PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION CONFERENCE GIVEN
BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR. JOHN GORTON, ON
HIS RETURN HOME AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH
PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE, LONDON ,7r
On Board s. s. cdl" S deN. S. W.
PM. Good morning, gentlemen. It's nice to be back! Before
I start on asking you whatever-questions you have in mind, I have got
an announcement to make. That is that The Queen and the Duke of
Edinburgh, at the invitation of the Governments of Australia and New
Zealand, will visit New Zealand and Australia in March and April of
1970. In both countries, they will take part in the celebrations of the
bi-centenary of Captain Cook's voyage. Their visit to Australia will
be confined to the Eastern States to the A. C. T. New South Wales,
Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania. if it is any help to YOU, the last
visit, according to the note I have, was made in February and March
1963.
Q. Some of the papers have said that the Commonwealth
Conference, although to everyone's relief it didn't blow up into a fight,
no-one is taking much notice of whether it did anything else. Do YOU
think in view of Australia's increasing preoccupation with the South
Eastern Asian region that the Commonwealth Conference this time
achieved anything positive?
PM. I don't think it achieved anything positive if you mean
by that did they reach agreement on some plan or some prospect of
combined action or some unified approach to some problems in the
world. No, I don't think it did. What it did do was to provide a forum
where differences of approach, which are natural when there are 28
different countries gathered around a table, were able to be discussed
moderately, temperately, and I think with an increase in understanding
on all sides of the points of view, of the reasons for the points of view
of the people sitting around that table.
Q. Prime Minister, would you care to say how, and if,
your thinking on defence has been affected by your talks in London?
PM. I'll put your question around the other way: Would
I care to say if my thinking on defence has been affected, and if so,
how. The answer is no, I don't believe it has. That answers the
second part too.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, why did you fail to support the
suggestion that aid should be given to the lesser-developed
Commonwealth countries? a / 2
-2
PM. I didn't fail to support any such suggestion. There
was a suggestion though I don't remember it being discussed at the
Conference in any detail that the Commonwealth should establish a
multi-lateral aid fund under the control of the Secretary-General of
the Commonwealth, Mr. Arnold Smith, and I failed to support that.
Indeed, I didn't notice anybody else supporting it either, because we
feel that we are contributin~ g already quite considerably through multilateral
United Nations funds and prefer to keep our assistance to the
Commonwealth on a bilateral basis.
Q. Prime Minister, what do you think was the highlight of
the Conference?
PM. Well, I don't know. I don't think I could pick out for
you any particular dramatic moment or any stage where crisis was
almost reached and avoided, which was what I would understand
" highlight" to mean. I don't think there was one. There were a
number of Interesting matters all the way through.
Q. Prime Minister, could you perhaps comment on your
relationship with the African leaders? Mr. Hasluck said on his return
that it was perhaps your smile that made things go so well....
PM. Well, franldy, calling on my memory, the smiles of
all the African leaders were far more beaming and they had far better
teeth than I did:' They were far more attractive. I liked a number
of them. Indeed, I didn't dislike any of them. I liked some more
than others as one always does, whether they are African or Asians
or Australians or English or whatever they might be. But we did,
I think, get on in what seemed to me to be a completely friendly way.
Q. Prime Minister, you appear to have struck up a special
friendship with Mr. Wilson. Would you care to say if you see any
tangible value in this relationship?
PM. If you mean can I see that there is going to be some
discernible difference in matters of trade or matters of defence or
matters of some other specific content, no I can't. But I think there
is tangible benefit, nevertheless, from a close relationship between
the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Prime
Minister of Great Britain. There must be.
Q. Mr. Gorton, is there any prospect of the Canberra
Five-Power conference going to Prime Minister level?
PM. We haven't decided on that yet. We discussed it when
we were sitting around whether it would be on a Prime Ministers'
level or on a Defence Minister s'/ Foreign Ministers' level. It is
obvious, of course, as far as Great Britain is concerned, that Mr.
Wilson would not be coming out here for that conference. But as
far as Mr. Holyoake or the Tunku or Harry Lee
3-
Q. Mr. Wilson wouldn't be coming? Apparenly -the Labor
Party are afraid that he might!
PM. Are they? Well, I wouldn't know about that. But the
question of whether the other four of us attend as Prime Ministers
or not is left for further discussion amongst us.
Q. What do y~ u expect to get out of this Five-Power thing?
PM. Well, as you know, there has been for a considerable
time working parties up in Malaya / Singapore since the last Five-Power
conference, working out this, working out matters of various kinds.
