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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
FO EI THURSDAY, 22 OCTOBER, 1981
STATEMENT TO THE PARLIAMENT ON THE SINAI PEACEKEEPING FORCE
I wish to announce today to Honourable Members the Australian
Government's decision on the question of-Australia's
par ticipation in the proposed Sinai peacekeeping force.
In doing so, I want to set that proposal against the background
of the hi's tory of the Middle East over the last thirty years,
f or it is only against that background that the importance of
the proposal can be judged and the decision relating to
it understood.
Over the last three decades the Middle East has been the most
unstable region in the world. This instability has had many
causes, but what has given it special character has been the
conflict between Israel and the Arab states. This has generated
more bitterness, more hatred, more suspicion than any other
conflict ifl\ the world during this period.
Four times in one generation it led to war: in 1948 immediately
after the creation of Israel; in 1956 during the Suez crisis;
in 1967 and again in 1973. These wars not only disrupted the
region itself, but threatened the peace of the world.
As well as war, the conflict caused a terrible refugee problem,
fed fanaticism and terror, and distorted and warped the lives
of-the countries involved. By the mid-1970.! s. for exam . ple,
Israel found it necessary to spend 36% of its GNP on defence,
with crippling results for its economy.
All efforts to end the conflict, and there were very many, failed
in the face of accumulated suspicion and hostility. The differences
appeared irreconcilable. Then, in November 1977, the nearest
thing to a political miracle in our time occurred.
In an extraordinary act of political courage and vision,
President Anwar Sadat of Egypt flew to Jerusalem and addressed
the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament. This single dramatic act
created a new situation overnight. It set in train a process of
negotiation between Egypt and Israel, with the United States
closely involved. / 2
-2
within a year, this had culminated in the Camp David Accords
of September 1978, and, in another few months, it resulted in
the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty of March 1979.
These events were generally welcomed as an historic breakthrough.
It was not a matter of believing that all problems were solved,
for clearly there was a long hard road ahead and the principal
actors would need not only great determination and skill, but
all the support they could get from the international community, ifthey
were to complete the journey. But the problems no longer
appeared utterly intractable and a willingness to contemplate
compromise had replaced complete dependence on solution by
the gun.
The Camp David Accords and the peace treaty contained two
essential elements. One dealt with the procedures for
implementing " full autonomy" for the inhabitants of the West Bank
and Gaza after the establishment of an elected self-governing
~ authority', The other dealt with the bilateral aspects of the
peace treaty and, specifically, with the return to Egypt of the
territory. occupied by Israel in the ' Sinai Peninsula during
the earlier fighting.
Several things n eed to be noted about these two parts. First,
they are not separate and discrete but interconnected, two
parts of a total and very carefully negotiated package. In
particular, progress on the future of the occupied territories of
the West Bank and Gaza depends on maintaining confidence at the
bilateral level between Israel and Egypt, and this in turn
depends on the completion of the return of the occupied territor7ies
of the Sinai to Egypt.
Second, the future attitude of the other Arab states to the
Accords is likely to depend very substantially on the successful
carrying out of the Accords as they relate to the Sinai. If
the current reservations and suspicion of the Arab states are to)
diminish, it is essential that they be carried out.
Thirdly, both elements of the peace process require substantial
political and strategic concessions by Israel. These were agreed
to by Israel in return for an agreement on a satisfactory set of
arrangements to guarantee its security. It is here that the
peacekeeping force assumes prominence.
On the basis of the confidence established at. Canp David, Israel
has already withdrawn from approximately two-thirds of the Sinai.
and, given the history of the relationship between the two countries,
that it has done so had been remarkable. It is scheduled to have
withdrawn completely from the Peninsula by the end of April 1982.
But, as the text of the treaty makes clear, that complete
withdrawal is conditional on the existence of a peacekeeping force
which will supervise both the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai
and the implementation of the security arrangements agreed on in~
the treaty. / 3
-3
The existence of an effective peacekeeping force in the Sinai,
one which would by its presence secure Israel's southern flank,
is therefore a necessary condition for total withdrawal. It
would also help to create the kind of confidence required for
progress to be made with respect to the West Bank and Gaza.
The existence of such a force would not guarantee success
nothing can do that. But without it there can be little hope.
The peace force that was envisaged in the treaty was a
United Nations force. Unfortunately, it has not been possible
to bring that into being.
