PRESS. RADIO AND TELEVISION CONFERENCE
GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER. THE RT. HON.
SIR ROBERT MENZIES, AT PARLIAMENT HOUSE,
CANBERRA 13TH JUJLY, 196-1
PIME MINISTER : I think, gentlemen, I ought to begin by asking you
whether the procedures that I have adopted in the past are satisfactory
to you.
I noticed one complaint somewhere that I had fallen into
the bad habit, I gathered, of starting off by saying something for
myself instead of confining myself to answering questions. Well,
I am pretty sure you will agree that as there might be four or five
topics on which you would be interested today, it would be a great
mistake to have a question on one and then a question on another
so that the whole thing became completely confused. I don't want
to restrict your questions at all but I do think that it might be
more orderly if I said something about the first topic and then
heard your questions on it and then passed on to another it being
open to you, of course, all through, to raise questions that you,
have in your mind to which you think I might give a useful answer.
If that is agreeable, I think I would like to begin by
saying something about the position in Viet~ am and our presence
there and how it has come about. I wouldn't have thought there
was very much doubt about this benause this has been very freely
debated in Parliament over quite a time but perhaps I might help
by summing it up a little,
Some gentlemen who have communicated with me recently seem
to think that I am doing something all by myself that I am involving
Australia in war, that I am helping to escalate that war into
something bigger. Strange Christian sentiments indeed,
Well, of course, I can't plead guilty to that because as
all of those of you who follow these matters know perfectly well7
our attitude towards Viet Nam, the placing of Australian forces in
Viet Nam was not just the decision of one man, it was a Cabinet
decision, announced by me publicly in Parliament on April 29; th and
thereafter debated in the Parliament the better part of two
s ittings. So that the idea that this is a sort of one-man frolic
is absurd. On top of that I think I ought to take the opportunity of
saying that so far as the Government parties are concerned -' both
Government parties every member of both porties entirely supports
the action of the Government in this matter, so that it is rather
foolish to talk about it as a sort of one-man decision,
I am not avoiding my own responsibility the decision of
the Government is entirely in line with my own view and I have never
had any reason to make any apology for it or any qualificatibn or
put any qualification upon it. Not only did we make this decision
and announce it in the Parliament but the President of the Security
Council was informed and the SEATO Council was officially informed by
my colleague. It is perhaps as well to recall that Australian defence is
not a solitary defence, It is a defence which is involved with
certain international treaties under which we have rights and under
which we have obligations. I don't need to mention them to
gentlemen like you who are familiar with them the South East / 2
2
Asian Treaty, the ANZUS Pact, our uni-lateral obligation to Malaysia,
publicly stated and debated in this Parliament and in the Press
all of these things are matters which involve us the defence of
New Guinea and Papua which we have accepted as part of the defence
of the mainland of Australia.
We have, as a matter of fact, a considerable variety of
obligations but we are also, I am happy to say, in possession of
a considerable variety of rights. In other words, there is
mutuality about all these agreements and that has much to say to
the safety of our own country.
South Viet Nain happens to be one of the protocol states
under the SEATO Treaty and that means that the obligations under
the SEATO Treaty w~' hich include military obligations, extend to
that country, buz on one condition, of course, and that is that the
government of the country concerned asks us to come in. We don't
go in against the will of the government of South Viet Nain and vie
haven't done so. I~ n the same way, the United States of America
hasn't gone in against the will of the Government of South Viet
Nain but is there by invitation. All this is an expression in
action of the SEATO obligations.
Now I find that there are some people who say, why
should Australia be in South Viet Nam?" 1 It would be quite proper
I think to answer that by saying, " Well, why is the United States
in South Viet Nain?" Her obligations are no greater than ours.
In one sense, her interests may be thought to be somewhat less
immediate than ours, But I notice that those who query Australia's
presence have not been so vocal in querying the presence of the
United States. -ell, why is the United States there? Wvhy are we there?
