O'BRIEN:
So if Australian intelligence was "thin, ambiguous and incomplete" on Iraq, can the Government that relied on that material to justify our part in the war on Iraq still argue that it was right to do so? The Prime Minister joins me now in our Brisbane studio. Mr Howard, do you now accept that you committed Australia to war in Iraq substantially on, quote, "thin, ambiguous and incomplete" intelligence?
PRIME MINISTER:
We also took a decision on intelligence which, according to Mr Flood, and it wasn't acknowledged in that introduction, which on the balance of probabilities supported the argument that Saddam did have weapons of mass destruction. In one of the most interesting paragraphs in Flood's report is that having looked at the material, he came to the conclusion that asserting the opposite of the judgment that we accepted was more difficult than asserting the proposition that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. Intelligence is always an imprecise science. There was an honest assessment made by ONA, which was an assessment we accepted. Now, that was a bona fide assessment and Flood and before that the Jull committee, and in other countries other committees have found there was not political manipulation or interference. I mean, the great claim being made against us was that we heavied the intelligence agencies and basically went to war based on a lie. Well that was never true and Flood has supported that.
O'BRIEN:
But when you say that it was either one or the other, that the intelligence agencies should say yes, he had weapons of mass destruction, or no he didn't. The fact is you were relying on them to make a case for war. Now that is one of the most serious decisions I would have thought you have ever made as Prime Minister, in your life in politics even. So it wasn't so much that they had to prove that there weren't, they had to prove to you that they were. And Mr Flood is saying that that advice was based on thin, ambiguous and incomplete intelligence.
PRIME MINISTER:
Yes, but he is also saying that, having reviewed the material, that it was easier to make the case in favour of a judgment that Saddam had those weapons than the opposite.
O'BRIEN:
But does that make the judgment right?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, none of us are possessed with the benefit of hindsight at the time we take decisions. There was a strong assessment made by ONA at the time. It told the Government that there was a strong circumstantial case and, as best as I can recall, the words in the unclassified submission to the Jull committee "a strong circumstantial" case which was in overall terms conclusive. You never have irrefutable proof, and you may remember in the lead-up to the decision we took I repeatedly said that we didn't have evidence that would be enough to satisfy an Old Bailey jury beyond reasonable doubt.
O'BRIEN:
Mr Flood says you had much less than that, that you had much less than that.
PRIME MINISTER:
But what he does say effectively is that on the balance of probabilities, the evidence supported the proposition that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.
O'BRIEN:
You said in your press conference on this today that Mr Flood found both ONA and DIO assessments, quote, and this was your quote, "reflected reasonably the available evidence and used intelligence sources with appropriate caution." Mr Howard, you dropped a rather important word from that quote. Mr Flood's full quote said, and I quote, "reflected reasonably the limited available information." You left out the word 'limited', which of course emphasises the thinness of their intelligence.
PRIME MINISTER:
Yes, but I did acknowledge and I said in my press conference, Kerry, the reference to the thinness and so forth of the intelligence. I mean, there was nothing in the press statement that I put out today that was designed in any way to disguise that. There was nothing intentional about that. We are not in the business of covering up anything that is in Flood's report. We published the unclassified version. I'm accepting, but for the recommendation of the name change for ONA which I see no point in, I'm accepting all of his recommendations. And I am as wary as anybody of the failure to find stockpiles of weapons since the war. I believed Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. I had grounds for believing that.
O'BRIEN:
Were you aware that the intelligence was thin? Was anybody saying to you, was anyone saying to you, any of your ministers saying, "Prime Minister, look this is a little thin. The intelligence hasn't been all that good since UNSCOM's withdrawal in 1998. We've got very little human intelligence on the ground.
PRIME MINISTER:
Well Kerry, all of these questions are asked based on material and developments after the event, but at the time I can assure you, without going into the detail of Cabinet discussions, there was a very strong view. This was not just a decision that I, you know, developed alone. Sure, I was the ultimate, I suppose, determinant of it, I accept that and I accept responsibility for the decision. If the Australian people judge me harshly for that, well, that is a price I pay, but I believed it at the time. We had a strong assessment from ONA. Did you ask me did I go through all of the hundreds of pages of intelligence? No.
O'BRIEN:
But did anyone tell you, you or any other member of Cabinet when you were making these very serious and painstaking decisions, that the information you were basing it on was thin, ambiguous and incomplete?
PRIME MINISTER:
I don't remember those particular words.
O'BRIEN:
Or anything like it?
