VI.! IT L' c' THE U. S. A24D U. K. 1971.
WASHINGTON
PRESS CONFERENC_$ AT BLAIR 11OUSF-,
GIVEN BY THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER, MR WILLIAM McMAHON
2 NOVEMBER 1971
Q W-hat was the President's reaction when you told him of
the Cabinet decision of the training of Cambodian servicemen
Pi I dealt with this against the background of what I had
known. And I pointed out that first of all in a Statement I had
made in the House I said we wou~ ld be retaining some advisory and
training troops in South Viet-Nam to train the South Vietnamese and
that we had agreed to train Cambodians in Australia and recently
we had made in principle a decision to train Cambodian troops in
South VietL--Nam in cooperation with New Zealanders and United Sft. ates
people. But as yet we haven't been able to spell out in detail what
is likely to happen. There was no intention whatsoever to train
Cambodians in CAmbodia or te , ride advisers there. Nor was there
any intention to provide combat troops in either South Viet-Nam or
Cambodia. We accept this without any question.
Q This is an in principle decision. THis is the one taken
in CAnberra yesterday
PM Yes.
Q Did the Preqiident express any view o-F this decision given.
PH No.
Q Did he suggest that there might be ( INAUDIBLE) to Cambodia.
PM4 No. He wouldn't be that sort of a person to be presenting
a point of view and he did not.
Q Sir, can you tell us why it was necessary to make the
decision before you saw the President
PM Wouldn't you have done so if you had been in my position?
Feeling that it might be raised by Mr Laird with me. Or if not by
Secretary Laird by Secretary of State Rogers. And by that time too
I had received the letter from David Fairbairn. So consequently
2.
I wanted to know Cabinet's views in case I was asked the question.
You would have known though when you saw MR Laird of
Cabinet's decision Well look I am not quite certain when I first received
the information but I know I -told Secretary of State Rogers and
I told the President what the position was and it is as I have just
announced it to you.
Are you concerned that you were not aware of the situation?
I was concerned Yes But I did not consider it to be
-a matter of, what shall I call it, very great importance. I would
have liked to have known earlier though.
Sir, have you asked for any investigations how it happened
that the U. S. asked us to do this on September 30 and you did not
find out until I think on the 26th
No I haven't. You must know that I nm here for a particular
purpose. I am here on matters ofgreat moment and importance to
Australia and the Australian Government. I don't want to get involved
in details at this time. I am sure Ir Anthony can look after
it. And already the M4inister for Defence has given assurance that
he will try to insure that it doesn't happen a gain.
Do you feel that the actual decision for Australia to
train troops in Cambodia doesnot mark any great departure from past
policy Have you decided that in your absence to make this decision
in a hurry and saw it as an important policy decision
First of all there will be no intentions of training any
troops whatsoever in Cambodia. There will be a training of Cambodian
troops in Australia and a proposal that they should be trained jointly
by the Americans, New Zealanders and ourselves in South Viet-Nam.
Secondly when I arrived . Ln New York, or the day after I arrived in
Ned York, I was handed Mr Fairbairn's letter in which he said he
would shortly be raising it. And 1 think I gathered the impression
that he had some hope that he might have been able to raise it with
me before I left. 71-ell,~ after heztring a question which was raised
in Canberra by one of your own representatives, I asked immediately
about it when I got to San Francisco. I checked again and when I
was in New York I made a further check and said... ' Look this has
become public knowledge. Now please let me have an answer as to
where we are moving', so that the Defence machinery and the Foreign
Office knew what it intended to propose so there was no difficulty
in presenting it to CAhinket at its next meeting.
Mly question was you said ' Sure the announcement that we
would be training Cambodian troops in Au : ralia was in the Defence
Report. However that would seem to me to be a different matter
entirely from training troops in South ViJet-Nam. ( ITAUDIBLE) From
what you have said I gather you don't see this as a major policy
change but just as a normal extension of what we are doing in Cambodia
Yes, and part-' larly b~ ecause we are prepared to train
South Vietnamese troops in American training centres in South Viet-Nam.
I thought it was just an extension of the existing policy.
/ 2.
Q Sir, was there a request from the Camb odian Governpemt to
to train their men in South Viet-Nam
PM That I don't know. I dcn't think there was WhatI_
am trying to you are putting me through a cross examination
-at a time when I have had so jnany tremendously important problems to
deal with. But I havenot delved into this at all. I have wanted to
-touch on other issues that are vital to the security of this country
in the future and to learn more about American thinking on issues
world issues of importance so I haven't gone any further than what
I just said to you.
Q Sir, we were told the other day that you had given your
views to Cabinet on this matter. It seems to me that you would have
gone into it fairly well before. Did you give your views to Cabinet
PM What do you mean give my views to Cabinet It had never
been raised in Cabinet while I was there.
Q No but we were told that when you asked for Cabinet's
decision you also conveyed your own views on the subject
PM I felt that this was an extension of our existing policies
insofar as it related to the South Vietnamese but in having said that
I realized it was a matter that had to be dealt with by the Cabinet
in'Canberra who have much better access to information than I had and
they had to make a decision. But in principle they knew the way that
my mind was trending.
Q Sir on the question of Cabinet's decision does this mean
that as small as it may be there will be Australian military advisers
committed to Seuth Viet-Nam over and above those that we had decided
to leave after we withdraw fighting troops.
PM Again you are pressing me on something I can't get an
answer to. I can't give it because I said so far that the decision
is in principle and I have not seen the Cabinet papers on it. I
have seen two cables from fir Anthony and no more.