The Soviet Union, which has consistently opposed the Camp Davi d
Accords and which vetoed the extension of the mandate of the U. N-.
emergency force, stands as an insurmountable obstacle to its
creation. The Soviet Union has consistently adopted an
obstructionist approach to the search for a Middle East peace,
has sought to encourage and take advantage of instability and
Ito position itself to make strategic gains.
The question has been, therefore, whether faced with the Soviet
veto, there should be no force at all with the disastrous
consequences that would entail in the whole peace process or
whether there should be an international peacekeeping force outside
the United Nations system. In considering that question it should
be noted that the likelihood of a Soviet veto was anticipated
at the time of the signing of the treaty.
In letters to both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin,
President Carter undertook that, " if the Security Council fails
to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the
treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps
necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an
acceptable alternative multinational force". That letter and the
assurance it gave were an integral component of the agreement
reached by Egypt and Israel in 1979.
The Australian Government believes that while it would have been
prefereable for the" Sinai peacekeeping force to be established
under a United Nations mandate If that is ruled out by the
position taken by the Soviet Union-then in terms of what is at
stake, in terms of peace in this highly sensitive region, it
is infinitely preferable that there should be an international
peacekeeping force created outside United Nations auspices than
that the whole peace process should be frustrated by the absence
of any force at all.
Let me add that we should be careful, in a situation where it
is possible to take significant initiatives for peace, before
we circumscribe them by establishing circumstances in which the
Soviet Union would gain a permanent capacity to interpose a
veto, for that might give to the Soviet Union a greater power than
it could manage on its own account to thwart and frustrate
progress towards peace. / 4
-4
Granted that the need for a peacekeeping force to support the
continuation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is accepted
the question remains as to whether Australia itself should
participate in such a force.
No-one would pretend that this is an easy question to answer
and this Government has deliberated long and hard over it.
I make no apology at all for the time we have taken in coming
to a decision. There are-considerations which weigh for and
against participation, and these were set out in the statement
to this House by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 26 May.
A number of major arguments point in the direction of
participation. Participation by Australia would encourage the
formation of a more broadly-based peacekeeping force which
would enhance prospects for international acceptance of the
peacekeeping force a force which is needed to ensure that
Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai can be carried out in accordance
with inte~ rnational commitments; Australia has given strong
support to the development of the peace process in the Middle
East and has a responsibility to follow up with practical
assistance; President Sadat took great political risks in
initiating and persevering with the peace process and it is
vital for his successors who have committed themselves to
support that peace process that the remaining third of Sinai
still under Israeli control be regained by Egypt in April 1982;
the failure, of Australia and other Western countries to
participate would require the United States to bear the burden
itself and would be seen as a failure by the West to support
United States policies in the middle East. This would risk
giving propaganda opportunities to the Soviet Union, whereas
participati-on in peacekeeping would encourage constructive
United States involvement in efforts to bring about a lasting
settlement of Arab/ Israeli differences. our participation would
be welcomed by Egypt and Israel, as well as the United States,
and our participation would imply our continuing support for
Israel's security; it would have positive impact on Israel's
approach to negotiating similar arrangements for its other borders.
A number of arguments have also been used against Australian
participation. It is sometimes said that our policy has been to
participate only in United Nations sponsored peacekeeping
operations, and that a force which was not broadly based would find
little international acceptance. Some have said that the
Middle East is remote from Australia and that the reactions of other
states in the region might be adverse. Some have said that the
extent of any Australian commitment would be uncertain and
potentially too extensive, especially in view of our commitment
to participate in peacekeeping in Namibia. Some have said that
participation in a peacekeeping force in such a volatile area
is too risky, and that it might even result in an adverse impact
oii supoprL it Australia for our relation.-.-io with the Unil: d States.
While there are weighty considerations on both sides a number
of factors have led the Government to the view that Australia
must be prepared to contribute to the multinational peacekeeping
force.
The starting point is that Australia has a clear and strong
national interest in the progress of peace in the Middle East.
It is first and foremost a matter of deciding what it is in our
own national interest to do, and then acting accordingly.
