COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SPEECH BY
The Rt Hon. J. G. GORTON, M. P.
ON
DEFENCE
( Ministerial Statement)
[ From the Parliamentary Debates,' 25 February 1969] " 4,
Mr GORTON ( Higgins-Prime Minister)
-by leave-Mr Speaker, the purpose of
this statement is to inform the House of
what the Australian Government is prepared
to do militarily in Malaysia-Singapore
after the British withdrawal from those
areas and to set this in the context of our
general interest in, involvement in and
thinking concerning the region. It is not to
be thought that we look on our activities
in that region as being purely, or mainly,
military. Any examination of our policy in
relation to our neighbours of the north will
show that we have encouraged them to
develop policies promoting political stability
and economic growth, promoting their own
defence capabilities in association with our
own forces and those of our allies and in
promoting regional co-operation.
Indeed, -the stability and security of the
area rests on many things. It rests on the
avoidance of territorial or other disputes
between the countries in the region. It rests
on the economic progress of those coun-tries
and on the capacity and willingness of rulers
there to see that that economic progress is
reflected in the raising of the standards of
living of the ordinary people. It rests on
peaceful co-operation between those countries
in many fields. And these are the bases
without which there will not * be endurin.-
stability. 12398/ 69 Therefore, these are the goals which Australia,
through diplomatic effort, through
economic assistance, through assistance in
the field of trade, will strive to help these
countries at-tain. For this is fundamental to
the Australian Government's approach-a
positive, co-operative effort to encourage
and assist peaceful change and progress. Yet
just as ultimate stability depends on progress
and rising standards of living, so does the
possibility of progress depend on maintaining
immediate stability. And provision for
defence is necessary to help provide that
immediate stability. Indeed, helping in conditions
of stability to accelerate progress,
and helping by military means to preserve
conditions of stability, are two sides of the
one coin. And the military action we propose
to take in the area to our immediate
north is the side of the coin that concerns
us in this statement.
Just a little over a year ago Great
Britain announced a considerable acceleration
in the pace and scale of the withdrawal
of British forces from Malaysia-Singapore.
Those forces are to be totally withdrawn.
The withdrawal is to be completed by the
end of the calendar year 1971-and the circumstances
under which they may return to
assist in an emergency are unknown. For
Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and ourselves
this latest announcement underlined
the fact that an era had ended. During
the lifetime of any one of us sitting in this
House British forces have been stationed
in Malaysia-Singapore to keep, or try to
keep, peace and stability in that region.
During the Second World War, and
since, Australian and New Zealand forces
have assisted in that task and Malaysian
and Singaporean troops have contributed
also. For our part we contributed to the
long drawn out military measures which
defeated the Communist subversion campaign
in Malaya, externally inspired and
sustained, which became known as the
Emergency. We contributed to the military
measures which repelled the raids and infiltrations
during the sad days of Confrontation.
We contributed, with New Zealand,
Malaysia and Singapore, to a force the
backbone of which was provided -by British
forces-seen to be there and known to be
backed by all the resources and reinforcements
which Great Britain could, if necessary,
send them. Now all that has changed.
The major power will be withdrawn. It is
no longer a contribution to the efforts of a
major power which we will all be called
upon to make. It is a substitution for the
efforts of a major power. And such a substitution
must fall far short of what previously
existed and be of a different
character. Faced with this basic change, we and the
other nations concerned have had to
reassess our position and then discuss with
one another what each of us should do in
the light of such reassessment. There have
been almost continuous consultations at all
levels-military and civilian, political and
technical-on steps to be taken to meet the
changing situation. Over a period of time the
plans of each of us have been influenced and
shaped by what has been thought and
suggested by the others and by the contributions
each has felt itself able to make,
or to be prepared. to make in the future. Our
own starting point was and is that we are
a part of and are situated in the region.
Hence security, stability and progress for the
other nations in the region must also contribute
to the security of Australia We
cannot fail to be affected by what happens in
our neighbours' countries. What affects their
security affects our security. Again, if
economic development in the region is to occur at the pace required, and if the
stability needed for this is to be maintained,
the immediate economic support of great
nations outside the region, and the potential
military support of great nations outside the
region, will be needed.
Australia, the most industrially and technically
advanced nation in the region, surely
would not wish, in these circumstances, to
refrain from -helping the region in all ways.
We could not turn our hacks on our neighbours,
refuse to help provide forces for their
security, and wash our hands of the possible
consequences to them and to ourselves. Yet
there were obviously several possible courses
for us. One theoretical course was to withdraw
all our forces from Malaysia-
Singapore at the time that Britain's withdrawal
is completed; to withdraw into
Australia behind a sea frontier and turn our
backs completely on the region as regards
providing military assistance, except for a
willingness to assist in United Nations
action. We reject this utterly. It is contrary
to our historical actions in Korea, in Vietnam
and in the region of which I speak,
and it is contrary to our future interests.
