PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Holt, Harold

Period of Service: 26/01/1966 - 19/12/1967
Release Date:
22/11/1966
Release Type:
Press Conference
Transcript ID:
1442
Document:
00001442.pdf 7 Page(s)
Released by:
  • Holt, Harold Edward
PRESS CONFERENCE BENDIGO, VICTORIA

Well gentlemn, I an sorry to have kept you waiting. We haven't been dallying I assure you, but there has been much to be done, and rather than hold you up whil I make a lengthy statement  an anything, I intend to give the discussion over to you for questions first  - answers by me if I can provide them.

But there is one matter which I would like to open up with you,  and you will be aware right through this campaign that there Is very little coming from the A. L. P. leaidership, or for that matter spokesman for the ALP about the detail of their Defence, policy. Mr. Calwell did include some very brief passages in the Policy Speech but there's been no attempt at definition of their proposals in the course of the campaign until we  find that in this last week of the campaign, we have the Deputy Leader, Mr Whitlam, putting an interpretation on their policy which I feel sure will come as surprise to Mr. Calvell and certainly is entirely inconsistent with the general view that Mr. Calwell has been putting thoughout the campaign.

He has made it clear that his intention is to bring Anstralian forces In Vietnam back to Australia - the National Servicemen or consscripts - immediately . isediatelys or as oon as practicable, and
the remainder after cossultation with our allies. in one
speech I think It will be agreed that he made it evident that
the consultation Itself was not a consultation likely to lead
to a retestioa of Australian forces In Vietnaim: it would
mezely relate to the seams of their withdrawal, and the timing
of their withdrawal. Andi indeed, it might very wall be the
case that seeing tha. Australia has been allotted an area of
responsibility related to the strength of the task force that
ones the National Service component which in some musteriavs
would be a very substantial proportion of the total, had been
withdrawn, those that remained might find themselves incapable*
not merely of carrying oujt the responsibilities of the area,
but of even defending their ova position In the area, and consultation
could In the result relate to the security with
allied assistance, of our oa remainder of regulax forces left
there.

66/ 120 6
PIgBss ( cont.)
That is oe aspect of the matter which I think should be
mentioned. The other is this interpretation which Mr. Vkktlanv
apparently without consultation of his Liert and certainly
without any prior Indication from any policy-naking source of
the Labor Party has put on the policy that they would pursue
but I an particularly referring to this evening those other
matters are of Importances they havem't quite the sam novelty
as one report attributed to Mr. Cainell ' Viicb I have only
won In ona 2iaper,, but it : is a paper which I an sure Mr. Fitchatt
would accept as an authoritative source, and that Is the Sydney
Morning Herald. I vould gatber from it that It proceeds from
the representative of the paper accompanying Mr:. Calwall. It
0 appeared in my edition anyhow,, of the Sydney Morning Herald
thisa morning.
It is headed " CALWMLL PLANl FOR W1 ' LIKS HAflI4L~ GLUM41
and headed " 2ownsvilles Mondayt" or at least under that
heading appears " Tosville ) tonay. A Citizen Military Force
of between 120,000 and 1401,000 mm ms suggested tonight by
the Opposition Leader, Mr. A. A. Calvall. This force would be
in addition to regular forcesi at about the present level.
Mr. Cal" 6ll" ( and I am qjuoting from the repori., of course)' vwas
ijivin3 his first defimitica' ( I stress that -his first
fefiniiion. of his Defence proposals since his J'olicy Speech
11 days agO and itts because of this categorical statmuiet
by the writer that I asszume be's somebody vftovs been ac ; nipaaying
Mr. Calwall on his tour. I don't vouch for thatv but that's a
reasonable assuaptiou to make from the text. He said'tie
Australia& Cliizn Forces would need between 120,000 and 140,000
men in all services If I'm sorry, " The Australian Clixizen
Force would need b~ eten 120,000 and 140,000 men In all services
if It were to be given ' Ireal teeth" like the A.', rican Natioxal
Gjard," land again I give what Is put in the quotation invorted
comas therefore, attributable ' to him, " The American Nationial
Gi'ard files supersonic aircraft and contains Armoured divisions"
He said ' t is a fallacy to ' think of the part-timer as unskilled.
The Citixen Forces should surely be given a chance to show their
paces. The should be given special bonuses ( just tell
ne if Iv'a going too f ast a n this, you can have the text
later) the 04? should be given special bonuses such as
housing loam. ad education grants to assist recruiting.",

