Jest New Guinea at length
South~ . Af-rica Nev Guinea
Unemployment fi gure
Cons titutiona. refLormn
Restrictive Trade Fractices
cternai -Iffairs portfolio
L~ aos
Britisla Commonwealth Southi Africa
J.-hite Australia Policy
TEXT OF TV PRESS CONFEIhENCE JITH THE PRIME MINISTER,
THE RT. HON. E. G. MENZIES IN SYDNEY2 ON SUNDAY,
APRIL 1961
QUESTION: Mr. Prime Minister can we talk, first of all, about
West New Guinea? Both you and General Nasution have
said that as a result of your talks here in Australia
that the issue over West Now Guinea has been clarified and
has added, perhaps, to cotmton understanding. However the
two views remain quite opposed. Would you say the two
countries have grown farther apart, or closer together?
PRIME MINISTER: I would say closer togather for two reasons, applying
one each uray; So far as Indonesia is concerned it has
obtained quite readily, a statement by myself that
Australia has no military engagement with the Netherlands
direct or indirect. Ho attached irportanco to that. It
had been said before, but perhaps not by me. So from his
point of view that was something cleared up. And in my
turn I felt that I had cleared up with him pretty
completely the importance that we attach to selfdetermination
for the people of New Guinea, whether in
West Now Guinea or in our section of New Guinea. And I
think that that registered in his mind.
qUESTION: Do you feel, then, that they nay press less vigorously
this claim to West Now Guinea after these talks?
PRIME MINISTER: Well, I think that one should assume that they won't
abandon their claim, they'll pursue their claim. But I
think there will be less disposition, perhaps, to permit
people to suggest a forceful solution of the matter. I
think that the General means it when he says " We are not
going to use force to establish our case". But that he
will use propaganda, all these other means that are
available, is quite clear. In fact he was very frank
about it.
QUESTION: Do you think that the stand that we have taken may
increase the influence of the Communist Party in
Indonesia?
9PRIME MINISTER: I don't think so. The Communist Party in Indonesia, I
gather, is on the bandwagon, to use our expression on
this matter. It is among the leaders of the demand for
lest New Guinea. Then thero is a difference of opinion.
Some people there think that if the claim succeeded and
the Dutch handed over West New Guinea then the position of
the Government against the Communists would be
strengthened. I would take leave to doubt that. I would
think that if they could claim that they had a big hand
in ; etting West Now Guinea that their position might be
strengthened. But anyhow that is an Indonesian problem
at the moment, not mine though, of course, if the
Communists did a lot of good, made a lot of advance in
Indonesia that would be our problem.
QUESTION: Do you feel that the possibility of an incident
creating some greater conflict, which General Nasution
mentioned when he first came here, has disappeared now?
PRIME MINISTER: It would be saying too much to say that it had
disappeared. But I think the dan~ er has receded. Because
this business of infiltrators, and soue of them with
arms, has been discussed and has been made public.
Everybody now knows that this kind of thing has been
going on. And I think, thoreforu, that there will be a
little less csposition.
QUESTION: What will australia do, though, if such a conflict
does arise, whether it is limited guerilla activity that
you have referred to yourself, or open conflict?
PRIME MINISTER: Now that is a question that you really shouldn't ask
me at this stage. I said all I had to say about that in
my statement in the House.
QUESTION: Can I ask you this, Sir? On that don't you think it
would be of advantage if the Indonesians knew the type of
policy you were envisaging in such circumstances to
prevent then possibly bringing about a fait accompli in
that area?
PRIME MINISTER: I don't think so, no. What I indicated in my
statement in the House was that if anything of that kind,
if force were used I've forgotten whether I used the
actual expression either in wholesale or in retail and
this gave rise to arried conflict then of course we
couldn't profess not to be interested in it, deeply
interested in it. So are the other nations affected by
these natters. The United States would be deeply interest
-ed in it; Great Britain, all the SEATO powers would be
greatly interested in it. And then I indicated it was
something the United Nations itself couldn't ignore; and
that what any other nations irrespective of such an
intervention by the United Nations what they were to do,
they would have to determine. But I don't think that it
is wise in a natter of this kind for us to be sabrerattling.
There's enough of it been going on; I'd
like to keep it outside
QUESTION: Do you have any fears Sir, that the President of the
United States might adopt an attitude towards Indonesia
that would be opposed to your onm?