Without question, the continued progress towards peace in the
Middle East is of enormous significance to Australia. An
outbreak of conflict would have repercussions not only for the
region but for the peace of the world which would affect us
profoundly and in manifold ways. It would affect our allies and
friends in ways which could not but impinge greatly on our
international relationships and with risks for the strategic
1alance of great moment to our national security. Australia'* s
interest is in seeing what is probably the single most serious
threat to world peace removed. Further warfare in the Middle
East could trigger off a much wider war.
Australia has a legitimate interest in preventing this. This
point is so evidently true that I believe it does not require
elaboration here. There is also the economic fact that Egypt is
Australia's largest single trading partner in the Middle East.
As the Deputy Prime Minister said in the House yesterday, a stable
Egypt is very important to the whole of our trade with the
Middle East region. It is in the interests of Australia and
the whole world that Egypt's stability be maintained, and this
maintenance requires continued international support for the
policies commenced by President Sadat, and which his successor
President Mubarek is pledged to continue. That we have an
interest in peace, rather than war, in the Middle East is, I
believe, indisputable.
This leads to the second fact which has weighed in our decision
that the peace process which has been begun in the region under
the Camp David Accords is the only framework for peace which has
been put forward in the long history of that region which
shows some prospect of achieving its immediate objectives. While other
proposals have been made from time to time, none has yet achieved the
degree of acceptance from Israel and Egypt the Camp David
Accords have achieved.
Senator Church made this point eloquently in Canberra yesterday
when he said: " There has been much said for and against the.
Camp David Accords, but remember that those Accords, though they
are still only partially implemented and far from perfect
represent the only formula that has yet achieved a peace in this
part of the world..."
i. central ip~ irt of the Caiiip David process i s the cst-b 1 . L; hi'mli-of a
pe-: acekeepinq force in the Sinai. The Government is aware~ that many
Arab Governments have stated public opposition to the Camp
David Accords. The Government believes, however, that thcere is
support for the concept of. returningj Arab land to Arab sovereignty:
in this case returning Sinai to its rightful owner, the Govornment
of Egypt.
6
The Government attaches great importance to its relations with
Arab countries, and understands their wish to achieve
a settlement which makes proper provision for the interests of
the Palestinian people. Australia hopes that its relations with
Arab countries will continue to develop. There is
a growing realisation that many countries including a major part of the
Arab world, are seeking the same objective peace.
Given that peace in the Middle East is in Australia's national
interest, and given that the only existent basis for peace is
Israeli-Egyptian accommodation, and the establishment of a
multinational peackeeping force, Australia cannot avoid the
cuestion: do we have a capacity to make a contribution to the
peace process by membership in that force?
One fact is plain: there is a limit to what Australia as a
middle power can do. We must avoid an unrealistic
view of what we can achieve. But to say that there are limits
is in no way to say that we could not make a useful and a
valuable contribution, in conjunction with other countries who
share our interests and our concern for peace in the region.
Egypt, Israel and the United States the nations which signed the
agreement in August this year providing for the establishment of
a multinational peacekeeping force have made it clear that
they would welcome Australian participation in the force.
: ndeed, they have indicated that they attach great importance to
our participation and that the assassination of President Sadat
has made that participation even more important to them.
President Sadat's successor, President Mubarek, has indicated
his determination to remain on the course set by his predecessor.
President Sadat's assassination has in fact created a greater need
for international recognition of the conditions for peace in
the Middle East.
Egypt without President Sadat needs more support from other nations
S-o continue the peace process than Egypt with President Sadat,
and the Egyptian Government made clear to the Deputy Prime Minister
on his recent visit that this was very much its own perspective.
This consideration has weighed with the Government and has been
significant in tipping the balance in favour of participation in
the peacekeeping force. We have a capacity to contribute, and
our contribution is sought by the countries most closely involved.
These facts place the most weighty responsibility on us.
This Government has never taken the view that Australia should
refrain from doing what it can to create a better and more
peaceful world. Within realistic limits we have consistently
argued that Australia has responsibilities, and must recognise
those responsibilities in our actions.
iAustralia has had recent involvement in peacekeeping in the
: iddle East: Austral . i n forces were part o. the U. N. pcacekeeping
corces in the Sinai 1: rr'rio 1976 to 1979 and were only withdrawn
when the Soviet Union indicated that it would veto an extension
> F the force's U. N. mandate. / 7
-7
In this case it would obviously be more comfortable to do
nothing to say that peace in the Middle East does not concern
us, or that we cannot contribute to peace. But neither of those
propositions would be true. Those attitudes widely adopted
amongst nations in other times and in other conflicts have led
in the end to catastrophic war. If all nations wanting peace
were to leave the active pursuit of peace to others, peace would
fail by default and we would all bear the tragic costs.
