, l A46U8 ALI( A.
PRIME MINISTER
21 OCTOBER 1985
FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT TH4E NASSAU CHOGM
ON SOUTH AFRICA, ENTITLED ' SOUTHERN AFRICA THE COMMONWEALTH
ACCORD-. SOIIH AFRICA
1HE COMMONWEALTH ACCORD ( UNDERI. JNrf))
WE CONSIDER THAT SOLITH AFRICA'S CONTINIIJN(; RF-FII5I TO DISMANTLE
APARTHEID, ITS ILLEGAL. OCCUPATION OF NAMIFrA, AND 17. s A;, RESSIOt,
AGAINST ITS NEIGHBOURS CONSTITUTE A SERIOLIS CHALI.. ENGL TO THE VAILUES
AND PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMONWEALTH, A CHALLENGE WHICH COMMONWEALT'H
COUNTRIES CANNOT IGNORE. AT NEW DELHI WE EXPRSSED THE VIEW THAT
"-ONLY THE ERADICATION OF APARTHEID AND THE E.,' IABLISHMENT OF MAJORITY
RULE ON THE BASIS OF FREE AND FAIR EXERCISE O1" UNIVERSAL ADULT
SUFFRAGE BY ALL THE PEOPLE IN A UNITED AND NON-FRAGMENTED SOUTH
AFRICA CAN LEAD TO A JUST AND LASTING SOI. UTION OF THE EXPLOSIVE
SITUATION PREVAIlING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.'' WE ARE UNITED IN THE
BELIEF THAT RELIANCE ON THE RANGE OF PRESSURES ADOPTED SO FAR HAS NOT
RESULTED IN THE FUNDAMENTA. CHANGES WE HAVE SOUGHT OVER MANY YEARS.
THE GROWING CRISIS AND INTENSIFIED REPRESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA MEAN
THAT APARTHEID MUST BE DISMANTLED tJOW IF A GREATER TRAGEDY IS TO BE
AVERTED AND THAT CONCERTED PRESSURE MUST BE BROUGHT TO BEAR TO
ACHIEVE THAT END. WE CONSIDER THAT THE SITUATION CALLS FOR URGENT
PRACTICAL. STEPS.
2. WE, THEREFORE, CALL ON THE AUTHORITIES IN PRETORIA FOR THE
FOLLOWING STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN A GENUINE MANNER AND AS A MATTER OF
URGENCY: A. DECLARE THAT THE SYTEM OF APARTHEID WILL BE DISMANTLED AND
SPECIFIC AND MEANINGFUL ACTION TAKEN IN FULFILMENT OF THAT INTENT.
B. TERMINATE THE EXISTING STATE OF EMERGENCY.
C. RELEASE IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY NELSON MANDELA AND ALL
OTHERS IMPRISONED AND DETAINED FOR THEIR OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID.
0. ESTABLISH POLITICAL FREEDOM AND SPECIFICALLY LIFT THE EXISTING BAN
ON THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES.
E. INITIATE, IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUSPENSION OF VIOLENCE ON ALL
SIDES, A PROCESS OF DIALOGUE ACROSS LINES OF COLOUR, POLITICS AND
RELIGION, WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING A NON-RACIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT.
3. WE HAVE AGREED ON A NUMBER OF MEASURES WHICH HAVE AS THEIR
RATIONALE IMPRESSING ON THE AUTHORITIES IN PRETORIA'THE COMPELLING
URGENCY OF DISMANTLING APARTHEID AND ERECTING THE STRUCTURES OF
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE LATTER, IN PARTICULAR, DEMANDS A
PROCESS OF DIALOGUE INVOLVING THE TRIE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
MAJORITY BLACK POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA. WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST DO
ALL WE CAN TO ASSIST THAT PROCESS, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT THE FORMS
OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA ARE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THAT
COUNTRY ALL THE PEOPLE TO DETERMINE.
4. TO THIS END, WE HAVE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH A SHALL GROUP OF EMINENT
COMMONWEALTH PERSONS TO ENCOURAGE THROUGH ALL PRACTICABLE WAYS THE
EVOLUTION OF THAT NECESSARY PROCESS OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE. WE ARE NOT
UNMINDFUL OF THE DIFFICULTIES SUCH AN EFFORT WILL ENCOUNTER,
INCLUDING THE POSSIBLITY OF INITIAL REJECTION BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN
AUTHORITIES, BUT, WE BE[ IEVE IT TO BE OUR DUTY TO LEAVE NOTHING
UNDONE THAT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEFIL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND
AVOID THE DREADFUL PROSPECT OF VIOLENI CONFLICT THAT LOOMS OVER SOUTH
AFRICA, THREATENING PEOPI. E OF ALL RACES IN THE COUNTRY, AND THE PEACE
AND STABILITY OF THE ENTIRE SOITiERN AFRICA REGION.
