BRIFING FOR HEADS OF BITREAUX,
PARLIAMENTARY PRESS GALLERY,
CANBERRA 1 APRIL, 1968
PRIME MINISTER : You have all had copies of the statement, so there is
no point in r~ eading it over to you, so here I am. What would you
like to ask about it?
Q : Can you tell us what lay behind the President's
statement. Any official or unofficial advice as to why he made
this decision?
PM: Nothing other than would appear on the surface of it
that hie does hope that this will lead Hanoi to start entering into
peace negotiations.
Q. is there anything to indicate that Hanoi might?
PM4. Nothing that I have seen, but It Is after all, quite a
gesture on the part of the United States.
Q. At what stage were you informed, Sir, of the US plans
for de-escalation?
PM: Yesterday.
Q. After you returned from New Zealand.
PM: Yes. They were trying to get In touch with New Zealand
but they missed me.
Q. Did you see a full draft of this speech yesterday, Sir?
PM: No, the State Department just sent out all the significant
points that were to be covered but not the draft of the speech. No.
Q. Did that include his decision not to seek re-election?
PM: Nc.
Q. You learnt of this today?
PM: Yes.
Q. V/ hat is your reaction to that, Sir?
PM:. Well I have got a brief statement that I have written
out, but it is not yet typed, but I could have it typed and circulated.
Here it is " I do ' not think it proper to comment on the decision
taken by President Johnson not to seek re-election, other than
to say that we In Australia will always remember with gratitude
the warmth and special consideration which he has shown to us
during his Presidency. / 2
-2
PM ( Contd.) " He has had to bear Immense burdens and make
momentaus decisions and carry the responsibility for
those decisions and I believe he has made them
on the basis of what he sincerely believed to be right,
and to the ultimate benefit of freedom inside the United
States and outside that country. He Is a greata."
Q. You are satisfied, Mr Prime Minister, that this
decision will hold and he won't go back on It?
PM: On reading the words that he used, it seems to me
that they come as close as It is possible to come to the words
the previous American President used who was It Sherman, I
think " IJw on't run, and if I am elected, I won't serve". It
seemed to me that
Q. It's final?
PM: Well, I can only go on the words that he used, but
they seemed to me to be very final words
Q. Except for the reason he gave. The one reason
I heard he gave was that he was so busy conduct Ing the war in
Viet Nam that he didn't have time to run an election campaign,
which did seem to leave the door open a little bit for a draught.
( Interjection) He said at a press conference afterwards It was
on our four o'clock news that the decision was Irrevocable.
PM: I can't comment other than on the words that he
used and they seem to me to be perfectly finite words.
Q. Mr Prime Minister, in your statement, you point
out where this statement of President Johnson's is consistent with
past American statements. In fact, this Is an entirely different
break In policy as far as we are concerned. ' They have virtually
unconditionally elected to cease the bombing. Did this particular
move catch you by surprise or were you expecting It fromn the
political winds?
PM: Now, let's analyse a little what you say bef ore I
answer it, if you don't mind....
Q. To put it more simply, Sir, were you advised in
advance of this major change of policy?
PM: I was told yesterday of the points that were covered
In the President's speech of today. If you will have read the text
of the President's speech, he presents this as an advance on his
San Antonio speech. In the San Antonio speech, he aid " We are
prepared to stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as soon as we
have an Indication that North Viet Nam will enter into negotiations
as a result"'. He has gone further than that, one step further than
that by now saying, " Well, we will stop the bombing of most of
North Viet Nam, even though we haven't got a previous indication
that Hanoi will enter Into peace negotiations, but we call on Ho
Chi Minh to respond to this, and we call on the Go-Chairmen to
ask Hanoi to respond to it. It is a further step. ./ 3
-3
Q. You wouldn't call it a major change, then?
PM: Well, I can only present to you the position as it Is
offered to Hanoi In the initial statement: " We will stop bombing
altogether as soon as you give us an Indication that if we do, we
will enter Into ngtais. Then that statement shortly
afterwards is expanded by another statement saying, " Of course, if
we do this aud we expect to enter into peace negotiations, we don't
expect the North to take military advantage of It in a great build-up."
