PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Rudd, Kevin

Period of Service: 03/12/2007 - 24/06/2010
Release Date:
23/02/2010
Release Type:
Interview
Transcript ID:
17070
Released by:
  • Rudd, Kevin
Prime Minister Transcript of joint press conference Parliament House, Canberra 23 February 2010

PM: The Government is today releasing the Counter-Terrorism White Paper. The first responsibility of any Government is the protection of Australia and Australian interests. The National Security Statement of December 2008 for the first time presented a coherent strategy for the whole range of national security challenges we face, and how we intend to respond to those challenges. The Government has since then released the Defence White Paper, Force 2030, which is one core building block in enhancing our national security capabilities for the future. Furthermore, the Government is today releasing a further piece of the Government's national security reform agenda, the Counter-Terrorism White Paper.

Terrorism continues to pose a serious threat, a serious challenge to Australia's security interests. That threat is not diminishing. In fact, the Government's security and intelligence agencies assess that terrorism has become a persistent and permanent feature of Australia's security environment. These agencies warn that an attack could occur at any time. The key threat comes from people who are adherents to the distorted and militant interpretation of Islam, that is espoused by groups such as Al-Qaida. Prior to the rise of jihadist terrorism, Australia was not a specific target. Now Australia is such a target. More than 100 Australians have been killed in terrorist attacks since 2001. Australians have been murdered by terrorists in New York, in Bali, in Riyadh, in Jakarta, in London, and in Mumbai. The White Paper outlines two key shifts in the terrorist threat to Australia.

First, there has been some counter-terrorism successes, most notably in South-East Asia, and, also in exerting pressure on Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. But this has been offset by newer areas of concern, such as Somalia and Yemen. Second, Australia now faces an increased terrorist threat from people born or raised in Australia who take inspiration from international jihadist narratives. The London attacks in July 2005 brought into stark relief the real threat of globally inspired but locally generated attacks in Western democracies. And in Australia since 2001, 38 people have been prosecuted as a result of counter-terrorism operations, and 20 have been convicted of terrorism offences under the criminal code. Over 40 Australians have had their passports revoked or denied for reasons relating to terrorism.

The Government is committed to concrete action to combat terrorism. No Government can guarantee that Australia will be free from the threat of terrorism. But the Government can guarantee that we will take all necessary and practical measures to combat that threat. The Government's intention is to provide our security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies with the resources to assist them identify terrorists and to protect attacks. There are four key elements of the Government's Counter-Terrorism strategy. Analysis, protection, response, and resilience.

Analysis - our need for analysis demands an intelligence-led response driven by properly connected and properly informed national security community.

Protection - the Government is committed to taking all necessary and practical action to protect Australians and Australian interests from terrorism at home and abroad.

In terms of response, the Government is committed to providing an immediate and focussed response to specific terrorist threats and to terrorist attacks should they occur.

And resilience, Australia's strong and resilient community has a key role to play in resisting the development of violent extremism and terrorism on the home front.

If I could make three specific points about the contents of this paper. The White Paper of course contains a range of specific announcements and a number of specific measures. The- one of them relates to the introduction of biometric checks for visa applications in around ten countries. Under the new system, people applying for new electronic visas in these countries will be required to present in person at a visa application centre to lodge their visa applications, and submit fingerprints and facial images.

Second, the Government is committed to providing coordinated operational counter-terrorism work through international efforts and with budget priorities so dedicated. A multi-agency counter-terrorism control centre within the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation will be established. This is about properly coordinating our intelligence efforts on the ground, in the field.

Beyond these measures, could I also draw your attention to the announcement recently that the Government made in the $200 million investment in airport security, including the introduction of full body scanners and enhanced explosive detection devices at major international gateway airports, as part of Australia's aviation security screening, as well as the enhanced security arrangements for air cargo, as well as at Australia's other domestic and regional airports.

Could I conclude with these remarks- the challenge of counter-terrorism is real. The threat that we face is continuing. And the agencies that advise us on these matters have concluded that this threat is now a permanent threat. Home grown terrorism is now a reality in Australia that we have to accept. The threat of terrorism is no longer just something that travels to Australia from overseas. The threat of home grown terrorism is now increasing. This White Paper is clear, some of the threat we now face comes from the Australian born, Australian educated, and Australian residents. Therefore, our response to this threat must be multi-layered across the measures that I have reflected in the contents of the Counter-Terrorism White Paper. Before taking your questions, I'd ask first the Attorney to add to my remarks, then the Foreign Minister, then it's open to you.