Obviously to resist armed aggression and subversion the very
thing that SEATO is directed to and the very thing which is
contemplated by the Charter of the United Nations that any
country finding itself under attack is quite entihed to defend
itself and equally entitled to ask its friends to come to its
assistance. And therefore everything that has been done here is
in complete accord not only with the South East Asian Treat' but
also with the Charter of the United Nations.
Now just let me pursue that a little further. Suppose
the United States of America, now building up its forces in South
Viet Nain so that they total, as at present, something of the
order of 60,000 suppose the United States said, " All right, we
will withdraw." This would give great pleasure to the pacifists.
No great pleasure to us in Australia if we value our own state
of security. Suppose they withdrew. Does anybody with his five wits
doubt that before very long Chinese communism., acting through North
Vietnamese communism, would sweep down through South Viet Namn,
would put itself in an early position to control Thailand, to
render the position of Malaya almost intolerable, putting Malaya
between two fires and would therefore in the long run and not
so very long run at that we would find ourselves with aggressive
communism almost on our shores, just across the water.
And it is because of these elementary considerations of
national safety that the SEATO Council when it met and my
colleague, Mr. Hasluck, was there on May 5th of this year
reaffirmed ( I will quote their words) that " defeat of communist
campaign is essential not only to the security of South Viet Nam
but to that of South East Asia as a whole." That is what the
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SEATO Council had to say and it is very well to keep it in mind.
We are not pursuing some strange warmongering eccentric
activity of ouz. c. urn, We are grown-up people. We have an imnlanse
respcns ' ibility to zhis country and the best way of discharging that
responsibility is to see that with our friends we stand across the
path of aggressive communism.
It is very interesting to notice that this is a view not
peculiar to us. The Foreign Secretary in the present British
Governzment, Mr. Michael Stewart, made a notable speech about this
in the House of Commons at the beginning of April. I wonder if
I might try your patience by quoting just two paragraphs from it.
He observed that after the signing of the Geneva Agreement
in 195W, both parts of Viet Nam both parts, North and South
continued to endeavour to put themselves in order and to make
economic and social progress, He continued and now I use his
words " These possibilities remained open until in 1959
there was a call by the Government of North Viet Nam for an
intensification of the Viet Cong activities in the South and
for full-scale guerrilla warfare against the Government of
South Viet Nam. Not only did the Northern Government call
for that; they then proceeded to help it with more weapons
and military advice, as was made clear by the majority
report of the International Control Commission in 1962.
Faced with that situation, South Viet Nam appealed
to the United States for help, and the United States responded,
but it is important to notice that in 1959, when this pressure
from the North began, and even as late as 1961l, two yeais later,
there were still only 700 members of the United States armed
forces in South Viet Nam. It cannot be claimed that the
action taken by the North was the result of a considerable
United States military presence in the South. The action from
the North preceded the arrival of the United States forces
in any considerable degree in the South."
No9w , it won't be irrelevant for me to add to that that
in 199 the economy of South Viet Nam was beginning to flourish
and the country was developing, at that time, a considerable
stability. I would like to point out also that it is widely
agreed that the Viet Cong th,, s replaced its serious losses because
itI-has hosd t'iam by recruitment from the Nort,% h. Up to thie end
of 1964 thii--t is only the end of last year it was estimated
that 40,000 infiltrators had come down from the North; in 1964
alone, 10,000 came in.
I reported to Parliament on April 29th that there had
occurred the infiltration of a battalion of the North Vietnamese
regular army. Wdell, I needn't go on. That's continuing.
And if we have those facts in mind, here is something........
I am not allowed to call it a war I gather, because somebody
thinks that there is a war only il~ there is a declaration of war.
Strange, remote, academic notion that is, in the modern world.
All I know is that there is fighting going on and the people
involved in it might very well be mistaken enough to think they
w. re engaged in operations of war; as of course they are.
The communists themselves from Hanoi and from Peking
describe this, themselves, as a war of liberation. a 00 / 1
But we are not allowed to call it a war, which is just
too bad. Well, it is a war of liberation from their point of vievi.
This is the grandiloquent name they give to a series of military
operations which are obviously designed to overthrow the Government
of South Viet Nam, to convert South Viet Nam into a communist
state and to extend the boundaries of communist influence so many
miles, so many iriles, hundreds of miles nearer to us.
