EMBARGOED AGAINST DELIVERY
STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY THE PRIME MINISTER
29 JANUARY 1984
EMBARGOED AGAINST DELIVERY 6 m. I
SHERATON HOTEL INCIDENT
Background Mr Justice Hope has reported, as requested by the
Government, on the incident at the Sheraton Hotel in
Melbourne, on 30 November 1983.
The Government became aware of the incident on
1 December 1983 and on that day asked Mr Justice Hope to
undertake an inquiry into it.
Certain details of the incident were subsequently
provided by Mr Hayden to the Parliament. This Report
describes the incident and the circumstances surrounding
the training exercise in detail in accordance with the
Government's formal request to Mr Justice Hope, conveyed
to him on 7 December 1983.
Further, as requested by the Government, His Honour has
examined the general conduct of all persons associated
with the exercise, including those who had a supervisory
role, and whether any breach of the law was committed by
anyone carrying out or authorizing the exercise.
Editing and Declassification of the Report
The Report presented to the Government was highly
classified. The reason for this, as His Honour noted,
was that the special operations role of ASIS has, in the
past, been treated as Top Secret.
The Government has declassified the report for tabling
because the background of special operations training is
essential to an understanding of the Sheraton Hotel
incident. There has been considerable speculation about
what ASIS was up to that led to the fiasco at the
Sheraton on 30 November last, and that speculation, and
the attendant disquiet in the public mind, could only be
put to rest by making public the fact that ASIS has been
conducting training exercises involving such scenarios
as the rescue of a hostage from foreign intelligence
agents.
Declassification of the Report has made necessary a few
small editing changes based largely on considerations of
our international relations and national security.
These small changes, which do not affect the substance
of the Report, have been discussed with the Royal
Commission. I have provided the Leader of the Opposition with a copy
of the classified version of the Report.
The Incident
The training exercise and I point out that Mr Justice
Hope has emphasised that what occurred at the Sheraton
was in fact part of a training exercise and was not a
real operation required the trainees to rescue
an individual from persons playing the roles of foreign
intelligence officers who were holding him hostage in a
room in the Sheraton Hotel. The means by which that
' rescue' was effected are generally known.
To put the exercise in some sort of context, to explain
why such an exercise might even have been contemplated,
it is necessary to consider briefly the functions of
ASIS. The principal function of ASIS, under its directive, is
the collection of foreign intelligence.
A minor function, specified in the directive, requires
ASIS to maintain a special operations capability for
war-time and other very special situations. As Mr
Justice Hope notes, that capability is maintained only
on a contingency basis.
The Government notes that the whole question of ASIS's
special operations function will be dealt with in the
Royal Commissioner's report on ASIS due later in the
year. Ministerial Responsibility
It being understood that the exercise was conducted as
part of training, under the authority of the special
operations function as outlined in the directive, the
question of Ministerial responsibility should be
addressed. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has made clear that he
was not aware of the planned exercise, and Mr Justice
Hope has concluded that there was no suggestion that the
Minister should have been informed of the kind of
special operations training which was being undertaken
in November, nor of the specific exercise which
concluded at the Sheraton Hotel.
Conclusions on the Exercise
In reporting on what went wrong and where responsibility
should lie, Mr Justice Hope has criticised the exercise
as being ' poorly planned, poorly prepared and poorly
coordinated' The Government agrees with these
criticisms.
His Honour has concluded that ASIS's training precepts
and training manuals provide inadequate guidance and
insufficient control on the conduct of exercises such as
the one in question ( 3.26).
Further, His Honour concludes that every aspect of the
exercise, including preparation for its execution, ought
to have been so planned and supervised so as to ensure
that it was carried out lawfully
Mr Justice Hope identifies as an obvious deficiency in
the planning of the exercise the failure to notify
either the Victoria Police or the Manager of the
Sheraton Hotel of the exercise The Government
agrees that common-sense and ordinary courtesy alone
required prior consultation.
Mr Justice Hope has commended the reactions of the Hotel
Manager and the Victoria Police at the scene of the
incident.
Offences Mr Justice Hope has made an examination of the possible
breaches of laws which may be applicable to this
incident but has taken the view that any decision on
prosecutions should rest with the appropriate
responsible authorities. He makes no findings that any
person has committed any offence, and he makes no
recommendation that any person ought to be prosecuted
( 5.18)
His Honour has found that there are valid reasons based
on considerations of national security and international
relations for keeping secret the names of those involved
in the exercise ( 1.10, 6.5-6.7).
The Government appreciates the difficulties for Victoria
in its consideration of possible prosecutions, where
national security, which militates against the public
disclosure of the names, conflicts with the State's
responsibilities to enforce the law.
A copy of the full report was made available to Premier
Cain without delay, and discussions on these difficult
issues have continued between our Governments.
I understand that the Victorian Government intends to
introduce legislation to enable the Courts in Victoria
to determine that there may be confidentiality in court
proceedings where necessary in the interests of the
national or international security of Australia.
On the basis of the enactment of such protective
legislation, and any necessary complementary
legislation, the Commonwealth will withdraw its previous
objection to the release to the Victorian Government of
the names of those participating in the Sheraton
incident and not already known to the Victorian
Government. There is presently an outstanding High Court injunction
against the release of any such names, but the
Commonwealth will use its best endeavours to secure an
appropriate settlement of that case in terms that will
allow communication of the relevant names to the
Victorian Government.
Recommendations Mr Justice Hope's recommendations for measures to
prevent a recurrence of this kind of incident are
contained in Chapter 6 of his Report. In brief, he
recommends prohibition on carrying any type of firearms
in public and of any exercise which might harm or alarm
members of the public, and a requirement for clearance
with police, local military districts and owners of any
property affected before any such exercises are
undertaken outside ASIS training facilities.
The Government accepts all of the Report's
recommendations designed to ensure that such incidents
cannot recur.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, has indeed
already taken several such steps and will ensure that
the other measures proposed by His Honour are put in
place. Mr Justice Hope has found that varying degrees of
responsibility apply to the ASIS senior management, the
planners of the exercise and certain of the
participants. Disciplinary Action
While His Honour touches on the question of disciplinary
or other action for those involved in the exercise, he
has not made recommendations as to what disciplinary or
other action, if any, should be taken.
Those questions have been left for the responsible
authorities to resolve.
I now announce that the Government has appointed a new
Acting Director-General of ASIS. The new Acting
Director-General will be Mr J. O. Furner, CBE.
Mr Furner has until now been the Director of the Joint
Intelligence Organisation, after retiring from the Army
with the rank of Brigadier.
Mr Furner's first responsibility will be to consider
disciplinary action concerning those involved in the
planning and execution of this failed exercise.
To assist Mr Furner in this consideration the Government
has appointed Mr Clarence Hermes to investigate the
conduct of persons who were involved in the authorising,
planning and carrying out of the exercise. Mr Hermes is
about to retire as Chief Magistrate of the Australian
Capital Territory. Mr Hermes is to report to the Acting
Director-General of ASIS and the Minister for Foreign
Affairs on whether disciplinary action should be taken
against any of those persons and, if so, what
disciplinary action.
In the course of those inquiries, those affected will of
course be given the opportunity to put their side of the
case. It is only when those involved with the exercise
have had this opportunity to reply to the Report that a
decision will be taken on whether disciplinary action
should be taken. The Government expects that process to
be completed in the next few weeks.
Conclusion I take this opportunity to thank Mr Justice Hope for his
Report and look forward to his further report on the
wider subject of the functions of ASIS.