would be responsible. The Russian reply was a long Note dated 5th July which
made no concessions but maintained the new Russian position
uncompromisingly. The exchange ended with a United States Note of
July which returned to the central issue and sought to
determine whether the Soviet Union was willing to reach an
agreement which would halt nuclear weapons tests under effective
international control.
Broakdown of Conference:
The Conference at Geneva continued, despite all
discouragnremnt, with the Jest still trying to meet the Russian
objections. On 28th and 30th August the United Kingdom and
United States representatives made three new and important
concessions:-( 1 They tried to satisfy the Soviet Union completely
about small underground tests. ( These at present
cannot be reliably detected and a moratorium had been
suggested to allow research into improved detection
methods.) The now proposals envisaged consultation
before the moratorium ended. During the last six
months a panel of experts would report on recommended
improvements in tno control system, the capability of
the system in the light of these improvements, and
whether or not it would be possible to reduce or
eliminate altogether the range of undetectable
explosions. They tried to satisfy the Russian doubts about the
impartiality of the administrator, by making him
removable from office by simple majority vote in the
Control Cormission which wo. uld comprise four Russians,
four WJestern representatives, and three neutrals.
They tried to allay Russian fears that inspection
teans would be used for espionage by offering to make
half the number of each team nationals of " uncommitted"
countries.
The Soviet reply, made on the same day as the last two of these
concessions, was to announce its intention to resume testing.
Soviet Resumption of Tests:
On Ist September the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear
device. ' von this did not exhaust the patience or the hope of
the Western leaders. On 3rd September, as I mentioned last
week, President Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan made a joint offer to
Mr. Khrushchev that their three governments agree, with imrediate
effect, not to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere such as
would produce radio active fall-out. They proposed that their
representatives meet at Geneva on 9th Septenber to record this
agreement. They further emphasized that this proposal was not in
any way conditional upon the establishment of new or additional
controls and that they were prepared to rely on existing longrange
methods of detection which would not involve entry into or
overflight of Russian territory.
The Russian reply, as we all know, was the explosion of
a second nuclear device, and a third and then a fourth. The
explosion of four atomic devices within a span of six days
points to a high degree of planning and advance preparation over
a long period. It means that Soviet participation at the Geneva
talks has for some time been a sham. It neans that while they
have allegedly been negotiating for the suspension of nuclear
weapons tests they have been preparing an extensive series of
tests which, it must be assumed, will add materially to Russian
nuclear weapons capability. In this context I would again
recall that on 28th August, 1959, the Soviet Government
announced its decision " not to resume nuclear explosions" if the
estern Powers did not resume. In the face of the Soviet Union's
patent indifference to the Western proposals or world opinion,
President Kennedy found himself obliged to make the followin
announcement on 5th September, after the third in the present
series of Russian tests:-
" In view of the continued testing by the Soviet
Government, I have today ordered the resumption of nuclear
tests in the laboratory and underground with no fall-out.
" In our efforts to achieve an end to nuclear testing,
we have taken every step that reasonable men could justify.
" In view of the acts of the Soviet Government, we must
now take those steps which prudent men find essential. We
have no other choice in fulfilment of the responsibilities
of the United States Government to its own citizens and to
the security of other free nations.
" Our offer to make an agreement to end all fall-out
tests remains open until September 9."
Recent Developments: The Soviet Union has now rejected the joint United
Kingdom-United States offer and gone on to conduct t0eefurther
atmospheric tests of nuclear devices, two with a force of several
megatons, that is to say, equivalent in explosive power to
several million tons of TNT. Mr. Khrushchev, in rejecting the
Western offer, contended that a nuclear tests suspension
agreement must be considered in the wider context of general and
complete disarmament, This Soviet reaction, as I suggested last
Thursday, provided " a complete test of the good faith and
pacific intentions of the Communists". They have failed that
test. In contradiction to Mr. Khrushchev's repeated statements
on the need tc protect th . world from the dangers of radio-active
fall-out, they have brushed aside the offer of an aZreement
which would have done just this.
The Soviet claim that it is not prepared to conclude
partial disarmament or suspension agreements, but wishes to
consider all those problems in the context of general and
complete disarmanent, is a transparent propaganda device. The
problem of general and complete disarmament is vast and complex
and a solution cannot be achieved by " short-cuts". The West
has always believed that a major stop towards general
disarmament would be the conclusion of a nuclear tests ban treaty.
In fact, some progress had been made towards the establishment of
such a treaty. Yet the Soviet Union by its present actions seems
prepared to nullify the progress already naeo. In the light of
this Soviet intransigence it was no surpri: s when the Geneva
conference adjourned indefinitely on 9th September.
