COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SPEECH BY
The Rt Hon. J. G. GORTON, M. P.
ON
VIETNAM
Ministerial Statement
,[ From the ' Parliamentary Debates,' 5 November 1968.]
Mr GORTON ( Higgins-Prime Minister)
-by leave-In September 1967 the President
of the United States in a speech at
San Antonio, Texas, publicly offered to halt
all bombing of North Vietnam as soon as
the North Vietnamese indicated that such a
halt would lead promptly to serious and
productive discussions on the substance of
a peaceful settlement in South Vietnam.
That offer was not accepted by Hanoi.
theS uPbrseesqiudeennttl y, o rodne r3e dIs t aM acrecshs atoifo nt hios fy etahre,
bombing over the major portion of North
Vietnam-that part where 90% of the
population lives and works-in the hope
that that gesture and that renunciation of
military advantage would lead the North
Vietnamese Government to enter into those
substantive negotiations designed to secure
a just and enduring peace-a peace which
his Government and the Government of
Australia had for some time been advoicating.
Bombardment was continued in the area
of North Vietnam to the north of the
demilitarised zone where troops and supplies
for the invasion of South Vietnam were
concentrated before flowing south. The
President said then:
I cannot in conscience stop all bombing as
long as to do so would immediately and directly
endanger the lives of our men and our allies.
24975/ 68 In the result, the North Vietnamese
made no reciprocal gesture towards lessening
the intensity of the fighting in South
Vietnam; nor were they prepared to enter
into substantive peace talks designed to
discuss the terms on which peace could be
attained. They refused to enter into peace
talks proper. They did however agree to
have discussions on the question of whether
there was any basis on which proper peace
talks could begin. The talks were held in
Paris, and have been continuing since
May 1968.
As a result of developments during those
talks, the President recently formed the
judgment that he
began to get confirmation of the essential
understanding that we had been seeking with the
North Vietnamese on the critical issues between us.
Those issues were 1. That he should have
reason to believe that the other side intended
seriously to join in de-escalating the war;
2. That he should have grounds for believing
that further reduction in bombing would
not lead to an increase in American
casualties; 3. That the right of the legitimate
elected government of South Vietnam to
take its place in serious peace negotiations
should be secured; and 4. That serious
negotiations on the substance of a peaceful
settlement should begin. In return for these
requirements being met, the President was
prepared to cease bombing altogether and
E961 AON 9
to agree to representatives of the National
Liberation Front being present on the North
Vietnamese side of the negotiating table.
I should however emphasise that this is
no formal agreement by the North Vietnamese
on de-escalation of the war but only
a judgment on evidence available to the
United States that this response will in fact
take place. For his part, the President has
made it clear, and I quote:
that such talks cannot continue if they . takc
military advantage of them. We cannot have
productive talks in an atmosphere where the cities
are being shelled and where the demilitarised zone
is being abused.
After President Johnson had announced
the cessation of bombing and the results he
expected to flow from it, I made the following
statement on behalf of the Australian
Government: As you have heard, President Johnson has
announced that all air, naval and artillery activity
on or within the territory of North Vietnam will
be stopped at 8 a. m. Friday morning, Washington
time-lI p. m. tonight our time.
We have been consulted by the Government of
the United States and kept fully informed of
developments leading up to this announcement.
It has been the attitude of the Australian
Government that a suspension of bombing in
North Vietnam would be justified only if in
response some corresponding reduction in North
Vietnamese military activity was occurring or could
be expected to occur.
The Americans have shared with us the information
which has led them to conclude that they can
be confident there will be such a response. We
believe there are good grounds for their judgment
and sincerely hope it will be proved right by future
events. A further expected result is that representatives
of the Government of North Vietnam intend to
enter into serious and direct talks with the
Government of the United States and the Government
of the Republic of Vietnam on the substance
of a peaceful settlement.
As these results occur we believe that they hold
out real hopes of future progress towards a just
peace. We will not be seeking to participate in
these talks at this stage.
That is the present position. Just as the
Australian Government in the past has consistently
favoured genuine negotiation, so
have we consistently supported President
Johnson in his refusal to accept the advice
offered from some quarters-that he
should order the bombing stopped unconditionally;
that is, without any grounds for
belief that the safety of Allied troops would
not be impaired and without any grounds
for belief that such action would lead to substantive peace talks. In taking this stand,
I believe events have proved us right.
Cessation of the bombing and the admission
of National Liberation Front representation
as components of -the North Vietnamese
negotiating team urged by some to
be conceded without the reciprocal understandings
which the President believes he
now has would have been concessions made
without any advance towards a peaceful
settlement. Cessation of bombing and the
participation of the National Liberation
Front on the North Vietnamese side of the
negotiating table on the understanding that
de-escalation and serious peace talks will
follow are concessions which do hold out
the hope of an advance towards a peaceful
solution and in those circumstances we
welcome them with hope.
The first course suggested, if taken, would
have lowered our shield while the enemy's
sword point was still levelled. The course
now chosen lowers our shield, but only after
the negotiations have led to good grounds
for expecting that the enemy's sword point
will be blunted and only after agreement to
hold substantive discussions on peace have
been achieved.
I do not propose in any way to canvass
the course which the negotiations may take
or the problems which may arise. In a situation
of this delicacy, on which so much may
depend, I believe it would be positively
harmful for anyone in this House to do this.
But I should, I think, tell the House that
my Government has advised -the Govern-
, ment of South Vietnam that while we
understand the reservations which it now
has, we feel that its interests would ' best be
served by its representatives attending the
talks in Paris at the earliest possible date.
They would attend as the representatives
of the true and legitimate Government of
South Vietnam. This is, in our view, a
Significant fact because until now the
Government of North Vietnam has refused
any contacts or dealings with the South
Vietnamese Government.
In conclusion, Mr Speaker, I would say
this. No-one can foretell how long -these
negotiations will continue and it is possible
that there will continue to be hard fighting
while the negotiations progress. We hope
not, but it is possible that this may occur.
The seeds of peace have now sprouted but
the plant has still to grow before we can
be sure that the people of South Vietnam
will be able to decide their destiny in peace
and by peaceful means. What is now
occurring is in accord with the pledge of
the Allied countries at the Manila Summit
Conference that:
We are now prepared to pursue any avenue
which could lead to a secure and just peace
whether through discussion and negotiation or
through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce
the violence.
Mr Speaker, neither the United States nor
ourselves went to Vietnam to conquer-but
only to prevent conquest of that country by
North Vietnam. We sought to show that
such military conquest was not possible.
It may be-I say no more than that it may
be-that the North Vietnamese have come to realise this, and that the negotiations to
be held may produce the cessation of
fighting and may produce the durable and
lasting peace and the right of choice of the
majority of people of South Vietnam, which
we have sought from the beginning and
for so long. If so, this is a consummation
devoutly to be hoped for and I know that
all Australians will join with the Government
in seeking to do all possible to ensure
that the talks attain the results so sought. In
the meantime, we should not have too
sanguine expectations of too early a settlement-
and we shall need to keep our
resolution -unimpaired.
Mr Speaker, I present the following
paper: Vietnam, Ministerial Statement, 5th November
1968.
BY AUTHORITY: A. J. ARTHUR, COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT PRINTER, CANBERRA, A. C. T.