PRIME MINISTER:
The Government has decided this morning to send a new Australian Task Force to Iraq to help in the process of rebuilding and consolidation and reinforcement, which is now all the more essential in the light of the very successful elections held on the 30th of January. The Government believes that Iraq is very much at a tilting point, and it's very important that the opportunity of democracy, not only in Iraq but also in other parts of the Middle East, be seized and consolidated. This Task Group will go to the Al Muthanna province in southern Iraq and it will have two tasks. The first of those will be to provide a secure environment for the Japanese engineering and support forces which are making a valuable humanitarian contribution to the rebuilding process. The Japanese forces are involved in matters relating to road and school construction, water availability, and also incidental health tasks. The Task Group will also be involved, importantly, in the further training of Iraqi security forces. That training is essential to the Iraqis in the future being able to take over the internal and external defence of their country.
The new Australian Task Group will consist of a headquarters, a cavalry squadron, an infantry company, and a training team. The total numbers will be approximately 450, and it will also have some 40 ASLAV armoured vehicles, and the great bulk of the Task Group will be drawn from the Darwin 1st Brigade, and it will take some 10 weeks from this announcement for the Task Group to be ready. There have been discussions between the Australian Government, the British Government - bearing in mind that the United Kingdom forces have overall security responsibility for the Al Muthanna province - and the Japanese Government over recent weeks. The Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, telephoned me last Friday night, and, amongst other things, invited and requested this Australian contribution. Likewise, the British Prime Minister, Mr Blair, telephoned me in Auckland yesterday morning to confirm the requests that had previously been conveyed by both Jack Straw to Alexander Downer, and Geoffrey Hoon to Robert Hill, the Defence Minister.
The trigger for this process, which has led to this decision following these requests, was that of the Dutch who for a period of two years have maintained some 1,400 troops in the area, and they had, I think, had one rollover of those forces, but decided for their reasons not to further renew, and the view was therefore taken that unless additional security could be provided to replace the Dutch, then there was a real possibility that the Japanese could no longer remain there, and that would have been a very serious blow to the Coalition effort. There is additional security needed in relation to the presence of the Japanese because of limitation, which I think will be well know to many of you, on what Japanese forces can do. The terms of their deployment mean that they can only operate in a non-combat zone. They can only be involved in humanitarian and reconstruction activities, and the use of force by the Japanese is limited to defensive action.
I should point out that any military deployment involves the risk of casualties. I do not run away from that, and I openly acknowledge that possibility. I should, however, emphasize that this province of Iraq, which has a very small population, has, relatively speaking, been free of violence, and the security position in this part of Iraq is plainly different from the security position that obtains in other areas of Iraq such as the Sunni Triangle. Some will ask, in view of previous statements I've made, why has the Government now decided to make this deployment. The answer to that is really threefold. First and very importantly, there has been a change in the outlook for Iraq since the election. We are at a titling point. There is a real opportunity if the moment can be seized for, not only Iraq over time and through great difficulty to have democracy, but also for the rest of the Middle East. Very importantly, this deployment involves working alongside a close regional partner in Japan. Japan's presence as part of the Coalition is very important. It is not only making a big contribution in practical terms, but Japan's presence is also very important symbolically - a significant Asia power, a major economic power of course around the world, and, importantly, in our own region. And working alongside and in partnership with a close regional ally and partner such as Japan is very important from Australia's point of view. Very important indeed.
In addition, the Task Group will play a major role in training, and everybody now agrees that if the ultimate goal of the withdrawal of foreign forces and the assumption of internal security arrangements, as well as defence against an external threat, is to be undertaken by the Iraqis, they must be better trained. And we have a role to play in that, and I see that as a very important role for the future. I think it's also important to make the point that whatever views were taken about Australia's involvement in the original deployment. operation in Iraq, rather, and whatever views are taken about that original operation by the Coalition, here and now we have a situation where a victory for the insurgents, for the terrorists in Iraq, would strike an enormous blow to Western and democratic prestige in that part of the world and in the broader world community. There is a lot at stake, therefore, in a successful conclusion of a transition to a more democratic Iraq. And we have seen in recent months some major victories for the cause of freedom and democracy. We saw it in Afghanistan on the 9th of October last year. We've seen it in the Ukraine. We have seen the benefits of the democratic process in building a new environment in the Middle East, in giving us the best hope in years for a settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and I think one of the more inspiring images of recent years is that of Iraqis holding aloft their fingers with the identification ink recording their participation in the first democratic operation that that country has had.
