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PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER
SIR ROBERT NENZIES, AT THE AUSTRALIAN EM'BASH,
WASHINGTON, U. S. A. ON 9TH JUNE, 1965.
PRIME MINISTER I had a very interesting experience last'night.
Just as I was about to go out to dinner with the Secretary
of State the President rang me up and asked me to come to
breakfast. It reminded me of the first time I ever was
invited to have breakfast and have a talk was by Stanley
Baldwin many years ago. What he wanted to see me about was
what he had referred to initially earlier and that was the
appointment of an Ambassador to Australia. He has got his
mind settled on an Ambassador and it's not for me, of course,
to announce the name of his Ambassador but he has got his mind
fixed on it and they will be taking the steps necessary to
secure the usual agreement in the next few days, and I think
we may anticipate an announcement say in a week.
Q* There is some technicality here, isn't there?
( Then followed a brief discussion between the Prime Minister
and the correspondents dealing with the United States procedure
in that after the President announces his intention to
nominate an Ambassador the Senate has the responsibility to
approve the nomination. This was not clear on the recording.)
Q. d~ ell, all this means is that it could be brought to
announcement within a few days, couldn't it?
P. M. Yes, he could announce his nomination. dIell, I think
as soon as he gets the ' bll clear" from Canberra hie will make
that announcement at once. He knoixis a good long time has
elapsed since the previous Ambassador left. It was clearly
on his mind because it was the first thing he mentioned when
I went in to see him at the White House.
Q. What time did you have breakfast, Sir?
P. N. 8.30. I'm a night worker myself. I don't get on too
well with conversation at breakfast.
Q. How long did you stay, Sir?
P. M. For about an hour and a quarter.
Q6 How did you like the bacon and eggs, Sir?
P. M. Jell, it's exactly what we had.
Q. The rzesident's favourite?
P. m. Is it? Well, my breakfast normally consists of a glass
of orange juice and one piece of toastt However, it was
very interesting.
Qe Was anybody else present or just you and the President?
P. m. Th ' re were four other people but two of them weren't
concerned but the other two I think might have had some
interest in this problem. a a a a a./ 2
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Q. Sir, I take it the President did, of course, give you
the name of the neivr Ambassador.
P. M. Oh, yes, I know who it is.
Q4 Is it a career diplomat, can you tell us that?
P. M. Oh, no, you mustn't ask me that now. I think it is
his right to make his own announcement. And I think it will
be well received,
Q6 Would you give us a run-down on your visit, Sir?
P. M. Yes, I think I could in some sort of fashion. Apart
from this matter of the diplomat, my talks with the President
have been almost entirely on Vietnam and the problems thot
are associated with it. He gave me the opportunity yesterday
morning of having three-quarters of an hour with Maxwell Taylor
who, of course 7 is fresh from the scene and he gave me a
singularly lucid account both of the military and political
problems in South Vietnam and filled in a lot of detail and
some background that I hadn't fully understood ;, efore. It
u; ill be very useful from our point of view to have the benefit
of his observations. On both fields both the political and
the military, there is no doubt that ihe next couple of months
will not be easy because of the wet the monsoons and in
that period the Viet Cong will no doubt be making extra
effortsi But I found no lack of either confidence or
resoluteness, either with General Maxwell Taylor or with the
President himself or with Mr. Dean Rusk or with Mr. McNamara
I saw them allb I have had very useful discussions with
Dean Rusk about a variety of matters that we're concerned
about ' With the Stat3 Department. I don't say that we broke
any particularly new ground but we brought each other up to
date in the thinking of our own countries. I had a good
talk yesterday afternoon with Mri McNamara. He was able to
give me a satisfactory report on the... 4what I used to-call
the what's it called now? Fill in which he sees
no reason to believe that there will be any delay in delivery.
As you know, we postponed the date for a year in which we were
to get ours because, quite obviously with the new aircraft
of a highly sophisticated kind like Lhis there will be teething
troubles and we thought, and rightly, that it was better to
have those attended to in the place where the plane is manufactured
and where it is designed rather than in Australia because
they would have far more facilities and the job could be done
in a much smaller time. So we decided we would take the
fully vetted machine even though that meant waiting twelve
months for it, But I believe we'll get it on the date.
Q* Sir, there has been considerable excitement by the
statement yesterday of the role of the United States Forces
in Vietnam.
P. M. Yes, I heard about that. I don't understand it.
Q. Is that the Australian role? Or some new idea that the
Australians will be there to fight if necessary?
P. M. It never occurred to me to the contrary. I don't think
that the 1st Battalion of the Regular Army would thank you very
much if they were cast for the role of onlookers. I always
thought this matter was simple enough. I don't know why there
should be thought to be much novelty about it. We send our
troops in. They are under the command of an Australian soldier
a 1P 0 ./ 3
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P . M.