PRIME MINISTER: That would be opposed to mine? No, I have no fear.
It night be differcnt fron nine. You see what I mean by
that? It may be that the President I don't know, this
is pure speculation would find his nind attracted by
some forn of Trusteeship for West New Guinea. I mean
this thing is floated around. Not the kind of trusteeship
that was proposed by Malaya which was not a true
Trusteeship under the United Nations, but was an interim
mnanagenent, so to speak, before handing it over to
Indonesia. Well, the President may very well be
attracted by some idea of Trusteeship. We don't reject
soe idea of Trusteeship; neither indeed, so far as I
know, do the Dutch. It is when you get down to the brass
tacks of it, what kind of Trusteeship, who should be the
Trustee, who should be the Administering powers this is
the kind of thing that they . rgue about in the General
Assembly of the United Nations for about a year. We
night not be exactly identical in our views that's
the point that I want
QUESTION: In the event of there being conflict you have mentioned
that perhaps the United Nations would be interested. Is
there a possibility, do you think, that a United Nations
attitude may be, in fact, against Australia.' s stand on
this, with a majority of say the Afro-Asian nations
supporting Indonesia's claims?
PRIME MINISTER: The first thing that would be done if this were taken
to the United Nations would be that they would call for
a cessation of hostilities. That, one :; ould expect
would bring to an end for the time being, these matters
of hostilities fighting, the conflict on the spot.
QUESTION: Then you are quite right: if the United Nations then
said, " Well this has become a matter of international
significance and we therefore propose to investigate it",
and having investigated it proposed then tu alter the
sovereignty of host New Guinea, and they had the numbers
for it, well that could happen. You are asking me to
speculate now about something that is a contingency on a
contingency. Sir don't you feel that there is a contradiction in
the policy of one, recognition of sovereignty and two,
the insistence upon, or the preference for selfdetermination
on the Australian Government's part? Is
there any way in which the securing of self-determination
for the indigenous people can be brought about by
Australia? Could it go to some tribunal to get that?
PRIME MINISTER: Oh, I don t think so. I don't see this conflict that
you are speaking about. We have sovereignty over at
least portion of our New Guinea territory and we are the
Trust power in relation to the other. We recognise
Dutch sovereignty. But the whole point about selfdetermination
is that the colonial power, so to
describe it, having sovereignty, exercises that by
pursuing a policy designed ultimately to give the
indigenous people the right to determine their own
future. That is an exercise of sovereignty.
( rJESTION: Sir, if Indonesia got control of West New Guinea
legally and had a sovereignty that you recognised would
there be any chance of the indigenous natives of West
New Guinea achieving self-determination at any time in
the future?
PRIME MINISTER: None.
QUESTION: That would be the end of it. There would be a
conflict then?
PRIME MINISTER: That I thought was made quite clear by General
Nasution. It was one of the matters of discussion
between us. Because I was saying, " We think that selfdetermination
of these peoples is of the essence. The
-, utch have promised it; the Dutch have made an agreement
with us" which I quoted in the House " undertaking to:
pursue this end and you won't have it". And he said, " No,
we won't, because we regard West Now Guinea as part of
Indonesia, not as a colony of Java and Sumatra or
whatever it may be, but as part of Indonesia, and it
therefore would have no more right of self-determination
than Sumatra would, or the Celebes, or whatever it may
be". So that there is a marked distinction between the
Indonesian approach and our own, and the approach of the
Dutch. And I think this has been tbrought out into sharp
relief as a result of these discussions, in a perfectly
friendly way. There is the point of difference.
QUESTION: On the other hand we have shown our interest in selfdetermination;
and yet we have said in the agreeuent
that we will respect any decision mutually reached by
the Dutch and Indonesians about this which, in fact,
would not involve self-determination by the people of
West New Guinea, would it?
PRIME MINISTER: Oh, I see what you mean. You think there is a
conflict between the idea of sovereignty and the idea of
self-determination. I don't think so. We start off
about West New Guinea by saying " We recognise
sovereignty". We want our own sovereignty to be
recognised and we therefore respect the sovereignty of
the other man. One of the faculties of the sovereign
state is that if it wants to deal with its territory in
some way, it nay. It has agreed with us that it will
deal with that territory by producing self-determination.
