

# PRIME MINISTER

E. & O. C. - PROOF ONLY

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE, AMBASSADOR BEACH HOTEL, NASSAU 16 OCTOBER 1985

JOURNALIST: Mr Hawke, you were talking on the BBC only Thirteen days ago about wide spread mandatory senctions. Do you feel now you have altered ahead a bit on that?

PK: Of course not, I wish you would be fair enough when you are talking about the position of myself and the Government to lock at the whole statement and series of statements we've made about our position on this issue and how we would be approaching the question at the Commonwealth Heads of Government. At all points we have made it clear that of course we would be talking about the questions of sanctions and urging the Commonwealth to prepare itself for the taking of sanctions. And they would be widespread sanctions. made it quite clear from the time of the 19 August when the Cabinet first considered this question in some detail, that we would be talking about a graduated step-by-step process. The words that were used at the time were repeated last month by Bill Hayden in the United Nations, That what we want to come is a situation W. we possibly can where no sanctions at all are necessary. That the two prong process that we will be putting to the Commonwealth here will be to look at the process of sanctions, what is available to be applied, and what should be applied if the approach of socking discussion and dialogue is not affective. And we will be putting in some detail starting tomorrow and through the discussion on Thursday and Friday the approach of the Government which we have discussed and now broadly with a number of our colleagues in the Commonwealth which pays here are the series of sanctions increasing in intensity which we should be prepared as a Commonwealth to institute which we as Australia will be prepared to be associated with, if the process that we are seeking of looking for dialogue with South Africa does not produce positive results. Now that has been clearly our position from the beginning in all the discussions, both orally and by letter with our colleagues in the Commonwealth, that's the position we have been putting and we have been putting hore.

And to take one line of something that has been said in the BBC interview is a totally unfair representation of what we have consistently been saying from August until now, and we will continue to put here in this conference.

JOURNALIST: Shouldn't you have said that in the BBC interview?

Well, what I said in the BBC interview was relevant to the context in which if was being said. Well you are likely to have a position where Mrs Thatcher would be arguing that that possibility of sanctdons should not be contemplated. Now I am concerned to say then and now, that of course we should be talking about widespread economic santions. What we will be talking about here, will be to look at the whole spectrum of time and intensity of sanctions. And there is no doubt that in this discussion we will be saying that if the processes of dialogue that we will seek to create don't work, if possibly a first tronchs of sanctions don't work then we have got to be looking right through the spectman to wide-spread sanctions and using the language of the United Nations, It would be appropriate to talk about the possibilty at the end of that spectrum of time of mandatory universal sanctions. So of course, one has been talking about that but at all points I have been saying where we have had the opportunity of detailing the position : of the Government that we are looking at a step by step process. I would hope that out of the decisions we can get here that we would be able to reach a position where the regime in South Africa would see that the Commonwealth having looked at this whole spectrum, having contemplated a series of steps leading to the possibility that the end if nothing else would work of mandatory sanctions through the United Nations, that the very fact of spelling out our proposed ness to contemplate that sort of approach could lead to a position where you did not have to use the sanction process at all, that they would respond to the indication that we were prepared to go that route and understand themselves that it makes much more sense in terms of some of the interests that they are seeking to protect, to start to talk and to chango.

JOURNALIST: Sir, Isn't your hope that that approach could be as a comprenise with both Mrs Thatcher and the Black Africans would except?

I've had the opportunity of talking now with President Raunda. I had a long talk with him last night. And he is at one with me in this approach in saying of course they would much prefer a situation where there is no need for sanctions, because it should be remembered, particulary in terms of the most effective of sanctions that they are as likely given the reaction of South Africa to have a heavy effect on the front line States. And so Kenneth Raunda speaking with I believe great authority, for the African States and particularly the Front Lines States is saying yes they would prefer a situation where while we talk about sanctions, prepare ourselves for implementing them.

We should be at the same time saying, well look, here are the steps that we ought to be taken, be should address ourselves to the processes of change. We should talk about whether, as I've said, the creation of group of Eminent People would be a sensible part of trying to establish that dialogue. And Kuanda agrees with that.

JOURNALIST: Mr Hawke, how long have have they got before you introduce sanctions? What is him limit?

PM: I am here as the Head of the Australian Delegation. I mean, for better or for worse I'm not making the decision for the Commonwealth. But we would be suggesting to the Commonwealth and in the discussions, lets see what comes out. But let me make this observation, that I think that we haven't got unlimited time. That I think we ought to be talking about, at least in regard to a first range of canctions, the possibility of saying if by approximately the end of this year or early next year, which is not very long away, that if there aren't signs of positive responses, than we ought to be talking about implementing action which could embrace a lot of what has already been done by a number of nations, including nations of the Commonwealth.

