PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Whitlam, Gough

Period of Service: 05/12/1972 - 11/11/1975
Release Date:
27/01/1973
Release Type:
Speech
Transcript ID:
2803
Document:
00002803.pdf 10 Page(s)
Released by:
  • Whitlam, Edward Gough
AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE SUMMER SCHOOL CANBERRA - 27 JANUARY 1973 - OPENING ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HON EG WHITLAM QC MP

AUSTRALIAN~ INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
SUITER SCHOOL CAN~ BERRA
27 January 1973
Opening Address by the Prime Minister, the Hon. E. G. Whitlam,
M. P.
It is a happy coincidence that this Summer School on Australia's
international relations should open on such a momentous day in the
history of our region and of the world the day tof the ceasefire in
Vie t-Nam. A generation of war and havoc and suffering lies behind us.
The problems ahead, in Viet-Nam, in Indo-China and in the region are
immense. They will tax statemanship to the limit, yet it is impossible
at such a time, on such a day, not to feel a sense of profound relief
and profound hope and a sense of excitement at the new opportunity which
this week's historic events have opened up for us all. It is in the
context of change, of hope, of new opportunities that I put my remarks
in opening the Summer School.
On 2 December the nation changed its government, but did not
and could not by that act change the essential foundations of its foreign
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policy. Australia's national interests did not change. Australia's
international obligations did not change. Australia's alliances and
friendships did not change. Nonetheless, the change is real and deep
because what has altered is the perception and interpretation of thosa
interests, obligations and friendships by the elected government. The
essential change is that the views and policies of the Australian
Government working within the same framework of facts as its
predecessors are now those of the Australian Labor Party. The
Australian Government acts on a mandate given to it by the Australian
people. On 2 December that mandate was given clearly to the Australian
Labor Party. I make these remnarks at the outset not to strike a partisan
note, but to place on record a simple, obvious but powerful fact which
should never be forgotten at home or abroad, neither by our opponents
here nor our friends abroad.
The mandate of the Labor Government was abundantly clear on
specific matters of our foreign relations. In the Policy Speech we did
not for instance say just in general terms that we would work for
normalisation of relations with the People's Republic of China. We said
specifically " The Labor Government will transfer Australia's China Embassy
from Taipei to Peking." We have done so. We did not just say that we
would deplore resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific. We said
" We will take the question of French nuclear tests to the International
Court of Justice." We preparing to do so. We did not just say that we
deplored racial-selection of sporting teams. We said " We will give no
visas to or through Australia to racially selected sporting teams."
We shall not.

Beyond, however, these and other quite specific pledges, there
were other great matters which were stated more generally and yet which
must be given commanding force and weight if we are to take our mandate
seriously. For example, the reference in my Policy Speech to Viet-N~ tm
was relatively brief and general. This was not just because in November
the ceasefire then seemed much closer than it turned out. It was
because there was not a matter in the whole range of policy domestic
or foreign on which the intentions and determination of the Australian
Labor Party and an Australian labor Government ran so deep, clear and
straight. But on three great matters the three relevant matters for an
Australian political party or an Australian government there had never
been any doubt about the attitude of my Party. Those principles were:
opposition to Australia's military involvement; opposition to the
bombing of North Viet-Nam; and, thirdly, a determination to use
Australia's influence to end the war.
From 28 April 1965 the day Sir Robert Menzies announced the
sending of the first battalion these three attitudes had never been in
doubt nor in question at any level of the Australian Labor Party. Nobody
could be under any illusion that once we had formed a government we would
delay for a day or an hour in acting upon these policies and these
principles upon this mandate.
Yet our mandate and duty to maintain the American alliance was
equally clear. This we will do. The ending of American intervention in
Indo-China will remove the really serious difference between the two
administrations. There will be another result of profound importance.
The end of intervention with all the bitterness and dissension it
brought will free the spirit and energies of the American people and
help mightily to restore the United States to her proper and constructive