But if it made an agree-ent tomorrow with Indonesia to
transfer Jest New Guinea to Indonesia, in the exercise of
its sovereignty, that of course w) uld be an end of selfdetermination.
But it wouldn't prove that our policy and
approach had been wrong. It would merely mean that the
Dutch themselves had changed the policy that is contained
in the Agreement with Australia. And we would regret it,
of course. Sovereignty is the paramount thing because it
is the beginning of the whole matter. Without sovereignty
it is idle to be talking to people about giving them
something in the way of self-deterination because only a
sovereign power can do that.
QUESTION: And yet in pushing self-determination hard do you
feel that wo may arouse snoe cynicism in certain quarters
about this very thing? I mean for instance, do you think
people may ask if Australia believes in self-determination
for the natives of South Africa, for the Bantu?
PRIME MINISTER: Well, of course, here you are raising the whole issue
of South African policy. You have to remember that the
Bantu population is in the sane country, South Africa,
within the Union of S. uth Africa, within the sane country
as the European people. It is not a case where you have
a separate race in a separate cor. mmunity in a spearate
spot, as we have with New Guinea. If you have a
geographical area like New Guinea, and there you have a
lot of Papuan people living in it, you can then talk
about self-determination for those people in that area,
because the problen lends itself to separate treatment.
But if we had the Papuans mixed up with our own people in
the Continent of Australia, you wouldn't be talking about
self-detormination because that would be an irrelevancy
you would be talking about racial policy, you would be
deciding whether you wore going to have intoeration or
separatencss; but you wuldn't be talking about selfdetermination
in the case of a com-: unity which itself was
a ringled community.
QUESTION: Mr. Menzies, could I switch to a local issue? Your
figures for those registored for oeploymnt are in the
neighbourhood of 82,000. Does the Govornoment regard this
as a satisfactory figure? Or does it propose remedial
action on that?
PRIME MINISTER: Well, you Imow, this expression " a satisfactory
figure" is a little bit . m. biguous, because if I say " Yes"
then I will be told I an all in favour of having 80,000
unemployed, which I am not. No figure of unemployment is
satisfactory so long as it exceeds the inevitable limited
numbor of people who will be unemployable and there are
some such, of course. But intrinsically, this is not a
critical figure, of course. The work fdrce today in
Australia is estinated to bo 4,200,000. And if, out of
that number, you h: ive 80,000 who are, at a given moment
registered for neployment, with of course another 20,000
vacancies bein advertised at the sane time, that is not
a critical figure, that . dosn't present a major problem.
But if it grow then of course nobody could ijnore it if
the nurboers grew.
QUESTION: The point is, Sir, that the Government does rocognise
it as a problem?
PRIME MINISTER: Look we exaggerate thle problem not for a
nonent. But so much do we have it on our mind th? every
week in Cabinet we have a report on the figures an.' iwe
have some discussion about where there nay be a pach of
unemployment, and what may be done about it. It's veiy
much in our minds.
QUESTION: Well how do you look at Queensland, Sir, where the
figure is
PRIME MINISTER: Queensland, of course, will always have a certain
amount of unemploynent, technically, because Queensland
has so nuch seasonal employment. If the cane cutting
season is long, then the people who are standing off are
fewer in numbers. If the cane cutting season is shorter,
then you will have people registered for employment rather
more numerously. Sane way with the neat season, so much
affected by the weather by whether they have had proper
rains in the cattle country beoause this will determine
the length of the killing season in places like
Rockhampton and Gladstone. Therefore there will always be
a slightly fluctu-. tir g figure in Queensland.
QU.. O: As you do reoard it as a problem, Sir, though not a
grave one at this stage, what remedial action lo you
contemplate for the foreseeable future?
PRIME MINISTER: Oh, well, look I'm not prepared to say that at this
stage because as I say, the problem doesn't call for
drastic action at the present time. What you do is to
have a look at Queensland, to take that example, and say,
" Well now is there really a serious pocket of unemploynent
chere; and if so where?" Then you consider whether
by some adjustment of your public works programne, or by
some dealing with the housing programj. io, you night be
able to bring about some relief in that area. But I an
not going to be dogmatic about this because that very
problem is at present under examination.
QUESTION: Would yju say, Sir, that likewise the repercussions of
the so-called " credit squeeze" don't call for drastic
action at the moment? In the way of remedy?
