PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Hawke, Robert

Period of Service: 11/03/1983 - 20/12/1991
Release Date:
03/10/1985
Release Type:
Interview
Transcript ID:
6754
Document:
00006754.pdf 7 Page(s)
Released by:
  • Hawke, Robert James Lee
TRANSCRIPT OF PRIME MINISTER ON BBC WORLD AT ONE

iAUSTRALIA&
PRIME MINISTER IvJ.. U
E. O. E. -PROOF ONLY
TRANSCRIPT OF PRIME MINISTER ON BBC WORLD AT ONE
JOURNALIST:.........( inaudible) South fr ica could well become the
major issue at the Commonwealth con erence. We reckon it will be
the dominating issue.
PM: I would think it would be.
JOURNALIST: Nothing else can really match this in importance?
PM: I wouldn't have thought so. This doesn't mean that there
are not other important issues. Obviously the questions of
international economic concern and the developing trends towards
increasing proctectionism around the world by any standards of
relevant judgment, those are important issues. But I adhere to
my first observation, I believe that this issue that you mention
will be the dominant one.-
JOURNALIST: You have already imposed some fairly limited sanctions.
You have closed down your Trade Commission offLice and you have
banned the export of petroleum products and so on. Do you think tLhe
Commonwealth countries generally will be looking for a much tougher
package of sanctions?
PM: I would think that the Commonwealth Heads of Government will
be a approaching it in this way. Firstly, that we would all, I
believe, rather see the obscenity of apartheid come to an end as
a result'of a realisation on the part of the South African regime
that they must take action to bring about this result. Speaking
for myself, and I would think that this would be the view of
other Commonwealth countries, rather than South Africa being
forced to that position by the application of general economic
sanctions. It would be more preferable if they would understand
the growing force of world opinion. So speaking for myself, we
will be doing two things. We will certainly be urging the
Commonwealth to prepare itself and to take to the United Nations
a position in favour of widespread mandatory sanctions. But at
the same time as doing that to develop a set of proposals to put
to the Sout~ h African regime requesting them to take observable
and meaningful action according to an acceptable timetable to
produce a result that will indicate their intention to abolish
apartheid. Now in that sense it is a two pronged approach.

JOURNALIST: I think everybody would agree with you. It would be far
better to see South Africa changing of its own free will but it
doesn't seem to be in Mr Botha's mind the wish to make the statement
of intent that Chief Buthelezi says is necessary, that Bishop Tutu
says is necessary, that Oliver Tambo above all says is necessary.
Has there been any sign, do you think, that the limited sanctions
that you and other countries have imposed, the EEC countries also,
have had any effect in persuading Mr Botha that the time has come to
change his mind?
PM: Well, you have to look at indirect effect as well as direct and
I think you would have to say that the growth in not merely feeling
around the world but also the growth in the indication of the
preparedness to take action including the more recent position of
the United States has had an impact upon the business community within
South Africa. They have now done specifically two things. They have
met with the ANC and they have also within South Africa by public
advertisement made their position clear that fundamental
changes must be made. Now I believe that one can attribute that change
of position and demonstrable change of position on the part of South
African business to a reaction on their part to what is being said
and done in the rest of the world. That in turn, it seems to me, must
begin to have some impact upon the South African regime.
JOURNALIST: Well Sonny Ramphal was talking about the possibility of
things like an end to international air links with South Africa,
a ban on the import in Commonwealth countries of South African
agriculture products generally and that kind of thing. Do you think
that it can come to that or do you have to go further to a general
trade embargo?
PM: Well I in a sense go back to the previous answer I gave. The
Commonwealth can move to a statement that it's prepared to do those
sorts of things. I think it will need not only to come to that sort
of decision itself but on that basis go into the United Nations
and seek the support of non-Commonwealth countries because you will
appreciate if you look at the composition of South African trade that
that is effected very largely by a number of non-Commonwealth countries
as well as Britain. So I think you need the two stages, the Commonw, ea lth
and the United Nations but I still make the point that one would hope
that on the basis of an indication that the world is prepared to move
in this way, the South African regime would come to its senses and
realise it is infinitely better that it should take action itself.
JOURNALIST: Yes, but if it doesn't and you have to go to the United
Nations PM: If it doesn't, of course, the world in our judgment should be
prepared to take this action.
JOURNALIST: But it looks rather as if you have to go to the United
Nations and look for mandatory sanctions, as if Britain will stand out
against and will veto and so on and so forth. The Prime Minister and
Foreign Secretary have made it very plain that they don't believe that
ecoflnaCm sanctions crc the

