Dutch " Vest Nev Guinea
Vlorld situation
Smrnmit United Nations
Mr. Khirushchev
Mr. Nehru at U. N.
P. 1iat U. N.
Mr. K. Four power Conference?
P. m. as " fall guy"
S~ mrnit Meeting
PRESS CONFELEANCE GIV BY THE PRIiE 1iINISTED9,
THE RT. HON. R. G. IENZIES AT KINGSFOrD SI TH
AIRPORT ON '' EDNESDAY, 19TH OCTOEILR, 1960
PIDE MHINISTER:
QUESTION: PR9DIME iINISTER:
QUESTION:
PRIME MINISTER:
QUESTION: PRD,, E M:, INISTER: I'd like to put you on warning that I'-
supposed to make a long statement in the
House tomorrow night on my deeds and misdecd. s
abroad, stated with proper reticence, so Id
better not try to make it now. I think perhaps
we might try to concentrate on a few points.
Now which ones, from the newspaper point of
view or television point of view would you like
me to say a little about?
Inaudible Could you tell us anything ab'out
the Malayan proposal for Dutch jest New Guinea?
That is not one of the matters that I've been
discussing.
That's why I asked you, Sir.
Yes I thought so. Oh, I knowi a little about it,
but I don't think that any comment about it will
be useful at this stage. I'll find out what the
developments have boeen over the last couple of
days.
Could you toll us Sir. whether you think as a
result of the proceedings at the time you were in
Now York the world situation has improved or
worsened? , ell I think it would be very difficult to say
whether the state of the world was easicr or
more tense. I sup ose that depends on what you
think about whether Khrushchev's tactics were
designac to cae tension or to increase it.
Frankly I thought th-. at he camnc thoro lo increase
tension though he's a strong aLvocato, judging
by what he tells me, of a Summit Conference.
But it's very difficult w'iith a man like that
who's a mixture a dictator with a strong
earthy sense of humour, a certain notion of th*
ridiculous, a fellow who thoroughly enjoys beating
his shoe on the desk and hopes that somebody
will take it seriously. I mecan he's a mixture.
( Aside This is a nice sound-proof room).
But I think going back to th! at I think that
one thing he arrived there to do was to wveaken
the present United Nations, primarily by an
attack on the Secretary-General. Bccause he
repeatedly made very savage attacks, usu. ally
of course saying that Hram-in-arskjoeld was a tool
of the capitalists, and such like original
phrases that one becomes familiar witt, that
he represented the western Doers, that no good
could cone out of him, that what Khrushchev calls
the Socialist power ought to be in the picture
and that instead of one Secretary-General there
ought to be three,
-2-
QUESTION: PRD MINISTER:
QUESTION: PRITE MINISTER:
QUEST ION: A remarkable proposal Because it meant
disuniting the United Nations. It meant having
one Communist Secretary-General, one neutralist
Secretary-General whatever that word
means and one from the democratic western
world, each of them presumably, so far as one
could understand it, with a veto over the other
two. It would, of course, have reduced the hole
executive arm of the United Na tions to futility
and therefore would have ben a dea. ily blow at
the United Nations,
It was taken very seriously by the United
States, very seriously indeed. And if the
outcome had been anything other than it vwas
there might have been serious consequences.
However, in the result, of course, he failed
hopelessly in his attack on the Secretary-General.
( Inaudible):
I think that he sees himself as the focus of
another kind of world organisation. After all,
if he's to get the better of the western powcrs
in the long run, it's very desirable for him to
make a play for the support of people who are
as yet uncommritted the African powers for
example, who are very numerous now, and most of
them very new, And ' sian powers not to be
overlooked in this connection.
: hen he said two or three times the United Nations
ought to be established in Moscow, this wasn't
merely a joke on his part. It cdid I thought,
represent something that was ha If-sriously
formed at the back of his nind.
Have you any comment to nake Sir, about your
interview with Mr. Khrushchev?
I found it extremely interesting. I thought
that it would be rather foolish to come back
to Australia not having had a private talk with
him and so I got my office to put in a bid
through the usual channels, indicating, with
my usual modesty, that 10 minutes would be very
satisfactory if I could get them. And in the
result I had 70 minutes. Indeed, so far as I
know, we might still have been tal-'-ig but for
the fact that other engagements emerged. But
it was very interesting, very interesting.
He's still something of a mystery to mec but
perhaps not quite so much as before, because he
has undoubtedly an earthy sort of humour,
Did he thump the table, Sir, while he spoke to
you?
-3-
PRIME MINISTER:
QUESTION:
PRIME HINISTER:
QUESTION: PRIIE MINISTER: Oh, no. Everything was quite relaxed and easy.