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role as the world's most generous and idealistic nation. But let me also
say this:-At no time in the eighteen years since the United States began
her military commitment in Indo-China, or in the ten years since Australia
first sent advisers there, or in the eight years since Australia
committed troops on the ground in strength, or in the seven years since
the bombing of North Viet-Nam began, has it ever been suggested by any
President, by any Prime Minister, by any responsible Congressman that
Australia's attitude to the war in Viet-Nam or any phase in the war in
Viet-Namn was a condition of the continuation of ANZUS. There is no
such suggestion now. ANZUS is a legal embodiment of the common interests
of the people of Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Those
interests remain constant beyond changes of administration in Washington,
Wellington or Canberra.
It is true that the changed Australian attitude to Viet-Namn
did lead to an alteration in the degree of consultation on American policy
in Viet-Nam between Washington and Canberra. That alteration had nothing
to do with the change of government. It occurred under the previous
government as the Australian commitment waE. wound down. As the
significance of the Australian commitment lessened, the less Australia
was told and the previous government did not and could not complain.
But this was an alt,-, ration related solely to Viet-Nam. It had nothing
to do with ANZUS.
However, for all its enduring importance, adherence to ANZUS
does not in itself constitute a foreign policy. It is a treaty at the
centre of our relations with only two nations, albeit one our closest
partner and the other the world's greatest power. Yet insofar as
ANZUS represents a security guarantee in the ultimate peril, reliance
upon it as the sole objective of our foreign policy would in fact place
our foreign policy in suspension until the peril emerged.

The real test of a successful foreign policy is the extent to
which a balance is struck and kept between a naition's commitment and a
nation's power. The United States herself now accepts that its cold
war commitment to global containment of Communism represented a gross
over-extension of her real power. This was one of the inexorable lessons
of Viet-Nam. To see the change which has occurred because of Viet-Nam
it is enough to compare the circumspection of President Nixon's second
Inaugural with the sweeping rhetoric of John Kennedyts Inaugural with
its vision of an unlimited universal acceptance of burdens by the
United States. In my Policy Speech I said:
" A nation's foreign policy depends on striking a wise, proper
and prudent balance between commitment and power. Labor will have four
commitments commensurate to our power and resources;
" First our own national security;
" Secondly a secure, united and friendly
Papua New Guinea;
" Thirdly achieve closer relations with our
nearest and largest neighbour,
Indonesia;
" Fourthly promote the peace and prosperity
of our neighbourhood."
The fourth of those is, of course, an extremely general
proposition. Yet Australia's actual situation in our region makes it a
meaningful objective for an Australian Foreign Policy. It is a
commitment realistically commensurate with our power, our resources and
our interests.

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Australia's actual situation is this: We are far and away the
richest nation in the neighbourhood. We have a gross national product
equal to that of all the countries between the Bay of Bengal and the South
China Sea. Those countries have twenty times our population. We ar3 an
island continent with one of the most formidable natural defences in the
world. We have no serious conflict of interests with any of our
neighbours and there are no foreseeable conflicts likely to arise well
beyond this decade.
We have an assured economic partnership a relationship of
interdependence, not dependence with Japan, the strongest power in the
wider region. Both Australia and Japan are moving swiftly into an
area of better understanding with the largest power, China.
If I appear to be placing such great emphasis on the rosier
aspects of our present situation, it is because I wish to contrast the
new realities with the old fears, shibboleths and suspicions. One
might say, with Canning, in a very different context ana very different
sense, " I call the new world into existence in order to redress the
balance of the old." I hasten to say that absolutely no significance
whatever is to be attached to my preferring Canning above Metternich.
Tc give an independent view from the other side of the world
I quote from the " Guardian" of 15 January:-
" Australia is the richest most powerful and most advanced
country in a part of the world that is otherwise empty of influential
states. It is proper and healthy that Australian policy should reflect
this political and economic fact.
" But until the new government came along a succession of
governments in Canberra had tended to accept for Australia a more
dependent status than the country actually enjoys. Since the Second
World War Australians and Americans have understood each other and have