MCCLELLAND: Well thanks very much Prime Minister. Just on two things, the Counter-Terrorism Control Centre and also the issue of addressing the issue of home grown terrorism.

The Counter-Terrorism Control Centre will essentially draw together experts from the intelligence community to a centre within the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. It will look at increasing the capacity to gather intelligence, analyse intelligence to communicate it to those agencies that may require that intelligence, or indeed to simply cross-check the intelligence, and to ensure that the intelligence as joined together is available for operational purposes. So that will, we believe, be a significant enhancement through combining existing capabilities of our intelligence-gathering capability. In respect of the issue of home grown terrorism, it's instructive to note that there have been 38 prosecutions- some of those matters are still before the courts, it should be noted- but of those 38, 37 were born in Australia, or, sorry, are Australian citizens, and of that 37, 20 were born in Australia.

Again, there are matters to be resolved before the Courts, but that is an indication that we're not simply looking at the possibility of a terrorist event occurring from overseas, but the reality of home grown terrorism is something that the Government needs to address and is addressing through our counter-radicalisation strategies.

PM: Foreign Minister.

SMITH: Thanks Prime Minister. To add to the remarks of the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General, the Prime Minister has outlined the new threats that the White Paper identifies, firstly, the evolution of Al-Qaida and its associates with now threats coming from the Yemen and from Somalia, and also the home grown threats which both the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General have referred to.

As a consequence, what we see in this White Paper for the first occasion is an attempt to mesh much better our domestic and our international strategies. So far as our international strategies are concerned, you'll find detailed in the White Paper the fact that Australia now has 10 to 15, I think the precise number is 14, formal memorandums of understanding with other countries on counter-terrorism. And so the work we do internationally is very significant, and the formal MoUs go beyond what you would regard as Australia's traditional like-minded friends, partners and allies in this area. So our international effort is significant.

So far as the enhanced visa processing arrangements are concerned, we expect the rollout to be in about 10 countries. We're not of course identifying those countries until the actual rollout occurs, but in due course, individually, that will become public. And there may well be a diplomatic effort required in respect of some of those countries as you would expect. Finally, just by way of interest, I think in the Cabinet anteroom some of the visa processing arrangements, the new arrangements, are there for you to inspect. The fingerprinting and the biometrics, the facial imaging and screening for your interest.

Thank you.

PM: In fact, we would like to fingerprint and facially scan all of you afterwards, so if you could just line up-

SMITH: That's the ones we haven't already.

JOURNALIST: Just, as you were eluding before, you know, when it comes down to terrorism, we often think about the usual suspects. You know you mentioned Somalia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. But in your own statement it points out that the 2005 British bombings were done by British nationals. Why, then, would we restrict this rollout of biometric testing to just 10 countries when we're going to be piggybacking off the British system, and then under the British and American system, they test practically everyone?

PM: Can I say one of the reasons we have taken this decision is that we've been again hugely informed by the developments in recent years, but also the developments on December 25 in the United States. And that is, the need for our intelligence agencies to have full access to global databases at every level, on terrorists and terror suspects. The world is a big place. There are other agencies out there who our friends and partners and allies who we need to draw on. It makes sense, therefore, to have complementary systems operating across the world. When it comes to your word, I think, 'piggybacking', we call it cooperation. They draw on us, we draw on them. And we actually have to be part of the global network to make this work. This is a serious business. We've listened very carefully to the presentation by the officials on this. The time for delay on this is well and truly passed. It has to be done, and rolled out. We also do not draw a particular line around the 10 that have been referred to by the Minister. We reserve to ourselves the right to expand this network further. But we are doing so carefully on the advice of the officials in terms of those parts of the world where we believe we have the greatest potential vulnerability.

JOURNALIST: Just on two things, does the money you're using come out of existing budgets, because some of these Departments are already under strain. And secondly, you say that the threat is from Australian born as well as overseas nationals- well the aviation security identity card still doesn't have any kind of biometric data, and people can use, we know that there's identity theft going on there at the moment. So why isn't that being rolled out at our airports?