( Contd.) Q0 P. M.
Q P. M.
QO P . M. 0 Bee 01/ 1
who, as usual in these circumstances, will have of course a
direct line of communication back to the Australian Government
in case he wants to bring anything to our attention. But
the Australian Battalion will be associated with American
units under what might be described as a brigade formation
which in its turn will be under the command of an American.
I don't think either the United States or Australia anticipates
that they are going to conduct completely independent
campaigns; the notion rather is that they will be associated
with Vietnamese forces and be in position to lend them
assistance where that assistance is necessary. And, of
course, there is good sense in that. We are there to help
to defend South Vietnam and therefore of course, must work
in the closest co-operation with the local forces and the
local authorities. Related to that, Sir, now that Australia is playing a
more active role in Vietnam, will we be consulted by the
Americans on policy for the future of the area?
Oh yes. Oht yes. We have a very close association with
them. I discussed with Dean Rusk, for example, whether
there was any way in which it was necessary to improve the
exchange of information, or the exchange of ideas, Neither
of us could think of one but if there is any blockage
anywhere it will undoubtedly be removed, but I don't say
there is any blockage. Our Commanding Officer on the spot
is fully informed about military activities. On the
political side, our own Ambassador is closely in touch with
the American Ambassador and, of course, with the Prime
Minister so that we get a good run of information there
. and as between the Department here and in Australia there
is a completely frank exchange of information. So there
will be nio complaint on my side that there will be any
failure of consultation or advance information. We'll get
all that. Sir, does this extend to Indonesia/ Malaysia as well
as to Vietnam? No. No. I'm talking about Vietnam because the
Americans have no forces in Malaysia. We have, under a
different obligation. You see, we regard our participation
in South Vietnam as essentially a SEATO exercise from our
point of view. The reason for that is quite clear, for the
Treaty itself in the American view and in the Australian
view these were both announced a long time ago imposes
obligations that are several as well as joint. It is for
that reason that South Vietnam being one of the protocol
countries under the South-East Asian Treaty, we regard it
as an essential ingredient an invitation from the Government
of South Vietnam because that is provided for in the Treaty
and, of course, we had that and we are there.
Sir, the other members of SEATO obviously do not view
the situation in the same light.
Well, I think there is some reason to believe*..-,, For
example France believes that the obligations are joint and
not several therefore there has to be unanimity, therefore,
in effect, somebody has a veto, That's a view that we
reject. But we don't comment on what others the other
parties in the SEATO Treaty, it's for them, and if we
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P. M. regarded ourselves as having a several obligation, well, we
( Contd.) grasp it by the wheel and act under it, and we [ lave. if
some other country has a different view, well, it makes its
own judgment.
Q. Sir, what of General Taylor's hopes for the future?
Pam@ Oh, well I think that I might safely say, without
becoming General Taylor's spokesman that he's got a
realistic view of' the immediate dif'liculties but an optimistic
view about the ultimate result.
Q. I An optimistic view?
P. M. Yes.
Qo -Sir, can you tell us anything about your talks with
Mr. Connor yesterday?
P. m* Yes, we had a sort of run-down particularly on the
question of the financial policy. I was able to give him the
text of what Mr. Holt had said, publicly indicating the
policy step by step of the Australian Government on these
matters and Mr. Connor found this very satisfactory. His
approach to our problems is quite a sympathetic one, quite a
helpful one, and we ourselves, of course, found out from the
American companies in Australia, the major people I think
there were about 74 to whom I addressed a letter and we had
full and frank information from I think 73 out of 74, so it's
a pretty good reaction and the broad effect of it was that
we were able to conclude that the impact of the new policy
on investment passing into Australia will not be as severe as
it was first thought either possible or likely. In short, I
think we've got a good working mutual understanding with him
and with his Department. We had some little anxiety well
not littleT: about the development of these big iron ore
deposits in the Jest and the bauxite deposits in the North,
ach of which involved massive amounts of money and on which
arrangements, largely through a banking consortium, had been
arrived at. We had a little doubt at the moment as to whether
they might continue but they've been completely approved,
so there is no hitch on that side. That's very important
for us.
Q. Sir, can you tell us a little bit more of your talks
with Secretary of State Rusk. I understand you discussed
not only Vietnam but also Malaysia, Red China, Indonesia.
P. M. Yes.
Q. Would you care to give us something on these points?
P. M. I don't think so.
Q. Sir, the President is being troubled at the moment by
a local group of intellectuals who are opposed to his Vietnamese
policy. What would be the public reaction in Australia,
Sir, in general, to our troops being in Vietnam?