This has not been, is not and will not be, an easy decision for the Government. I know it will be unpopular with many. I ask those people to take into account the reasons that I have given. I believe this is the right decision. It will make a significant contribution to the Coalition effort. It will make a significant contribution to the rebuilding of Iraq. It has the endorsement and support of the interim Iraqi government, and of course the completion of the deployment and the continued presence of our forces in Iraq will naturally be conditional on the support and encouragement of the incoming transitional government in Iraq. We have consulted as we properly should the Prime Minister in the transitional government, the interim rather, Mr Allawi, Dr Allawi and he's indicated his very, very strong support and appreciation of any decision that might be taken by the government to deploy these forces. But it isn't as I said a moment ago, an easy decision to take but I do believe for the reasons that I have outlined it is the right decision. We are at a tilting point and the opportunity I believe has to be taken. I did telephone the Leader of the Opposition shortly before this news conference to brief him on the details of the government's decision as to an Opposition response that is naturally a matter for him to articulate. The timeframe...
JOURNALIST:
What's the timeframe?
PRIME MINISTER:
Hang on, hang on, hang on, I will take all the questions you like. ... and I indicated in broad outline what the Government's decision was and naturally it's for him to articulate. Now, timeframe, initial deployment we expect for a period of two deployments for six months each for a period of year and we will review the operation after six months. Obviously if there were an early than that end to the Japanese presence then the presence would be reviewed.
JOURNALIST:
The Dutch troops that the Australians are replacing, have they suffered any causalities in the two years they've been...
PRIME MINISTER:
Over the two-year period, my advice is that there were two deaths and a number of wounded.
JOURNALIST:
Mr Howard, was there consultation, did you consult with Washington on this as well as the British and the Japanese?
PRIME MINISTER:
There would have been exchanges about it at what I might call a State Department, Pentagon and Defence level, I did not receive a request from President Bush when he spoke to me last Friday fortnight, he did not convey a request. Look its fair to say that for the last two years, since the end of the major combat phase, that at a military level, from time to time both the Americans and the British would have expressed to their counterparts in the Australian Defence Force, a desire for further Australian contributions. I mean let there be no mucking around about that. They would at all material times, both the British and the Americans, at a defence and military level, have wanted a greater Australian involvement because they appreciate very much the quality of Australian contributions and it's also fair to say that they have been carrying a very significant load, now let me say you there is, there would plenty of exchanges at a military, defence level in relation to that but as I recall it, the initial Dutch decision not to renew the deployment, took place about the middle of November last year and there was a period of time during which attempts were made at a political level to persuade the Dutch to reverse that decision so it wasn't until a few weeks ago that it became apparent that that decision was final and therefore I suppose you might say the tempo of finding what might be an alternative increased.
JOURNALIST:
... make clear that without this extra assistance he would (inaudible)
PRIME MINISTER:
No he did not say that in the conversation but it is clear from the terms of the Japanese deployment that unless there were a secure environment, then Japanese would go and because of the terms of the environment, the terms of the deployment.
JOURNALIST:
Do you know why Prime Minister why the Dutch decided not to renew their involvement?
PRIME MINISTER:
Because of domestic, political considerations.
JOURNALIST:
And what are those, do you know?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well you would have to ask the Dutch, I mean I don't, you know, with respect, I can't, I am not an authority, I don't think their government had the numbers in the parliament, I think that's as simple as that, that's my broad understanding of it. They did of course make a commitment, they had some 1400 troops there for a period of two years so to be fair to the Dutch, they did carry a very, you know, make a very significant contribution over that period of time.