Well, I am not going to engage in word-spinning arguments
about phrases that can be used. I think it is quite foolish at a
time like this for people to think that they can solve this great
problem by what I now believe is called an exercise in semantics,
because the facts are not that way.
There is a war going on, and United States forces are
engaged in operations of war defensive war against an
aggressor. And Australian forces are engaged in operations of
war defensive war against aggression, side by side with the
forces of South Viet Nam.
Under those circumstances, our position is just as the
position of the United States is that until the aggressor is
really prepared to negotiate for an effective peace which will
leave South Viet Nam in command of its own affairs, then the
fighting will need to continue.
We are all very conscious of the risks of this business.
There are risks always in these matters. But the very notion that
the contribution to peace is to abandon South Viet Nam and walk
out on them is, I think so fantastic that 95 per cent, of the
people of Australia would find it entirely unacceptable.
Now, we had a look at this matter at the Commonwealth
Conference. There are various views expressed in a Commonwealth
Conference. There are now twenty-one of us I was almost going
to say with twenty-one different views but at least, let us say,
a wide diversity of opinion. And let's face up to it there are
some of the new Commonwealth countries who are opposel to American
action and therefore opposed to what we are doing who lean in the
direction of China. I won't mention their names7 but it is quite
clear that some of them do.
And the Prime Minister of Great Britain said: " Well,
don't let us thrash out our various views pro and con, because we
wil. n~~ e There will be complete opposition between A
and B and between C and D. Could we make an effort to break this
jam by sending a mission from the Commonwealth to Hanoi, to Peking,
to Moscow, to Washington to see whether there is some basis on
which a conference, a peace conference, could be heldT That is
all to discover whether there is some basis on which a conference
may be held." And in the long run, with I think one dissentient, this
was agreed to and the members of the mission were appointed,
It was quite extraordinary to me that one representative
objected to Mr, Wilson being the Chairman of the mission. Whby?
Because Great Britain had and has publicly expressed her support
of what the Americans are doing. Therefore we were told " You,
Great Britain, are committed" but the very remark was maae by a
gentleman who was equally committed by having made a joint
communique with Chou En-Lai upholding China and denouncing
America, and having been brought up in the old school, I still
like words to mean the same kind of thing where they are used. 00
Of course most people there are committed in the sense
that they had views pro or con. One or two of us were committed
because we had committed forces, but that didn't make our
commitment any clearer. It made it more practical if you like,
but it still remained true that we had taken our stand and we
knew what side we were on, and the mission was appointed,
Well, you know what has happened. It is just as well
to remind some of these people in Australia there are very few
of them of course who think that I stand in the way. I r all
important stand in the way of any peaceful settlement. it is
very interesting to remind them and perhaps to remind the public
that there has been a score of attempts to produce some kind of
settlement, settlement consistent with the freedom of South Viet
Nam, Let us never lose sight of that.
It has been before the United Nations. They sent their
Secretary-General, or they said to him that he might consider
visiting Peking and Hanoi and he got the dusty answer which
everybody else has had ever since: United U~ ations intervention
in the affairs of Indo-China can't be tolerated.
This is the communist reply. " This firm stand of ours"
they went on, " is unshakeable and admits of no exception." 1 Well
then, the co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference tried something.
The seventeen non-aligned nations passed resolutions and sent
them forward and got the same rejection. President Johnson has,
of course, done everything I think that a man could$ in all his
statements, to encourage peace, but the only answer to him was
that it was a swindle, ( These genteel words are used quite
freely a swindle.) The British Government sent my old friend,
Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker, around. He couldn't get through the
door. " Nothing to do with you," they said, The President of
India, he suffered a similar fate. The Americans, not long ago,
tried a temporary suspension of bombing north of the line. This
had no effect whatever. And in the case of the Commonwealth
mission, well, as I don't need to tell you, the answer has been
in the rudest possible terms " Nothing doing. V1e will not
confer. We are the people," they say, " who will not under any
circumstances arrive at any peaceful negotiation unless all-those
people who are engaged in defending South Viet Nam get out.!.