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, Kerry, if you're saying to me, "Does an intelligence agency tell you that there are always reservations, there are always doubts, there are always caveats?" Of course they do. In this particular case, the assessment made by ONA was, as I have described it. Now we factored that in. We're not blaming ONA for our decision. We took the decision. It wasn't ONA's decision, it was my decision, it was a decision of the national security committee of Cabinet. And I have never sought to blame them and I have never sought to blend together the political decision which took into account the intelligence assessment, but also took into account, as I said in all of my speeches at the time, the importance of the American alliance.
O'BRIEN:
Here is another unequivocal judgment from Mr Flood on page 25 that both ONA's and DIA's assessments. Quote, "about Saddam's intent and capacity to use WMD against US forces or against those countries who allowed their countries to be used by US in the event of a US-led invasion, were the were not borne out". In other words, they got it seriously wrong.
PRIME MINISTER:
Well, everybody knows that the advice has not been borne out so far by the events. We all know that. That is not a - and I'm not being disrespectful of Mr Flood - but that is not a blindingly new claim. We know that from the reports in other countries, and remember, in fairness to our agencies, that the overwhelming bulk, something like 97 per cent, of the original source material that fed into their ultimate assessments came from American and British sources.
O'BRIEN:
But it was still wrong. If I understand you correctly, you're saying that one very significant reason that you went to war in Iraq was because of the American alliance. Does that mean that regardless of the fact that the intelligence assessments of Saddam's arsenal, was it side by side in importance where the American alliance?
PRIME MINISTER:
Kerry, I'm not in any way retreating from what I said at the time. I don't retreat from that. I accept that the existence of stockpiles of weapons has not eventuated, I accept that. But I can only say to you as I would say to anybody else, you make judgments on the basis of the information before you at the time. The great difficulty with waiting, of course, until you get proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even more overwhelming proof, is that if may be too late.
O'BRIEN:
But if you knew, sitting down now, assessing a case against Iraq for war, if you knew that Saddam Hussein did not have that arsenal of weapons, could you have justified to yourself sending Australia to war against him.
PRIME MINISTER:
Kerry, it is just not possible to do that. You are asking me now to retrospectively superimpose another judgment. I mean I haven't so far, in the last few minutes, I haven't talked about the fact that the country, Iraq, is infinitely better off without Saddam Hussein as president. I argue...
O'BRIEN:
But you always said in the lead-up that regime change was not a factor.
PRIME MINISTER:
I did always say that. Equally if I'm required to retrospectively impose another judgment after the event, well I am entitled to point out that one of the benefits of us joining the 'coalition of the willing' is that Saddam is now gone. It is an irrefutable reality in my view, and I believe this very strongly, that if we had followed the view of the Labor Party here and the view of the French and the Germans and the Russians and left the thing to the United Nations, Saddam would still be running Iraq and still murdering people.
O'BRIEN:
That might be the case, Mr Howard, but he was murdering people over decades when the West did nothing. In fact, there was actually a point when he was an ally of the United States.
PRIME MINISTER:
But that doesn't excuse that conduct, does it?
O'BRIEN:
But the West did nothing about it.
PRIME MINISTER:
That doesn't mean to say that later on you shouldn't do something about it. And if you stand by...
O'BRIEN:
Are you saying you could actually make a case against a country like Iraq, because you've got a butchering dictator to go in, to actually take pre-emptive action, commit war against that country to get rid of a dictator?
PRIME MINISTER:
What I'm saying to you, Kerry, is if I'm required retrospectively to superimpose a different judgment in the light of after-acquired information, I'm entitled retrospectively to point out the benefits for the Middle East and the benefits for Iraq, and the benefits for the long-term prospects of democracy in the Middle East of the removal of Saddam Hussein and that is exactly what I'm doing.
O'BRIEN:
Mr Flood points out that the two key intelligence agencies, ONA and DIO., began to differ in their assessments after January 2003, that is, six weeks before war was declared. ONA says Iraq must have weapons of mass destruction. DIO did not. Did anyone point those differences out to you? Were you aware of those differences?
PRIME MINISTER:
I think there was a consciousness of a variation. I would have to go back and look at all the material to refresh my recollection as to how great it was. I don't think it should be over-emphasised, but in the end...
O'BRIEN:
Even though that might have suggested the DIO was getting cold feet?
PRIME MINISTER:
At no stage did anybody say, "Look, it's absolutely beyond any argument." These things are always assessments. They are always, in the words of that submission of ONA, a strong circumstantial case which is conclusive in overall terms.
O'BRIEN:
Mr Howard, we are out of time.
PRIME MINISTER:
What a pity.
O'BRIEN:
Indeed what a pity, but that's the way it is.
[ends]