4j. AUST K AL I
PRIME MINISTER
FOR PRESS 5 SEPTEMBER 1977
MR WHITLAM'S NATIONAL BROADCAST ON
URANIUM'
The Leader of the Opposition last night made a
National Broadcast -about Australia's decision on uranium which
was dishonest and deceptive. It misleads the Australian public
and provokes division within the community. It contains
selective quotation and misrepresentation.
Mr Whitlam said that the Government's decision
commits Australia to the export of uranium regardless of the
lack of international.-controls to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and to reduce. the risks of nuclear war.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
The Government's policy on nuclear safeguards,
announced by me on 24 May and described in detail in the
material explaining the Government's decisions of 25 August,
will ensure the application of the most stringent nuclear
safeguards to Australian uranium. That policy goes beyond the
recommendations of the Ranger Inquiry in:
The requirement for International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards on any nuclear material supplied by Australia
to existing nuclear weapon states.
The requirements for prior Australian consent to
high enrichment
reprocessing
of nuclear materials supplied by Australia .2
2.
The requirement for assurances of adequate physical
security The requirement for a clause in contracts noting that
transactions are subject to Australia's safeguard
requirements.
But the Government is not complacent; it will be going further.
As I have already announced, the Government will investigate
areas in which Australia could assist the International Atomic
Energy Agency. The Governient will act with other suppliers to
ensure that nuclear safeguards are effective and are kept under
review and improvement.
Mr Whitlam claims that the Australian Government has
committed itself to supplying uranium before any of the 0
customer countries have committed themselves to safeguards.
This is a gross misrepresentation. The Government has decided
that the mining of Australian uranium should proceed but with
exports permitted only to countries that accept safeguards of our
standard. Non-nuclear weapon states who wish to import our
uranium must be parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, involving
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Existing nuclear
weapon states must agree that Australian uranium will not be used
for military or explosive purposes and will be covered by
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
Mr Whitlam again misrepresents the facts when he says
it does not make sense to play the game before the other side has
agreed to stick to the rules. The Government's position is
precisely that we will not authorise the sale of uranium unless
customers fully accept our safeguards requirements. / 3
3.
They will be required to enter into a binding bilateral
agreement on those requirements before any Australian uranium
is exported to them.
The Ranger Inquiry says " the dangers of proliferation
are very serious. They affect the whole world and exist whether
or not Australia makes its uranium available to other countries"
It is quite clear that Australia's place in advancing the cause of
non-proliferation, in furthering development of stringent safeguards,
and in contributing to studies aimed at reducing the risks of
proliferation such as the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
will be very much less if Australia decides to wait for ten or twenty
years before making a decision on the export of uranium.
Again, when Mr Whitlam says that the export of
Australian uranium would increase the amount of man-made nuclear
waste, he is misleading. Countries requiring uranium for peaceful
purposes-to heat homes and to provide jobs will acquire that
uranium from other sources. Those other sources may be less
concerned than Australia is about the risks of proliferation
and may not require the stringent safeguards that Australia does.
Mr Whitlam's proposal that we delay a decision about uranium
would do nothing about the amount of nuclear waste in the-world,
could increase the costs of power generation in energy-poor countries
and, indeed, could increase risks of nuclear proliferation.
Mr Whitlam causes further confusion when he refers
to the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
in the Euratom countries. The plain fact is that, under its
nuclear safeguards policy, the Government will not agree to the
supply of Australian uranium unless it is covered by International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards from the time it leaves Australian
ownership. Pending the completion of subsidiary arrangements with ./ 4
4
Euratom countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency is
empowered to make ad hoc inspections, and is already doing so.
Mr Whitlam misleads again when he says that the
United States cannot account for some 8000 pounds of nuclear
material. The United States' Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
stated that there has never been an unresolved case of enough
" Material Unaccounted For" to make a bomb. " Material Unaccounted For"
is not necessarily a result of diversion but is usually the result
of the limits of precision of analysis and of operating losses
such as deposits on pipes and filters.
Mr Whitlam misuses statements by the Ranger Inquiry, by
me and by the Minister for Environment, Housing and Community
Development when he talks about the disposal of nuclear waste. Let
me be clear. The technology for handling high-level radioactive
liquid wastes exists and is proven. The technology for the
solidification and vitrification of those wastes into a form suitable
for ultimate disposal exists and is being developed on a commercial
scale. Mr Whitlam makes a spurious and dishonest comparison
between the safe storage of nuclear waste and the atmospheric testing
of nuclear weapons. There are no proposals by other countries thai
we should store their nuclear waste. Mr Whitlam is ignoring the
concern of other Governments in Japan, in Europe, in the
developing countries for the welfareof their people and the well-bein
of their environments. Mr Whitlam, having made a show of examining
his own conscience, is now trying to act as the conscience of thewbrld
The price he would pay would be to reduce Australia's effectiveness
in international forums concerned with nuclear proliferation and
waste disposal.
