PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Menzies, Robert

Period of Service: 19/12/1949 - 26/01/1966
Release Date:
18/09/1964
Release Type:
Statement
Transcript ID:
993
Document:
00000993.pdf 5 Page(s)
Released by:
  • Menzies, Sir Robert Gordon
SPEECH BY RT. HON. SIR ROBERT MENZIES, K.T.C.H.Q.C.M.P ON COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
SPEECH
Rt. Hon. SI R ROBERT MENZIES,
M. P.,
ON
COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS'
CONFERENCE.
[ Fromt the Parliamentary Debates," 18.8.64.]
Sir ROBERT MENZIES ( Kooyong-
Prime Minister)-by leave-After I
returned from my overseas visit, and Parlia6-
ment not being in session, I gave a long
Press and television interview. It is not
my purpose to repeat all that I then said
Da-bthlee verbatim tape record will be avail-
to honorable members-but I do propose
to say something about some of the
highlights of my work.
For the record, I will say at once that
I propose a little later to lay on the table
-) of the House the text of the final communique
of the Prime Ministers' Conference.
I had intended -to pay a visit to Israel.
Indeed arrangements for this visit were well
advanced when, by reason of illness, I
found, with very great regret, that I had to
cancel my journey to that country. I hope
to make it on a future opportunity. In the
result, I had made sufficient recovery to
go to the Prime Ministers' Conference in
London via Washington. It was necessary
for me to leave London the day after the
Prime Ministers' Conference, in order to
be back in time for important Cabinet
discussions on the Budget.
Two matters emerged from my talks in
Washington. The first was that I was keen
to discover from the Administration
10543/ 64. whether the statement I had made in this
House on the A. N. Z. U. S. Treaty was one
with which they agreed. I should, I think,
quote the substance of what I said in the
House because there had been some controversy
about-the position inside Australia
and there had been, indeed, some misrepresentation
of what the then Minister for
External Affairs had said on this matter.
In this House on 21st April, I said-
The treaty is between the United States,
Australia and New Zealand. Article IV reiads-
" Each Party recognizes that an armed
attack in the Pacific Area on any of the
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety and declares that it would act to
meet the common danger in accordance with
its constitutional processes."
Of course, this should be in accordance with
constitutional processes. Very few countries go
automatically into a state of war. They all have
certain procedures to go through but, subject
to constitutional processes, which can operate
here just as much as they can anywhere else,
there is a clear statement that the parties will
act to meet the common danger in accordance
with their constitutional processes.
The article goes on-
" Any such armed attack and all measures
taken as a result thereof shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council of the United
Nations. Such measures sh-all be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security."

Article V reads-
" For the purpose of Article IV, an armed
attack on any of the Parties is deemed to
include an armed attack on the metropolitan
territory of any of the Parties, or on the island
territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific
or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft
in the Pacific."
Those words do not produce automatic hostilities,
because reference is made to constitutional processes,
but they contain in the clearest terms a
high-level acceptance of responsibility. It is not
for us to assume thut any great ally of ours will
avoid that any more than we will avoid it.
There is a contract between Australia and
America. It is a contr-ct based on the utmost goodwill,
the utmost good faith and unqualified friendship.
Each of us will stand by it.
I was happy to find in Washington that
my statement was accepted as a completely
accurate interpretation and that the State
Department had, in fact, ciirculated it as a
definite statement On the point. This, I
think, revealed a state of affairs eminently
satisfactory to Australia. It has, as I pointed
out last week when we were debating these
matters, been powerfully reinforced by the
recent statement of President Johnson, and
the terms of the resolution of both Houses
of the Congress. In the second place-and
I think I should report this having regard
to some comments that have been made-
President Johnson very promptly, at the
beginning of our discussions, stated his
pleasure and the pleasure of the American
people at our contribution, to the defence of
South Vietnam. He expressed pleasure both
with the content of our response and the
prompt way in which we had made it.
It is sometimes thought that Australia's
efforts in these fields, being relatively small,
are either of no significance or must provoke
some American criticism. This is not
so. The United States is the greatest power
in the world. It has given enormous aid to
other countries. It must occasionally fel
somewhat isolated. It would be more than
human if it did not occasionally feel that
it was being cast for the role of the world's
gendarme with the major responsibility for
keeping the peace. It is because of these
things that in Washington contributions by
other countries are welcomed as an identification
by other countries of their world
interests with those of the United States.
