PRESS CONFERNCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER,
SIR ROBERT MENZIES, IN LONDON, ON 27TH JUNE. 196S.
PRIME MINISTER,: There is a passage in the communique about the
voluntary contributions to the United Nations to get it out
of its present financial troubles, Great Britain and Canada
having made announcements. I reserved the decision of
Australia and perhaps that requires a little explanation.
What I said was there were two aspects to the
matter. One was that we all wanted to see the United Nations
solvent but that the nations who hadn't paid and about whom
the Article 19 argument was being waged, must consider whether
their position was being weakened or strengthened by these
voluntary conti butions. In other words, if the people who
hadn't paid comt to the conclusion they can go on refusing
to pay because the other people will make up the difference
by voluntary contributions, it may be that the Article 19
point will never be determined and I think it should be
determined and determined quite soon.
I indicated that we had a good record of voluntary
contributions but I did want to discuss that with my colleagues
as to which way the balance might lie. You might have noticed
that the United States had not announced any voluntary contributions
yet and I don't know whether they will at all. They
may have similar considerations in their mind. This question
requires a little thought from the point of view of are we
handicapping ourselves in the Article 19 argument.
There was some discussion about whether the
Prime Minister of Great Britain should be Chairman of the
Mission. The overwhelming view of the conference was that he
was doing it as Chairman of the conference not as Pr~ ime Minister
of Great Britain. There was a great deal of argument if one might
call it such about Great Britain being committed against the
North Vietnamese, Some members of the Conference appeared to think
that they were not committed one way or the other. The fact is
that most of them were. They think Australia is committed
as indeed Australia is because Australia has produced troops.
Australia was committed before then quite clearly as a matter
of publicly-stated policy.
Countries like Tanzania and so on are equally
committed not by troops but by the plainest public declarations
in favour of China and against America.
I think there is a good deal of double talk
about committed people and uncommitted people on this matter.
In fact I think on two or three occasions I said so,
The end result on Malaysia I thought was not
unsa t isfa ctory. The shadow of the Afro-Asian conference at
Algiers has been rather heavily cast upon this conference.
It may seem odd because it has nothing to do with the Commonwealth.
It is an entirely different body which has some
membership in common, Still it was very much in evidence and
I thought at one stage there was a disposition to go a little
cautiously on the subject of Malaysia and the Indonesian o 12
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confrontation and this might muddy the waters at Algiers and
therefore the end result was very satisfactory from our point
of view because they once more quoted what we said last year and
added words bringing it up to date, so I think the Malaysian matter
came out pretty well.
There are a few comments I would make on disarmament.
You know or can guess how these communiques are hammered out over
a long day, but you get to a conclusion which isn't exactly in the
form you would have liked yourself but in substance is near enough
to be acceptable. This disarmament question includes one or two
illustrations of that
" They hoped that early progress would be made towards
an acceptable agreement on some of these measures
including the limitation and reduction of stocks of
nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles,"
Now this standing by itself, a reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons
unaccompanied by reductions in conventional arms and armaments
seems to me to be inadequate, and so I made the point and the words
were added " and a phased reduction in conventional armaments"
which brought it back into balance. Everybody agreed that that
was right but it had perhaps been overlooked in the draft.
This reference to nuclear-free zones arises because
the Organisation of African unity and the Latin American States
have been working out the idea of a nuclear-free zone in their own
countries. I explained the reason why my Government rejected the
idea of a nuclear-free zone South of the Equator.
Somebody credited me with talking about nuclear
visitors, which was a new phrase to me and I not having uttered it,
don't know what it is, but I can repeat the point that I made with
the greatest of pleasure, because I have made it elsewhere.
I said that if we were to enter into agreement for a nu clea r-free:. zone
south of the equator and were in a position to enforce suchagreements
as we had miade, the only effect would be that our
opponents being situated north of the equator could fire nuclear
weapons at us or at our friends without retaliation because we
would have banned our friends from discharging nuclear weapons
from south of the equator. That would be a ridiculous position
it would help our enemies and hurt our friends.