In other words, unless there is surrender, there will be
no negotiation. Strange, strange, bedlamite sort of idea I. t is,
but that is the one that they have put forward.
I remember that at the conference the Prime Ministers'
Conference one of the Prime Ministers, heavily influenced, by
the Chinese, I regret to say objected to the mission because
he said it would be putting China in the dock. I ventured to ask
him why China, if China was a peace-loving country, should feel
put in the dock by being asked to negotiate for peace, That
was a littJe difficult that question, but he still persisted that
this was putting China in the dock, and of course in that sense,
he was right, because although this mission hasn'Z achievedw
anything positive because it hasn't been received, it is perfectly
true that it has made it clear to the world as to where the*'
objection to peac~ e exists and who are the people who are responsible
for carrying on this dreadful operation of war in Viet Nam.
Now I don't know whether there is anything more that I
need to say on that matter in genoral. I should tell you that
the Department of External Affairs has put together a compendium,
suitably indexed, containing the documents relating to Viet Nam
9 a 6
the first half of this year and I am told that there are
sufficient copies available for each of you to take one away
at the end of the conference. They contain verbatim extracts
from all the statements and documents and reports that are relevant
to this matter. well
QUESTION Can you tell us, Sir, if there is any chance of the
stalemate in Viet Nam ending in the foreseeable future?
P. M. Well, it would take a wiser man than I am to answer that
question, you realise, with any dogmatism, because I had the
great advantage of quite long discussion on this matter with
General Maxwell Taylor in New York and, of course, in London and
elsewhere. The monsoon season is on in Viet Nam and they have a
north-east monsoon and a north-west monsoon and the clouds come
over and the rain comes down and this is ideal hunting time for
guerrillas, Therefore it is to be expected that the Viet Cong
would in this period have some success from time to time. And
they have had some successes. They have also had some failures.
The casualties each day are quite formidable,
But there is a strong feeling of confidence that by the
end of the monsoon season, the progress of the Viet Cong will have
been somewhat disappointing from their point of view and that
this might have its psychological effect on Hanoi.
It is elementary horse sense, I suppose, that as long
as the other fellow thinks he is winning, he is not going to talk
settlement. Well, whether he will still be thinking he is winning
at the end of the monsoon season in the next two or three months,
I dontt know, but I saw no symptom whatever of any doubt, any
weakening of resolution on the part of the United States,
They are increasing the numbers of their forces, t hey
are devoting a tremendous lot of energy to this matter because
they know, as I think most sensible people would agree, that you
dre not going to get a settlement on this matter while you are
being on the face of it pushed around. You will get a
settlement when the other man begins to think that there is~ no
future in it, and therefore we have to make up our minds that we
will go through a very difficult period.
Things may be worse before they are better in fact
I think the President said something to that effect in the last
day or two. But this is no reason for any pessimism; this is
one of the inevitable circumstances of an operation of war
you will notice I didn't say " a war" an operation of war,
conducted under these circumstances of weather and, of course,
with all the advantage that guerrilla forces have of secrecy,
choosing their own time to strike and of sheer terrorism against
the civilian population.
These are trcmendous advantages, but in the long run,
they won't be good enough. You can put me down among the
optimists on this matter,
Q, Mr. Prime Minister, on the political side, some observers
say that some kind of nationalist Viet Nam unified under a
communist r6gime will be preferable to a South East Asia in
flames. Could your Government contemplate a Titoist-type
nationalist communist government at South Viet Nam ostensibly
free of Chinese domination?
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P. M. I would contemplate a communist regime in South
Viet Nam with the utmost horror,
Q. Do you think it can be avoided, Sir?
P. M. I do. But only if we stand firm. Only if we refuse
to allow our morale to be whittled away by a lot of
philosophic doubters,
Q0 Sir Robert, there have been reports from Viet Nam
showing that the boots and clothing of members of the First
Battalion have been literally falling apart. Does this
suggest that our troops have been let down by bad planning
and that they were sent to Viet Nam before the Army was ready
to put them into the field properly equipped?