I have repeatedly said that while we
rely and will continue to rely very much on
the collaboration of the great powers in our own defence, that collaboration involves
mutual obligations which we will
at all times be prepared to honour. This
is well understood. I have not been able
to detect any mental reservations about
the friendship of the United States for Australia
or-and this is of broad importance
-the determination of the United States
to do all in its power to preserve the
peace in South East Asia and to prevent
the spread of aggressive Communism.
This attitude of mind has, in fact, been
illustrated vividly ' by recent events.
When I went on to the conference in
London, I was quite convinced that something
should be said to strengthen the
position of Malaysia and to make it clear
that, as a Commonwealth country, it enjoyed
the support, physically or morally or
both, of all the Commonwealth nations.
Honorable members will be familiar with
what I will call " the new vocabulary
There is a strong opposition to
" 1colonialism and to imperialism
and to what is now called neocolonialism."
As I understand it, " neocolonialism
" is an expression which relates
to a new or derivative form of
" 1colonialism It is, as honorable members
know, an expression frequently used by
the rulers of Indonesia to support their
allegation that the creation first of Malaya
and then of Malaysia did not represent
the termination of colonial rule but
represented an attempt by the former
,, colonial power to use the new independent
body and thus to deprive it otf
some of the attributes of complete political
independence. I
Considerable play has been made of the
fact that the military and paramilitary and
economic aid given to Malaysia ' by the
United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand represents some desire on the part
of predominantly European nations to
maintain a position of influence and thus
to treat Malaysia as not fully free. This
notion seemed to me-and I believe that
I will have the support of honorable members
in this view-to have a somewhat
dangerous quality. I therefore had a very
great desire to secure in the conference
some general support for Malaysia, a
support which should include that of the
West Indian, African and Asian members
of the Commonwealth.

A great deal of discussion occurred on
these matters with, at one stage, some
divergence of opinion but in the long run,
I am happy to say, a satisfactory result.
There was ' no disagreement about the
statement in the communique that " they
will maintain their efforts to reduce the
areas of international disagreement with all
the means within their power, while maintaining
both the strength and the resolution
to resist aggression from without or
subversion from within But there was a
difference of opinion as to whether, having
said this, we should give some assurance
tthe Prime Minister of Malaysia of our
sympathy and support in his efforts to preserve
the independence and integrity of his
country. Some thought that an expression
of sympathy was enough. My own view was
that it was inadequate; that one might well
sympathise with people without agreeing
with them or in any way backing them
up. I pointed out, and so did others, that
the word " support" did not necessarily
connote military support or even material
support, since the nature of the support
to be given would be for each member of
the Commonwealth to determine.
I did my best to point out that every new
African nation represented at the Conference
was jealous of its own independence and
would strongly resent any interference in
it by outside people. This, indeed, had been
demonstrated in the case of Kenya and
Tanganyika, each of which had, after independence,
been happy to receive British
military aid against aggressive movements.
I said as strongly as I could that what was
true in the case of African countries was
equally true in the case of Asian countries
Dand that Malaysia was entitled at the very
least to our strong moral support at the
United Nations and around the various diplomatic
posts in the world. I expressed the
view that a Commonwealth which was not
prepared to take a public stand in favour
of the political independence and territorial
integrity of all its members would be a
strange kind of Commonwealth. From our
point of view in Australia this is, of course,
extremely important. We are not supporting
Malaysia, as we do in the most practical
terms, because we have some colonialist
point of view. We have not. But we do
believe that we have obligations to sister
members of the Commonwealth while, of
course-and this may be stated quite frankly -we have some particular interest in the
preservation of Malaysia having regard to
the threat from Communist aggression
which -presses down upon us or in our direction
from the north. I am happy'to say -that
agreement was finally secured upon an expression,
not only of sympathy, but of support.
This was to me one of the crucial
matters in this Conference. The fact that it
was resolved in the manner contained in
the communique, a unanimous document,
is one of the facts which has enabled me
to say, as I have said publicly, that the
Conference achieved valuable results.
It will, I hope, ' be remembered-and I
repeatedly invited the Conference to remember
it-that when Malaysia was created it
secured the unanimous approval of an
earlier Prime Ministers' Conference, it
secured admission to membership of the
United Nations by a unanimous vote and
that, later on, when it was alleged by
Indonesia that the people of the Borneo
territories had been ignored, a special mission
set up by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations had found that there was
approval in those territories of wvhat had
been done.