We are not starting a nuclear war and Australia is
not a nuclear power and has no intention of becoming one, wIe
agree that there should not be a proliferation of nuclear weapons.
We think they ought to be kept in as few hands as possible,
responsible hands, and we would fear very much the escalation of
small wars if a number of powers themse~, ves possessed nuclear
weapons. This has been stated by me many times in the Commonwealth
Parliament, If some other people in entirely different circumstances
want to set up a nuclear-free zone, that is their business.
That is the background to the disarmament passage.
Now letts turn to Rhodesia which occupied an
enormous amount of time this year as it did last,
From the very beginning of this meeting, the British
Government made it clear through Mr. Bottomley that they wanted
a state Of affairs in which there would be steady progress towards
majority rule unimpeded by reactionary constitutional changes,
immediate improvement in the Political status of the African
population and the progressive elimination of racial discrimination. P a e ./ 3
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They also made it quite clear that they wouldn't recommend to
Parliament Parliament being the one authority on this matter
the grant of independence to Rhodesia unless they were satisfied
it was on a basis acceptable to the people of the country taken
as a whole. In other words, to the majority of the people on a
conception of adult suffrage, Now this seemed to me to be clear
enough. Over what period the change to complete majority rule
should occur that is of course a different matter. Nobody but
the extremisis could imagine that it could be created tomorrow
morning and perhaps none but an extremist on the other side would
believe that it could never be created. This is the problem of
Southern Rhodesia, the two extreme views no change complete
change tomorrow morning. I think there is a growing support for
the idea that this has to be phased in some careful way so that
over a period of time the movement is steadily towards increasing
the African vote until you get a majority and they will be in
charge of Parliament. This, I imagine, is the view of the British
Government and it was the view of several of us who spoke on this
matter. Now the communique itself as in the case of last year's
set out first of all what the British Minister said and then what
some other Prime Ministers said. The British Prime Minister was
urged by other not the other Prime Ministers you will observe
but other Prime Ministers, because I was not one of them nor were
indeed two or three others..., was urged to convene a constitutional
conferenge at an early date, say within three months and there
were certain other, in effect, directions contained in that
paragraph. These were the viei~ s expressed to the British Government,
not by the conference, but by certain Prime Ministers with
strong views on these matters, principally African Prime Ministers.
My approach to the matter was and is that I think that
the British Government having the complete responsibility on this
matter is having to deal not with a Crowm colony but with a selfgoverning
colony which has been self-governing for many years, that
the British Government should not be handicapped by too much
iiublic instruction, that it was rather a mistake to be talking
a ' bout a conference within three months. It was quite unrealistic,
particularly as obviously there must first of all be some rnegotiations
continued between Great Britain and Southern Rhodesia and as
Mr. Wilson pointed out in the last paragraph of the communique on
this point if there is undue tardiness, if there is no willingness
to engage In these discussions then the British Government would
consider whether it should call a constitutional conference between
all the relevant parties.
Now it is quite clear that the United Kingdom understands
the difficulty of this matter. This is not a problem which lends
itself to shouting from the sidelines, It is a very serious and
difficult problem and so far as I am concerned I would like to
see an attitude of mind on both sides in which discussions continued
in a constructive way between the Governments of Britain and
Southern Rhodesia, leading in due course whenever that may be, to
the holding of a conference in which all aspects of the matter can
be thrashed out from a constitutional point of view.
All this cannot be done in three months, but I think
this is rather a bravura touch put in to exhibit their sense of
the urgency of the matter. A little quietness and a little
deliberation would be of great value on this matter. 0 0 0 / 4
I must say I thaought Mr. ' Wilson and his Government
went as far as any Government could go on this matter.