Were we, with our potential, to do this we
could scarcely expect smaller countries in
the region to be encouraged to protect themselves
or larger countries outside the region
not to be affected in any future decision they
might have to make should the region be
endangered. For us, the question has never
been whether we should play a part
militarily, but how we should play that part.
A second possible course was to decide
to withdraw all our military forces, of all
arms, at the same time as Britain withdrew,
but to assure Malaysia-Singapore that we
retained an interest in their military
security, that we had not withdrawn to our
island Australia from which we would
never make a sally to assist them, but that
we would, if and when we judged it necessary,
be prepared to despatch military
forces to their shores to help them. This
course could well cast doubt on our
sincerity of purpose as far as Malaysia-
Singapore and other countries of the region
were concerned; and it had also obvious
military drawbacks.
It is much easier to despatch aircraft
from Australia to assist in another area of
the region if Australian aircraft are already
situated on a base in that area, and operating
from it, and in possession of or provided
with all the complicated equipment
needed to service and maintain and guid. 2
such aircraft. It is much easier to despatch
ground forces to an area if, in that area,
there is a securedly held base and the
headquarters and command and signals and
supply complex is already set up and
operating and needing only expansion
instead of construction de novo. And of
course, it is much easier for a country
which is to be assisted to believe that it will
be assisted if forces from the country which
may provide such help are there and are
visible. We therefore, took the view that
while a capacity for swift additional
assistance should ' be maintained within
Australia, yet it was essential for some
forces, to ' be stationed within Malaysia-
Singapore itself. In so stationing them we
are doing not only what we believe right
but also what these countries want us to do.
Accordingly we are prepared to maintain
and are planning to maintain forces of all
arms in that area after the British withdrawal-
without setting any specific terminal
date.
The forces planned to be retained will
consist of 2 squadrons of Mirages, totalling
in all 42 aircraft, and stationed at Butterworth
in Malaya, except for one section
of 8 aircraft which will be stationed at
Tengah in Singapore. In addition, both
ourselves and the New Zealanders will each
maintain a naval ship in the area at all
times for purposes of protection and not
merely for purposes of training. Further,
we are planning to maintain, in conjunction
with New Zealand, a 2 battalion
organisation of ground troups of which the
Australian component excluding personnel
required for headquarters, cornmunications
and the Jungle Warfare Training School
in Malaya to which we shall contribute
will be approximately 1,200 men. These
troops, in accordance with the advice
tendered to us by our military advisers on
military grounds, and because of the considerable
financial savings involved will be
based at Singapore, although one company
will be detached in rotation to Butterworth
except on occasions when the whole force
is training either at the Jungle Warfare
School or elsewhere in Malaysia. It has. of course, already been accepted by all
concerned that for purposes of defence,
Malaysia and Singapore are indivisible.
Consequently, no matter in what part of*
the Peninsula ( including Singapore) our
forces are stationed, we regard them as
: being there in order to assist the security
and the stability of the whole of that
Peninsula. Now, Mr Speaker, having specified the
Australian Forces which we are prepared
to dispose in this way, I wish to indicate the
conditions under which they will be there
and the role which we envisage they will
fulfil. They will be stationed in t ' he area
under existing arrangements, the terms of
which are governed by our association with
the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement.
Should that Agreement in the future cease
to be operative we would wish general
understandings rather -than specific treaty
obligations to be worked out with the countries
concerned and ourselves. Olur forces
will not, of course, be there or remain there
unless their presence continues to be
actively desired by -the governments of the
countries in which they are stationed. While
there, they are not intended for use, and
will not be used, for the maintenance of
internal civil law and order which is the
responsibility of the government concerned.
Their presence, and their military cooperation
with Malaysia and Singapore, are
not directed against any other country in
the region, and this we believe is well understood
and accepted. Indeed, * by helping to
strengthen the defences of one part of the
region it is hoped that -they will indirectly
contribute to the stability of the whole.
Their presence in Malaya and Singapore,
and their participation in training and military
exercises with Malaysian and Singaporean
troops will we believe have value in
helping to build the indigenous defence
capacity of both Malaysia and Singapore,
will -provide additional security while that
indigenous defence capacity is built up, and
will make it more possible for Malaysian
troops to be assigned to other parts of
Malaysia should -the Malaysian Government
so desire. They will. be available-
our troops-subject to the usual
requirement for the Australian Government's
prior consent for use against
externally promoted and inspired Comnmunist
infiltration and subversion of
the kind which became familiar during the
Emergency and which is judged by our
military advisers to be the most likely form
of aggression in the area.