Australia is concerned. We can contribute. And accordingly,
we have decided, provided certain reasonable conditions are met,:
to make a contribution to the multinational force.
On 12 October .1 wrote to President Reagan informing him that the"
Australian Government would agree to participate in the peacekeeping
force if certain conditions were met. I informed President Reagan
that the Government has decided that Australia will agree to
S? participate in the Sinai peacekeeping force subject to Britain and
WCanada also agreeing to participate.
In the interests of obtaining the broadest-based international
acceptance of the force, significant European participation is a
critical factor. We are glad to see from published reports that
France is reconsidering her attitude. The Australian contribution
would be limited to th * e contribution we are initially called upon
to make, and that contribution will be of limited duration to be agreed.
Apart from the membership of the peacekeeping force there are
other matters which the Government believes are important to
Frovide full protection for Australia's independence and
sovereignty, and which were set out in my letter to President Reagan.
As is usual practice, we would need to instruct the commander of
any Australian contingent that if he received orders from the
commander of the force which he believed were contrary to, or went
beyond, the agreed purposes of the force, he should not comply
with them until he had consulted with Australian authorities.
SNo part of the peacekeeping force ( including the United States
Wcomponent) should have any association with the United States
Rapid Deployment Force.
A, solution to the Palestinian issue is clearly central to the
future stability and peace of the Middle East. In participating
in the Sinai peacekeeping force we would be concerned that our
contribution would have the maximum positive influence in continuing
and broadening the peace process in the Middle East..
Australia has consistently supported the continuing peace process
but we have been disappointed by the lack of progress and prospects
for further movement in the autonomy negotiations.
stated in my letter to President Reagan that Australia will. be
. Looking to the United States to exert and sustain the strongest
jre .; sure c-i-isure effc-Live progress in lm;) 2cmentincj thoe Catmp tDav. idl
A ccords a t.. hi y re3 at-c i. only to the Sine i but ailso to
P-alestinian jautonomy. / 6
8-
We recognise how much the United States has been doing in an
endeavour to establish lasting peace in the Middle East.
We recognise also what President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin
were trying to do in their search for a peaceful solution.
It is important for the Middle East and for the whole world
that these efforts should be continued ar~ d should have the
widest possible support.
Our participation in the peacekeeping force would be on the
understanding that all the parties to the Accords abided by
word and deed with their provisions, and press forward with a
continuing peace process in the Middle East. The conditions neaess3-ary
for Australia's participation have all been conveyed in the clearest
terms to President Reagan. The Australian contribution under
consideration at present comprises elements of an air transport-unit,
equipped with helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, and probably
involving some 200-300 personnel. But the precise composition of
cur contribution will of course depend on the outcome of discussions
1with other participants. I want to set out step by step the
timing of the decision and the discussions and consultations
which led up to it, because it is important that there should be
no misunderstandings about this. During the Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting I would obviously want to have consulted with
leaders, and at the time President Reagan put the same suggestion
to me and to certain other countries. I consulted with the Prime
flinisters of Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdm in Melbourne during the
Conference. And then following the assassination of President Sadat, the
Deputy Prime Minister consulted with Secretary of State Haig,
Dr. MacGuigan, Lord Carrington and Mr. Colombo, who were in Cairo
for President Sadat's funeral. These consultations in Cairo
took place on 10 October, and I was informed of their content
by cable and i~ n telephone conversations with the Deputy Prime Minister.
The decision that Australia would participate under the conditions
I have already outlined was taken on 12 October. And I want to
make it plain that that decision was taken after consultation
with, and with the agreement of, the Deputy Prime Minister
who was overseas at the time.
The Government's decision about participation in the peacekeeping
force and the conditions for that participation
was conveyed by letter to the President of the United States
and to the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada on
12 October and the Prime Minister of New Zealand was subsequently
advised of our position. It will be obvious to the House that.
while Australia's decision was taken on a completely independent
basis, the practical commitment which will flow from it will
depend upon the decisions of other Governments, and this is why
I said in the House on Tuesday that " there is no procrastination
on this issue by this Government" and also that " I expect to be
in a position to make some announcement about this decision in
the relatively near future, but that is not necessarily waiting
on decisionFs of this Government, but decisions of other Gov'ernmients"
/ 9
9-
It was appropriate, in view of the conditional nature of
Australia's decision, that the other Governments should have some
time to formulate their own positions in relation to that, but
it is the view of the Government that events have now moved ahead
and that Australia's decision should be made known.