Later on there is a reference to immigration to
Britain. I would like to point out that this was not discussed
by the conference as a conference. I take the strongest possible
view that every countryts immigration policy is its own business
and this is not open to debate at a Prime Ministers' Conference*
It happened that bilaterally the Prime Minister of Great Britain
had talks with some of the countries affected by the immigigtion
laws and that is why the matter was referred to. One or two of
them mentioned it in the conference itself, but there was no doubt
whatever no lack of unanimity about the proposition that the
extent ol immigration into Britain was entirely a matter for the
British Government. I want to emphasise that there was no immigration policy,
for example, of Australia's mentioned. It i-s, in this case,
entirely a matter for the British Government, and obviously our
own is entirely a matter for us. Now this is a very vital
principle. There's a little disposition in the new Commonwealth
I'm using words with extreme moderation to want to discuss and
deal with domestic problems in other countries and this, of course,
if pursued will become fatal to the Commonwealth. An association
of free, independent, autonomous nations are not going to have
their internal business tossed around in conference and the
inurigation policy is, of course, a perfect example. Every country
there at the table has its own policy and I think would agree must
jealously guard its own rights to determine the composition of its
own population. The reference that was made to the meeting of Commonwealth
trade ministers is preceded by a reference to an offi* cials?
meeting. I myself pointed out that there was no value in convening
a meeting of Commonwealth trade ministers just out of the blue to
sit down to discuss an almost infinite variety of trading problems,
some of which concern one country, some two, some three, but very
few of which concern the lot and if such a meeting occurred., they
would be bound to say we musi refer these matters to officials.
Therefore, commonsense suggested that the officials should meet
first and do a bit of work on this matter before the ministers
themselves met. Well that view was accepted and was included in
the communique. The Commonwealth Foundation speaks for itself; that was
accepted all round without any difficulty.
The Commonwealth Assembly didn't leave the barrier.
Well perhaps I'm wrong, The starter started it but it didn't go
for a furlong for the fairly obvious reasons thai we have the
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the Inter-Parliamentary
Union and this seems to all of us here to be merely duplication.
The Commonwealth Secretariat. There had been a difference
of opinion about what the functions of the Secretariat ought to be.
Some of my colleagues obviously felt it ought have a very wide
commission and be able to conduct investigations and make economic
recommendations, exercise some supervisory power over works of
development. There were others of us who said that that would be
fatal, that it would require an enormous secretariat for a start
and would give rise to a good deal of resentment around the Commonwealth
on the part of people who thought they were quite capable
of conducting their own developmental ideas. In the long run, the
ea e so o o
limited proposition was approved. The Secretariat is to be what
I will call a facilitating body, not to be an executive body. It
is not to seek to extend its jurisdiction in a hurry and must
proceed cautiously in a pragmatic way, and that being accepted as
it was, I think the Secretariat might serve a very useful purpose.
As you already know, Arnold Smith was appointed. In
fact, I gather that during the discussions he had an overwhelming
volume of support and in the conference where his nomination was
approved unanimously. I'm supposed to have had strong views about
various people. I don't know why. I read in one paperthat used
to be a pretty accurate paper, to the effect that I have been
carrying since Suez a sort of vendetta with a gentleman called
George Ivan Smith. I had never heard of him at the time of Suez;
in fact I wasn't conscious of his existence until his name appeared
on the list of nominees. Sir John Bunting reminded me that he
was once at a dinner which I attended. That's the nearest I have
ever got to him. I have no views good, bad or indifferent
a bout him. It has to be remembered that there is great advantage
in a venture of this kind in having a man who has what I will call
civil service experience, who is accustomed to the processes of
government and how they are worked out, who knows how the political
animal operates as all senior civil servants do, and of course in
this field this man was outstanding.
Peiris of Ceylon, whom we didn't nominate, but whose
name we said ought to be under consideration because people have
a very high opinion of him turned out to be not available because
he has been appointed the Lbassador of Ceylon to W~ est Germany.
There is no reason why if the Secretariat carries out
its designed functions and doesn't extend them there is no reason
why the whole experiment should not be extremely useful.
I'm told that one or two points ought to be made on the
guide lines of the Commonwealth mission.