But It would be reasonable to expect them to maintain the forces they
have got there. This is a further step forward In that he is now not
ceasing bombing, but ceasing bombing on a considerable are....
Q. Less ruthless, shall we say?
PM: Well, it Is closer to the battle area and more designed
obviously to hinder flows of men and materials directly to the North
where the fighting Is taking place. B ut he Is taking that extra step.
Q. He also says, Sir, just to sort of get back to this:
YThis is the first step in a series of de-escalating the
PM: He says It may be the first step in a series of
de-escalations
Q. We don't have the full text....
PM: 9. and he hopes it will be the first step.
Q. But it Is a step towards de-escalatlono This is the
Important break I was talking about. There have been a series of
escalations military escalations and this Is the first positive and
recognisable military de-escalation as distinct from statements of
what we would do or could do. They are actually doing soiiierhing.
Did that particular act Ion take you by surprise?
PM: You are claiming that previous bombing pauses which
have taken place are not to be described as de-escalatlons because
you know that America has stopped previously, and you wouldn't
regard that as being a de-escalation?
Q. They didn't call It that at the time.
PM: No, but they did stop it. I think you should read the
actual text of the statement which Is that he hopes that this will lead
to rapid peace talks and that they in turn will lead to increased
de-escalation.
Q : On this point this is " Iffy" of course If nothing
happened quickly, would you want the bombing to start again, because
you say " We must all hope that this response is forthcoming quickly"
PM: W ell we hope -the response Is forthcoming quickly
because we hope that the peace talks will begin which Is what we
constantly wanted.
Q. If nothing happens? o. / 4
-4
PM: Well, I wouldn't know.
Q. Will this make any difference to the talks ANZUS
and SEATO are having?
PM: I would think not. I would think it would have no
bearing on them at all.
Q. Sir, have you had any impression from America
that if this doesn't lead to de-escalation, it doesn't work out the
way the President hoped, it will resume bombing?
PM: I have only got the text of the President's speech
and the points which waere covered, and they don't extend into that
area.
Q. Sir, the request in the past to be kept informed of
any major change in policy in Viet Nam and the fact that your two
Ministers on Tuesday and Thursday were obviously placed in the
position that they went right on a linb, on the thing, are there
going to be any approaches that we be Informed of these things In
the future?
PM: Well, I think we have consitnl made it clear,
Indeed as late as the Governor-General's S peech, where it was
said in unequivocal language that we would support any moves Which
were designed to lead to the opening of peace talks, and we expect
those peace talks to lead to a real peace which, Indeed, Is clear.
By " peace", I ne an a just and enduring peace, and self-determination
for the Vietnamese a real peace Indeed, the President's
statement this time indicates that thisis what Is being desired, and
not something which he describes in his statement as a fake peace.
Well we have consistently indicated that we wouild support those
kinds of moves, and I think this is a move along that path.
Q. Mr Prime Minister, doesn't it seem that the close
consultation that we have always been told this Government has with
the American Government wasn't in evidence this time?
PM: I told you when we were informed of the points
which were to be covered in the American speech, they weren't
discussed with us before that time; but as I have pointed out, we
have made It perfectly clear that we were prepared to support
efforts to reach a genuine peace. This Is a step further than the
San Antonio speech. It is a step further. The San Antonio spoech
was speaking of ceasing bomibing altogether, which I think you
mentioned. This one mentions ceasing bom-bing In the highly
populated areas, the food-producing areas, but retains it on the
approaches to the military field, and It Is therefore a cessation
of bombing on significant areas of Viet Nam well, I have put
it in this statement.
Q. Prime Minister, are you likely to discuss this
directl. y by telephone or any other way with Mr Johnson to get
to his reasoning? You have indicated you only have the text
of his speech as we have probably had It.
Me Yes, well...
Q. I thought you would probably want to know the reasons
behinL_.