PM: On the first question concerning the funding of this program, this is a new investment. In relation to the airport security measures that we referred to the other day, these are new investments as well. And this has been a matter of considerable debate within the Government against fiscal pressures on the one hand, but also responding to some very sharp and focussed advice from our agencies, advice which I in part commissioned following the events of December 25 in the United States. There's a bit of a danger that we all get numbed to the terrorist threat. It's a word which is used, and people have become so used to it over the last near decade, that it no longer bites home. December 25 was a near-run thing in the United States. We have taken a lot of advice since then from our agencies, and this is the appropriate response.

As far as airport security is concerned, the measures that we detailed I think a week or so ago with the Transport Minister are robust. I'd draw your attention to his comments then in terms of the card in question, and of course we have further things to do in that respect.

JOURNALIST: Prime Minister, just on another issue. In 2007 you promised to deliver 260 childcare centres on school grounds. You're actually delivering, I understand, 38 by 2012. What's the problem, and do you concede that that's a broken election promise?

PM: I think on this one I'll defer to the Deputy Prime Minister and the relevant Minister.

JOURNALIST: I asked her yesterday.

PM: I'd like to respond to your question. I think as far as the rollout of support for the childcare industry across the country is concerned, the Government has done a lot. On the specific progress and the implementation of that and how it is being done, and how it dovetails with the use which is being put in some schools for the multipurpose halls for the purpose of after school hours care etcetera, I'm not sure where the final detail of that has landed. But once we are clear on that, we'll certainly come back to you.

JOURNALIST: Prime Minister, this White Paper's been a long time in the works. Does it tell you anything about the threat of terrorism that you didn't already know? Is there a classified version that hasn't been released?

PM: This is, of course, based on extensive classified discussions of the National Security Committee of the Cabinet. As I said, December 25 was a very focussing event. Yes, the Counter-Terrorism White Paper has been under preparation for a long time, but what December 25 required us to do was to bring it together rapidly against newly emerging data.

You see, two big things now confront us out there.

One is terrorists, al-Qa'ida-related terrorist organisations now have training effectively in other parts of the world. We have had some success in Afghanistan, we've had some success in Pakistan, but the references to Yemen and Somalia are there for a specific purpose. That is why our international efforts are so crucial here.

The second key element of this, which was confronting when we looked at the raw intelligence data, concerned the increasing home-grown threat. This is a statistical conclusion from our agencies based on their intelligence efforts. As I said, Australians have often seen terrorism as something as a risk which they confront when they travel abroad - maybe. Now we are confronted with the reality that home-grown terrorism in Australia is increasing. That is the sober conclusion from our agencies and it was starkly underlined by the heads of our agencies as we prepared this document.

JOURNALIST: (inaudible) Australians more at risk from dodgy home insulation than they are from a terror attack?

PM: I understand the Liberal Party today is now saying that the home insulation program is a bigger threat to Australia than terrorism and some have argued, in fact, that we should not have proceeded to release this Counter-Terrorism White Paper today. Can I explain to you why I fundamentally disagree with that proposition?

The first is, we now confront significant and continuing threats of terrorism and we have specifically taken advice from our agencies following the events of December 25, which isn't that long ago. Secondly, could I say that when it comes to the introduction of body scanners and the introduction of biometric checks, these have to be put into place as rapidly as possible. That is why we have made these announcements that we have made in the last week or so and again today.

On top of that, can I say that when a document is ready for release on something as fundamental as counter-terrorism, it should be released so the agencies can then be put in a position to give it effect on the ground.

And, finally, can I just say in relation to the comments by the Liberal Party that I seem to recall the Liberal Party's been calling upon us to release the counter-terrorism white paper for a long, long time, so here's the call to Mr Abbott: pull in his Liberal Party spokesman on this subject, let's have a real discussion about counter-terrorism and threats to Australia rather than just engaging in, let's call it a political scare campaign.

There.

JOURNALIST: Prime Minister, why didn't you defend Peter Garrett in parliament yesterday? Why did you leave that to Anthony Albanese?

PM: The censure motion was directed to the Minister. If you've looked at the, I think, dozens of censure motions which have been lodged against the Government by this Opposition in the period that we've been in government, frankly, they've become a bit like a dime-a-dozen, if you want to really know.