Our advice is that the greatest threat to
stability and security arises from the possibility
of insurgency in South East Asian
countries which could ultimately expose us
to threat by the spread of Communism in
an insecure and -unstable Asia. We have
seen insurgency associated with direct military
action in Vietnam and whilst the
decision to employ our forces is, as it
always has been, a matter to be determined
by the Australian Government at the time,
and in -the circumstances of the time, these
forces will be available to oppose any insurgency
which is externally promoted,
which is a threat to the security of the
region and which is -beyond the capacity
of the forces of Malaysia and Singapore to
handle. It is clear however that at some time in
the future it could be possible that a situation
might arise when the scale of such subversion
and infiltration from outside--or
some other organised threat to the region at
present unforeseen---could be such that
Australian resources alone would be insufficient
to support successfully the forces
of Malaysia and Singapore. If such a situation
should arise we would have to look to
the support of allies outside the region and
-the scale of Australia's continued effort
would in that case have to be decided in the
light of all the circumstances that then
prevail. What they would be we cannot now
know and we cannot therefore now make,
precise decisions. But we can, and
have decided, that we are -prepared to
dispose part of our forces in the manner
I have described. At the same time we shall
continue our efforts to help with the training
of local Malaysian and Singaporean forces
which we expect will be increased in size
and capacity, and to provide financial
assistance for defence aid aimed at assisting
Malaysia and Singapore to build up their
own defence capacity.
We have, to date, allotted some $ 41m
for the supply of equipment to the
Malaysian armed forces, the Royal
Malaysian Police, and the Singapore armed
forces-and we have allotted $ 4m for the
provision of specialist training courses in
Australia and for meeting part of the cost of Australian servicemen seconded to the
Malaysian armed forces. This programme
has been and is continuing in close consultation
with the Malaysian and Singapore
defence authorities.
Side by side with military measures to
promote regional defence and co-operation,
the Government has pursued and will
pursue active measures in other fieldsdiplomatic
and economic. The Australian
Government is itself in regular contact with
all the governments of the region of South
East Asia and with other governments with
a direct interest in the region, either through
bilateral dealings or by participating in the
work of international organisations. It has
been our endeavour to play a constructive
role in helping to ease tensions and to
reduce or eliminate causes of friction. We
have seen it as a positive task to help promote
political and economic conditions
which will allow the independent countries
of the region to proceed with their programmes
of national development in an
atmosphere of confidence.
The basis of security for the region is
weakened when there are divisions within
the region-divisions that threaten to get
out of hand and to lead to serious clashes.
Of course, there will be differences of
opinion between countries and interests will
not coincide on all matters but it is not an
impractical aim to try to have some assurance
that differences will not lead to armed
clash and that no country in the region need
fear for the security of its own borders.
Where differences exist within the region,
their settlement should be sought by peaceful
means and by peaceful means only,
and various ways of achieving this exist.
Some of them are directed at the removal
of the causes of disagreement, others are
directed at creating an atmosphere in
which solutions can be sought. One possibility
that has appealed to us as an aim
is the attainment of a non-aggression pact
or pacts whereby the countries of the region
would declare their intention of never resorting
to force against one another and of
respect for existing territorial boundaries.
I do not regard this as being the total
answer to the problems of regional security
and regional development, but it could be
a most useful and stabilising element in
a total approach. It is not capable of immediate
achievement. As in so many matters.
we shall have to feel our way forward,
making progress as conditions permit. The
countries of the region, including Australia,
cannot force anything on one another, but
by trying to understand one another's
interests and aims and broadening our
co-operation with one another the conditions
for still closer co-operation will be
created. One of the difficulties at present disturbing
the region is the dispute between the
Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah. For
our part we respect the territorial integrity
of all the countries in the region within
their existing boundaries. And we believe
all governments in the region should do
the same. We recognise Malaysia as the
rightful successor to Britain in Sabah and
we believe that the people of Sabah have
already exercised the right of self determination.
We believe, too, that the Philippines
would not wish to prosecute its claim
by armed attack and indeed the former
Minister for External Affairs was assured
of this by the Government of the
Philippines. Bearing in mind that the use of Australian
forces is always a matter for decision
by the Australian Government-and that
that decision will be made in the light of
our judgment of all the circumstances at any
given time-we believe that the best contri-
12398/ 69-2 bution we can make to the peaceful settlement
of that dispute is by diplomatic means.
Mr Speaker, this statement has confined
itself, as I said it would, to the question
of what we are prepared to do in Malaysia-
Singapore after the end of 1971. It has
touched on the disposition of part of our
forces. Our military advisers have for some
time, knowing that we wished to provide
for the possibility of such disposition and
in the context of their new strategic assessment,
been working on plans for the future
composition and equipment of Australian
forces which will give us flexibility-a
capacity for home defence which will also
allow us to contribute in accordance with
our treaty agreements of SEATO and
ANZUS. This study is still proceeding.
But I commend to the House the
decisions here announced: That we are
-prepared to provide to the region in which
we live military -assistance for which
Malaysia and Singapore have asked-military
assistance visible to them-and an
assurance that both we and they share a
common purpose in being prepared to combat
that Communist inspired military subversion
which our advisers consider to pose
the major threat to the region. I present
the following paper:
Defence-Ministerial statement, 25 February
1969.
, Printed for the Government of the Commonwealth by W. O. MuuAri at the
Government Printing Office, Canberra