PM: Well the reasoning behind It, I think, appears quite
clearly in the speech itself. He does hope that this will lead to a
reaction from Hanoi, and that it will lead to the opening of peace
talks. He expresses in his speech the hope that he will get a
reaction from Hanoi in response to this gesture and that then the
question could be open for discussion as to whether the areas that
were being still to be bombed for military purposes could be.
also taken away from bombing, provided certain arrangements were
made. And this is the de-escalation of which you were talking...
Q. Do you feel there is a necessity to ring him or to
get our Ambassador in Washington to give you a background report
or briefing on this?
PM: WNell I don't think it is necessary because I think the
indication is there. When the State Department people told me the
points that were to be covered, they indicated to me that this was
a hope in the hope that this sort of thing would follow.
Q. I presume you will discuss it with Dean Rusk during
your talks with him later in the week, anyway?
PM: I wouldn't necessarily say that I would or that I
wouldn't. I will be discussing a whole range of matters with Dean
Rusk.
Q. You will have some background material from our
Embassy in Washington, Sir, won't you, be fore tomorrow's
Parliament?
PM: Well, we have had some background material from
Waller. You can't go much further, I don't think, than what I have
told you. That is the background material and the background thinking
to it.
Q. What about the President's health? Do you know
anything about that?
PM: No, but Waller's views were the same as mine
there was a question I was asked earlier as to the definiteness of
this announcement of not standing and Waller's views were that
he believed It was quite definite. Since then, there has been another
thing I understand.
Q. Sir, there are two alternatives in this either the
North Vietnamese have indicated something or the Americans have
made a definite change. You have indicated that this is a new step.
PM: I indicated they had gone one step further. Yes.
Q. It's about six weeks since I think Mr Rusk finally
rejected the last Vietnamese statement. / 6
-6-
PM: I don't jkpci' which cone you are talking about, John.
! tes abo. ur six weeks. Now, what is the newv factor as
You see it in the la oix weeks which has influenced the President to
mako thim, ._, iic we see as a new step?
PM: I'm sorry, John, I don't know the statement of Rusk that
you are talking about, but It was, I think, last August that the San
Antonio srneech was
Q. Yes, then late in December, the North Vietnamese
Foreign Minister said something -If you stop bombing, we'll talk.
PM: Did he?
Q. And it took until 14th February to investigate it and say
that It wasn't bona fide. Now, in the six weeks since, we have a new
factor to make a new step?
PM: I don't have any information I haven't been given any
by the Ext ernal Affairs Department that the North Vietnamese have
ever made the statement You stop bombing and we will talk.
Rather I thought the statements had been Unless bombing Is stopped,
we won't talk.
Q. Sir, you have indicated that you are quite happy with this.
Some of your Ministers in the past have strongly opposed any such move
on the grounds as recently as last Thursday, the Defence
Minister, Mr Fairhall, talking about bombing North Viet Nam at large
said that the only thing that made North Viet Nam as a whole different
from the demilitarized zone or Laos and Cambodia which were safe
havens for the North Viet Nam troops, was the bombing at large of
North Viet Nam Have you discussed this with them? Are their
feelings still the same? Are they still opposed to this?
PM: I haven't discussed the statement with Mr Fairhall.
If you look at practically everything I have said on this matter, either
in the Higgins by-election or in radio and television appearances, " Four
Corners" and things of this kind, or indeed again, in the Governor-
General's speech, or in New Zealand, you will see a consistent thread,
I think, that we don't to destroy North Viet Nam, we don't want to
destroy the North Vietnamese Government. We see the value of bombing
as to try and hamper and hinder the flow of troops and materials from the
North to the South and this Is the significance we attach to it. Well that
again, as this statement indicates, is now going to be sought to be done
by bombing a smaller area than it was before. That Is still designed to
try to prevent and we never claimed it did prevent but to make it
difficult, to hamper the flow of men and materials, while at the same time
freeing the large areas further north from the danger of attack in
the hope that that will lead to a postive response from Hanoi. Then it
could go step by step If that happened. I think that was the reasoning
behind it.