66/ 207
mrlssS ( cant.)
CaluVll Said a Lbbor Goverznent would reintro duc* the Citixm
Airforce, the Cbvernentfs Defence Policy bed, failed to
attract sufficient volunteers yet vast numbers of those vho did
vol unteer for service ithin Australia mare turned away on
educational grounds. Mr.* Clell said the Goerets*
Military adviser* should examixe the practicability of bringing
tbese am si to a Ilassable standard of educadon. during; the
first 12 months of their training. This would give then an
attractive Armed Jervices Career in which they could take a
pride. have no sympathy for a Government which Shouts about
threats to Australia and the admits it cannot get enough
O volunteers r Mr. Colwell sad.*
110ur Armed Forces ame is such a pathetic condition that if the
whiole lot war* thrown into s& me overseas action they could make
so significant contribution. ws really have nothing with which
to dend our country. The Halt Governent to Defence establishme.
is a abobless that's viby we ame lsarning so heavily on
Americas policy."'
W& el1, there's comment that could be mad* on all the latter
part but the significant aslict I think for Immediate purposes
is that here is a = w line of policy stateet which appears In
the IasM. week of the campaign. There Is no indication that It
has proceeded from any of the official policy-making sources
of the Labor Party. itsm going to give you in a noment the
actual, militia figures in the three services so that you'll
se what kind of an undortakin Ur. Calvell Is Putloing. I
have here the Defence Repor t for 1966g and you mill gather from
this tha neither of the two regular services of the Navy and
the Airforce rely to any substantial extent upon citissa force
components. The Navy at Jume 1966 had just under 3800, that is 3,717.
The Airforce at that points June 1966# had 665& and the Army
had 32,702. The total in the CUitius Forces In three services
usn 36,708. Now there axe a few points to be made about
that.
One. Is, of course, that the Army strength has been greatly
Increased In the O43 as a result of the choice * 2ich Is now
available for those who would peefier to join the OWI to
taking the risk of being ballotted Into National Service under
the National Service Schm arrangementes and if you look at th C

66/ 208
PVR3 _( cont.)
figjur& for June 1965 wheup as~ I understand it, the National
Service Scw bocame effective# the figure then VMS 38,146,1
& Wd the year befare 27,500, the year before that 27,300 -so
It** pretty clear that this Sharp lift of just on 4,000 betwen
1965 and 1960 was attributable to the Incentive that -Ji
ewdstae of the National 5ervice, ; de. provided.
Consequently, if you abandon Nationa" Services then I think
O'ie realistic tIjjx* to be looking at in relation to Xr.
Calwall's 320,000 to 140,000 is the figure of the total of
Zitizen Formes at j~ m 1965 ol 322632. Now a few points
immediately.. DO YOU MIND) IF? I HAVE A QtESIOff ? SR& SIR? ARR VW AMIUING
3Y THIS nMA tVX1I GMF IS A FAILURB, OM R& CRWIWS PR001IMUS
A FAILMS FOR THS W4 VDLB3.3 YOU HAVE T18 TM4E& r OF H& l'IOMtL
ZIWICM?
No. Jhaf.-w're saying is ' that the target for tbt CXrP is a
target of 35,000 at~ the present tim# e aid on the latest
figureS the dtizea FOce OXPectatica is ' that we Will have
9 reached that target by 1967.
DiO YXT7 S~ O ZM 4M Z R~ OUD BZ AT. 11BUUr Tro
PATRI01I, 14 OR " OM MOTIV . IiW M". T ARISING OU? 0W 21E FAC?
VIAT TUCE I~ rNa-MMONAL S: I= fLJXCON HAZ D3TIOa~ a0 l CaDi.
Wel, that ajl be so, bus, It vwant all that good4 in 1964
for example. o It no t Il'a saying that. undoubtea7~ the fact
that there mas a Natilaal Siervice Scheme has assisted in producing
the higher 460-tal and I doon' arguem by any means that the
schme has proved or the recruiting has proved failure,
because as at 1962 for example, it was less than. 21,000.
ittsi been moving up year by year until it has reached
this fiqj'r* of I'ma sorry, 1963: 27,000. It was Sairly
ea-4-ic around ' 63, ' 64, $ 65, youi aust have in mind that tlare
is a time period of service in the CKI, ad you have to replace
therefore, those that. are moving out* so whiat has kmppened in
the period from June ' 65 to ' 66 is, theaw's not really been a
replacamnt, of the normal wastage, but quite a significaut lift
in the strength of the forces, but what I ' a really wanting to
get at in this comet is that again you have Labor Party
policy undertaking which has mo relation to the realism of
our Current situation.