He evern looked me up and down . and said for an
Imperialist I wasn't a bad specimen. ( Laughter).
And I told hin that as a Connunist he improved on
closer inspection. ( Laughter).
Pr. Mcnzies did you get the im. pression from him
that he was quite serious about wanting a Summit
Meeting? I think so. That's one thing I do believe. I
believe he would like a Sunnit Meeting. And that's,
perhaps, one of the positive results that I always
hoped would come out of this imtter over the
fanous amendment because the other three, France,
Great Britain and the United States voted for a
Sumnit Meeting as early as practicable which of
coUBle were words designed to acco1mnodate the
exigencies of the Presidential election in
lnerica. And he himself made it quite clear to
ne and I asked him whether there was any mystery
about it, and he said " none whatever', that he
wanted a Summit moeting, He realised it couldn't
occur now until after the Presidential election
and the new President had established hiLself. But
so certain an I that he does, and therefore all
four do, now, cearly declared, that most of our
convero: ation had to do with what natters could
usefully be discussed at the Summit. He nominated
Disarmament. He said that is something that has
to be discussed in the broad and in principle
between the four atomic power le. aders before it
can usefully be dealt with in point of detail.
And therefore that's his friority No. 1. He
thought that the problems of Berlin, for example,
to take an example, were though important, ninor
compared with the problen of disarnaIcnt. But
anyhow for three quarters of an hour I discussed
with him what sort of things could be discussed at
aSurmmit mceting. How usefully, what the
possibilities were of getting practical results, all
this didn't argue to me that he was just going
through the fom of saying that he wanted a
Conference. Do you believe he wants a four-power Conference,
not two?
He wants a four-power. All this proposal about
having a meeting between Khrushchev and Eisenhower
never did have any reality in it. Bless my soul,
before the thing had been tabled for hours each
of the supposed neeters had said ' No'.
Khrushchev had said ' I won't"\ except on terms
that are obviously unacceptable and Eisenhower
said the sane thing. I never have seen nuch use
in an Assembly of Nations passing a resolution
directed to two hunamn beings who have both
rejected it in advance, ha. t's the sense of it?
None.
4-
QUESTION: P1LIEITh INISTER:
nUESTION: PA1I1, vE 7IINISTEik:
QUESTION: PRIPI,. E iI. 1INISTEPL:
QUESTION: PRIME MINISTER: \ ivould you care to comme_, int on M. Nhi
attitude a. t the United ', ations, Sir?
Weoll I wa-s surprised," at hi spec 13e
surprised. Iltbeyond_ that.-L I have no ccalicl.
I daresa-y that he him-selIf 1wou! li reret, b3y now,.
some. i of the things th2. t hc though--t fit to say.
Aft er all1 theore i s cothim-tou he Ct: d aout
when someb) od-y j-oves for a ConfCrencc of tro and
someb) ody else, the two having sa3~ T't a
2-meaeting, sa-ys 7elI the r-ight t1, iJng to do is to
get the four together.
That' s a true, niacndmcn-u and' eonstructiv., c one)
and it's worth rememibering, or v.-ortn be-ing; known8
that before. the great day1: s cut, or at-Lany~ rate
it was one o'clock i~ n tGhe m: in -tecohnically
it was that nighit tLL five-powevr resolution had
7ec n so altered by votes that it wa-s 7ithdrawin
completely, so that that rsLutio_ faLe_ d.
My ameandme,, nt had, of course, beeon rejected, 3ut
not by the powers concerned In it, not 1b1 the
atomic poviers three oc iwhoa--ToteUd o itdLh
other abstained.
Did you ma-ke a chock-up be,. fere -vetvot on your
mc~ indrment, Sir,
I didn' t maake a-ny check-up. I a n1eVw-bo at
the General AssemblyDi. Therc arc toor three of
the old hanlds; I see theni fiittig, aroundl like
bats, and no d oub. t there is gra obiggoingon.
I couLd quite im: rginc, h~ avinj, rcgari. to the
distribution of the, five, that a mnmn
wouldn't be carried. That wiouldn'-t have
troubled rie a bit a-. nd df id1n't I 2 1-wva nted
to do was to d-o somac-hing first o.-f all1 to
prom-ote the idea of the true Summ. Irit Coference,
and that could best be, d-one-by sftting the vote,,
of those who w ere to be pirties to it a-nd in the
second p-la-ce to g& t rid of th1; i-, noxious
idea because it is thaL tL. he wleconiflict
in the world is b-etwe( en th6 Uni-u6. L States and
" he Soviet Union, a notion which -wV-as alm-. ost
e,-nshrined in the five-powVee. res oluticn.