It follows from all this, as I said to the
Conference, that the validity of the existence
of Malaysia cannot sensibly be challenged.
The challenge to it-in other words the so
called confrontation policy of Indonesiafinds
its expression in actual military aggression
across the frontiers of Malaysia. This
beipg a clear case of military aggression, the
argument that there were unsettled disputes
has a somewhat hollow sound. The plain
fact is that Malaysia is defending itself
against aggression and therefore comes
plainly within the Commonwealth statement
that there should be a resolution to resist
aggression from without or subversion from
within. It became clear, as the Conference proceeded,
that the problems of the new Commonwealth
must be approached patiently
and without illusions. An example of this
fact is to he found in one reference in the
communique. It is as follows-
They discussed the great significance of China
for South and South East Asia. They also discussed
the question of relations with China and
of her membership of the United Nations.
This, it will be seen, conveys very little.
The reason for this is that there were deep

divisions of opinion and of emphasis, and
that these rendered a more positive statement
impossible. I must recognise that from
the point of view of most of the African
countries, Asia, particularly South East
Asia, seems a long way off. They do not
feel that Communist China presents any
threat to them. When I presented views
which are based upon the aggressive policies
and activities of China in and around Laos
and Vietnam, I was told that this was
cold war talk, and that the cold war was,
for purposes of a Prime Ministers' Conference,
an irrelevancy. In some quarters there
even seemed to be an assumption that the
cold war had been created by the West, and
a failure to understand that but for the
tenacity and success of the great Western
powers in resisting the cold war and deterring
a hot one, the Prime Ministers might
have been meeting, if at all, in very different
circumstances. I mention this not by way of criticism but
by way of explaining some of the atmosphere
of a new Commonwealth meeting.
New nations, with different histories and
backgrounds and emotions, cannot be
expected to fall into our inherited patterns
of thought, or to see world conflict in the
same light as those of us who have treaty
associations and obligations and indeed
special regional problems of security and
survival. But I am not at all despondent.
The greatest value of these conferences is
that we are all conscious of our special,
though undefined, relationship to each other,
that we exchange our experience and views
with great vigour, but with personal goodwill,
and that we learn something from each
other. The Conference having noted-I am sure
with great satisfaction-that since the war
more than 20 countries, with a total population
of some 700 millions, had been brought
to sell-government by Great Britain,
and that others will shortly be added to
the list, became involved in a discussion
about Southern Rhodesia. Now, we all
agreed at the outset, and reaffirmed
-unanimously in the communique, that the
authority and responsibility for leading the
remaining colonies to independence must
continue to rest with Britain In spite of
this, and of the further fact that under the
agreed Soufhern Rhodesian Constitution of
1961, there will be an African majority of electors within a period variously estimated
at from five to ten years-I think I heard
somebody say it might be twelve-some of
the African leaders said they wanted a
discussion. It was pointed out to them that
as any further negotiations must be conducted
by Britain and as there were strong
political views and differences in Southern
Rhodesia itself, advice or instruction to
Britain might well complicate a task already
sufficiently delicate and difficult.
In the result, it was agreed that the
Southern Rhodesian problem should not be
discussed in full conference, but in a closed
session with restricted membership.
At the end of the Conference, it was
agreed that the matter could be referred
to in the communique, in the terms which
I now quote-
At the same time, Prime Ministers of other
Commonwealth countries expressed their views
to the Prime Minister of Britain on the question
of the progress of Southern Rhodesia towards
independence within the Commonwealth. They
welcomed the decision already announced by the
British Government that, as in the case of other
territories, the existence of sufficiently representative
institutions9 would be a condition of the grant
of independence to Southern Rhodesia.
We all agreed about that. It continues-
They also noted with approval the statement
already made by the British Government that they
would not recognise any unilaterial declaration of
fndependence--We all agreed about thatanid
the other Prime Ministers made it clear that
they would be unable to recognise any such
declaration. The view was also expressed that an Independence
Conference should be convened which the leaders
of alt parties in Southern Rhodesia should be free
to attend. The object would be to seek agreement
on the steps by which Southern Rhodesia might proceed
to independence within the Commonwealth
at the earliest practicable time on the basis of
majority rule. With a view to diminishing tensions
and preparing the way for such a conference, an
appeal was made for the release of all the detained
African leaders. The Prime Ministers called upon all
leaders and their supporters to exercise moderation
and to abstain from violence; and they affirmed
their belief that the best interest of all sections of
the population lay in developing confidence and
co-operation, on the basis of tolerance, mutual
understanding and justice. In this connection, they
recognised the necessity for giving confidence to
the minority community in Southern Rhodesia
that their interests would be protected.