On 10th September, immediately after adjournment of the
conference, the Soviet Union announced that it would begin
testing mu] ti-stage rockets to be fired into the Pacific Ocean in
an area south-west of Hawaii. The rockets to be tested are said
to be more powerful and improved versions of multi-stago carrier
rockets already used in space experiments.
Commentary The record makes it clear that the Soviet Union has,
from the outset, treated the whole issue of nuclear tests bans
with complete cynicism, recklessly pursuing what it conceives as
its national interest yet at the same time playing on the hopes
and fears of the millions of peace-loving people throughout the
world. The first Russian " suspension" in March, 1958, followed
completion of one series of tests. The next series, in November,
1958, was pressed through with a total disrogard of international
opinion. In August, 1959, presumably when the irmmediate
requirenents of the Russian military machine had been met, a
solemn promise was given that the U. S. S. R. would not be the first
to conduct any further nuclear tests. The events of these last
days show how-uch faith can be placed in assurances of this kind.
It is also clear that while professing to ne: otiate seriously at
Geneva, the Russians were making detailed prcp-rations for the
current series of tests. No doubt as soon as the series has
been completed there will be yet another Soviet proposal for an
unconditional suspension on both sides, with the Communist
propaganda machine fully mobilized to denounce the United States
if it continues the tests it has now been forced to undertake.
The Australian Government commends the patience and
restraint contrasting sharply with the Soviet approach to this
issue which the Western loaders have shown throughout the long
and ( as now proved) fruitless negotiations at Geneva. Still more
commendable have been their persistent and imaginative efforts to
seek out every possibility of agreenent and, in recent days, to
salvage something from the wreck. Given the total lack of
response from the Soviet Union, it is inconceivable that the
United States should continue its self-imposed ban on nuclear
testing in the present grave situation. My Government wholeheartedly
supports President Kennedy's decision to resume underground
tests, a decision which the Soviet actions have now made
essential to the security of the free nations. For, let us make
no mistake, our own security is directly involved. So long as
the Soviet Union refuses to conclude an effective aroeeent for
the prohibition and control of nuclear tests, we will be left in
the grim position that the only assurance that its leaders will
not resort to the ultimate weapon is the knowledge that its use
would mean their own annihilation.
At the same time it is noteworthy that even now the
United States, at a substantial sacrifice in time, convenience
and money, still refrains from carrying out the atmospheric tests
which generate fall-out. There is a clear and important
difference between the atmospheric tests conducted by the
Russians and the underground testing now being undrtaken by the
United States.
Although the recent Lo_ v. i et actions have not com., e as
a complete surprise, their suclacnness a.-id brutality and the
threat which tiiey pose to w) rla! peace are nonotheless
shocking and," doeply dW prssin It ap-Doars tiha-t -the fifthl
sixth Lind seventh. Soviet tests we r: in tiO iAr t~ c regieins.
Only two m~ onths a'-o ton nati-o-ns ritin Canlbrra in this very
Char., ber to ive effect to the . AnIt-( 2Uctic Tre_) aty, a m_-odest
a,:: roeioent designed to rcim. ove cL1.1c:; e of fricti-n anMd dispute and
to facilitate work to,-etho lo'teernngodi xlrto
and developmient. The Soviat Union was amion.,, tnc simno.; orios to
this ag,-reement, under which nuclear explosions are forbidden in
the Antarctic. I should still like -to hope that in thne larger
interests of mankind, the S,. viot leaders co'. uld recover, something
of thie spirit of moeaion and co-operation which m11arked the
Antarctic Conference and that the ban on nuclear-tests, with
propter control an,' safe omurds, will become universal. Until it
does, the free nations place no reliance on Soviat
professions of concern for mankind. Nor can they accept as
~~. otnhu ie oitcaim to be the champion of erlan
complete Jisarrmariont.
GEi-EVA C0NFR~ C OHl Tn DS OTTTNUANCE ONUCLAR
VEAP101* TfLST3-CC~ h~
1at July,, 1958
21 st Augu. st, 1958
22nd August, 1 958
31st October, 1958
1 st November, 1958
3rd November, 1958
13th April, 1959
23rd April, 1959-
May, 1959
14th May, 1959
August, 1959-
29th Aiugust, 1c, 50 Following oxchanrGes be twe en Pre side nt Ri sonhowvir
of' the United States and Marshal LuIgani of' the
Soviet Union on the possibility of' a Nuclear
Tests Dan Treaty a Oonf'orenca of' iEcprts to
Study tho PFossibility of' dotecting Violations
of a icssiblej Agreement on the suspcn , ion of'
Nuclcear Te sts opcned at Geneva.