PRIME MINISTER: Well, you know, there seemed to be profound differences
of opinion on this natter. I noticed in your State and
mine that is if you are still a Victorian that there
is a widespread belief that the right cure now is to
restore import licensing, to slacken out on the credit
squeeze.
QUESTION: I don't think everybody in Victoria shares that view,
Sir, but I do think even some of your own friends feel
that perhaps the width of your own responsibilities today
and the pressure of day to day ev-nts moan that there
isn't sufficient attention possible for the job of
winning the next election right at this moment.
PRIME MINISTER: Well, it's interesting that y.) u should say that,
because I had a conference yesterday with what they call
the " organisational planners" in my Party, and they, and
I, had a very strong belief in common and that was that
we were : oing to win the next Election. And we
discussed ways and means of d: ing it.
QUESTION: Did you fix any taret, Sir, of what would be your
employnent figur for round about the election period?
PRIME MINISTER: No, no. All these estiratos of figures are, of course,
as you know, rather speculative.
QUESTION: What has happened, Sir, to one or two of the ie
loosely described, perhaps, as " planks of platfo:.--ch'at
haven't been mentioned for a little while constitutional
reform? Was there not an all-Party report subitted to
you on this apparently very vital question? Are we going
to hear any more of that in the course of this year, Sir?
PRIME MINISTER: Well we had a debate about it the other day in the
House. The Opposition, very naturally, is warmly in
favour of the entire report because it embodies
practically every constitutional principle they srcand for,
QUESTION: You haven't particularly fond memories of referendums
Ithink, Sir, have you?
PRIME MINISTER: I don't mind telling you I am a complete sceptic
about these referonduis: ' When in doubt, vote " No"'
QUESTION: And will constitutional reform require a referendum?
PRIME MINISTER: Oh, yes, oh, yes. Therefore you have to consider very
carefully not only whether it would be a. reeable to have
a particular am. endmont in the Constitution, because on a
number of occasions it would be, but you have to consider
' Will the people vote to include this amendment'? And
past experience, you know, doesn't lend nuch support to
the view that they will. Because the Constitution is a
complicated docunent, not very many people have read it,
and fewer have understood it. Judges have disagreed
about it; and the man down the street who is a sensible
chap says, " Well if the Judges can't make up their minds
what this means, who am I to say so?"
QUESTION: Does that mean, Sir, that there will be no
constitutional reform proposed?
PRIME MINISTER: Let me choose ny words with some care. I don't
anticipate that you will have a constitutional referendum
before or at the election.
QUESTION: Now, Sir, if we could ask : f one of these other
things that have been oposed by your Party. Will we
shortly hear of any progress in regard to restrictive
practices, and the measures necessary to eliminate them?
PRIME MINISTER: I'm sorry, old boy, but you have been so occupied with
such success in the television world that you haven't
been reading your parliamentary debates. Because the
Attorney-General has boon questioned about this matter
several times. And I can tell you that he takes this
problem very seriously; he has done an enormous amount of
work on it; he invostigated when he was over in Aerica
to see how they were handling their problem; we had
another investigation made in London about the working of
their Restrictive Practices Act. It is not a matter on
which the Commonwealth has single power. Therefore the
Attorney-General himself is in consultation with the
States on this matter. But it is not to be hurried. It
is no use pretending that you have discovered the answer
to all this, and putting duwn a piece of legislation that
can have a coach and six driven through it. But the work
is being continued. I myself attach very great importance
QUESTION: to securing the best possible measure that can be got in
collaboration with the States.
Have you any hope, Sir, that at least the broad
principles can be stated in your Policy Speech wh ch
should be the end of this year?
PRIME MINISTER: I would hope so.
QUESTION: Sir, there has been a great deal of talk about the
burden that you bear carrying the External Affairs portfolio
as well as the Prime Ministership. Is there any
chance that you will be relinquishing that portfolio?
PRIME MINISTER: I don't know yet. All I can say is that I have had
two najor operations in the capacity n-t intc':-..
operations major operations in the field of rYl:; r. al
Affairs, that relating to the Prine Ministers'
Conference and South Africa an'. the attendant mi. a-; turs,
and the other matters on which I spoke the other day. I
don't think anybody, really, on either side of the H* ouseo
felt that I wasn't informed on the matters that I dealt
with.