P. m. I have no reason to suppose they weren't sent in a
properly trained and equipped fashion. I read what you have
referred to and no doubt the Minister for the Army, who is
reported to have been there on the spot, will be back and
taking an active interest in these matters,
Q, Were you surprised, Sir, to read these reports?
P. M. Oh I can't say one way or the other about that,
Every time I find myself in the tropics under much more
comfortable circumstances I wonder how your clothing lasts
anyhow. But everything that can be done must be done, that's
quite obvious. There can be no beg pardons or excuses on
this matter. None.
Q, Sir Robert, you referred to the United States
increasing its forces in South Viet Nam. Was there any
suggestion in your discussions with President Johnson that
we might be asked to increase........
P. M. No, none. None either there or anywhere else, I
may tell you it is very well understood that we are in a
rather special position. We have limited resouroes. We
have our obligations that we are performing in Malaysia,
We have forces in Viet Nain. We have our particular obligations
in relation to Papua and New Guinea and, of course,
our own defence. I found no lack of understanding. In
fact, on the whole, there was great appreciation of the fact
that we had rather stretched our resources to do what we did.
Q. Sir, were you given any indication in Washington
of how far the United States might go in terins of commitment
of forces in South Viet Namn?
P. M. Oh no. All I know is that they are increasing. But
you mean to say did they tell me, " Well, we will build' them
up to X thousand"?
Q. Yes, Sir.
P. M. Oh no. They are not so silly as that. That's a
piece of information of interest only to the enemy. They
are not in the habit of doing that.
Q, Apart from commitment of troops to Viet Namn, did
you get the impression that the US administration would
welcome when we could afford to do it an expansion, a
general expansion of our defence base? 3. / 8
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P. M. It was never raised. They are very familiar with the
very sharp expansion that we are now engaging in. I found
them very clearly understanding of that problem.
Q. Sir Robert, have you been informed of the Philippines'
decision which amounts virtually to not sending 2,000 troops
to Viet Nam?
P. M. Well I haven't been informed of this but at the moment
I am not frIghtfully well informed. I have been in bed most
of the time since I got back home.
Q9 Sir Robert, do you think the Malaysian situation and
the Viet Nam horror are part of the same problem?
P. M. All these things, I think, fall into the same pattern.
As I said earlier, if South Viet Nam went and the communlats
came in, well, anybody can imagine the pressures that would
arise, the internal subversions that would be promoted in
Thailand and in Malaya proper, and that would mean that Malaya
proper would find herself once more in the same sort of
trouble as before with the guerrillas in the north and at the
same time defending herself against confrontation on the
Indonesian side. Therefore this is of tremendous importance
to Malaysia and the position and defence of Malaysia,
Q. Sir, if you think there is no doubt about Australia
being at war in Viet Nam, how would you define the Australian
position vis-a-vis Indonesia and Malaysian Borneo?
P. M. In exactly the same way. There are operations of war
going on along the frontier, You know, don't fall into the
error that some of these gentlemen have fallen into of thinking
that we are engaging in a lot of legal technicalities. We
are not. I Make a great distinction. There are operations
of war because fighting is going on and fighting is an
operation of war. What is the use of arguing a lot of stuffwho
has declared war on whom. Some even had the impertinence
to suggest that this has been a frolic of my own. Everything
that we've done has been done by the Government of this
country and with the entire support of all the members of the
political parties who stand behind the Government. I am not
arguing about words, They don't interest me for this
purpose.
Q. Relating to that, Sir, do you think it would clarify
the situation as far as other countries perhaps are concerned
if war were to be declated?
Pam. For us to declare war? For America to declare war?
For North Viet Nam to declare war? It would be an interesting
exercise but purely academic. They would go on fighting in
the same way and in the same places.
Q. Sir, you have often said that the real aggressive
imperialists today are the major communist powers.