The Prime Minister of Britain said that he would
give careful consideration to all the views expressed
by other Commonwealth Prime Ministers. At the
same time he emphasised that the Government of

Southern Rhodesia was constitutionally responsible
for the internal affairs of that territory and that the
question of the granting of independence was a
matter for decision by the British Parliament.
Frankness requires that I should tell -the
House that 1, for one, did not associate
myself with this public tendering of adviceadvice
which might be interpreted in some
quarters as instructions-to the Government
of the United Kingdom, which alone, as was
expressly conceded, had the power and the
responsibility. I want to put my position on
record to my brother members of this House.
So that there may be no misunderstanding,
I should make it clear that-
The Australian Government had
already offered friendly advice to
the Government of Southern Rhodesia,
stating our belief that the
end result to be arrived at, if
D aSdomutihtteerdn tRo hotdhees iaC owmimshoendw etoa lthb, e
was a voting roll which would
provide an African majority.
We took the view that if this result
was not achieved in due course, it
would probably be impossible for
the United Kingdom to grant
independence and therefore
Southern Rhodesia could not be
admitted to membership of the
Commonwealth, the Commonwealth
being an association of
independent nations.
D A unilateral declaration of independence
before the necessary conditions
existed had no chance of
Commonwealth recognition, and
would tend unhappily to isolate
Southern Rhodesia from Common-
3wealth affairs.
Those are all views that we ourselves had
put, through me, to Southern Rhodesia.
On the other hand, I indicated to the
Conference that I thought it would be a
dangerous precedent, and an invasion of
domestic jurisdiction, for the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers to get into a
position of sitting, as a body, to examine
the affairs of other members, and pronouncing
public judgments. I said that it was not
difficult to foresee circumstances in which
any one of us might find this intolerable.
This difference of view explains some of
the language of the communique. I was,
of course, as I hardly need to say, not opposed to the idea of a constitutional
conference about Southern Rhodesiaindeed,
that is inevitable-or the
adequate representation of the African
citizens; this is completely proper. But I
felt strongly that -the Government of the
United Kingdom should not -be handicapped
in its negotiations by public state,-
ments which could increase its difficulties
by stiffening resistance. After all, the problem
is not easy, and needs to be solved
in an atmosphere of mutual understanding.
It is proper to remember that there are
many thousands of settlers in Southern
Rhodesia, frequently of long standing and
with no other homes, strongly British in
their allegiance and with legitimate rights
to be protected, who will be unhappy at
becoming a minority in what is now a
fashionable African conccpt-a one party
republican state.
But, Sir, I am sure that most of them,
watching the tides of events in other former
African colonies, realise that there must be
an accommodation, and that -in due course
-and not too long a course-an accelerated
movement towards adult suffrage
must be completed, or the alternative
accepted, of mounting internal disorder, of
hostility among neighbours, and of a result
finally achieved in an atmosphere of hostility,
not friendship, with racial hostilities
unfavorable to the continuance of
European settlement and out of harmony
with those inter-racial relationships for
wich the new Commonwealth has come
to stand.
In the course of the general survey of
world affairs with which we normally begin
in Prime Ministers' Conferences I thought
it proper to make some reference to the
still ' current dispute between India and
Pakistan over Kashmir. This is a dispute
which has considerably embittered relations
between these two great countries and has
led to circumstances which do not aid
the presentation of a common front to
common dangers. Naturally, I had nothing
to say about the merits of the dispute,
about which there are deep differences of
. opinion. All I was concerned to say was that,
if the dispute could be solved by some
mutual accommodation, it should be of great
advantage to all of us. In view of what
has been subsequently said, I should make
it quite clear that the Conference did not

debate the merits or nature of these
differences of opinion. But it did happen
that the distinguished President of Pakistan,
Field Marshal Ayu-b Khan, and the Minister
for Finance in India, Mr. Krishnamachari
who, in the absence of Mr. Shastri, most
ably represented India, both made speeches
of a helpful kind. We all hoped that if the
atmosphere so created continued we might
see a settlement. But quite clearly the
problem is one for the two countries concerned.
I repeat that, as a meeting of Prime
Ministers, we were not sitting in judgment.