QUESTION: Without suggesting that, Sir, don't you feel that a
weakness could be that in this day and age there must, of
necessity, be contact with Asian heads of State, and your
dual role which demands your presence at Primeo Iinistrs'
Conferences, for exaniple, and things like that, "-n. ter
restricts your ability to , o to Asia to see thes0 ., eople?
PRIME MINISTER: Look if that is a disability in ne, let me remind you
that it is a disability which is shared by the Prime
Minister of Now Zealand and by the Prime Minister of India
QUESTION: By the way, Sir, wasn't there criticisn of that by
your : wn High Cornissioner in India, Mr. Crocker, in a
departmental document?
PRIME MINISTER: Was there? Well, I haven't seen it. You seem to have
an infra-red eye.
QUESTION: When Lord Casey was Prine Minister up until January
last year, I think, it would be true to say that he
travelled very intensively in Asia. Do you feel that you
have been able to do that as nuch as you would have
perhaps liked because of the fact that you occupy both
portfolios?
PRIME MINISTER: I think I have done it enough. Y. u can overdo this
business, you know. I find when I an talking to Foreign
Secretaries around the world, both in aeigland and in
iWashington, that they are all getting a little tired of
the idea that a F: reign Secretary, or a Foreign Minister,
has to be in the air all the tine. They have been forced
to the conclusion that if there is to be continuity of
policy there has to be a great deal of work done at the
centre, and more responsibility imposed on Abassadors.
And consequently if I wore Foreign Minn ister Minister for
External Affairs, and nothing else, you wouldn't get me
hurtling around the world at a great rate, at intervals o:
a nonth or two. I'n not criticising anybody. I would
find that, nyself, inconsistent with the proper performance
of my policy work. Other people thrive on it. John
Foster Dulles absolutely throve ontravelling around.
QUESTION: At the other end of the scale, Sir. we have Mr.
Khrushchev who does get around a grea deal, doesn't he?
Presumably because he fools that it is worthwhile,
particularly in the part of the world in which we have
this vital stake, in sia.
PRIME MINISTER: But you nust always ronember that Mr. Khrush. r-v. has
an extraordinarily what shall I say?-well-dis.:-, lined
administrative structure under hi., and is, hirs: o7
essentially, the reatest living Minister for Pc-, ania
and propagandca, he finds, is nore usofully exhibi..:.
outside his own country. And so he -oes.
QU-STION: Do you ever attempt to enwy him these advantages of
his efficient propaganda
PRIME MINISTER: Never! You see I have a reasonable oxpLect-tiov1 tho. t
when I an dismissed I'll still be alive.
feel that this is an enormous advantage in c
country. ( Laughter)
QUESTION: Sir, if we c., uld ask you a qu.-sti n as PrimLe i, . ister
and Minister for External Affairs, Yo-u must be v y
disturbed about the events in Laos the last cuup'. of
days. Do you regard then as very dangorous?
PRIME MINISTER: Yes, I do. This thin isn't going very well., the
SEATO meeting we were aobl to get a unanimous on the
part of the S.., TO powers in favour of having an d, .~ endent,
united, neutral Laos, quite independent r'l
by the Soviet Union or the Comnmunist powers., . l
by the Wostern world. That was the objectiv, . n
order to get that a proposal was made by Great 1 M. jn
which was approved of by the United States for r : easoefire,
for the re-constitution . f the Internati-,.: l
Control Comission and the re-cAlling of a 14-pc o; er
Conference. All this looked to be good. And the Soviet
Union itself, after a little delay, agreed and has joined
in the call for a cease-fire. I hope, bona fide.
QUESTION: You have some doubts about that?
PRIME MINISTER: Certainly Because the fighting has gone on. The
Pathet Lao has been fighting and fighting since, making
advances since. I would like to be sure that the Soviet
Union has exercised its imeo nse influence with the Pathet
Lao, the Comnunist group, to bring about a cuaso-firo.
But as it is the fighting is going on. And roc-lly, as at
today, as you know, the position is very serious. It may
be that before the Conference can over be in there will
be a conquest of the essential areas of the country and
once the Cor. unists become established in that fashion
it is not a simple natter to get rid of then; and
indeed every SE._ TO power will have to think very hard in
the next day or two about the circunstance that arises
should the capital, the r:) yal capital and the administrative
capital, both of them, fall to the Cor. unists.