Mr Whitlam's course is a gesture to protesters at home.
The Government's course is constructive and internationally
responsible. Mr Whitlam dismisses the economic significance of
exporting uranium. He says the export income, royalties, jobs will
not begin for five or even ten years and so, he says, the
decision is irrelevant to Australia's current economic problems.
This illustrates the myopic and blinkered attitude of the
Opposition. Mr Whitlam ignores the benefits the jobs that
will result from the construction works at the mines; these
are not five to ten years hence. However, most seriously of all,
he ignores the fact that in five years time Australia will be
facing economic problems if it does not have additional export
income, not least to pay for additional imports of oil.
Mr Whitlam would not only have us deny other countries the energy
they-need, he would have us, too, out of work and shivering in the
cold as energy costs mount. That is only to be expected from
the leader of a Party which, in Government, brought exploration
for oil in Australia to a halt. Mr Whitlam ignores the totality of
our energy needs. The Government does not.
Mr Whitlam says the Ranger Inquiry favoured a delay of
several years in the decision about supplying Australia's uranium.
This is untrue. The Ranger Inquiry said on page 5 of its Second
Report that " a decision on the options ( to delay or not to delay)
depended largely on what was deemed to be the best strategy in
relation to the matter of prbliferation". The Government took its
decision with full regard for advancing the cause of
non-proliferation. President Carter's initiatives, the International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, and recent deepening in international
concerns about proliferation make this the most propitious time
for Australia to make its decision. / 6
It is significant that throughout his broadcast
speech, Mr Whitlam referred to the Ranger Inquiry as the
" Fox Commission". Mr Whitlam ignores the fact that Mr Justice Fox
for whom the Government has the highest esteem was one of
three Commissioners; the other two were Mr G. G. Kelleher and
Professor C. B. Kerr. The Ranger Inquiry's recommendations
were unanimous. The Government gave careful and lengthy
consideration to those recommendations. It arrived at its
decisions on them after consideration of other relevant factors,
including international developments in non-proliferation.
The Government explained its decisions fully and honestly to 0
the Australian people. Unlike the Opposition, it has explained
its decisions consistently.
Finally, I reiterate what I placed on public record
on 25 August:
" The Government's decision was taken on the basis of the
Inquiry's principal findings and recommendations.
" On uranium mining, the Inquiry concluded:
' The hazards of mining and milling uranium, if those
activities are properly regulated and controlled, are not
such as to justify a decision not to develop Australian
uranium mines.'
The Government is now satisfied that the environmental
control and industrial health measures proposed by the Inquiry
and accepted by the Government, will provide proper regulation
and control.
" On nuclear power reactors, the Inquiry concluded:
' The hazards involved in the ordinary operations of nuclear
power reactors, if those operatinns are properly regulated and
controlled, are not such as to justify a decision not to mine
and sell Australian uranium.' / 7
i
This is in accordance with the Government' s own view.
" On waste disposal from nuclear power stations, the Inquiry
concluded: ' While we do not think that the waste situation is at present
such as to justify Australia wholly refusing to export uranium,
it is plain that the situation demands careful watching, and
depending on developments, regular and frequent reassessment.'
The Government is satisfied that the technology exists for the
safe management and ultimate disposal of highly radioactive waste.
International developments will continue to be closely reviewed and
Australia will continue to participate in international studies
directed to improve standards for waste disposal.
" On the possibility of nuclear terrorism, the Inquiry concluded:
' In our view, the possibility of nuclear terrorism merits
energetic consideration and action at the international level.
We do not believe that this risk alone constitutes a sufficient
reason for Australia declining to supply uranium. It does, however,
provide a further reason why the export of our uranium, including
what is proposed to be done with it, and where, are matters which
the Government should keep under constant scutiny and control.'
The Government is satisfied that the specification of standards of
physical security by the International Atomic Energy Agency
constitutes the basis upon which national governments can provide
strong protection against nuclear terrorism.
" On Australia's international obligations, the Inquiry concluded:
' A total refusal to supply would place Australia in clear
breach of Article IV of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and
could adversely affect its relation to countries which are parties
to the
Article IV of theTreaty obliges Australia to co-operate in the / 8
production and usage of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The export by Australia of uranium under stringent safeguards
would give effect to our obligations under Articles III and IV
of the Treaty"
CANBERRA September 1977