We thus by implication re-affirmed our
belief, to which I have referred elsewhere,
that we are not an arbitral body, that we
do not sit in judgment and that we
recognise that there are very important
domestic or intra-Commonwealth problems
in relation to which we should not seek to
impose our views.
We had some discussion, perhaps not
enough, looking back on it, on the importance
of and the problems associated with
economic development in the Commonwealth.
I say not enough, because I felt that
rather too much of our time was devoted
to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. In
the result, the economic problem might
have been dealt with in too general a way
and without useful definition if it had not
been for the fact that the Government of
the United Kingdom put forward a series
of positive proposals. These were put forward
as practical ways in which the
Commonwealth could be given added
vitality, meaning and purpose, as a sort of
co-operative association so as to be able to
help both its own members and the world at
large, and thereby contribute to world peace
by the raising of living standards and the
achievement of economic progress. As the
Communique records, various proposals
were advanced. They were in a broad way
accepted in principle. The final decision was
that they were to be put into study by
officials in the first instance to determine
how best they could be carried into effect.
Some of the proposals were as follows-
That technical assistance on a co-operative
project basis within the Commonwvealth
should be provided to aid the development
and use of resources.
I pause here to say that, as I said in
the Conference itself, it is a mistake to
think of the Commonwealth as an association of rich countries. Some indeed are
very poor. Some, like our own country, are
far from poor but are still heavily involved
in the importation of capital and technical
skill for our own industrial development.
Great Britain alone can be described as a
capital exporting country; but, as the Prime
Minister of Great Britain pointed out more
than once, sometimes with a wry smile,
there is a limit to what a nation with its
own balance of payments problems can do.
We were, therefore, not so much talking in
terms of massive capital assistance as we
were in terms of technical assistance, in
which field so much may be done by one
for another. I return to the proposals-
The . encouragement of closer contacts
between professional and other bodies
within the Commonwealth to strengthen
the links between us.
This is, I think, an attractive proposition.
It is quite true that nobody can attend amodern
Prime Ministers' Conference without
realising, sometimes with a shock, that
we * have very different ideas about the
institutions of government, and indeed, very
different ideas about democracy itself.
Quite a few of the newer Commonwealth
nations have one-party systems in which
the principle of one man, one vote becomes
quite ironical. Some have different ideas
on the rule of law from those which we
entertain. Some have different ideas about
the treatment of minorities from thos(
which we entertain. It would indeed be
quite impossible today to make a speech
about the Commonwealth in which the
point was made, as it used to be made
years ago, that we all had great constitutional
ideas in common; that we all believeJ
in Parliamentary democracy, in the
sovereignty of Parliament, and in the rule
of law. The sober fact today is that some
of us do and some of us do not. But this
is not a matter about which we are to
lecture each other. Indeed, I have constantly
opposed any idea that we are to
interfere in each other's domestic affairs.
Such interference violates the most classical
precepts of foreign policy; it is quite contrary
to the Charter of the United Nations;
and it is in my opinion a matter which
could seriously damage intra-Commonwealth
relations. For these reasons, I was
very glad to find some attention directed
towards the establishment of closer contacts

on matters in which we do have some
common interest and some common desire
for advancement. Examples of these are
obviously to be found in the establishment
of closer contacts between professional and
other bodies in relation to which there is this
community of interest.
Incidentally, Sir, I noticed recently that
the Leader of the Opposition ( Mr. Calwell)
seemed to be * under the impression that I
lectured the Prime Ministers on the
advantages of private enterprise. I can
relieve his mind; no such incident occurred.
SNobody has been more careful than I have
) been to make it clear that each member of
the Commonwealth is entitled to adopt
whatever system of government it likes,
and whatever economic principles or
policies seem best to it. I have attended the
last nine Prime Ministers' Conferences. In
that time, there has never been a discussion
on private enterprise or socialism. The
proposals continue-
The proposal that we should aim at the
pr~ ovision of financial assistance to the
developing of higher education in
Commonwealth countries.
Here again there is no doubt a limit to
financial aid. We know from our own
experience in Australia that higher education
is not cheap. Indeed the cost of university
education in Australia is mounting at a
mst formidable rate, while we have
.> recently received a report in relation to
-Papua and New Guinea which recommends
further developments of this kind in those
territories. Yet there still remains a field of aid
Yvhich we all thought should be explored.