WE ARE ASKING THE PRESIDFNT OF ZAM[: IA AND THE PRIME MINISTERS OF
AUSTRALIA, BAHAMAS, CANADA, INDIA, THF UNITED KINGDOM AND ZIMBABWE TO
DEVELOP WITH THF SECRETARY. GENERA: 7I1F hODALITIES OF THIS EFFORT TO
ASSIST THE PROCESS OF POLITICAI DIILOGFl IN 50LITH AFRICA. WE WOULD
LOOK TO THE GROUP OF EMINENT PER!' ON!; TO SEEN TO FACILITATE THE
PROCESSES OF DIALOGIJ REFERRrD TO IN PARAGRAPH 7( E) ASOVE AND BY ALL
PRACTICABLE MEANS TO A) V~ tfCE THlE FULFILMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS
ACCORD. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE AS AN EARNEST OF OUR OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID
REACHED ACCORD ON A PROGRAMME OF COMMON ACTION AS FOLLOWS:
I) WE DECLARE THE COMMONWEALTH'S SUPPORT FOR THE STRICTEST
ENFORCEMENT OF THE MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLTIONS 418 AND 558 AND COMMIT
OURSELVES TO PROSECUTE VIOLATORS TO THE FULLEST EXTENT OF THE LAW.,
II) WE REAFFIRM THE GLENEAGLES DECLARATION OF 1977, WHICH CALLED
UPON COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS TO TAKE EVERY PRACTICAL STEP TO DISCOURAGE
SPORTING CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.,
III) WE AGREE UPON, AND COMMEND 10 OTHER GOVERNMENTS, THE ADOPTION
OF THE FOLLOWING FURTHER ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA,
WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADOPTED BY A NUMBER OF MEMBER COUNTRIES:
CA) A BAN ON ALL NEW GOVERNMENT LOANS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS AGENCIES.,
A READINESS TO TAKE UNILATERALLY WHAT ACTION MAY BE
POSSIBLE TO PRECLUDE THF IMPORT OF KRUGERRANDS.,
NO GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR TRADE MISSIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA
OR FOR PARTICIPATION IN EXHIBITIONS AND TRADE FAIRS IN
SOUTH AFRICA.,
A BAN ON THE SAI. E AND EXPORT OF COMPUTER EQUIPMENT CAIIAF-E
OF USE BY SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES, POLICE OR SECURITY
FORCES.,
A BAN ON NEW CONTRACTS FOR IHE SALE AND EXPORT OF NUCLEAR
GOODS, MATERIALS AND 7ECHNOLOUY TO SOtlJH AFRICA.,
A BAN ON THE SALE AND EXPORT OF OIL 70 SOUTH AFRICA.,
A STRICT AND RIGOROUSLY CONTROLLED EMBARGO ON IMPORTS
OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, MILITARY VEHICLES AND PARA-MILITARY
EQUIPMENT FROM SOUTH AFRICA.,
AN EMBARGO ON ALL MILITARY CO OPLRA'rION WlIII SOUII4i AFRICA.
AND DISCOURAGEMENT OF ALL CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVENTS
EXCEPT UHERE THESE CONTRIIJUTE TOWARDS THE ENDING OF
APARTHEID OR HAVE NO POSSIBLE ROLE IN PROMOTING IT.
7. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE PROCESS AND MEASURES WE HAVE AGREED UPON
WILL HELP TO BRING ABOUT CONCRETFE PROGRESS5 TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVES
STATED ABOVE IN SIX MONTHS. THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MENTIONED IN
PARAGRAPH 5 AflOVE, OR THEIR REPRFSENTATIVES, WILL THEN MEET TO REVIEW
THE SITUATION. IF ItN THEIR OPINION ADEQUATE PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN
MADE WITHIN THIS PERIOD, WE AGREE T0 CONSIDER T14E ADOPTION OF FURTHER
MEASURES. SOME OF US WOULD, IN THAT EVENT, CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING
STEPS AMONG OTHERS:
A. A BAN ON AIR LINRI wini SOUTH AFRICA.,
B. A BAN ON NEW INVESTMENl OR I( INVF'; TMENT Or PROFITS
EARNED IN SOUTH1 AFRICA.,
C. A BAN ON THF* IMPORT OF AGRICUILTUJRAL PRODUCTS FROM
SOUTH AFRICA.,
D. THE TERMINATION OF DOIlBI F TAXATION AGREEMENTS WITH
SOUTH AFRICA.
E. THE TERMlNATION OF ALI GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO
INVESTMENT IN, AND TRADE WITH, SOUTH AFRICA.,
F. A BAN ON ALL GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA.,
G. A BAN ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS WITH MAJORITY OWNED SOUTH
AFRICAN COMPANIES.,
H. A BAN ON THE PROMOTION OF TOURISM TO SOUTH AFRICA.
8. FINALLY, WE AGREE THAT SHOULD ALL OF THE ABOVE MEASURES FAIL TO
PRODUCE THE DESIRED RESULTS WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD, FURTHER
EFFECTIVE MEASURES WIL. L HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. MANY OF US HAVE
EITHER TAKEN OR ARE PREPARED TO TAKE MEASURES WHICH GO BEYOND THOSE
LISTED ABOVE, AND EACH OF US WILL PURSUE THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS
ACCORD IN ALL THE WAYS AND THROUGH ALI APPROPRIATE FORA OPEN TO US.
WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IN PURSUING THIS PROGRAMME JOINTL. Y, WE
I ENLARGE THE PROSPECTS OF AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO SOCIAL, ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE
SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION AS A WHOLE.
ENDS