P. M, That's right,
Q. Do you think that while this remains true of China,
that the Soviet Union may be moving away from a policy of
aggr~ essive expansionp 0 00
9-
P. M. I like to think it is. Yes I rather like to think it
is. I think there are material dilferences today between the
Soviet Union approach and the communist Chinese approach,
and I think that the events of the last few years have rather
supported that idea, I think that it is reasonable to hope
one can't be dogmatic but it is reasonable to hope that
peaceful co-existence will become more and more real from the
Soviet Union outwards but of course as I don't need to
tell you, the communist Chinese have an entirely different
view, They regard the Soviet Union as a lot of miserable
revisionists. They are pure Marx-Engels-and-let-the-battlego-
on,
Q. Sir, a few months ago in this room you told us of a
consultation you had in London aimed at getting some order of
priority on strategic situations in our part of the world.
Can you say whether you have made any advance in implementing.....
P. M. I have had discussions on them but they are not of a
kind that I could announce.
Q. What you were saying earlier, Sir Robert, about the
problems of being committed in several areas, do you mean to
say we couldn't send any more troops to Viet Nam?
P. M. I didn't say anything of the kind. I simply said that
the question had not arisen.
Q. Could we send more troops to Viet Nam?
P. M. That's a purely hypothetical question, I am an old
man, as I have been reminded in the last two or three days,
much too old to sit down here and prophesy about the future,
Q. Sir Robert, I will carry on that question. How far
do we go in the situation of Viet Nam? America is a very
very big country, we are a very small country.
P. M. That's right,
Q. We've got to follow the line, but where does the line
draw? Where does it stop? How far do we go?
P. M. Well, we start off by trying to win.
Q* Granted. Where do we go from there?
P. M. Well, let's win first.
Q-Sir Robert, can you comment on a report that Mr, Wilson
has asked for a British bomber base to be set up in Darwin?
P. M. I can't comment on that at all.
QO Did you have any conversation with Mr. Wilson on
strategic bases in Australia in this regard?
P. M. I had some discussions on defence, on common problems
of defence in London but they were private.
Q. In those talks, can you say, Sir, whether the Viet Nam
and the Malaysian positions were regarded as a common problem
in England? 000 00/ 1 0
10
P. M. I must say that I think that the British Gover'nment,
and indeed I think all parties in Great Britain, are very
conscious of the importance of South East Asia. I think that
this occupies an increasing place in their minds andift their
planning. I have no complaints about that at all,
Q, Do you think the Americans appreciate this, Sir?
P. M. Oh yes very much.
Q. Sir, at Mascot airport on Sunday night you said that
your conversations with the American Presideni coming and
going were of immense value to Australia.
Pam. gIell I hope so.
Q. Can you enlarge on that at all or particularise?
P. M. No, except on the old-fashioned view that our safety
out here, our future the question as to whether we will
have free Press conferences in twenty years' time largely
depends upon how far the United States of America is prepared
to continue to accept responsibility in this part of the
world. I think this is of vast importance. That doesn't mean
that we have to go and bow three times and s~ y " Yas, of
course you're right" but it does mean tLat for us to be on
terms which enable us to talk frankly and in a friendly way
and in a receivable way is of tremendous importance.
Q. This is not new, Sir.
P. M. I know it isn't
Q. You spoke as though it were something special,
P. M. Oh no, I think it is getting better, that's all,
Q. Sir Robert, judging from Press reports that we have
heard from overseas, there seems to be an increasing confidence
amongst the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in the situation in
Malaysia. Could you elaborate on this?
P. M. I think cm the whole the Malaysian section of the
discussion worked out pretty well. You must get rid of the
idea that we are now a monolithic structure in the Commonwealth.
We are not. We exist to debate our disagreements,
primarily, and therefore when one gets a decent amount of
agreement on something that is a good day, and there was a
splendid amount of agreement on Malaysia the right of Malaysia
to defend itself and the right of Malaysia to enjoy our,
support, not necessarily military support which we give: but
support diplomatic, moral, whatever it may be. Yes, I
thought that portion of the discussions came out very woll.
Q. That's judging from the outcome of the previous
conference?
P. M. Yes that's right. I thought this, on the whole, was
rather betier.