## JOURNALIST: Specifically, what Mr Hawke?

Well I think that it is fair that I put these details to the Meeting. But let me say this. The concept of what I am putting is that it seems to me, that you would look at catagories of possible sanctions, increasing in severity, and also may I say, increasing in terms of their possible impact upon the front ling States. And one would hope that if it was understood, a preparedness to move in stages like that, that you would increase the capacity to put pressure upon south Africa to be prepared to talk. Now, therefore, to what was to be included in those categories, if this sort of approach recommends itself to the Commonwealth, is a matter for discussion. I mean some people will have different views as to what things should be included at various stages. But I see it as important to try and particularly get Britain to understand that we are not here wishing to talk about sanctions for the sake of sanctions, that all of us, including the Front Line States in Africa would much prefer a situation where we can get dialogue, And if by talking about that sort of approach, it increases our capacity to get that sort of understanding by Africa. Feel so much more likely are we to be able to get a common decision out of the Commonwealth Meeting.

JOURNALIST: Mr Hawke, the South African Government has

PN: You it has.

JOURNALIST: Have you got any real hope that they will come to a dimlogue with some group set up by the Commonwealth?

PM: Well, let me say this, that I think there is evidence of very considerable concern within South Africa at the level of business. I mean I have had the opportunity of talking with President Raunda, who went into considerable detail with me of the meeting between the rapresentatives of the South African business community, and the ANC which he faciliated in Lusaka. And it is quite clear that those powerful elements within South Africa have recognised the increasing strength of world opinion and of a papared ness to move from rhetoric to action. And so the climate for receptivity now is, I think, greater than it has been before. So I think when you have the position that the Black African States themselves are saying that they see merit in this proposal for trying to get dialogue, rather then immediately moving into sanctions then that of itself should very substantially form our decision.

JOURNALIST: Are you still aiming for a joint Commonwealth position to be taken to the United Nations, Mr Hawke, or is that no longer relevant.

PM: No, you have got the complication here, let me go one step back, we believe obviously that whatever comes out of the Commonwealth should be reported to the United Nations. The question of whether in any immediate sense you would be able to seek a United Nations replication of a Commonwealth decision could to some extent, depend upon what measures were included at the first stage of sanctions. In other words, if you could get a position where the Commonwealth could come to a unaminous agreement, including the position of the United Kingdom, as a first stage. That could include a ban on the export of oil and petroleum products because the United Kingdom currently has that position. So to get that at the first stage of the Commonwealth would be important. But if you sought immediately to take that to the United Nations, Britain would be in a position perhaps where while yould agree to it in the Commonwealth as part of a package, they wouldn't agree to it universally, because it would have a different impact. So I'm making a point yes, we want to discuss here what should be the relationship between the Commonwealth and the United Nations, but that it is to some extent complicated by the factor to which I refer.

JOURNALIST: Mrs Thatcher refers to economic sanctions, and other times she refers to economic boycotts and trade boycotts what exactly do you understand she means when she talks about the sanctions?

PK: I haven't spoken to her yet. I hope to. I mean outside the actual context of the meeting, the formal meeting. I think this is semantics really.

I mean I don't believe that as far as we are concerned that it turns on a word. I mean where you are talking about sanctions or boycott you are meaning that the nation concerned, that is the nation acting against South Africa would take a decision to deny a particular service or comodity. If you want to call that a sanction or a boycott I don't think it turns on a word.

JOURNALIST: Would you be proposing as a first stage, something along the lines Mr Ramphal put for sanctions?

Well, You have got this alternative. You can say you can look at range of actions that have been taken by a number of countries that are there in place and say well lets apply that as a first stage. Or you could seek just the application of the two criteria of relevantly minor impact upon the Pront Line States as determined in what should go in the first package. And it won't necessarily produce exactly the same combination of elements. I'm going into the discussion on the basis of a concept. Here is the concept and being open as to what the elements of the first stage should be. But gaying from Australia's point of view, that we are prepared to go along with a consensus position on the assumption that that represents a determination by the Commonwealth to increase the pressure upon South Africa and in the hope, as I say, that the other avenue which we refer would produce a preparedness on the part of the regime to talk. And that's not just to talk with the Commonwealth, but to talk with the elements within South Africa that have to baltalked with if you are going to more to change.

JCURNALIST: Do you see your role as a bridge between Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth?

PM: Personally?

JOURNALIST: Yes

PR: Well, I don't want to elevate my role, but it has been put to us by a number that Australia, and Canada was mentioned as well have a particular opertunity to perform that role:

JOURNALIST: I was wondering based on your discussions so far, you still feel that Britain is going to be isolated at this Conference on sanctions?