An agroed report on the technical f'earsibilitiy
of' detecting nuohar explosions was3 adopted by
the Conf'eronce of' Experts.
The United Kingdom and the Uited States Governments
announced that thcy wer3e proparad to
suspend nuclear testing f'or cno year from 31 st
October, 19508, provided negctiatic,. ns for a
Tests Pan Traaty beg-an on that dlate arid provided
the Soviet Unidon did not resume tssting.
The Geneva Confc-rence on the biscontinuance of'
lluclear Weapon Tests convened.
The Soviet Union cmx~ odoed a Nuclear dovice.
The Soviet Union exploded -a furtier Nulcar
device. President Eisenhower a letter to Mr0 Kitrushchev
suggested. that, in the absence of' Soviet
agreement to controls that would be ef'fective
in all anvircnmcnrtf$ a6.~ erou rvd~
for disconftd khco n ccartaid' 6hivironrlentb -be negbtin.
tad. The krnsidRnt suwCGested banning all atmos-
' nhoric tests initially.
PLr. Khruschav rejected President Eisenhowe.-r's
proposal and insisted that ef'forts continue with
the sole objective of' concluding a treaty that
would provide for the cessation of all types of'
nuclear weapon tests.
ro sidenb Eisenhowor in a letter to 14r, Khrushchev
reitezratod the terms of' his letter of' 13th
A . pril0o
W'o IKhrushchev in a letter to .1& e-sidant Eisenhower
althu-h r3stating thco views expressed in
his letter of' 23rd April, exressed Soviet
willingness to entor in~ to experts' meetings on
the deteaction of' higLh altitude tests0
Mz--Ydlrushchov statod that the " is
ready to accolpt th3 most solemn obligation not to
be the first to conduct any further tests of
nuclear weapons".
The Government of' the United Kinigdoma confirmed
an earlier st,% temant, made by Mr. RA, Dutlor
in the H-ouse of' Cormxons, that it would not conduct
anmy nucJloar iweapon-tests so long as useful
discuss0ions at Geneva conitinued.
0./ 2-
Page 2.
29th December, 1959
11th February, 1960
13th February, 1960
19th March, 1960
29th March, 1960
1st april, 1960
3rd May, 1960
11th May, 1960
December, 1960
27th Locember, 1960 President Eisenhower announced that the United
States would consider itself free to resume
nuclear weapon, testing when its voluntary
moratorium expired on 31st December, 1959, but
that it would not resume testing without
announcing its intention in advance,
The United States, supported by the United
Kingdom, presented to the Conference a proposal
for a phased treaty which would immediately
end all nuclear weapon, tests in those
environments where effective control could be
established. The proposal called for a ban on all tests above
ground up to the maximum height to which effective
controls could be agreed, all underwater
tests, and all underground tests above a seismic
magnitude of 4o75 on the Richter seismographia
scale( This magnitude became known as the
" threshold").
France exploded its first nuclear device in the
Sahara Desert.
The Soviet Union expressed its willingness to
agree to a treaty banning all tests in the
atmosphere, underwater and in cosmic space,
and all underground tests above seismic magnitude
4.75, contingent on a proviso that all parti-s
to the treaty undertook an obligation not to test
below the threshold daring the period required to
conduct a research programme.
The United States and the United Kingdom declared
themselves willing to accept a temporary, unilaterally
declared, moratorium on tests below the
threshold. It was made clear that neither country
would institute this moratorium until the remaining
treaty issues e. g. quota for on-siteinspections,
voting procedures, etc. were resolved.
France exploded its second nuclear device in the
Sahara LDsert.
The Soviet Union declared that the United Kingdom
United States declaration of 29th March could
have a " positive" effect on bringing the positions
of the East and West closer together on an agreemont
to halt nuclear weapon tests.
A conference of scientists from the United Kingdom,
the United States and the Soviet Union convened
to exchange information on the research programmes
each power believed should be undertakon to
improve capabilities for detecting and identifying
underground nuclear explosions.
The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of
Nuclear Weapon Tests adjourned.
France exploded its third nuclear device in the
Sahara Desert. / 3
Page 3.
21 st -1rch, 1961
18th April, 1961
April, 1961
4th June, 1961
17th June, 1961
July, 1961
July, 1961
28th August, 1961 The. Geneva Conference on tha . Di oc( uAtf inlanon of
Nuclear Weapon Tests rn-oponed. The United
States pros nt. d new proposals covering most
of the contentious issues relating to the control
system which still remained.
