I am releasing with this statement the unclassified version of the Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies prepared by Mr Philip Flood AO in response to the recommendations of the Jull Committee (Parliamentary Joint Committee into ASIO, ASIS, and DSD - PJCAAD). Mr Flood found that the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) is performing well and is a potent capability for government. He found the AIC had adapted to the major challenges posed by global terrorism and increased requirements for support to deployed Australian forces.
In order to strengthen the contribution of sound intelligence to government decision making, Mr Flood proposes an extensive list of recommendations concerning the better functioning of the intelligence agencies, improved oversight arrangements and greater transparency and accountability. The government intends to accept all of Mr Flood's recommendations, except for his suggested name change for ONA. This means that the annual budget for ONA will rise from $13.1 million to $25 million. In addition $2.5 million will be re-allocated to cover the transfer to ONA of some activities from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Staff numbers at ONA will effectively double from 74 to 145.
Mr Flood's report is particularly notable for its firm rejection of any suggestion of political interference in the intelligence community. As the report notes there was "no evidence of politicisation of the assessments on Iraq, either overt or perceived"..."there was no evidence of politicisation". This report is further confirmation that the Government in no way whatsoever attempted to mislead the Australian people.
On Iraq, the report confirms the broad judgments made at the time and concludes that ONA and DIO assessments up to the commencement of combat operations "...reflected reasonably the available evidence and used intelligence sources with appropriate caution...".
Nor did Australian agencies merely reflect the judgments in Washington and London. "Using similar but not all the material available to the UK and the US, Australian assessments on Iraq's capabilities were on the whole more cautious and seem closer to the facts as we know them so far."
Indeed, despite noting that the intelligence on Iraq's WMD was "thin, ambiguous and incomplete", Australian assessments and key judgments were "relatively cautious". The obverse conclusion - that Iraq did not have WMD aspirations and capability - "would have been a much more difficult conclusion to substantiate". Mr Flood notes that prior to the commencement of military action, the only government in the world that claimed Iraq was not working on, and did not have, biological and chemical weapons or prohibited missile systems was the government of Saddam Hussein.
Concerning the activities of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the report notes that Australian intelligence agencies should have known more before December 2001 about JI as a group developing terrorist capabilities and intentions. However, the report goes on to note that the Inquiry saw nothing to indicate that any Australian agency, including ASIO, had any specific intelligence warning of the attack in Bali.
On behalf of the Government, I would like to record my appreciation for the professional quality of the report, and in particular, its forward-looking character. Like Mr Flood, I continue to be impressed by the level of commitment, talent and integrity within the leadership and staff of the intelligence community. The report's recommendations, taken together, will ensure that Australia continues to have an effective, world-class intelligence structure which is appropriately open to review and scrutiny.