Q. Sir, could you tell me, since you were Informed yesterday,
which Ministers have you discu.-sed this with? Have you talked to Mr
Has luck? / 7
-7
PM: Well, I have been in cable communication with Mr Has luck
In New Zealand. I had a word with Gordon Preeth, the acting Minister
bere, and with a number of officials, and with the Deputy Prime Minister.
Q. Have you spoken to any other Prime Ministers like Mr
Holyoake?
PM: No.
Q. Sir, how soon do you expect a positive response from
Hanoi? ' What would you call a reasonable thing?
PM: I couldn't guess. I wouldn't guess.
Q. Mr Prime Minister how big do you see this move?
PM: I think it ought to be able to be regarded a~ s a real test
of whether North Viet Nam Is prepared to start talking or not.
Q. Would you go further than that?
PM: I think that Is a pretty big thing, Isn't It?
Q. Do you think there have been steps to peace on an equal
scale?
PM: I think perhaps that this is the greatest concession the
Americans have made. There have been concessions, but following on
from the thing held out at San Antonio, and the President's speech itself,
when you read It all in with the 3San Antonio one, this is a further concession
than was offered In the San Antonio speech.
Q. Mr Prime Minister, could you illuminate the section of
the President's statement on troops? Could you call his attitude now one
of having a holding operation?
PM: No, I don't think I would. I think he has indicated a resolve
to continue the struggle, and indeed, a resolve to build up the South
Vietnamese armed forces, and expect them with the equipment which the
United 2tates will provide, to take an even bigger part to provide some
reinforcements from the United S0tates Itself, and to continue the struggle
I have forgotten the words he used, but the resolve is completely unweakened.
Q. This is directly related to the Tet offensive?
PM: I have seen no Indication of It. I car only tell you what
I have been told and what I believe to be the reason behind it. I think
the reason behind It Is All right. We will make this further concession.
We will go this extra mile.
Q. Do you think the New Hampshire primaries may have had
anything to do with it?
PM: W1-ell, would they have anything to do with it if he wasn't
go to stand for President again?
~ 0-
Q. Does this leave you in the position that you need to
clarify your thinking on the thing. Obviously, yourp. consbsted of a
series of impressions as you have told us today.
PM: My thinking of a series of impressions on what?
Q. On his official statement and the slight background
given to you by the S" tate Department. Will this speed up any intention
on your part to go to the States to talk with him and his authorities?
Or will you rely on Mr Rusk here?
PM: Well, I will be talking to Mr Rusk here. I was proposing
to go to the States quite soon for a rush trip, but they will be engaged In
all kinds ofi various political activities. Now that President Johnson has
indicated that he will not be standing again, I will have to consider whether
It might not better to do it later.
Q: Could you indicate when you say'soon Sir, what your
original plans were?
PM: 6 Well, they were pretty tentative.
Q. You will wait for a new President, then?
PM: W~ ell, this Is the sort of thing I said I would have to take
into consideration. I want to think about it.
Q. Otherwise it could be a trip which
PM: Well, there are all sorts of considerations
Q. In view of the fact that this very latest step was taken
without consultation with the Australian Government, despite assurances
we had in 1966 after the Honolulu Conference, can we take this as
official acknowledgment now that the war has passed out of our hands
without even going through the pretence of Influencing the course of the
war here?
PM: Well, I suppose anybody is at liberty to take arythi ng
at any time in any way they like. Are you asking me the way i take it
or you asking me the way you can takce it?
Q. The Government.
PM: Well, let me make these points. This is not anything
which in any way requires any increased contributions from Austrdflia.
This Is not something which requires Australia to make some additional
effort at all. In those kind of circumstances, I have no doubt whatever
that full consultations would take place. I don't expect them to take
place In other circumstances.. . If anyone wants to interpret that....