Q. Sir Robert, is Australia using its offices to try and
bring the fighting factions within Malaysia together Mr.
Lee Kuan Yew and the Tunku 0 00 0/ 1 1
11
F~ M. Oh, look we have our diplomatic representatives i14
Kuala Lumpur and in Singapore. They both have the closes
access to the people concerned. I think these differences,
you know, can easily be exaggerated myself. Anyhow it i6
in our interests and in everybody else's interests to see:
them disappear and that is our constant desire.
Q. In your discussions in Britain, Sir, did you get
any indication as to whether Australia as a traditional
and dominant outlet for British capital investment has
any special status under Mr. Wilson's programme to curb
capital outflow?
P. M. I didn't myself engage in discussions on their
financial policy. We just had no time in the complex of
other matters.
Q. Sir, at the beginning you said, " Some gentlemen
have communicated with me recently who seemed to think
that I was the one who was involving Australia in war in
South Viet Nam." Could you enlighten us on that, whether
you have had a large mail bag on this subject?
P. M. No. One letter signed by sixteen people, Kept
me awake all night*
Q9 This is since your correspondence with the bishops?
P. M. Oh yes. But even that consisted of As I said,
my epistle to the bishops made me feel quite like the New'
Testament except that the A1postle didn't ever get a reply
and I did.
Q. You've been quoted here as saying in London at the
last Conference that certain people seem to be under the
influence of communist China? Could you elaborate on
that?
P. m. I think there are distinct symptoms in East Africa,
in particular, of Chinese communist penetration.
QO Does this mean that there is general concern within
the Commonwealth?
Pam* Oh, I wouldntt say it gave rise to general concern.
My views on that problem are not necessarily those of a
majority. I wouldn't know.
Q. Are your views that this will hurt the Commonwealth?
P. M. Assuming that all these countries remain within the
Commonwealth, it would hurt the Commonwealth. Yes,
Q. Do you see a future for the Commonwealth, Sir?
P. M, Well I wish I knew. Look, the whole point about the
Commonwealth is that now there are twenty-one. Twenty-one
Prime Ministers arrive. That means that we meet in a room
at Marlborough House and there are 100 people there. There
is a new fashion that has arisen in the new Commonwealth
andyou boys will be delighted to hear this to engage public
relations officers so that the speech made in private is in
the press before it is delivered sometimes. It's a public
relations exercise very largely, and all this I think is very
puzzling. .0*/ 12
12
P. M~ tThere are twenty-one Prime Ministers today what,
in a year's time twenty-five; something like that, and
everybody wants io make a speech, except me, and that moans
that if they all have a go at everything, and there are
set speeches made and duly published, the conference will
last a month and nobody will be able to afford the time
to attend it. There's a great problem here in these
growing numbers as to how far we can devise somie
machinery by which you shorten discussions or perhaps work
from committees or groups. I don't know. Some of us gave
a little thought to it in London but without any finality.
There is no doubt about it. It has completely altered the
character of the meeting because now it is a matter of
expressing views, of seeking to get support for some
pressure on somebody else. There is a growing disposition
to want to interfere with or sit in judgment on the
affairs of other individual countries. This is not the
old Commonwealth.
Q, Does this suggest, Sir, that your support of a
Commonwealth Secretariat is waning?
P. M. My support of a Commonwealth Secretariat hasn't
waned. It has always been pretty clearly defined.
That is to say that the Secretariat ought to act as a
Secretariat. It ought to act as a means of facilitating
the exchange of knowledge, of getting papers prepated
so that when people meet they will know what the other
man has in his mind and te prepared to discuss it
intelligently. That's what a Secretariat is for.
There are some who would like to see a Secretariat
which in effect achieved executive action, which could work
out economic plans and discuss the position of this
country or that, what assistance it ought to have and
from whom. And you know, when it gets to that, I think
that will be the end of the penny section. In fact the
penny section is rather a ludicrous reference because as
a rule it is the million pounds section. It depends on
how this works out. The Secretary-General appointed is
well aware of this. I have great hopes that he will
restrain it from too much empire-building, but if it
became too formidable and too much disposed to go in on
a variety of problems, like the Secretariat of the United
Nations which has to I think that there would be great
internal strains in the Commonwealth, considerable
resistances which might not be favourable to its existence.