PM: Could I just make this point th at Britain may have to come to
thp realisation that we live in 1985 Britannia no longer rules the I
JOURNALIST: And do you think that if Britain persists in their present
position at the Commonwealth conference that the British govern ment
is going to be isolated?
PM: I believe so.
JOURNALIST: And what effect would that have on the Commonwealth if
Britain were to be isolated......
PM: Well we all attach the utmost importance to our links with
Britain, after all so much of our structures sprang from there. The
Commonwealth's future existence does not depend upon a situation where
we have to have the agreement of Britain to every decision that we
in the rest of the Commonwealth believe is demanded by the morality
of the situation. Now it is an unfortunate fact, unavoidable, that
the decision and the attitude of the British attitude is determined
to a very considerable extent by its perception of its economic
interests in terms of the very substantial investment it has in
South Africa. I can understand its concern about these matters but it
is my firm view and I believe it will be the firm view of the
overwhelming majority of those represented at the Commonwealth.
We are here dealing with issues which transcend an assessment of a
commercial balance sheet.
JOURNALIST: What about your own problems with South African,
Prime Minister, what is the position at the moment about this
unofficial rebel cricket tour that is supposed to be going?
PM: Well unfortunately the position at the moment seems to be that
they intend to go ahead. I and my Government couldn't have done more
publicly within Australia to indicate our rejection of this concept.
We, however, do not follow a policy here of refusing passports.
If they go they know they will be going without the support of the
Australian Government. They know they will be going against our
commitment under the Gleneagles Agreement. We could not have done
more to make our position clear on this issue.
JOURNALIST: Well you have, as you call use of the
shameful. One would expect the players who go to suffer the same kind
of punishment as the-British players who went.
PM: Well the Australian Cricket Board of control here has made it
clear that there will be sanctions, if I can use that word in this
context, imposed upon the players. They will not be able to
represent their country for a number of years and within the States
and even at the level beneath that actions have been taken. So they
will be paying a price. Unfortunately, at this stage, it seems a price
they are prepared to pay.
JOURNALIST: As you say, it will be directly against the Gleneagles
Agreement. Do you think that if it goes ahead the Commonwealth Ga-ec
2 fl next. v~ n~ 2rcc' morej~. c~: t
a Ir ca dv a r?

4. I
PM: Not because of our rebel tour, because the African countries
have been fulisome in their acknowledgement of the appropriateness
of the position of my Governmient.
JOURNALIST: Prime Minister I wonder if we could talk for a little
now about the ANZUS Treaty?
PM: Certainly.
JOURNALIST: Which you say or were saying in March exists in name
only. Does it exist in anything more than that now?
PM: As far as the Unitej1 States and Australia is concerned it, of
course, does. Our relationship under the ANZUS Treaty continues
as fully and as effectively as they always have. It is the case, of
course, that as far as the relationship between the United States
and New Zealand under the Treaty that that relationship has been
very very substantially diminished.
JOURNALIST: But it does sound, therefore, as if you are talking more
now about, if I may say so, an AUS Treaty than an ANZUS Treaty. Do you
think New Zealand can be persuaded to come back in?
PM: At the moment, the position of the New Zealand Government in
regard to the visits of the United States' ships which may be nuclear
capable stands as a barrier to the participation of New Zealand in
the ANZUS Treaty. That is the case and I cannot say on the evidence
available to me that the New Zealand Government appears to be about
to change their position on that matter. So while they maintain that
position then there is, as far as the United States and New Zealand
is concerned, a stalemate.
JOURNALIST: Now that sounds very much as if you would like New Zealand
to reverse the decision
PM: Well, let me make the position clear. We said to the New Zealand
Government soon after their election what our position was. We said
that we regard ANZUS as of fundamental importance to Australia,
that we accept as a significant and unavoidable, and appropriate
part of that ANZUS relationship, the right of the ships of our
American ally to visit Australiarnports. That's our position. We
explained it to the New Zealanders. We said to them and we said to
the Americans we are not going to be here to tell an independent
sovereign nation New Zealand what its policy should be. We~ have
a policy which is different from theirs. We will adhere to ours.
It is their business as to what they do.
JOURNALIST: I wonder if you could clarify my thought on one thing then.
Just under a couple of years ago the British ship ' Invincible' wasn't
allowed to come into an Australian port to repair because there was
some doubt as to whether she was carrying nuclear weapons and the
British Government wouldn't say ' y.' or ' nay' on it. What is the
Australian position now if there
PM: The position is quite clear. Firstly, in regard to vessels fr=-
aL1~ LC' LY~.' i
dry-docking raised a different consideration because it m-ayv . w\
the off-loading in those circumstances of nuclear capacities. . o
we made it quite clear at the time that in regard to hypothetical
situations into the future, we would, of course, do nothing to
endanger the safety of the vessel and those upon it. We would deal.