Indeed it was such a report from our own people in such a working party
that led us to the decision already announced to base our troops at
Singapore rather than remain in Terendak. By the time that the next
conference is held I think that these kinds of discussions, at working
level group by foreign service departments, by defence departments
will have enabled more details as to the working out of the general
arrangerrmnts
Q. Do you expect then from this conference to be able to
announce or decide what our role will be in the area?
PM. It will help towards that.
Q. You won't at that time be able to make a fresh...
PM. I didn't say that. But if it didn't result in one being
able to make a definite role statement, and a role is what I am talking
of.. if it didn't enable that, then it would certainly, I think, have
made a considerable advance towards the situation where that could
be.
Q. Will you be able to intimate to the other leaders
PM. I think there will have been a lot of discussions on this
before the meeting takes place, and when the meeting takes place, it
could greatly help to crystallise it. You know, it was agreed at the
last Five-Power conference that there would be another one held in the
first half of this year, but the actual date on which it was to be held was
not decided, nor was the place at which it was to be held decided.
Q. Both these facts having now been decided, and it being
Canberra, I would have thought the other Prime Ministers would expect
you to be far more positive about our role after 1971
PM. How do you know how positive I have been with other
Prime Ministers?
Q. You haven't discussed it with them?
PM. No, not yet! a / 4
-4
Q. Prime Minister, would you care to elaborate on your
speech to the Australia Club on 17 January about fore~ ign investment
on your terms. Can, you give us some idea of what these terms will be?
PMK What I did was lay down general principles, in the
speech to which you are referring, which we would like to see carried
out. Those general principles being that we would wish to see tf I
can put it this way more selective controls on the takeover of
Australian companies, particularly by foreign companies, the sort of
controls that Great Britain has and so many other nations have themselves.
This is a matter being studied at the moment by the Eggleston Committee
and no doubt we will be getting reports from them, and in the meantime
the Treasury itself has been asked to make a study of the question too.
In relation to the raising of debenture capital inside Australia by
overseas firms, we have indicated that we would wish to see before
debenture capital was raised in that way that an opportunity for
participation in equity was given by those oversees firms. We have
also indi~ cated in a general way that when some new enterprise is started
with overseas capital, we would also like to see the opportunity for
equity participation offered to Australians. This is the subject of
study by the Treasury. The Treasurer informs me that the papers
concerning th is which would come to the Economic Committee of
Cabinet, are well advanced. Subsequently, of course, we would have
to see what it was we were able to do of our own power and what it
was that it would be necessary to be done by States Attorneys -General
and our own Attorney -General, acting in concert.
Q. You have spoken in terms of opportunity for equity
and the necessity for some equity. Have you in mind any size equity
per cent, 10 per cent even 1 per cent is the opportunity for some
equit.....
PM. Yes. I think we would need to have a far more definite
indication than some equity. I would prefer to see the Treasury's
papers and have full discussions on them before I would go any further
than that.
Q. At that time you might be able to make a statement?
PM. Possibly.
Q. While in London, did you meet again Taufa'ahau Tupou
of Tonga, and if so, did you discuss supporting Tongan moves to join
the Commonwealth?
PM. No, I didn't meet him.
Q. Prime Minister, just to return to that foreign
investment question again. These guidelines.. are they in fact
guidelines or just your thinking aloud on the subject? Is the Reserve
Bank obliged to follow your remarks relating to this? a 0
PM. They will be more than thinking aloud. They will
be an indicLution, in more detail when the papers have been further
advanced, as to what it is that we would wish to see and what it is
that we could arrange to see did happen.
Q. The position at the moment in relation to the raising
of debenture . companies that have been well established here
such as the ESSO organisation have been allowed to raise debenture
funds. Do you intend to change this, or hope to change this?
PM. ESSO/ BHP were allowed to raise debenture funds, I
think not just for ESSO but for ESSO and BHP which is the Australian
component of that company. Also, of course, they have brought in a
great deal of proper overseas capital at the same time.
Q. If I could just switch across to defence for a moment,
Sir. In Kuala Lumpur, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia
indicated that Malaysia has firm ideas On what sort of a role Australia
should play if it wishes to retain troops in Malaysia. In his own words,
he expects Australia to get involved in intra-regional affairs. He was
talking specifically of Sabah. When you were in London and you were
speaking to the Tunku, did he spell this out to you or wasn't the subject
raised?
