PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER
ON THE JOINT DEFENCE FACILITIES
22 NOVEMBER 1988
I wish-to inform the. House that the Australian and US
Governments have agreed to a number of important changes to
the arrangements under which we cooperate in running our
joint defence facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar.
The changes we are making reflect the commitment of both
Governments to maintaining and strengthening our
long-standing partnership in these joint facilities. They
ensure that the facilities continue to operate in ways that
best serve the interests of ourselves and our partners.
These changes also reflect the commitment of this Government
to informing the public as fully as possible about the
facilities. on 6 June 1984 in this place I made the first
detailed public statement about the roles of the facilities.
In making that statement I was convinced that better public
understanding of the roles of the joint facilities could
only increase public support for them. my remarks today,
which will in some respects go beyond that earlier
statement, are made with the same conviction.
Since the joint facilities were established in the 1960s,
the alliance between Australia and the US has evolved and
matured, the technologies involved at Pine Gap and Nurrungar
have developed, and Australians have learned more of the
skills involved in running the facilities.
The new arrangements at Pine Gap and Nurrungar accommodate
these important changes.
At Pine Gap, the number of Australians engaged in the
central-operational . activity is being steadily increased.
Some of these personnel, who are drawn from scientific and
intelligence areas of the Department of Defence, are taking
over functions previously carrie~ d out by US employees.
Whereas only a handful of Australian Government personnel
was directly involved in the central work of the facility in
the 1970s and early 1980s contributing less than
per cent of the staff there the proportion is scheduled
to rise to about 30% over the next two or three years.
But Australians are not only doing more of the operational
work at the facilities. Under the new arrangements we have
agreed, Australians will carry out more of the senior
management functions at both Pine Gap and Nurrungar.
3678
At Fine Gap, a senior Australian Defence official will be
appointed to a newly created position as Deputy Chief of the
Facility. He will advise and support the US Chief of
Facility in managing the facility and its activities, and he
will share responsibility with him for that work. He will
also continue to be the officer in charge of the prohibited
area, with ultimate responsibility for the physical security
of the facility. Other senior management positions will
also be filled by Australians.
Parallel changes have been agreed to the staffing at
Nurrungar. Australians constitute some 40 per cent of the
staff in the key operational areas, and will now take a role
in management with the appointment of the senior Australian
officer there as Deputy Commander. Like his counterpart at
Pine Gap, he will share re5ponsibility with the Commander
for the management of the station and its physical security.
The integration of Australian personnel in both the
operation and the management of the joint facilities at Pine
Gap and Nurrungar is such that the Australian Government can
be assured of having full knowledge of all, aspects of the
operations at the facilities, and reinforces our confidence
that our interests and sovereignty are respected at all
times. At the same time, Australia will be able to take more direct
advantage of the facilities, capabilities for our own
purposes than has been practicable in the*. past.
Hitherto, by agreement between ourselves and our partners,
we have spoken in public of the capabilities of the two
facilities only in conjunction. Under the new arrangements,
and in pursuit of better understanding and stronger support
for the facilities we have now agreed to specify the
separate roles of Pine Gap and Nurrungar.
Nurrungar is a ground station used for . controlling
satellites in the US Defence Support Program ( DSP). The
satellites provide ballistic missile early warning and other
information related to missile launches, surveillance and
the detonation of nuclear weapons.
Few if any elements of the strategic systems of eithe-r
superpower make such a decisive and-unambiguous contribution
to keeping the peace as the Defense SupotPgrm Asa
essential link in the DSP, Nurrungar plays a quite
fundamental role in preventing nuclear war.
The DSP, through Nurrungar, would give the earliest warning
of an ICBM attack on the US or its allies.
Because the DSP gives longer warning of an attack than other
systems, it reduces the chances that US forces could be
destroyed in a surprise attack, and that makes it extremely
unlikely that anyone would ever try such an attack.
3.
Together with other elements of the US early warning system,
the oSP provides highly reliable warning of attack. It thus
plays a vital role in helping to prevent nuclear war by
accident. Australians can be glad that we help to operate this vital
facility, and that every day, around the clock, Australian
personnel are playing this part in helping to prevent
nuclear war.
I turn now to Pine Gap. Pine Gap is a satellite ground
station, whose function is to'collect intelligence data
which supports the national security of both Australia and
the US.
Intelligence collected at Pine Gap contributes importantly
to the verification of arms control and disarmament r
agreements. The value of that data has become more and more
evident over the last year or two, as disarmament has moved
from being an aspiration to become an emerging reality.
Today, for the first time since the invention of the atom T
bomb, nuclear weapons systems are, under the INF Treaty, a
being destroyed by their owners. The next step is already e
underway, in the START talks the superpowers are seriou sly 0
negotiating to make major cuts in their strategic arsenals. f
Verification is vital to this arms control process.
Verification was the key issue in reaching that IN14k?
agreement last year, and verification will be the key to anys
START agreement in the future, if the START process were to e
fail, despite the efforts of both sides, it would be largely
because of the difficulties with verification. e a
in April this year, nuclear risk reduction centres were
created in Washington and M~ oscow. This new confidence T
building channel is being used to notify the two sides of j
missile launches required by arms control accords and will n
alGo serve to reduce the possibility of nuclear conflict. d
WV
Without Australia's involvement in arms control c
verification, the risk of nuclear war would have been T
directly and significantly incQased. 0
I th ink it is important for those who have urged us over the
years to close Pine Gap and Nurrungar to reflect on the
undoubted fact that, had we done as they urged, the INF
Treaty could not have been signed and the START process
would not have got underway.
with the information now on the public record about the
roles played by these facilities in preventing nuclear war,
I think it is clear that nobody seriously committed to peace
could argue for their closure.
3680
' 2o 4.
There are of course limitations on what it would be sensible
for me to reveal publicly about details of the operations
that are conducted at either of these joint defence
facilities, or details of the organisation and manning
arrangements which apply there. It has been the practice of
successive Australian Governments not to comment on
intelligence matters, and this Government will conti ' nue that
policy. Details of our capabilities in the sensitive'a-nd
important area of intelligence collection, or in relation to
systems providing attack warning, are not in our national
interests to divulge and this Government will not do so.
The Government takes the view that the irreplaceable
contribution made by these facilities gives us a special
responsibility to ensure that they can continue to function
in an atmosphere of stability and commitment.
At present both facilities, operate under agreements-which
are terminable at one year's notice by either side, we do
not regard this as satisfactory, both because of the
re continuing importance of their effective operation to global
re peace, and because of the specific benefits to Australia of
d long-term access to their capabilities.
To this end the US and Australia have, as part of the new
arrangements for the operation of the facilities, agreed to
extend the arrangements under which the two facilities
Ly operate for a further ten years in each case. We have
ly further agreed that three years' notice shall be required to
S. terminate the agreement.
Last week the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Senator Evans, and the US Ambassador Mr Bill Lane, signed
any exchanges of notes to formalise this agreement. For the
to information of Honourable Members I now table those
3ely exchanges of notes. Members will note that this exchange
also defines clearly the functions of the two facilities.
These agreements confirm my Government's conviction -that the
f joint defence facilities will continue to serve Australia's
11 national interests; that they will continue to reflect the
depth and substance of our bilateral strategic relationship
with the United States under ANZUS; and that they will
continue to play a vital role in preventing nuclear war.
The Government intends that Honourable members will have an
opportunity to debate this statement.
r the
war, peace 3681