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depended upon each other to a degree that was unknown before Pearl Harbour.
But friendship between Australia and America does not require Australia
to be subservient." I am determined that under this Government the Australian. people
will be encouraged to shed the old stultifying fears and animosities which
have encumbered the national spirit for generations and dominated, often
for domestic partisan purposes, the foreign policy of this nation.
The other great theme our Government will wish to stress both
with the great powers and our neighbours is that with the end of foreign
intervention in Viet-Nam the region has a second chance. The West threw
away an opportunity for a settlement in 1954 after Korea, after Geneva.
I believe the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and China are
determined not to let the second opportunity slip because assuredly it
will not be offered a third time. In particular the Australian
Government will discourage at all levels the kind of thinking which
would place North Viet-Nam in the role of the new antagonist as a
replacement for China and which wiould place Thailand in the role assigned
to South Viet-Namn in the early ' 60' s. Accordingly, we shall support
the ASEAN proposal for a zone of peace and neutrality in South East
Asia and encourage the other countries involved in the region to endorse
the proposition. I have spoken on several occasions in recent months of the
great importance wie attach to the development of our relations with
Indonesia and stressed it in the Policy Speech. The importance of
Indonesia to Australia is indisputable. We need, however, to see the
development of ) ur relations with Indonesia within the wider South
Ehst Asian regional context. I do not want to give the impression that
by giving priority to our relations with Indonesia we would do so at
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the expense of our relations with other ASEAN countries. Indonesia is,
of course, closer geographically and much larger than the other members.
But our standing in other regional countries is not irrelevant to the
importance which Indonesia will attach to Australia. In the same way
as our destiny is inseparable from Indonesia, so Indonesia cannot
separate her own destiny from those of her immediate neighbours to
the north in ASEAN. So the continued development of our relations with
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines is important not only
in the wider regional context, but in the context of our own relations
with Indonesia. We see our relations with Indonesia as complementary
to and not in any way competitive with her or our relationships with
other ASEAN countries. This is what I mean in saying that in giving
priority to the development of our relations with Indonesia we are
not doing this at the expense of our relations with the other ASEAN
countries. I might sum up our general approach to the affairs of our
region by stating the situation I expect to exist by 1975. With New
Zealand, relations wrill have grown even closer through a series of
co-operative endeavours to promote the welfare and harmony of the
South Pacific. We shall have as our close neighbour an independent Papua
New Guinea which will have for the rest of this century the first call
on our substantially increased foreign aid programme. We shall be
working closely in co-operation with the Government of Papu~ a New Guinea
through a specific and guaranteed economic programme.
We do not see any immediate threat of external aggression
to the countries of South East Asia. We do not want to look on South
East Asia as a front line in terms of the old cliche of forward defence.

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We do not see South East Asia as a frontier where we might fight nameless
Asian enemies as far to the north of' our owm shores as possible in
other people's backyards.
To meet the new realities and our perception of them we shall
be seeking new forms of regional co-operation. In its present form,
ASPAC no longer reflects those realities. In particular, the continued
presence of Taiwan makes ASPAC anacronistic. Three of ASPAC's members
Australia, New Zealand and Japan recognise Peking as the sole legal
government of China. We will not be withdrawing immediately from ASPAC
although we consider that unless there is a change in its present
membership, it cannot function effectively or continue for very long.
In Wellington the New Zealand Prime Minister and I expressed
our intention to work with our Asian and Pacific neighbours in making
adjustments to existing arrangements and seeking new forms of co-operation.
We shall be consulting with our neighbours including Indonesia, Japan
and others before any final decisions are reached on how we should
proceed. There is no question of seeking to change or enlarge ASEAN.
We should like to see all our ASEAN neighbours in a larger regional
association for Asia and the Pacific, but ASEAN itself is a sub-regional
grouping which is doing valuable work and any enlargement of the
organisation is a matter for its members.
Regional co-operation will be one of the keystones of
Australia's foreign policy for the 701s. We shall be charting a new
course with less emphasis on military pacts. It will be based on an
independent outlook in foreign affairs and will be directed towards a
new regional community geared to the realities of the
The guidelines of the regional community that I foresee will
be an organisation genuinely representative of the region, without / io

ideological overtones, conceived as an initiative to help free the region
of great power rivalries that have bedevilled its progress for decades
and designed to insulate the region against ideological interference
from the great powers.
I do not intend that Australia should try to impose a detailed
formulation for setting up such a community and we shall not seek to
intrude beyond our realistic capacity to participate and assist in the
realisation of this concept. We shall be patient and punctilious in our
consultation and prepared at every turn to take account of and participate
in the genuine aspirations of the region. But we shall be active in
seeking this end. I have already initiated efforts in the relevant
Departments of my Government and I shall continue to advance this concept
as an earnest of Australia's genuine interest in the developmnent of a truly
representative regional community.
I conclude by expressing our profound satisfaction that this
auspicious day should mark a new beginning or at the very least a chance
for a new beginning in our region. I take it as a happy omen indeed that
this should have occurred so early in the life of the new Australian
Government. Events of this week add a new importance and a new dimension
to this Summer School. Australians like yourselves who wish to help us
frame new policies and take the debate on foreign affairs to a new level
can now do so free of the overwhelming preoccupation of Viet-Nam.
I have long stressed that a Labor Government would seek and welcome
the help of Australians in framing our policies at all levels. Your views
and ideas are doubly welcome at this time.

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