PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Menzies, Robert

Period of Service: 19/12/1949 - 26/01/1966
Release Date:
06/10/1960
Release Type:
Correspondence
Transcript ID:
227
Document:
00000227.pdf 2 Page(s)
Released by:
  • Australian Mission to the UN
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - INWARD CABLEGRAM FROM AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM
JRR1.2645 Sent: 5th October, 1960.
0200
Rec'd: 6th October, 1960.
2032
FROM: Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK. UN1109 UNCLASSIFIED
Repeated Washington 1298.
Following is outline of the Prime Minister's
speech introducing amendment to the Five Power Resolution on
Khrushchev and Eisenhower contacts this morning:
2. Australia dissented from only the final paragraph
of the Five Power Resolution believing that, if carried, its
effect would be undesirable. Sukarno had had reservations
even about a Pour Power Summit Conference but had finally
moved resolution requiring not four leaders but two to renew
contacts. Many millions of people had hoped that the Summit
Conference in Paris might serve to create some atmosphere of hope
and settlement of some problems including Nuclear Tests Treaty.
But the Summit failed even to begin because the Soviet leader
would not participate. The other leaders had then expressed
willingness to take part in negotiations at any suitable time
in the future. This was a fair and good tempered proposition
and tenacious in the cause of peace. If talks were now to
proceed why should we, by carrying the Five Nation Resolution,
dismiss the United Kingdom and France from the first act.
3. Mr. Nehru had frankly stated that there were serious
limitations to the usefulness of bilateral talks. Was there
any reason to think that Eisenhower was in some way the stumbling
S block and that he should therefore be the one leader of the
West to be brought under persuasion or pressure? He was in
fact passionately devoted to peace. Moreover it was a well
known Communist technique to seek to describe the drama of the
Y7orld's problems in terms of antagonism between the United
States and the Soviet Union alone. It was a dangerous fallacy
to regard others as insignificant or at least uninterested onlookers.
The real conflict was between authoritarian Communism
and systems of Free Government. To narrow the issue down
( by excluding France and Britain) to discussions by the leaders
of two Governments was to put the world problem out of
perspective., this was the reason for Australia's amendment.
4. Australia believed that Summit Talks should be
resumed but recognized that they could not be arranged quickly
and doubted whether they should be rushed. A meeting of
the Four could not solve all or many of our problems. Some
great matters, within the responsibility of the United Nations,
could not be delegated to a few but some have been recognized
by all to be in a special way the concern of the Four Powers.
They could also make a beginning on matters of wider concern
such as disarmament. Moreover in practice the events of
the last four days raised a doubt whether there was a genuine / r
A

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
-2
INWARD CABLEG" 4
hope of useful bilateral talks. ,,. ustralia was concerneCl to
avoid the perpetuation of the notion that the World confli,, t
was between the United States and the Soviet Union.
JV'MIN. DEPT. EA..
MIN. DETm. DE~ FENCE
P. M's. 6th October, .960. / l
7/

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