The Soviet Union demanded, contrary to its
earlier position, that the proposed Administrator
of any agreed treaty should be replaced by a
triumvirate representing Soviet, Western and
Uncommitted nations and that all decisions should
be unanimous. The Soviet Union for the first
time raised the question of French nuclear uesting
claiming it would have a " negative" effect on
the Conference.
The United Kingdom and the United States'
representatives at the Geneva Conference on the
Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests introduced
the text of a complete draft treaty for banning
nuclear tests.
France exploded its fourth nuclear device in the
Sahara Deserto
Mr. Khrushchev meeting with Mr. Kennedy in Vienna
handed the latter an " Aide-Memdre" restating the
Soviet points of view on the Western proposals
for a Draft Treaty. In this " Aide-Memoire", the
Soviet Union propounded the view that it was
impossible to find a " neutral man" and that it
was thus necessary for any body administering a
Nuclear Tests Dan Treaty to be a tripartite body
and for any international peace-keeping body to
operate through the Security Council with a
bipartite commission. These two proposals lay
open the way to Soviet veto.
The United States Government delivered a Note to
the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reply to
the Soviet " Aido-Memoire" which rebutted the
arguments of the Soviet Union, drawing attention
to the handicaps of the Soviet " troika" proposal
and pointing out that truly neutral officials
have frequently held international office before.
The Soviet Union forwarded a Note to the Government
of the United States which in greater length
repeated the arguments already advanced in the
Soviet " Aide Menoiro" of 4th June.
The Government of the United States of America
forwarded a further Note to the Soviet Government
in reply to the Soviet Note of 15th July, but
concentrating on the central issue in dispute;
that of whether the Soviet Union really wished
to negotiate an effective Nuclear Tests Dan
Treaty. The Note pointed out that despite
Western concessions on all points which the
Soviet Union had stated to be stumbling blocks,
the Soviet Union remained intransigent.
The Western representatives at the Geneva Conference
mada concessions designed to satisfy the
Soviet Union completely on what would happen
towards the end of the moratorium on small underground
tests. Provision would be made for a panel
of experts to report on improvements in a control
system and recomendat.-ons made on whether the
" Threshold" should be lowered or eliminated.
Fage 4.
August, 1961
August, 1961
Ist September, 1961
3rd September, 1961
4th September, 1961
September, 1961
Septembar, 1961
6th September, 1961
September, 1961 The Western representatives at the Geneva Conference
made concessions designed to satisfy the
Soviet Union on the remaining matters which the
Soviet Union claimed constituted obstacles to the
conclusion of a treaty. These further concessions
covered the position of the Administrator of
a treaty providing for his replacement by a
majority vote in the Control Commission if he
proved unsatisfactory and the inclusion in
inspection teams operating in the territory of
the original parties of the treaty of 50% of
members from uncommitted countries.
The Soviet Union announced that it was resuming
the testing of nuclear eapons.
The Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device in the
atmosphere in Soviet Central Asia. The device was
in the " intermediate" range ( approximately
kilotons). The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the
President of the United States proposed to Mr.
Khrushchev that the United Kingdom, the " nited
States and the U. S. S. R. agree immediately not to
conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere which
would produce fallout. This offer was to remain
open until 9th September.
The Soviet Union exploded a iucloar dev co in the
atmosphere of " intermediate" range in Soviet
Central Asia. This was the second device exploded
following the Soviet announcement that it was
resuming testing.
The Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device of
" intermediate" range in the atmosphere in Soviet
Central Asia. This was the third device exploded
by the Soviet Union following the announcement it
was resuming testing.
President Kennedy issued a statement that " in
view of the continued testing by the Soviet
Government, I have today ordered the resumption
of nuclear tests in laboratory and underground
with no fall-out". President Kennedy further stated
that the offer he had made jointly with Mro
Macmillan still remained open until 9th September.
A White House spokesman said that testing would
resume some time in September.
The Soviet Union exploded its fourth nuclear
device in the atmosphere since announcing the
resumption of tests. This explosion was somewhere
cast of Stalingrad.
The Soviet Union exploded two nuclear devices in
the atmosphere near the Arctic island of Novaya
Ze nlya. The first device exploded was the largest
of the present Soviet series with a force of
several nmegatons one megaton eauals the force of
one million tons of T. N. T.
The second device exploded was in the " intermediate"
range
Pag~ e
1 2th Septoniber, 1961 The Soviet Union explodad its sovnnt-h xiuloaxr
device of several mogatons force in thG
atnosphorci in the Arctic.