JOURNALIST:
Prime Minister, the British and the Americans didn't feel they had the capacity to take up the space?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well it's fair to say Jim that the British and the Americans are already very heavily committed. The British who have overall responsibility for this province have got some 9000 in Iraq and they have at various stages they backfilled for the Americans in relation to particular operations and I don't think anybody can say that they haven't carried, and the Americans, leaving aside arguments about the operation, generally I don't think anyone can argue that the British and Americans haven't carried a very heavy load.
JOURNALIST:
Was it the Japanese approaching Australia, was it the Japanese idea that we play this role or was it your idea?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well the initial request came from the British but the Japanese factor weighed crucially in my mind. I mean I am not indifferent to a request, an approach from the British or the Americans or indeed other close friends and allies but the Japanese element of this is quite crucial because Japan is a major regional partner of Australia, the Japanese presence in Iraq as part of the Coalition operation, albeit of a humanitarian kind, is a very important one and if it were to have disappeared then I think that would both in substance and in symbolism be a very bad thing.
JOURNALIST:
Prime Minister, this is the reversal of the policy you took to the people at the election isn't it?
PRIME MINISTER:
No I don't think it's a reversal, I think what's happened is the circumstances have changed. I mean it's four months, four and a half months since the election. I mean the circumstances have changed, you've got the election, you've got the Japanese element that I have outlined, you've got the greater emphasis on training. I mean of course and I acknowledge that in my opening remarks of course, I have previously said that we didn't contemplate - although I also said you keep the level and composition of the forces under review. The fact of the matter is that in the four and a half months that have gone by there have been changed circumstances and I don't accept for a moment that it's a reversal in that sense - we have to respond to those changed circumstances.
JOURNALIST:
If circumstances change again Prime Minister would you entertain a further increase in our commitment?
PRIME MINISTER: Well Jim all I can say in answer to that is we will keep the level and nature of our involvement under constant review.
JOURNALIST:
Does this have any implication for the existing Australian military...?
PRIME MINISTER:
Yes the one implication it will have is that we have some 50 - 70 involved in a training role in another part of Iraq - in the northern part of Iraq and when that particular commitment ends, it will in effect be rolled over into this, so effectively, the 450 - 470 of this task group will be partially offset by the 50 odd at the time that that occurs.
JOURNALIST:
But it still means that our overall deployment will more than double Prime Minister won't it?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well our overall deployment in the area is some 950 if you take into account the naval personnel and the person in a very adjacent country that are involved in the C130's and the P3's; it represents against that 950, another 450.
JOURNALIST:
The fact that we are sending more troops this far into the conflict, what does that say about original estimates about the strength of the insurgency and the ability of Iraqis to provide their own security, did we underestimate that?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well self evidently everybody would have liked the post major combat phase to have gone differently but we have to deal with the current situation and we have to ask ourselves what would be the consequences of a coalition withdrawal or defeat and I think they are unimaginable, not only in terms of, not only the symbolism, the reality and the prestige and the authority, the sort of values that we hold and the sort of world view that we represent.
JOURNALIST:
Mr Howard, say Iraq's at a tipping point then and you just explored that but you also said it has an effect on other countries in the region, what exactly do you mean by that, do you think that we're going to play a role in other conflicts, is this more of a psychological affect, what impact does it have on other surrounding countries?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well when I say Iraq is at a tipping point, I mean that if the right things are done, with enough commitment, I believe you can have a very successful outcome in Iraq but if the wrong things are done and there is a crumbling of the Coalition commitment then I think you will have the wrong outcome, that's what I mean by Iraq being at a tipping point. So far as other countries are concerned, I am not suggesting by the language I'd use that we are going to get involved in other military operations in other countries. I don't know of any other military operations in other countries and I hope there are none but what I mean is that if the transition to democracy in Iraq continues - and this is the first serious democratic experiment in an Arab country - if that is successful and that becomes contagious then I think you have seen a major change in the Middle East. Now that is a long way down the track but that's what I mean by its impact other countries. I wasn't signalling for a moment that we're contemplating military involvement in other countries.