This is a further attempt and a further step to see whether they can
bring about talks while continuing the struggle in South Viet Nam, wl-e ther
they can bring about talks leading to a genuine peace. 7! e have
consistently said that we would support such attempts. / 9
Q. Have we said what we think is a genuine peace?
PM: Yes, we have. I can't remember the words, but a just
and enduring peace that really gives the people of South Viet Nam the
opportunity to make freedom cf choice. That Is it by and large. You
will find this firm statement in the Governor-General's Speech, I think
Q. On this point of consultation Mr Prime Minister, are
you then satisfied with the lack of consultation and warning that the
Australian Government was given?
PM: I thought I had answered that before in the last question,
Indicating that we would support moves leading towards it ( peace). In
the Governor-General's Speech, we said we seek a just and lasting
peace based on those objectives. I will read you the whole passage,
because It ties In with something you said, Frank
" My Government believes that the South Vietnamese
people should retain the elementary right to determine their own
future In their own way and will, besides the effective military
assistance It is rendering to this end, continue to provide economic
and civil aid 10 South Viet H'. am.
In doing this, my Government desires neither the
destruction of North Viet Nam, nor the overthrow of the Government
of North Viet Nam but merely the cessation of aggression against
the people of South Viet Nam so that those people may, by the
exercise of a franchise they have shown they know how to exercise
even under the most difficult and dangerous circumstances, choose
their own form of government. We seek a just and lasting peace
based on these objectives. We have supported and will support
every effort for negotiation of such a peace.
Q. Even In the better conditions of peace, as we state them,
what are the pre-conditions as you see them for. peace. talks? What are
the pre-conditions before we get Into talks? Are there any?
PM: Well, I Imagine a pre-condition Is that the Government
of North Viet Nam indicates that they are prepared to enter into peace
talks.
Q. A cease-fire?
PM: This seems to be the objective, doesn't it? I mean, this
Is the objective, to enter Into peace talks. This has been, all the time.
The United States has been saying, " W. ell, we'll try this. W. e'll try
that to see whether It results in an indication that the North Vietnamese
will begin to talk" Not necessarily before the fighting finishes, but
begin to
Q. The diplomatic pressure Is obviously on them now. There
will be some sort of an answer, apparently. If we presume there will
be some sort of an answer, I am looking for a minimum pre-condition
that we would regard as acceptable. Just a willingness to enter talks?
PM: Well, this is what.....
Q. Will we be taking any diplomatic Initiative to urge Britain
to follow the Fresident's request to call a meeting, to get moving? ./ 1G
C'.
10
PM: To call Britain and. Russia to get on to Ho Chi Minh?
Q. Are we going to press Britain along on this?
PM: I wouldn't comment on that at this stage.
Q. V/ hat is the difference between this bombing pause and the
previous bombing pause? This has been presented as a dramatic move by
the US. It has been presented In rather dramatic circumstances with
rather dramatic surrounds. But Is it essentially any different from the
previous bombing pauses?
PM: Well, I think one has to make on's own mind up about this,
but previously, there have been sort of bombing pauses this is not presented
as a bombing pause essentially but there have been bombing pauses in
the sort of hope that we would see what happened. Now, the -next step was
that the President I am sorry to go over the same ground again made
the San Antonio speech in which he said, " We'll stop bombing if youwill
start talking and not take great military advantage of our stopping bombing"
and that didn't seem to elicit any response. Then a number of people around
h the world said, " W~ ell, give it a go anyway. Stop the bombing and we think
they will probably talk if you do. Give them an opportunity to talk. They
said they wouldn't talkc if you didn't. This is a stopping of bombing except
for the direct military support which Is needed. Well, as I said before, It
will test whether this does lead to indications of their willingness to enter
Into talks.
Q. This also has an element of tick-tacking involved in it. " We'll
do this and we expect some gesture on your part and we will do something
else. This wasn't apparent In the earlier bombing pauses.
PM: This word " tick-tacking" what do you rre an by that? I think It Is
a sort of indication. All right. Here's a real gesture. Does it elicit
any response? If it elicits a res-ponse, then we can talk about the next
step downwards, at the same time as we are talking about how to achieve
a just and enduring peace. The whole thing, I think, is now waiting to
see what sort of a response it elicits.