Did you sound out h'r. I reh-ru becforchand, Sir, to
see how he
Nobody sounded mc, out! The flist I hea rd of the
five-power re_: solution waCs whcnit was prod: ucedf,.
And indeedC it wa-s pro.-uco' ' m~ Tr interesting
way beca-use Soekarno Iac two-hour speeDch -tha: t
seem-. s to be -, ho u~ inimiiua at Asse-bl,
5
QUESTION:
PRiME MINISTER:
QUESTION: PRTIE MINIST ER: consistent with self-respect and it was
distributed as he began to speak 65 pages of
foolscap. So it was formidable.
And with it, at the last nonent, came a page
to be inserted, at page 65 headed " Vital
Please insert this at page 65". And that
contained the terms of the resolution. That's
how much out of the blue it caie,
There has been a suggestion here in Australia
that because the amendment ( noise interruption)
having a very bad effect on our relations with
Asia.
That suggestion has been made only in Australia.
I'm sorry to say. Not a hint of . t at New York.
I've been in the closest touch for the whole
time that I've been there with a dozen of the
leaders in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. No, I
didn't see Soekarno because he left innmdiately
after Speech. I saw Subandrio and had discussions
with him.
I didn't see Nasser because he left, I think he
had actually gone the day I arrived. But I did
see his Foreign Minister, Fawzik, who was present
at the Suez talks that I had in 1956. I sat with
him at dinner and we had a very interesting
exchange of ideas.
Then there was the new Prime inister of Nigeria,
who, I thought nade the best speech of the entire
Assembly a very renarkable man and I've great
expectations of Nigeria as a wise and stabilising
influence in the new Africa.
Oh, I saw a lot of these people. Those are just
namcs that occur to me.
, hat did Mr. Nehru say Sir?
' ell it's very odd. Mr. Nehru and I rct after
he'd made his famous speech. He seelcd to be
quite amiable. And there. fter I spoke. I made
my main speech, which one or two people preferred
not to publish in Australia, It is much nicer to
try to underminc the position of the Prime M'inister
of Australia when he was abroad. But when I made
my nain speech I had occasion to make many
references to what I believe to be Mr. Nehru's
point of view. And so far as I know these were
entirely consistent with his own mind.
You don't want to build this up as if two people
had a dog fight. They didn't. This is not the
way to regard these natters. I have offered no
word to which anybody could take exception to
the distinguished leader of India.
QUESTION: PRII'IE 1] IIISTER:
QUESTION: PRE1E Pi' 4BISTEi?:
QUESTION: P9] hI'E 1vINISTER: -6-
He's a vcry distinguished rman, ih t reasols
he r. y hve had, teiporar ily, in his m-lind for
saying what he did-, in thc way he sai]. it,. I
don't knowa. But those-tin: gs I wVas very
teml; pted, 1 to reply to until rlise tt t to
rcply in tha-t atmlosphere-,, wou: ld a very grcat
international headcr,. So T Tcfr. inneC.
You would c prepared to say con-i. c.' dentiy, Sir,
that our rel-tions -, With Asia arc strong a-s
ever? I think so. I' sure they are,,
( Inaudible).
Oh, I didn't. discuss the ! nnic ni; with
Mvr. Khrushchev because thv had( abstained.
You don't a aa. snk ilA'hy d. id you abstain?"
WJhat I w-a nted to find, out we-ire wh-t his views
on the i-matters of ir:-oortlancc,
There is so much talk gone on a. bout m,. otions and
amendants. These arc not the ilaortant things
in life. It's the result that m-atters
internationally. ihalt I wntd to d'iscover \ v-s -hether there
ere any real prospccts of putting the four
people together who hapjen to be the only
atom. ic powers in the worl-, and1 therefore have
the secret of peace and lVlr inr teir hands.
That wa~ s the thin. Tha t's a '-. atter c[ substance.
All this business about how rmany votes somebody
got I could' t cre less. It's very important in
a , enrl election in A. ustrali,
1. r. -lenzics could-you tell if hr. Khrushchev woulI
ha-ve preferred to havc the four powers leet rather
than just him. iself and Eisenhower?
Jell tht's quit( clear because he ha-. d already
sn. id " No" to a cctinn,, with MLr. Eisenhow-er.
A; fter all therc s another thing about it, you
know. Khrushchev's a tough follow, but he's
nothing if not a realist.