JOURNALIST:
President George Bush once said it was a case of mission accomplished in Iraq. Are you now saying that democracy could collapse and you can see a situation where coalition troops would be forced to...
PRIME MINISTER:
No what I am saying that if the coalition will were to crumble at this point, you will not have a successful transition to democracy. To have that successful transition, you need a continued coalition presence. Self evidently, the Iraqis at the moment are not able to provide for their own security. Nobody is asserting that they are. They need the maintenance of the forces that are there, they need the reinforcement where appropriate, which my announcement today is an example. But they also need training and it will take time and if we were to see a crumbling of that coalition commitment then I think the likelihood of Iraq completing the transition to democracy would be absolutely non-existent.
JOURNALIST:
Prime Minister, do you mean by that that the withdrawal of Japan and possibly the withdrawal of the Dutch troops could be the crumbling of the coalition?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well I certainly don't regard the Dutch withdrawal as a crumbling. I'm addressing that description to the total coalition presence.
JOURNALIST:
How do (inaudible) numbers Prime Minister (inaudible) 450 or 470, but they're replacing a contingent of 1400; there's obviously a huge discrepancy...
PRIME MINISTER:
Well they won't be doing everything the Dutch were doing. The Dutch, the overall security of the province will be the responsibility of the British. We'll have a separate national command but we will work, we'll have a separate national command but we will work in collaboration with the British and the overall security of the province is the British responsibility, whereas the Dutch had a greater role in relation to that. Also there was a view that perhaps the 1400 was a few more than was needed and there has also been an assessment made that the Iraqi capacity has improved, although it is still short of what is needed for a complete assumption of responsibility, it has improved over the past couple of years. The numbers were on the basis of the task described, the numbers were assessed by our military, they weren't assessed by the Cabinet. We said this is what we want to do and based on their advice from the British and the Americans and discussion with the Japanese General Leahy and General Cosgrove told me and the Defence Minister that what was needed was this 450.
JOURNALIST:
Was there an assessment of the security situation in that particular province as better than when the Dutch first went there?
PRIME MINISTER:
It's fair to say that it's always been relatively benign. I wouldn't try and say it's got dramatically better or no better or a bit worse. It's remained relatively benign. Now I use that term deliberately because I can't guarantee that there won't be incidents. I'm not going to try and do that. But it's a lot better and this is a much safer part of Iraq than the Sunni Triangle.
JOURNALIST:
You originally set a timetable of months rather than years for this, how did we get it so wrong?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well I think everybody is familiar with what's happened since March of two years ago.
JOURNALIST:
Prime Minister, how and when did the British make this request, was it a personal request from Prime Minister Blair to you?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well at a military level, as I said earlier. I am, not specifically to this but generally for over a period of time, I think over the last two years every so often at a military level the American and the British have sort of said well you know we'd appreciate the Aussies coming back again or doing more. I mean there's no point in pretending otherwise. In relation to this particular issue, I can't give you the exact date, but it would have crystallised some time after the 16th of November because the 16th of November, and probably some weeks after that, probably well into December, that you started to get a serious request from the British because the 16th of November was when the Dutch made the decision and then for a period of time there was an attempt made to persuade them to stay and then the requests came at a chief of the Defence staff level to General Cosgrove, there was a request from Geoffrey Hoon to Robert Hill and then only what two and a half, three weeks ago when I was in Davos and Alexander Downer was in London he spoke to Jack Straw and received a letter from Straw and then there were further discussions and we talked about it in National Security Committee last week and I took the phone call from Koizumi and Blair spoke to me yesterday morning and we discussed it in full Cabinet this morning. Now, look as you can imagine with something like this it just doesn't come, nothing comes out of thin air and there have been discussions at different levels for some weeks, but the starting point of this process, and there were earlier requests, you may remember there was a request made by Kofi Annan about providing protection for the electoral process and that we decided not to accede to that. But the trigger was the 16th of November - I think that's the exact date when the Dutch decided they weren't going to renew their commitment.