PM. The matter of the role of Australian troops in the area
will be a matter for decision by the Australian Government and subsequent
announcement by the Australian Government.
Q. Was Sabah discussed specifically between yourself and
the Tunku?
PM. I don't think I will add anything to what I have just said
to you.
Q. Is this the sort of thing that you might cover in your
promised statement to the House when Parliament resumes, Sir?
PM. One would want to indicate the kind of role envisaged,
not merely the disposition.
Q. Mr. Prime Minister, did you gain anything from your
talks with Mr. Trudeau?
PM. Well, all I gained from talks with Mr. Trudeau was
an underlining as it were of what lie has already said publicly that he
felt himself that Canada should look more towards the Pacific and take
more interest in the Pacific than perhaps she had done in the past. There
was no opportunity for me to ask him to spell that out in more detail.
Now, you asked me about anything significant. I think perhaps that is
significant but not detailed and definite. / 6
6-
Q. Sir,.-you just indicated that -you* wanted to talk about the
future role of our forces in your forthcoming Parliamentary statement.
This must be an advance on your decision in December, when you spoke
to us about this. Now what are the factors that have influenced you in
the interim? You talk now about a disposition as well as a composition.
PM. We have had further discussions, we have had further
advice and we will be having yet further discussions. I would hope by
then we could advauge, because after all, advance is the keynote of this
Government.
Q. Do you think your visit to Mr. Nixon will have any
bearing..... I mean will you be able to spell out anything in the Five-
Power talks before you talk to Mr. Nixon about America's role in Asia?
PM. Well, according to the sort of timetable one envisages,
the Five-Power talks would be in May and I would hope to have been
able to visit Mr. Nixon before May.
Q. Would you care to say when you will make your statement
to Parliament on defence?
PM. Oh, quite soon after Parliament meets. I wouldn't want
to give you a definite day but as soon as possible after Parliament meets.
Q. Mr. Gorton, when in Fiji did you discuss Fiji's
future relations with Australia and did you meet the Chief Minister?
PM. No, I didn't. I got off an aeroplane after having flown
for I don't know how long and boarded the ship and went to sleep.
Q. Prime Minister, I didn't quite catch the request over
here, but were you indicating that your talks with Mr. Nixon would have
a bearing on your attitude at the Five-Power talks?
PM. I was indicating that the timetable envisaged was such
that I would be likely to be speaking to Mr. Nixon before the Five-
Power talks took place.
Q. It follows therefore that his attitudes would influence
our attitudes at the Five-Power talks?
PM. Well, I can only refer to what I have just said, that I
would be hoping to see him before the Five-Power talks took place
in May.
Q. Prime Minister, I take it that you have heard of our
latest Parliamentary romance and your good wishes?
PM. I read something in the ship's bulletin about it. I
haven't heard in any detail if this is accurate. I gather it is accurate?
If so, one extends the best of good wishes to both parties.
Q. Did it come as a surprise to you?
PM. PWM. ell, I had no inkling of it.
-7
Q. Mr. Gorton, the Malays have indicated they would like
to see an agreement emerging out of this latest conference, something
to replace the present Anglo-Malaysian defence agreement. Do you
think this is likely?
PM. I don't see the necessity for it, at any rate now. The
arrangements under which our troops are stationed in the country at
present would seem to me, and according to my advice, would cover
the stationing of our troops there. So it doesn't seem to me to be a
question which does arise.
Q. Have you been in consultation with President Nixon at all?
PM. No. He has been pretty busy. There was a possibility
which could have occurred of my coming back through Washington and
having a completely informal half an hour or three-quarters of an hour
with him on the day before his inauguration. This appeared to me to
offer no great prospects of advantage to either of us and considerale
disadvantage to him when he was getting ready for his inauguration the
next day.
Q. Sir, in view of the decision to do a study into a peaceful
nuclear explosion in the North-West, has the Government moved further
along towards signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty?
Pm. Our situation on that remains exactly as it has been....
that we are in favour of it in principle, we want to make quite sure it is
effective and efficient and also a good deal more information on a
number of other aspects before we go any further.
Q. There was a reference in the communique from the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Sir, to the Treaty.
Did we take part in any discussions on it?
Pm. No.
Mr. Eggleton. Perhaps one final question, gentlemen.
Q. Is there any suggestion, Sir, that our planes stationed
at Butterworth will move across to Sabah?
PM. No.
Thank you.