The Australian Government believes that this multinational
peacekeeping force is a significant step for peace. It is not
a decision which is pro-Arab or pro-Israeli. It is a decision
pro-peace. It is a decision which could never have been made had
President Sadat not taken his historic initiatives.
The assassination of President Sadat has strengthened, not
weakened, the need for international support for the peace process.
A role of the utmost importance now falls on Prime Minister Begin.
Many have questioned his approach to peace and the implications
of his policies.
Australia has made abundantly clear on many occasions, its
support for the State of Israel behind secure and recognized borders
as specified in U. N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. our
credentials on that matter are not exceeded by any nation. So let
me from that point of support and friendship say that much will
now depend on Prime Minister Begin and on the Israeli Parliament.
There are many who believe that it was President Sadat who was
foremost in carrying the banner for peace in the Middle East.
Nothwithstanding that Prime Minister Begin has fully participated in
the progress) to that point, with President Sadat's death there now falls
to Prime U1inister Begin the opportunity to hold aloft the banner of
peace that President Sadat carried with such courage. Prime Minister Begin
nav has the opportunity to make sure that the autonomy talks are meaningful,
and do all that he can to bring about positive results. Let him
make-sure that there is a true and fitting memorial to
President Sadat in a peace settlement that can endure and that
leads to a wider settlement in the Middle East.
There is a challenge before Prime Minister Begin, Israel, Egypt
and other countries such as the United States to act with vigour
0 and initiative so that those who celebrated President Sadat's death
by firing their guns for joy are confounded, and the terrorists
and promoters of discord are defeated. And let those who have used
terror as an instrument recognise, with the vision of a Sadat,
that the true road to peace lies in a recognition of Israel's
right to exist then discussion and negotiation can replace the
sound of gunfire.
In making this commitmnent I wish to emnphasise that what
Australia will contribute to is a peacekeeping force not to
a conflict. The Sinai peacekeeping force will not be taking sides
with either Egypt or Israel. It is not going to be involved in
either military attack or defence in any military sense. Its
role is to monitor, to observe.
10
I consider it most understandable that when two countries,
with a long and sorry history of mutual conflict, decide to
put this history behind them and engage in a new era of
peace, they should wish to have mutual friends in whom they
can have confidence to assist them in the sensitive business
of overcoming past suspicions. The Sinai peacekeeping force
is to play the role of mutual friend.
If the time should come when either party should wish to attack
the Sinai force, then the whole peace process would have come to
an end. By definition the force's role would already have come.
to an end and it would leave the region. But this situation wiIl
not come about, and it will not come about because Australia and
other countries are ready to play their part, which is after all
a modest part, in ensuring that Israel and Egypt pursue their
mutually declared objective of developing a new and friendly
relationship.
I realise that at the moment there are differences of. view
on this important issue. I hope that
Honourable Members and the Australian public will give very
careful consideration to all the considerations I have mentioned
and will agree that in the end the right course for Australia
is the one the Government has decided to take.
Australia has played a significant role over many years by its
willingness to contribute to peacekeeping forces in trouble spots
around the world, and while this particular decision has been more
finely balahced than others, I have no doubt that in the end the
easier decision would be irresponsible and wrong. The easier
decision would be one we might well live to regret, for surely
none of us would want the situation in which a failure on our
part to help two countries in their search for a lasting peace
might contribute to increasing instability in a region where it
is the interest of Australia as of the whole world that there
should be increasing stability.
I appeal to Members of the Opposition not to seek to divide
Australia on this issue. I appeal to them not to be swayed by
talk of war when the proposition and possible prospect is one
of peace for one of the most war-torn parts of the whole world,
The conditions wrapped around this particular decision are such
that all parties can accept the decision itself as one that in no
way derogates from Australia's sovereignty, as one that
recognises our responsibilities to do what we can to help achieve
the objectives of peace that is so close to the hearts of
Australians, as one that is in Australia's widest national interest.
000----