JOURNALIST:
Prime Minister, in terms of today's Cabinet agenda what can you tell us about what Ian Macfarlane said about the need for reform?
PRIME MINISTER:
I don't know, I haven't been there. We discussed this matter first up and since then I have been preparing for this exchange. We had quite a lengthy discussion and I then came out and got ready for this news conference.
JOURNALIST:
Prime Minister, just to clarify some numbers. Doesn't this, as Steve said, doesn't this double the boots on the ground in Iraq that we've got?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well I'd have to do a calculation. I mean you're quite right in saying that the actual number, the 950, involves a lot of people who are not physically in Iraq, they're in adjacent areas, but they're in the theatre because they're providing, I mean the Naval personnel are providing security for Iraq's oil supplies, and the C-130s go in and out and some of those people are in Iraq and they're based out of Iraq but very close to Iraq. But you're right, I mean the whole 950, and I'll get you the exact figure, the whole 950 are not permanently physically all the time located in Iraq, that's right.
JOURNALIST:
Prime Minister, we know you don't like putting timeframes on Australian deployment in Iraq, but this does suggest that our troops are likely to be there for several more years at least does it not?
PRIME MINISTER:
Look I am not going to get caught up in timeframe things.
JOURNALIST:
You have talked about the 12 month period, I mean does this...
PRIME MINISTER:
Well this decision is for a deployment of a year with six month rollovers and after the first six months we will decide how it's going, subject of course to the understanding that if the Japanese were to withdraw in an earlier period of time well that of itself would trigger a review of whether there should be any continued Australian presence. But I can't do more than that; we've made a decision for an initial deployment, for a deployment of a year and then two rollovers of six months each.
JOURNALIST:
Did the request to you specify a number that the British or Americans thought was desirable for our Task Force?
PRIME MINISTER:
I can't hear that I'm sorry.
JOURNALIST:
Did the request to you specify a number that the British or Americans thought was desirable for our Task Force?
PRIME MINISTER:
We didn't consult them about how many people we should send, the decision about the 450 was taken on the basis of advice from General Leahy and General Cosgrove. We told them what we wanted to do, what the task was, and they told us how many people were needed to fulfil that task and their advice that matters to us, it's not really, I mean no disrespect to others but it's their advice on what is needed. And bear in mind that there is value in these things in having your own headquarters and your own national command structure and that inevitably involves having a few more people than might otherwise be the case. But we're not happy with an arrangement where we don't have a separate national command and we don't have our own headquarters and although we will have to rely on the British for a lot of logistics and other support there is a certain critical mass which is needed to give you a proper national branding and national identity and national presence and national command and that is the number that General Leahy and General Cosgrove advised were necessary.
JOURNALIST:
So isn't it the case that our 450 are doing the job that the Dutch 1400 were doing?
PRIME MINISTER:
No because a lot of the tasks that the Dutch were doing, or a number of the tasks the Dutch were doing, will be carried out by the British and to a lesser extent the Iraqis, a much lesser extent, and it was also thought that maybe the 1400 was a few more than was necessary.
JOURNALIST:
Will it require more funding Mr Howard?
PRIME MINISTER:
Yes of course it will require more funding.
JOURNALIST:
Any estimates?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well you're looking at, I would say at least $250 to $300 million on an annual basis.
JOURNALIST:
Mr Howard, would you concede there have been mistakes made in the last two years that have got us to this point where we're still needing to send soldiers?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well whenever a decision is made to deploy military forces you can say well if this had been done or something else had been done this may not have happened. The fact is that for all the difficulties of the last two years Iraq is in a situation of having a brighter future than it would have had if Saddam Hussein had been there and we have to deal with the here and now and the here and now is that if the coalition effort were to crumble then that would be a devastating blow to the cause of freedom in the Middle East, it would be a devastating blow to the prestige of the West, it would be a devastating blow to the fight against terrorism and I think it would imbue with a new zeal those in our own region who think that terrorism is the answer to the future.
Thank you.
[ends]