66/ 209
To train 120,000 to 140,000 people in Citixen mlilitary Forces,
particularly wbn you ' d removed from the Resgular Force that
National Service element aind therefore reduced your Regular
Force to betwen 24,000 & Wd 25# 000 you'd need a very large
proportioa of your rgt4. ar force fox the trainin, of your
Citizen Military Force. Woi w" om of the liniting factors
w found when So set out to increase oa own Qegular Amy.
The number of %; he regular -omore experienced regular service-.
men sho had to b. allocated to trainiagg limited the contribution
we Mgrt able to Rake in respect of our Various Camitments and
if you're to have 120,000 to 140# 000# mail first of all there
are the various munitions and supplies, usiforms and equipment
required for such a vastly expanded force# and tham the draw am
the sklled persanil of the " gular Forces for their traning
fir. Calwall talks about training them in the use of supersonic
aircrafts and the otber arsoured divisions and so Sorth
in the Amrican Hational ( Garxd wall what sort of draw this
would make on Australiats comaratively limited resources of
a-uipmwnt of this kind# it it can be Anagined, although no.* o
could put a precise estimate on it.
ATcen clso I think, has to bedawn row Wrvv is that
by the criticisms, and analyses of their policies that on the
ong hand th Dputy Leader has sought to rationalise their
situatlun by adopting ini~ erprotatiuas which certainly have not
0: 00 * Q the south of the leader of the Party. On the other
hand, the Loader of the Party has coat up with a scheme which
Ila sure vill have struck Mr. * Whitlam with a* smuch su. rprise
as Mr. .4iitlants interpretation brought surprise to his Leader.
There's moLhing in ihat has been said, so far as Ila are,,
by any Labr spokesman earlier to suqggest that they had in corntemplation
a hiome force program* e of the order cf 120,000 o
140,000 man, so once agaia you get %, he vagueness of Labor's
proposals which T& en spelled out by them reveal '-hemselves as
completely unrealisic. They sees to have bees panicbsd ino
making theso ruttift~ these proposals or these explanations
forward, and I think the public wifl treat them both sith
the reservation that they deserve and aem in theme agjain an
indicatios that the Labor Party basalt bought through its policy
sufficiently clearly to he Justified in giving being given
the responsibility for implasenting them.

66/ 210
PRSS ( coat.)
4IY PANIC, t. PRIMW MINTST1R? YOU MNIOND ? HB D " PANIC."
' W PAM C,'
Because they can feel that the tide of public support is ruming
against them, and this is where they believe themaselves to be
most vulnerable. They know that the public has been troubled
by the prospect of Australian Porces being withdraw by the
concept of fortress Australias in which Australia would b'
looking to its om resources.
Mr. lItlm tried to answer this by pointiLg out that their
policy doesn't necessarily mean withdrawal of our regular forces,
Mr. alell on the other hand, who clearly intends that it should,
is driven to finding sm satisfactory anasmwr and be comes up
9 with a greatly expanded home guard. How, he kept saying that
he wouldn't reort to conscription for his purposes. e have
mployed all the methods that occurred to us including Laprove.
pay and conditions, various benefits for the militia and until
the introduction of National errvice it had produced a otal
of 28,000 as at June 1965, so what methods be proposes -to adopt
to get 120,000 to 140,000 are still wrapped in the mists of
mystery. YOU PIND I 140,000 IMPOSSIL. B. AS I UDRfTAND) IU?
I find it am impracticable target in relation having regard
to the training requiresmoute, the provisioning, the draw it
would male oan the economy at a time iban the econmy is fully
employed. It would be putting the country on well If not
on a war footLg", it would make very heavy drains on the
national resources at a time * tn his other policy proposals
suggests that he would be drawing heavily on resources to give
effect to them.
I ' 11 probably be saying something about this tonight as ell.
but thought I' 4 give you in am atmosphere where + he matter
could be put without iaterruption the fiLures as I have
them.
Now, over to amy genmeral questions:

66/ 211
PRS ( cont.)
MR.* PRIMS MINISTER: 00 4CNALTH OF'PICS AiRS PLA-? WD FOR WflMI0O
T0 8ktI ALL DaPAa1m48IW now sc&?? SR ro ( ms HAaflIAmsR
CDMLD ' oU sAY tWiEX ThW alILDINS3 WILL aS SUECMD'b
No, Itm afraid I cocldn't. It# s nlot mtter * dCh fallS
within Uy ova province, but hbae You sou~ ht that aswer from
tbe Minister directly concermie
NO SIR.
I cot~ d t.-y to Ujet It for yoA Wan 10W caapaijn conClud*$
in fact, w'll y aW~ A~ t it X-r you tomorrow.
SOCOID. Y M4R. PiWU3 MIHI1BR: USI 0304WWRALH OGWINMiCS3
BBNDXOO tA'UU) A l4AJOA aLLJU'i. dAW1 I~ i TWL~ oT
PAIflG 00,1 11-1 FACM0iY; aLL IT ' RaWN AT X~ i PRES16NT 4) RK
FORCE OR 4d LL as$ o a) IVL. 0imwI as aYSM ukt ATI ~ i ni w1 mXoNAL
D6UM ? LANI
; f1l, valve 0one to som trouble over the years in order to
keep the factory Voing. I~ ve regaded it as valuable both
to the irAfttrial development of Bewdi~ o œ taelfp & Wl the
mploysumt uhich i~ c ;, ves, but also been ret.. ardsid as a
useful * lewent in the Qamoawealtb's munition. uaking capacity
and I mul~ d vithout having technical asuers, with net think
it reasonable assime that It mould bav* a& * xpaLoding
rather than a dinisbing role. 14a speaking without retfoence
to the Minister concerned. The Minister -% cor ziipply would be
the Minliter directly involved in this.

1442