P. m. Very favourable, overwhelmingly favourable. As a matter/
of fact, curiously enough, my political opponents as recently
as last February produced a statement of policy which completely~
upheld the American presence in South Vietnam. But since then
they have been a little bro'ibeaten by what you call intellectuals
and a certain amount of philosophical doubt has entered
into their attitude. We really got to the point in course of
o
P. M. discussion in the House of it being necessary to point out
( Contd.) that it was a strange doctrine that it was quite right and
proper for Americans to be engaged in South Vietnam but
quite wrong and improper for Australians to be engaged. it
looked to me rather like leaving everything to the United
States. We all know that the United States is getting'a
little browned off about being the world's gendarme and
that's why they attacht great significance to what we can do
to show the flag and show our-co-operation even though
intrinsically it may be small. It has a symbolic value
here which is far beyond the numbers, but I think, I am sure,
it has given great encouragement to the President, for the
very reason that you mention. I had to make a speech at
the White House and it's a real business trying to remember
w~ iat you said but I think one or two of the philosophic
doubters were present. In fact I know they were. And I
fell back in consequence oxi Shakespeare who said " And thus
the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er wi~ h the pale
cast of thought" and that resolution is the operative word.
Q. Do you expect to be troubled, Sir, if that's the right
word, by the same kind of intellectuals, if that's the right
word, in Australia?
P. M. No, It accustomed to them. The more people I suc-. eed
in putting into universities in Australia and I have had
a fairly big hand in all that the more intellectuals there
are, or aspiring intellectuals. But if the Government
proceeded by purely intellectual processes, the country
would fall into a grave state of disrepair.
Q6 Sir, do you think the Australian and American people
will have to be prepared for some reverses in Vietnam in
the next couple of months?
P. M. Yes. It stands to reason that in this monsoon season
where there is a great deal of cloud and rain and therefore
air activity is limited or inhibited and the guerrilla boys
have all the benefits of mobility and working under cover,
we must expect to have some reverses and what we have to do
is not to get -them out of proportion because under these
circumstances there will be reverses, but if they're matched
in the broad by a progress over all, then they have to be
taken and seen in their proper degree. But I am sure that
in the next two months we'll from time to time read about
some successful attack by Viet Cong on some battalion or
some formation there, That is in the nature of a war
against the concealed enemy. ; ide had it, you remember, at
one stage in North Malaya. It took a long time to 3lean
up*
Q& Sir, could you give us an appraisal of the Indonesian/
Australian situation, the relation between the two countries
and what your hopes may be?
P. M. 4ell, wetve tIraughbitmade it clear to Indonesia tat
we have every desire 6o be friend7y with a large neighbour
of that kind, very close to us, with a great deal of interest
in common, and that there is one matter alone on which we
completely depart from them and that is on " confrontation"
the policy towards Malaysia and on that we have of course,
not only offered our views but we have comLiitted l'orces,
That was under a declaration I made on behalf of the Government
some time ago which was made not under formal
obligation but unilaterally that we would be prepared to
5 0 0 0 0 6 -/ 6
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Pam. associate ourselves with British Forces in helping to defend
( Contd.) the territorial integrity and political independence I
think those were the words of Malaysia. And that's
understood. Every now and again it produces some extravagant
speeches but I think one must learn to live with extravagant
speeches. They dontt disturb us unduly.
Q. Sir, do you feel ttiat the ANZUS arrangement is
satisfa ctory?
P~ j~ jI do. I do, completely. By the way, somebody told
me this morning that I'm supposed to have described the
Australian battalion as the first batch or some such phrase.
Certainly a phrase I never used or thought of. The broad
. inference 1bias that we'll keep piling in more forces now.
I think it is proper to say that in all these discussions
nobody has asked for more. There has been no kind of
pressure put on. On the contrary they understand very well
the nature of our defence build-up and the fact that this
takes time bringing in the new compulsory service people and
getting them trained and getting them equipped and organised,
This is not done overnight and they have a very accurate
idea of the military strength we possess and the military
strength that we aim at achieving over this period. But
certainly we haven't reached a stage at which we have to
give consideration or they have to suggest further forces.
After all, the battalion has barely just arrived or is
arriving. Early days to be talking about what happens
thereafter. So I have given no hint publicly or privately
about expanded forces. No inference is to be drawn from
thiat one way or another because who am I to know how the
circumstances will develop in the next year or two years.