I seem to recall when I was Leader of the Opposition you would think very carefully about the occasions upon which you would choose to launch a censure motion against the Government, and then do so. What I seem to encounter in the period that I've faced now four Liberal leaders, three leaders of the Opposition, is they seem to roll thick and fast, about every week or two. As I said, it must be Thursday, it's censure day, so as far as all that's concerned, you would have heard my remarks in complete support of the Minister in parliament last week - my position on that has not changed one bit.

JOURNALIST: Thanks, Prime Minister. Could you just elaborate now on your definition of ministerial responsibility? I mean, it's something that, obviously, vexes ministers, I don't think it's fair, but in the end someone's got to cop the blame when things are stuffed up and this has been stuffed up, but what is your definition now of ministerial responsibility?

PM: I think the proper definition of ministerial responsibility is as follows: one, that a minister, when charged by Cabinet with the implementation of a program has commissioned, through his department, appropriate risk assessment as to what measures should be put in place for the proper implementation of the program; secondly, that the minister then acts appropriately in response to the departmental advice that the minister receives in the implementation of that program.

Against those core measures, I stand by the minister, as I did last week, as I'll do next week.

Can I also say this - in the broader debate of ministerial responsibility, let us look at the daily responsibilities of those who have been minister for aging in the past and at present. The Australian Government funds, primarily, almost exclusively, the aged care system of Australia. On a day-to-day basis, what happens in an aged care institution in terms of the operation of it can produce some awful results, which we've seen over time.

Is the Minister directly responsible for each and every one of those events? Well, it goes back to the more fundamental systemic questions of what risk assessment was undertaken in the design of a policy, and has the minister in question acted responsibly in terms of the departmental advice that was put to him or her in laying out a program? Whether it's the aged care system, whether it's the transport system, whether it's the road system, whether it's the safety and security of our Defence forces at a particular time as well, let's put some context into this debate about what constitutes ministerial responsibility.

JOURNALIST: Mr Rudd, you have in your department a senior officer who coordinates and oversees the stimulus program generally. What role did that officer have in regards-

PM: -Sorry, can you just say that again?

JOURNALIST: What role did that officer have in regard to the insulation program, and did you get any reports from the officer on the way through?

PM: You're talking about the Office of the Coordinator General? The Office of the Coordinator General, I believe, was working with the Environment Department throughout the implementation of this process. As I understand it, once Cabinet took decisions to implement the home insulation program, the Department then commissioned its various risk assessment procedures and took its various risk assessment advices. The Coordinator General, from time to time, advised the Cabinet on the implementation of the program. I'm advised that in the Coordinator General's reports over that period of time no safety concerns were raised, I'm so advised.

JOURNALIST: The head of the Environment Department yesterday said the timeframes set by the Government for the roll out of this scheme was a very major ask. Minter Ellison warned that it should be delayed three months. Was the rush involved in getting this program rolling a contributing factor to the problems that we saw?

PM: I think, as I understand it, and I'm advised Minter Ellison recommended a management plan to deal with risk management, and there were, I think, four to five key elements of that, which involved: one, developing a detailed project delivery business model; two, engaging industry leaders in developing guidelines; three, simplifying the business model to reduce time constraints; four, closely monitoring the resourcing and project delivery targets, and; five, using external resources where necessary to reduce time constraints.

I'm advised that their recommendations in all of those areas were taken into account by the Minister.

Can I add to that, specifically, the recommendations which were contained within the Minter Ellison report concerning the safety of the program, and, as I'm advised, on page 5 and 17 of the report in particular, page 5 of the report identifies certain risks concerning the program. To mitigate this, Minter Ellison recommended the effective process for registration of installers. I'm advised this was done with the National Installer Provider Register.

I'm also advised that as a consequence of that, that further to that Minter Ellison recommended that installers be hooked into Australian Standard and that in response to that what the Department did was undertake that with program guidelines requiring adherence to the relevant Australian standard.

Page 17 of the report, the Minter Ellison report, identifies the risk that there would be inability to attract enough people to train to become installers. To mitigate this risk, Minter Ellison recommended to the Department that they develop a process of registration for installers. I'm advised that this was done through the National Installer Provider Register.