It must be remembered that this mission has been appointad
by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and is responsible
to it as a conference. Men are not appointed to the mission simply
in order to air their own views, but to represent what is
undoubtedly a wide cross-section of opinion in the Commonwealth
itself. It became desirable to set out what ultimate objectives
are during their consultations with the parties principally
concerned, You will notice that paragraph is the suspension
of air attacks on North Vietnam. This is accompanied by and
these are regarded as completely hanging together, a North Vietnamese
undertaking to prevent the movement of any military forces.
I make no secret of my view that in the second paragraph
we should have said " a suspension by North Vietnam" to balance
the suspension in the first paragraph, but the general view was
that the United States was not likely to suspend attacking the
lines of communication and supply of the enemy merely on an
undertaking, The undertaking would have to be effective before
any result appeared under I dare say that is right.
Total cease fire on all sides, I might say, includes
a cease fire by the Viet Cong; whether the parties involved will
include the Viet Cong is not a matter for me, but for the mission. .6
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They will go around and see if they can establish
a basis for a conference. I don't quite know how you establish
the basis for a conference with people who live in ambush and
who come out of ambush and who presently have a nice healthy
cover from cloud and rain. This is a physica problem, but
following the usual communist technique, they have a political
aspect and call themselves the National Liberation Front and
these are designed for political purposes.
It may be that if the mission ever reaches Hanoi,
Hanoi may say " tie want to have some representative of the
Viet Cong." 1 That would be entirely intelligible, since the
Viet Cong are obviously working under their direction. There
is no reason at all why they shouldn't send for one or two of
them, but the mission will determine that.
The difficulties of the mission are very great, but
at the same time I think there was merit in the Commonwealth
as such taking the initiative to indicate that whatever our views
are, if a genuine conference could occur and be brought to accept
genuine propositions which involved the freedom of South Vietnam,
then the experiment was worth making,
Q. You told us Mr. Wilson talked at length with you before
putting up the proposal for a mission. Could you tell us what
influence on his thinking that talk might have had?
PM. I haven't a clue.
Q. Has the Australian Government had any indication of the
Viet Cong's willingness or otherwise to talk with the mission?
PM. No, We have no means of communicating with them.
I asked because there was a new Chinese agency report
this morning that they would not meet the mission, but this did
not come directly from them. It came from China.
Pm. Yes, that would not surprise me. Let's be sensible about
this matter. As long as North Vietnam and the Viet Cong think
they are on a good wicket and are making headway, they won't talk.
When they come to the conclusion they are not winning, that will
be a different matter and that is why the United States an4 the
rest of us who aro involved have to keep banging away at it.
Q. Some days ago when someone asked you about the future of
the Commonwealth you said you were " unclear". Do you feel any
more inclined to be clearer after the last week?
PM. No. I have no views to offer on that at all.
Q* Do you regard the declaration on Malaysia this year as
being stronger or more valuable than last year?
Pm.* Temi No. I think that approximately it has the same effect.
The ainthing was to get a recognition of Malaysiats place and
Malaysia's right to preserve her integrity and to ask her friends
for support which, of course, is the precise principle that any
of the African countries would apply in their own case,
Q. Might it not be slightly stronger because it refers to
the country's integrity and gives support to the country, whereas
last year they gave support only to the Prime Minister? 9 a e e e/ 7
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P. M. I see the point you make. Yes from that point of
view it might be regarded as more comprehensive. Yes, thank
you very much.
Q. In his second statement on the peace mission, Nkrumah
said the mission had been placed in the absurd position of
having to discuss with one of those who authorised the mission
the terms upon which Australia itself was prepared to
disengage itself, Do you accept the premise here that we
are engaged in the struggle and therefore we ought to be one
of the countries with whom the mission should confer?
P. M. Oh no. That is quite unreal. True we have a force
there and in that sense we are engaged in the struggle and
we strongly support the American action, but the mission
doesn't need to come and talk to us. Its main problem is
to get in touch with those whom I may call " the other side".
QG Do you want to comment on his proposition that the
National Liberation Front and the Saigon authorities are
rival governments engaged in a civil war?