They're having a Pre sid_ entil E]. ction in
irerica before the m'ionth's oul.. E veryb ody' s
sleaking with waht us It tha' I; iJ. iy Hughes
once said with a tfl] inF inflexionu., If
you're going to ha vo a foarI-~ or iscussion
that really iloves in the d_' Lirection of settling
something, you don't want to e it w. ith a
Presioent who will hf' e had his successor elected
in a few weeks' time.
QUES T ION
PRE1-l imISTER:
QUESTION: P11D, 0 i'ImISTER:
PT-1r. _ r" l1 7TP1 7
Khrushchev's a realis-c; he-' fdia;, s t , H
wants to have a i-eeting w.! it~ h the 1Pre1sid. cn.
of the United States speakinE with uthority,
and particulrarly anfter an clection, as he will
with fresh, a nd clear, auhriy
hyeonu w r ta ng to M Khirush chev, S r
did-* you invite him.-to Australi-'?
I d-idn't discuss that ma-ter at
.0.. You credited' 11r, Khrushchev, w. i th a keen,
knowledge of Austra-lia-n affairs. or w,.-ord_' s to
tha-t effect.
He ha) s obviously taken sei; ne i~ ntero3st, He ' knew
somethin, about our geographical set up and ou2
econolm-ic set up. Oh, cs
Nr. Menios it' h-. s been s'z1in, CDCe
quarters thal-t yo--u a ' keirne . Of~' h
f or s ome. jpover in the capitali11st section.
You meian by tha,) t I was a o, r f'_ nneeent fellow
and I went into thei Lion'Is cen . iitli those
wicked Llen, Eisenhower and 1" aciiilan, andl they
said, we must ha-ve oebd who, ill put
this up; -; ic dI" on' t; wan to p1. ut it.: ust have
som-ebody, Here's this peer irocm colonial
sa'p from-. A ustra_ lia, ' we' 1 Lou! lle him -into
doing! it'.
Really, they would botla , et a-rreat; kickr if they
read that description.. 1ecause-yjou see as it
hap_-cns, and I reu~ eat this, I'~ re sa-Id it' before.
I happ,.,. n to havre -proposed the 1aof , in am.. endment,
because I thourght it much be rt,) me apstv
prop7-osa-l rather than just a~ doptL a bla11--nk negative
to a, prolrcal which I thoLght uSelc0s5 5 nd, in
some1 respects, dangerous,
This was, rig-htly or ,-iron,-1. y, my7 pro; oSal. If
I had all the timec over L.." iin T ; iculu still
make it. AInd( they d-iscl~ ussedJ tiie m-atter. it
wa[' snt accepted! b,-y them:, I im-a. clu it fcfrst on
Saturday night and it t ' cye pthtedm
until Sunda_ y i-ioXTKin,,.
So the " fall g-uyl took an eful 1o= w falling,
into the net. And finally, heIhddtd
it, m:, yself, and had it typed' d-ns cusoTi
with Mac-iillan andL Hertor afteLir l-unch on th(
Sundlay, they sa-id " Ye1s' tiey thoug2htU that wiaS
it andl so there we re. I ocquircd -what t. he
rules M-reand I -out it in. the nexIt d'ay.
4
QUESTION: PRITM E INISTER:
QUESTION: PIMIE MINISTER:
QUESTION: PRIME MINISTER:
QUESTION:
PRIMDE HINISTER:
QUESTION: PRLE IMNISTER: -8-
I have complete responsibility for initiating
this matter. And all I can say is if we're
going to talk in terms of substance, as
sensible pcople should, then the substance of
my proposal was that we should not try the
futile task of getting two people together
who said they were not willing to neet anyhow,
but that we should add to the world pressure
for a meeting of the four powers at the Su unit.
And by the tine the day was ended that second
position was as substantially achieved as
anything should be. So why apologise? I like
that expression " fall Luy". Thank you very much.
That's Aerican isn't it?
You would think Sir, then that the prospects,
or the renewed prospects, of a Sunnit Meeting
some tine next year are worthwhile?
I do. I think that the new President of the
United States will naturally want to establish
his aidministration and all that sort of thing.
I would have great hope myself that these people
will get together by the northern spring,
somewhere around April or May.
The New York Times, Sir, refers to you in this
morning's paper as " the good Snmritan",
apparently because of your.....
Jell that shows you have to go abroad to have
nice renarks made about you in a newspaper.
Mr. Menzies both the Anerican Presidential
candidates stated that the only reason they
would attend a Peace Conference, if elected, is
if they had somne, alost written guarantee that
sonething ( Airport noises)
', iho was supposed to have said this?
Both the An. erican Presidential candidates.
Not in one of those debates, in one of those
television debates?
That's right sir.
, ell don't ask : n about those because all I
want to say about Television debates is " Never,
with my approval, in Australia".
4' S.