with such a circumstance, if it were to arise in the future, on
a case by case basis with a clear understanding that we would not
do anything to endanger the vessel or the lives of those upon it.
We are not dealing with a day to day occurrence. When that situation
arose as I recall was the first time that had for tens of years.
So it is not appropriate to in any sense speculate beyond what I
have just said there in regard to what is an entirely hypothetical
situation other than to repeat the two things that I have said.
One, that the normal operations of vessels of the Royal Navy will
continue to be one of accommodation by us.. ipi our ports when they
visit. The hypothetical situation of themi ' wry-docking facilities
in the case of some emergency we have stated our policy on that
which I have repeated to you.
JOURNALIST: What about the hypothetical consideration of an American
Navy ship which might be nuclear needing dry-docking?
PM: Well, the hypothetical situation would be handled by exactly
the same formula that I pu. t to you. I have discovered in a long period
of public life, and my grandmother warned me don't spend too much
time worrying about hypothetical situations.
JOURNALIST: Prime Minister, it is clear that David Lange in New
Zealand would dearly love for the whole area including Australia and
New Zealand and the South Pacific generally to be a nuclear-free area.
Have you any sympathy with that ambition?
PM: Well you really should catch up with events a bit more. There is
such a thing as the South Pacific Nuclearij'ree Zone4 ~ tis not
David Lange but a fellow called Bob HawkeAinitiatedA.& e South Pacific
Forum meeting here in Canberra in July of 1983. As a result of the
initiative that I took then, just a few weeks ago in Raratonga eight
nations signed that South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and the ninth,
Papua New Guinea, signed it just three weekends ago when I was in
Port Moresby.
JOURNALIST: In that case, what about Australian/ French relations,
in view of Francds determination to carry on with testing in
Mururoa Atoll?
PM: We came to Government in March of 1983. I had the pleasure of
meeting President Mitterand in June of 1983 in Paris. I conveyed
directly to him the opposition of my Government and the overwhelming
majority of the Australian people at the continuation of French
nuclear testing in the Pacific. We have continued to put that position
to them, we will continue to do it.
JOURNALIST: Is there anything more at all though. You can protest
and protest and protest but President Mitter'and seems to be unconvinced
by the protest.
PM: Well , thbt Is the thing frmPeietMteadWe don't contemplate
the blowing up of any vessels in any of his harbours.
JOURNALIST: Going onto another topic, do you expect the Commonwealth
conference, which as you say will be mainly dominated by san~ ctions,
to be considering the Gorbachc'. 7/ T~ ea-i sum ltdi' x'at raaLcrs o-.
defence might be raised there?

6.
PM: I would think in the considerations that are given by the
heads of government to the general internatio! situation that there
would be some consideration of the issues likely to arise at that
summit meeting. And certainly the areas of concern to Commonwealth
countries and, of course, nothing is more important to us than that
the reduction of armaments in the world generally and, regard to
nuclear in particular. They.. ave an enormous obligation or
responsibility resting upon~ and I would imagine without presuming
in advance to pre-empt what the decision of the CHOGM conference
would bep I would be very surprised if out of the communique there
did not come paragraphs which expressed the hope of the Commonwealth
countries directed to leaders of the super powers that they should
bend their best endeavours to producing that result.
JOURNALIST: The Commonwealth is a very loose and very desperate
collection of States and widely spread. Is it, do you think, still
an important factor in world affairs?
PM: Yes, I believe it is. I think at all levels of political
activity it is very salutary that you never overstate significance
and importance and certainly therefore as far as Australia is
concerned while we believe we have a worthwhile and significant
contribution to make to the affairs of the region and also generally
in the international sphere, we don't delude ourselves that we have
capacities and influence beyond those that, in fact, we have. Now
I think that sort of salutory reminder that we always give ourselves
is one that the Commonwealth should also give itself. But nevertheless
when you are talking about the Commonwealth you are talking about
a very large number of nations representing a very significant
proportion of the world's population. And I think we are able to take
positions, do things to some extent which can be helpful in producing
better more equitable resolutions to problems. For instance, I think
in regard to our last meeting in 1983 we were able, in regard to the
Grenada question, to play a useful conciliatory role that had some
effect there. In regard to the 1985 CHOGM, I believe, I certainly
hope that the sorts of things that we will be able -say constructively
as well as in terms of looking at developing sanctions possibly,
that what we will be able to say and do in regard to South Africa
will be useful in giving a lead to the rest of the world.
JOURNALIST: It certainly seems that the black and white Comrmonwealth
generally is going to be in Iway more cohesive on the issue of sanctions
than it has been on pretty well anything else for quite a long time.
Do you see at the end of this conference that the Commonwealth could
be seen as even more strong, with Britain as it were,, painted into a
corner? PM: Well I certainly am not going to CHOGM on the basis of Itrying to
paint Britain into a corner. That is neither politically sensible
nor in terms of achieving results a very sensi ble to do. But I will,
for one, be about trying to explain to the meeting-and if that means
particularly to Britain, therefore let it be so to Britain, that
there are certain moral considerations here which I believe transcelld
everything else. And that a proper analysis and consideration of thosrc
1~ c 3i: t, o~ : icvc rta.'. c-ncll.. O. si M Y. 2
woulQ lead Britain to see tnat in thosc ~ n: isi
the whole of the rest of the Commonwealth is right and that they ar
not right on this issue. I mean, it would be quite remarkabl" if
you had a situation in the Commonwealth where everyone else had a

7.
particular point of view and Britain had another. It would be a
pretty remarkable exercise in logic to think that everyone else
was wrong and that they were right.
JOURNALIST: Prime Minister, thank you very much indeed.
PM: Thank you very much.

6754