Q. Sir Robert, do you think that the Secretariat could
usurp the moral leadership role the British Government now
exerts?
P. M. Well if it tried to, that would be the end either
of the Secretariat or of the Commonweaith, the new
Commonwealth.
Q. What steps are being taken to stop this, Sir? How
far did it go in the conference?
P. M. Oh, we had a discussion on this in the conference
itself when we were settling the terms and conditions of
the appointment. 99./ 1o3
13
Q9 Any time period for the Secretariat? A testing
period, a trial period set for it?
P. M. Well, the first appointment was made for five years
for the Secretary-General. But we discussed this and I
aired my views on the matter and Mr. Pearson of Canada took
the same view and this was finally the received idea in the
ccnfarence that it must have a modest beginning, it must
not try to extend its jurisdiction in a hurry and that its
usefulness will largely depend on how it conducts itself in
the first year or two. But it is a highly experimental thing.
Q. Sir, as a result of your talks with President Johnson,
is there likely to be a greater Budget appropriation for
defence this year than there might otherwise have been?
P. M. Now! Harold.. ( To Mr. Holt) He tells me the book
is closed.
Q. Sir, did you return from London with the name of our
next Governor-General?
P. M. I have nothing to say about that yet. I haventt met
my Cabinet.
Q. Can we expect an imminent announcement, Sir?
P. M. I don't know.
Q. Sir, can you give us your views on the situation of
the United Nations, the contribution towards the deficit
that has been made by some nations about which I believe you
said you reserved your own decision?
P. M. Yes, well the deficit in the United Nations of course
arises from the fact that some of the countries like the
Soviet Union and France and so on, have declinel to pay for
these peace-keeping operations. It went to the Permament
Court. It was decided that they were liable to pay and. there
the question arose as to whether Article 19 ought to be'
enforced. No pay no vote. Good simple rule to which I
subscribed heartily.
Well, in the meantime, they are not paying and the
Assembly has been held up because they don't want to become
involved in this imbroglio. Thle British Government announced
that it would find ten million dollars as a voluntary.
contribution, and Canada offered a voluntary contribution.
I said that we had never been backward in the past in making
voluntary contributions but I did want to discuss with my
colleagues one matter, If the people who are not in
default make up the lag for those who are this year, is
this going to be the rule next year? Does this mean that
you abandon the enforcement of Article 19? Will it be
conducive to getting them to pay up under Article 19 if
they find that other people will pay instead? And I would
like to think about that with my colleagues, not in any
miserable piking spirit because we dontt want to see the
United Nations go broke, but we do want to have some clarity
in our minds as to what it is we are doing. That's all.
QO Do you think the United Nations can survive? of0 0 0 ./ 11+
P. M, You know, you are developing a fascinating interest
in survival. This is the second question of that kind
you have put to me. I am largely devoted at present to
my own problem of survival.
Q. Talking of that Sir, there are a lot of rumours
around that you are thinking of going out at the end of
this year. Would you comment on that at all?
P. M. Well, any self-respecting man of my age must give
thought to his fuiture and to his duties and I am doing that.
I dontt know what the result will be, but no doubt following
my traditional practice, when I have arrived at a conclusion,
Ifll say it.
Q. Do you think you will arrive at that conclusion
within the next few months, Sir?
P. M. I haver.~ t a clue. Haven't a clue. I thought I
might run a little Gallup poll around here. There was a
Gallup poll wasn't there? I was fascinated to find that
per cent, of my opponents wanted me to retire. The
nicest compliment they've ever paid me.
Well any more, boys, any more?
Q. One question, Sir, if I may. Joan Sutherland. Do
you intend to see her during this
P. M. 1 Oh, look, I don't know. I' love to of course. I
got back two days late to see her opening in Melbourne which
I had been invited to attend. Oh no, I am a Joan Sutherland
fan,