QUESTION: Is SEATO allowed to intervene in Laos, as there has
boon no indictable invasion?
PRIME MINISTER: It could intervene un. ler the South East ,. sian Treaty
on the request of the King.
QUESTION: Has ti re been such a request, Sir?
PRIME MINISTER: Well, not up to the uonent.
QUESTION: Do you anticipate Sir?
PRIME MINISTER: I don't know.
QUESTION: I think a point that viewers would like very much to
hear from you, Sir is what you consider nenbers of the
British Commonwealth still have in cor. mon? And \ hrt do
you see as the future? A lot of people, I thin, ': nk
that there is a slow disintegration, or an end1' the
worth of the Comr. ionwealth.
PRIME MINISTER: Well, I think, in spite of what has happenoed, . at tbo
great thing we have in common is that we all rec,
that we stand in a rather special relationship to eoc.
other naybe rather undefinable but a rathe:--
relationship to each other which enables us t: o . ct a;-t
Prime Ministers' Conference and have a discussloi,
the doors, of a kind that I don't think you couldc Cs.-; L; y
have in any committee or forum of the United fntj* i'::
Now that is a tremendous advantage. We c:
other pretty well and we can talk quite
other. We can assist each other, if you . o3 I
that way, with advice on matters falling wi"'-o-' tC rn
experience. My trouble, essentially, abc. tt thiJ. > t one
was that I felt that South Africa, being . ff! et put out
on a matter which was a problem of policy '.. s: idj
boundaries of South Africa, may, if we are noet. ' ul.
give rise to further difficulties in the we
begin to talk, in the Prime Ministers' t
our internal, what we all think of our int..-il " s,
then I don't see any end to it. Perhaps
to the Cornonwealth by these recent event i. ll. n
realisation into the minds of the other irO.;
countries that this process is not to be l c,' 2.
continue, except perhaps under the nost
circumstances.
QUESTION: Was that your motive, Sir in raising the ' i: d.. 3
Australia question so promptly when this thing happenqd?
PRIME MINISTER: I'd like to make it clear that I didn't raise the
White Australia question nor do I ever refer to the
White Australia policy, as a matter of fact: I refer to
our immigration policy. That matter was promptly raised
by Sir Edgar Whitehead of Rhodesia ad was given some
prominence. That having boon raised I, in private, took
the opportunity of pointing out to my dolloa~ as in the
Conference that that was our business, just as wvhat
happened to the Chinese inlialaya was Malay's b usiness and
not mine, just as what oight happen about the Tamils in
Ceylon was the business of Ceylon not nine.
QUESTION: This support, Sir, for domestic jurisdiction which
you have adhered to in the Colrmonwealth is not so now, in
the United Nations, where Australia recently cast a vote
condemning apartheid. Is there some danger, do you
think, that we may be accused of doing one thing in the
Commonwealth, and another thing in the United Nations
over this?
PRIME MINISTER: I have been. I have been accused. An eminent
journal in this city, when the vote had been cast in the
United Nations, said that I was the grotost political
acrobat of all time. But when I nmde my full statement on
this matter to Parliament and had explained our actions
on this matter Igot a very commendatory leading article
in the sane paper. So the acrobatics were not all one gvy.
QUESTION: Why were thc.' e acrobatics, as you put it, Sir? Why
did we change our policy at U. N?
PRIME MINISTER: Well, the position historically, in the United
Nations was that Groat Britain and Australia had, over a
number of years, voted a. ainst this ros. lution not
because they were in favour of apartheid, but because
they said that this was a natter of domestic jurisdiction,
This tine Great Britain altered itL vote from opposition
to straight out support.
QUESTION: Was that a surprise to you?
PRIME MINISTER: It was. A complete surprise. I had knowledge of it a
few hours before the vote was to be taken. In the
result they said, " We raintain domestic jurisdiction, we
maintain our attitude on that; but in the events that
have happened and particularly the removal of S ) uth
Africa from the Commonwealth, this matter now has
achieved international si. nificanco, and we therefore
propose to vote fcr it". And Aust-L-lia? What would have
happened to us if we had been the only Corinonwealth
country standing out sitting . ver there with Portgual?
We would have been r. isrepresented all over Asia about our
attitude; and we were not going to be misrepresented. We
had had enough. We weren't gping to be misrepirosonted any
further. So we voted with the United Kingdom.