P. M. I think that is the communist line and 11m sorry that
he has succumbed to it if he has. Civil war, really. Here is
a settlement made and ihere is a line of demarcation. -There
is a guarantee of no fighting across the frontier, no attack
on South Vietnam, but yet you have all these attacks plainly
organised by the Viet Cong, obviously organised from the
north. In fact they hardly make any secret of it and their
supplies all come from the north. They don't produce any
munitions themselves, except for a few homemade things. They
all come from the north, so the north is intervening in breach
of the treaty on a large scale and to convert that into a
civil war when it is really a war by the north against the
south is just playing with words. W~ e don't accept that
proposition any more than we would have accepted the
proposition with Malaya a few years ago, when the communist
bandits up in the north were engaged in a civil war. At that
time nobody thought of it, but now it's the line,
Q6 Do you think the Peking Government is making headway
with some countries of the Commonwealh?
P. M. Yes, I do. I think that the influence Le~ t's
put it this way. I found this year perceptible signs of
penetration by China in at least an ideological way, I
think they have a real influence and perhaps a growing
influence in some African countries. I won't particularise
who they are.
Q9 Were you heartened by the fact that the Commonwealth
nations appear to have rather snubbed China over the Algiers
Conference?
P. M. Oh, don't ask me what their reasons are. I know
nothing about the Afro-. Asian conference, but after all, when
the erstwhile revolutionary head of the Algerian Government
is plucked out of his place and, I gather, put on trial and
another goes in, I think if I had been one of the Afro-Asian
countries, I would have said we had better determine how
this thing settles down otherwise we might be holding a
conference in the middle of a counter-revolution. * 9 e 9 / 8
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Q Would you regard the communique as a victory for
the moderate elements in the conference?
P. M. I won't adopt those words but I'll say I think the
ultimate communique was a good deai better than at one stage
I feared it might be,
QO Ther'e is one-line reference to some discussion of
Chinese membership of the United Nations. Could you tell us
something about that?
P. M. You hardly need to be told that some of us don't
recognise Communist China and are not to be told at a country
Commonwealth meeting that we should. What any Commonwealth!
does in its diplomatic recognition of another nation is its
business and nobody else's, There have always been a number
who either have recognised Communist China or want to persuade
other people to do so, but if it had a one-line reference, it
had a one-minute discussion. There is a reference to the
importance of China being a party to any genuine disarmament
scheme but I've said that myself, more than once. Tht'
a praclical problem.
Q, Given the fact that most of the current disarmament
negotiations of any value take place in the framework of
United Nations, doesn't it make some sense that China might
be brought
P. M. Now you want to argue with me. The Australian
Government's view on the recognition of Communist China....
Q6 Not the recognition of Communist China, but its
place vis-a-vis the United Nations.
P. M. Well, one seems to be almost consequential on the
other, if you recognise them. You first of all have to solve
the problem of Formosa and this is a problem which is neatly
dodged by almost everybody who discusses this matter, but
I don't want to make a long statement on that. We have stated
our views and our reasons many times in Parliament,
Q6 Can you see an alternative way in which China could
be brought into disarmament talks of some kinds outside the
United Nations?
P. M. Well, after all China has been involved in some
discussions in relation Lo South-East Asia I don't think
it is at all impossible on an overwhelming matter of world
significance like disarmament to have people coming to.
conference whether they are members of the United Nations or
not, simply in their capacity as significant powers,
QO One last question on a subject which has become
rather touchy Could you tell us whether you have discussed
the Governor-6reneralship with The Queen since you have been
here?
P. M. Why has it become rather touchy? Only because some
fellow in the " Sunday Mirror" has to write a think-piece
about somebody, You know, it is most awful nonsense. There
is a limit to folly on these matters, When a Governor-General
is appointed, The Queen will announce it. 0 0 a./
9
Q. But have you discussed it yet with The Queen?
P. M. I have had a preliminary talk with her. All these
names that have been bandied around, they dwell in beauty
as in the eye of the beholder.
Q. Could you go further Sir?
P. M. No. I have a strict sense of courtesy in my
dealings with The Queen.
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