I understand that Minter Ellison recommended that they set up monitoring and reporting processes to identify emerging provider stress. I'm advised the Department established a project control group with representatives across government and external risk consultants.

I'm advised that Minter Ellison recommended that we should ensure contract structures provide capacity to monitor and take action on poor-performing providers. I'm advised the Department established a roof inspection program and a process to de-register non-compliant installers in result.

Furthermore, the Minter Ellison report identified the risk that the product does not meet safety standards and how to deal with that particular risk, and to mitigate that Minter Ellison recommended that the Department, quote, 'set product quality guidelines with industry'. In response to that I'm advised the Department conducted a series of roundtables with industry, including a 29 April industry compliance meeting with representation from the ACCC and state authorities.

And furthermore, Minter Ellison recommended setting up a third-party process for dealing with quality exceptions, including rectification by alternate providers as required and the Department, I'm advised, established a roof inspection program overseen by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and a process to de-register non-compliant installers.

The reason I've answered your question in those terms is because it goes to the manner of, well frankly, the implementation of the principles which Mark Riley's question went to, that is, what were the specific recommendations contained within the risk management assessment obtained by the Minister, and what reasonable action did he and his Department take in response to that, hence I've answered in the way in which I've done so.

JOURNALIST: Mr Rudd, risks were identified and action was taken to mitigate them, but ultimately the program had to be abolished because of failure. Is there, where to do you eventually apportion blame?

PM: Look, as far as responsibility for any government program, I, as Prime Minister of the country, am responsible for the good news and the bad news, the implementation of programs effectively, the implementation of programs which have problems. As Prime Minister of the country I take full responsibility to that which goes well and that which doesn't go so well, and that does not exclude the debate concerning this program.

Up the back there. Sorry, I'll take this one up the back.

JOURNALIST: What does that responsibility that you take, ultimately, amount to in terms of-

PM: -It's my responsibility to the Australian people, and we undertook this program, as you know, in a concerted effort to deal with the challenges of the global recession. We implemented it together with a whole range of other stimulus measures against the economic objectives which we set for ourselves. The stimulus strategy has been exceptionally effective and the implementation of elements of this program, there have been real problems and I have said that for quite some days, that we simply need to call a spade a spade and deal with the practical problems which have arisen as a result.

Therefore, the key challenge the Minister has identified is dealing with outstanding problems which the program has encountered and those households which are uncertain, and secondly to get on with the business of designing a rebate scheme for the future which mitigates further against these risks.

JOURNALIST: (inaudible) quoted extensively a moment ago from the Minter Ellison report. They also gave the Department the so-called risk register which said one option here should be to hold off by three months the roll out. Why didn't the Government accept that independent advice, and given that the whole process, the whole scheme, is now being abolished, do you agree with the Opposition that it was a failure?

PM: On the question of the, I think the risk register that you're referring to, my advice is that from that register, on safety, Minter Ellison concluded that the risks were tolerable, that is there term, quote unquote. Safety concerns relate to installation quality and compliance are described in that relevant part of the report. In the report Minter Ellison describes the effectiveness of mitigation action as, quote, 'adequate', unquote, and indicate that the residual risk value, quote unquote, is 'tolerable', quote unquote. Therefore, I'd suggest that whole document be read carefully in its entirety.

To put my response, then, into the broader context again of Mark Riley's earlier question, did the Minister seek, through his Department, to obtain risk assessment in terms of the implementation of the program? He did so, and the Department did so. Did he and the Department also seek consultation with all other relevant representatives of industry and relevant safety authorities? You've heard the Minister's extensive answer to those questions so far. I believe he did so. Furthermore, in terms of his response to each of those actions, it is quite plain that the Minister and his Department, in response to the concerns which were raised to him about the risk assessment, adopted a reasonable course of action, and on top of that you'll also be aware that from the time the guidelines were introduced as of 1 July of last year they were strengthened on a number of occasions since then.

And I just say this in conclusion: remember, prior to this program coming into being there was no nationally consistent training program for anyone involved in the installation industry - period. There were, generally, a whole series of deficiencies concerning the regulation of this particular industry. What the Minister did was establish, in many cases, the first applicable standards and in the case of other standards improve them over the period of time.

That doesn't detract from the problems which have been encountered. They are real and the Government fully accepts that, but I think we also need to keep this debate in its proper context.

Thank you very much.

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