Q. just on this point of consultations, Sir. Is the point you are making
because we have said we support any steps towards peace, there Is no need
for the United . States to come to us and say " We are going to do this because
we see this as a step towards peace"?
PM: W~ ell, I was endeavouring to indicate that the United Statep
in relation to all the things we have said about supporting ste-ps towards
peace and supporting the previous San Antonio speech of the President,
might have thought it was essential fcr long-term prior consultations had
there been any alteration the other way, had there been any alteration in
continuing their resolve on the ground in South Viet Nam, altering their
approach there, which there is no indication of at all.
Q. It is-just that in the reassessment that went on, one would have thought
they would have said to the other nations fighting " What are your views
as to the conduct of the war and how It is going?" before they made the
unilateral decision.
11i
Q. Particularly in the light of the fact that our Government, the
Australian Government hes; ccfte* nr1v elsme. di that one of the motives
in bombing was co save Australian lives.
PM: Well, the bombing Is still going on in the areas where there is
a military build-up put it this way, the bottlenecks, the trails along
which men and munitions have been flowing down to the south, and that
Is why the same approach you have just said, quite properly, is the
Australian Government's approach, is why the American President said
" I couldn't In all conscience prevent that part of the bombing" because It
would tend to help our people being killed.
Q. Sir, in the last paragraph of yq 1i~ ment today you talked about
not leaving allied troops at too great a fsdvantage. s' hsa diso
that the cessation that is being allowed will do just that?
PM: V1111 do just what?
Q. Leave our troops at some disadvantage...
PM: Oh. You read out my statement which said this is not leaving our
troops at too great~ isadvant age and then suggested my statement was
saying it did just that, that it did leave them at too great a military
disadvantage. It doesn't. But clearly there would be some military loss
because you are not bombing arms factories, barracks and roads and
bridges further north, so there would be some diminution of the effort
in that direction, and that, I think, Indicates that this Is a real gesture
on the part of the United States.
Q. ' Would it seem, Sir, if this gesture does succeed, even more Australian
lives will be saved?
PM: You mean if it moves step by step long term, and you reach the
logical goal of having a real peace which gives them a chance, well you
don't have people killed when you reach a real peace.
Q. You don't see it in any way what the Americans have done about
bombing as a public admission that their bombing policy has failed?
PM: I don't think it is a public admission at all. I think it Is a genuine
attempt, as the President has said, to make this move in the hope that it
will lead to Hanoi entering into these talks whereas previously and this
is the significant change that we'Ve been talking about, he has said we
would like an indication of entering Into peace talks Iefore we make the
next move. Now that is a significant change Indeed.
Q. Do you propose a debate on any straement you might make on this
to the House?
PM: I don't believe I would be proposing a debate. I will probably make
a statement to Parliament, but then it is open to debate....
Q. You will make a further statement tomorrow?
PM: I think ! ha t would be the reasonable thing to do.
Q. Thie way will then be open for the Opposition to reply?
It 12
PM: Well, there could be a debate on this. Yes.
Q. Has the Foreign Affairs debate finished?
PM: Well, I have been away. I haven't caught up with it. W~ e only
got back yesterday afternoon. I had to do a little work yesterday after
we got back and I haven't had time to get round to
Q. It was adjourned, Sir, on the motion of Mr Giles.
Q: VWill you have an early Cabinet meeting to present this to Cabinet?
PM: W~ ell, we will be having a Cabinet tomorrow in the normal way,
but what this would call for is not a Cabinet discussion?
Q. Sir, personally, do you feel optimistic about the outcome of
this
PM: Oh, I am not going to speculate on the future. Sorry, I just can't
speculate on this one.
Q. Can you say anything now about the Fill? Remember you were
asked yesterday and you said
PM: No, I'm sorry I can't. But Mr Fairhall is coming up here. He
Will probably be able to say something about it. He has indicated to me
that he will be getting reports from the United States authorities on
whatever it was that happened. Nobody seems to be quite sure yet what
it was. Thank you.