We are pretty fully stretched at present not only in terms
of manpower but in the terms of the Budget, I think it is
becoming pretty clear that this year's Budget w~ hich we will
begin to discuss when I get back home will find a further
increase in the Defence Vote by something in the order of
or œ C90M. wrhich in our Budget, of course, is a very
substantial item,.. coming as it does or as it will at a
time when the Loan market is a little weak and when,
therefore, the Commonwealth support for the Loan programmes
whiich have just been arranged with the States rqay turn out
to be quite substantial on the Budget itself. Last year
we had a very lush Loan market. This year we can't expect
it to be as good and this means that you may find yourself
having to support or supplement the Loan market with X
millions out of the Budget. I wouldntt like to say how
much but it very probably would be substantial; and at a
time when the Loan market is a bit weak, there is a
disposition for the redemption obligations to grow because
fewer people convert and that again is a Budget item. It
comes into the cash position. So that we have a large
Budget problem and apart from that, as I've said, of course
there is the manpower problem.
PART TWO
PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER,
SIR ROBERT MENZIES) AT THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, on 9TH JUNE, 1965
Aft pr the Prime Minister had discussed the impact of the Defence
bui4Ld-up on Australia's Budget and resources, he commented further
on Jnited States' awareness of Australia's development problems)
PRIKE MINISTER After all there is a great awareness here of
the fact that the problem of growth of Australia and the
development of resources is one of great importance to us
and as we're an Ally, they want to see us growing stronger and
Ithat's quite right. And when their enterprises have gone
into Australia they have been active and they have been
profitable. Some of them export quite largely and the
Americans are realistic enough to know that you can't just
chop off the supply of capital without in the long run
hindering the development of these very enterprises. So
that there is a common interest their enterprises want to
succeed and we want them to succeed because we want the
country to grow and our resources to develop.
Q. Sir7did you extend an invitation to President
Johnson to visit Australia sometime in the future?
P. N. Look, there's no need to. He knows that, But if you
want to know whether I said 114hen are you coming out or what
have you, no, no, there's no point in that. He would like
very much to come to Australia and of course we would like
him to come, but not a very good time, I think, to be asking
people to come away. I'd like Mr. McNamara to come to
Australia but Mr. McNamara has got a plate full at present.
It doesn't make it very easy for him to get out of the country.
But they are all friendly. They would like to go but we
haven't got to the stage of sending them an invitation.
Q4 I wasn't thinking in terms of a formal invitation.
P.* I V It might be quite embarrassing, you see, because
they might have to say I do know the President's
outlook on this matter and he would certainly like to come
but I wouldn't have thought there was any chance this year.
Q. Sir.. one other thing related to Vietnam. Since the
announcement has been made, has it been possible to assess
the reaction in Asia to Australia's decision in Vietnam?
P4N. I donft think it has really. We get vague general
remarks, approval here, and silence there. There are people
concerned with what's going on inside South Vietnam as to
whether there might be some resistance on the part of the
local inhabitants to outsiders coming in with forces, and on
this I discussed the matter not only with Max-rell Taylor but
through our own Ambassador and with senior military officers
we sent up recently to look over the ground and they are all
of the opinion that this is welcomed and that is very
important. It is to avoid any resistances or resentments of
that kind that the military arrangements involve the close
association of American troops with troops of South Vietnam.
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Q. w Sir, reverting back to Mr. Connor again, I was
wndering whether you discussed any trade barriers.
PA4No, no, I didn't want to become involved myself in
specific arguments about specific commodities because, vwell,
this is not my field. I'm not the expert in this field.
My colleague the Minister for .' rade is., He and his people
are constantly in negotiation with them, I think Dr.
Westerman was here in the last few days. No. I don't horn
in on that. I occasionally may offer a broad remark which
perhaps registers somewhere but not in detail.
QO Just back to Vietnam if we might for a minute, Sir.
Was General Taylor able to assure you or make clear the
views of the South Vietnamese themselves on this war? Are
they still wholeheartedly behind it?
P. * He thinks the morale is good. Yes. Of course the
war will begin to build up when the Viet Cong morale falls,
but of course, the Viet Cong morale we may assume will be
pretty good during this wet season because of the reason we
mentioned earlier. Every now and then they have a little
bit of a coup.
QO You mentioned earlier, Sir, that you couldn't
foretell what might happen in the next few years, or
something to that effect. I was wondering is it the opinion
of General Taylor and others that this war might go on for
some years? No, I wouldn't put that view into his, They have
to look at this thing as any other person would, step by
step as it develops. I think any estimate as to the
length of this trouble will be affected by whether during
the wet season the Viet Cong really do make what I'll call
some permanent headway and on that he's both confident and
resolute. After that, who knows?
Q. In other words, the next two months will be
crucial? or three
P. 0 1 think the next Iwo/ months in a sense will be
crucial but in any event will be difficult, and morale
will have to be maintained and these, as I said earlier,
any little setbacks that occur here and there will have to
be seen in their proper proportion and not regarded as the
writing on the wall. But I think the public morale is
pretty good on these things. One mustn't expect too much
unhappiness.