-It may well be that Australia can aid some
other Commonwealth country or countries
by providing expert advice in the universities
field; by the provision of visiting professors,
lecturers or administrators. For similar purposes,
we must continue to receive in our
own universities students from other countries
and particularly from Commonwealth
countries with whom we have such a special
association and such close engagements.
The next proposal was-
The encouragement of specialised training
and research in public administration
with special emphasis on the needs of
developing Commonwealth countries.
This, I venture to say, is of prime importance.
That wise man, the Prime Minister of Nigeria, who presides over the destinies
of the largest of the African nations, has
more than once said to me that the great
shortage in all these countries is a shortage
of competent administrators. Here, I think,
we can help each other a good deal. The
Government of the United Kingdom had in
mind the establishment of some special
teaching or training body in London or in
connection with some university. I by no
means reject this idea, but I do feel that
in the long run the best training in administration
that can be given to people from
other Commonwealth countries is that they
should be, so to speak, fitted into the public
service of a more experienced nation so that
they may learn something of the rules and
practice of administration and something
of the mental and moral attitudes which
distinguish an advanced Civil Service in a
politically advanced country. The last proposal
I wish to mention was-
The convening of a Commonwvealth
Medical Conference in 1965.
This idea fits into what I was saying
earlier about professional bodies. Such a
conference would do good, because the
problems not only of personal medicine but
of public health are of immense importance,
more particularly in new nations where
medical services may be scanty and the
problems of public health extremely
complex. These various proposals, and there were
others, the nature of which is broadly stated
in the communique, must be converted from
vague expressions of principle into practical
schemes. Our officials will willingly contribute
to this result. If, in some or all of
these matters, an effective result is achieved.
we will, I think, have done a great deal to
put substance into a Commonwealth
relationship the nature of which has so
changed in recent years, and to counter the
scepticism which is frequently expressed as
to the capacity of the new Commonwealth
to endure.
The proposal for a Commonwealth Secretariat
is of course not a new one. It had,
over a period of years, been put forward
in general terms by Mr. Curtin and myself
and others. On this occasion, the idea was
first mentioned in the meeting by some of
the African Prime Ministers. The suggestion
was that there should be established in

London a central clearing house In the
first instance, it was suggested that it should
prepare documents on trade aid and
development and should circulate information
on these matters to all the members
of the Commonwealth. Then, by way of,
further or alternative suggestion, it was
proposed that the Secretariat might assist in
the preparations for the meetings of Primel'
Ministers in the sense of receiving and'
circulating papers, which would make us.
all much better informed of other problems
when we arrived. I myself drew'
attention to the Commonwealth Parliamen--;
tary Association and the small and useful'
secretariat which it has. I felt that a
Secretariat for the Commonwealth on the
Parliamentary Association model might encourage
members to put forward papers and
proposals for circulation, information and
consideration in advance of Prime
Ministers' meetings.
After general debate amongst the Prime
Ministers, it was decided to ask an official
committee to go into the proposal further
and to report back to the Prime Ministers
on what functions a Commonwealth
Secretariat should perform. The view I
stated was and is that the task of the
Secretariat should be to pool and coordinate
and disseminate information of a
factual kind. There should be no question
of a policy o~ r executive role. As the
examination proceeds, there may well be
considerable differences of opinion as to
what a Secretariat should do. Some may wish to have something resembling the
office and -functions of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, with considerable
executive significance. We must, I put to
the House, be astute to avoid constituting
the Commonwealth as a sort of committee
of the United Nations, with resolutions and
votes. If we are to achieve and maintain a
special significance, it will be by preserving
the informality of our association, and
the basic independence which each Commonwealth
country brings to the conference
table. It was at all times important that
this Conference should produce constructive
results and thus contribute to the
future of the Commonwealth. I think that
I should, therefore, pay tribute -to the
invaluable work of the Chairman. Sir Alec
Douglas-Home exhibited at all stages great
tact and fairness and admirable flexibility
of mind, a broad wisdom and a complete
knowledge of the subjects under discussion.
Without these elements, I would have
doubted more than once whether the Conference
would have a satisfactory conclusion.
It is proper, therefore, that I should
say that what were sometimes acute
differences of viewpoint were in a large
measure reconciled and that in the result
there was a general feeling that the new
Commonwealth had great usefulness and
could make a powerful contribution to
human destiny.
I present the following paper-
Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers,
1964-Final Communique dated 15th July
1964.
BY AUTHORITY: A. J. ARTHUR. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT PRINTER, CANBERRA.

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