PM: ALE think, Niki, the right way of putting it is this. That diveryone looking realistically understands that if you take the statements that have been made by the time we got here, Britain is in a position different substantially from the rest of the people. But the very interesting thing that has emerged from my discussions with a range of delegates, including, as I say, Kenneth Kaunda, is that there is no desire to say, fook Britain has made its decision. There is no point in talking with them, Lats now isolate them. Rather the view is lets, by the processof discussion and debate see if we can bring Britain to a position of agreement, so it now remains to be seen whether those processes can been successful.

JOURNALIST: Do you think they will be? Are you confident?

PM.Well I think it s just too early to say, I haven't had the opportunity of talking the Mrs Thatcher, but what I can say from my own point of view is that I will be doing all that I can, and I think I will be helped by a number of people I've referred to my long talks already with Mr Mulroney. Mr Gandhi is coming to see me tonight after the dinner and we will be talking about the same issue obviously. So I think that there are a number of us who are going to be trying very hard. So let's hope.

JOURNALIST: On Mr Gandhi, Mr Hawke, He said in his speach today that the Metoria regime was impervious to reason and that the Nassau CHOGM must demand comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, the question cannot be deferred. Do you think that given his position, ong hand, and say Mrs Thatcher's position on the other, that will make some common position very very difficult?

Woll it would be foolish of me to say that we are not faced with a difficult task, of course we are. But I have had Wat opportunity of talking with Mr Gandhi already. say I am going to be talking with him again of some length tonight after the dinner. And I know that he wants to Britain can be associated achiave a position where with action, so he has not given up hope. And I really don't know in a sense that I can say about that, because the position is pretty stark in terms of statements that have already made, but I think that one element that is important is this. Clearly Britain is concerned about the level of its economic stake in South Africa and its legitimate for them to have it in I think that it will be important for Mrs Thatcher to understand really two things concerning Britains econcaic interests in South Africa. Firstly, and I can say this strengthen by the discussions I have had President strengthenthy the discussions I have manda, that it is important for the future of a new that the economic capacity Ker has been and just society in South Africa should be retained. Kounda recognises this, they don't want to the the process of political amancipation associated with economic aut and dissipatation of resources that represented by accumulated capital and expertise there: Now 12 Mrs Thatcher can understand that this is the position of the Black Africans then I think that is important and may help to change her thinking. And of course, associated with that point which if I may add to it, would mean that in the avenue of discussion that we are talking about by thin Fanal of Eminent People, one of the things that we would be wanting, or that I have in mind that ye would be wanting, such a group to be talking about would be precisely this issue. To try and see how in the processes of political change of evolution to a new gree and just South African society with universal sufferage, fo discuss with the existing regime what would be involved to ensure that the economic capicity was maintained.

Now if Mrs Thatcher, as I say, can understand that that is what we and Black Africans are about, it may change her thinking. And the second point is that I think that she must understand that in that sort of context that I am talking about it is infinitely more likely that the British interests that do exist are more likely to be maintained and Viable than in a position where there is no dialogue, there is no process of peaceful evolution, but at some stage the explosion. Now I have the feeling that those are such compallingly logical and correct arguments that you must have some chance of getting through.

JOURNALIST: Prime Minister, in your consideration and Liscussion about this Panel of Eminent People, has the name of Pierre Trudeau been mooted at all?

PM: No so far.

## JOURNALIST: Or Kaunda himself?

PM: No. But I think you will appreciate, I don't wally want to go too far into the question of the names. Because I think wo've thought through some names and we will be prepared when asked to say well here are some—that we have thought about. But I won't be saying that there is the Pangl—that it should be. But those sort of people.

| JOURNALIST: But Trudeau is not one of them? - wasn't on that list, but it wasn't an exhaustive list. I am therefore not saying well no Trudeau. I am simply saying that if was rather a short list, illustrative if you like of the Seri of

#### JOURNALIST: How many names?

PM: Mell there were about seven or so on this list. But I don't want you to get carried away by those names on that list, I mean its the concept that is important. And as far as Australia is concerned we quite flexible we the concept makes sense and I'm getting a fair bit positive reaction, then we are quite open to talk about composition.

#### JOURNALIST: How important will that be?

PM: Inthink very important, because what emerged in the discussion with Sonny and myself is that, and others that he has obviously talked to as well, but I can only speak about my own conversation, is that we will, I think get to start talking about South Africa, the later part of tomorrow: seession. And then go in to having a fairly substantial part of Friday on it. Then I think the idea is that we would cut off the discussion by about mid afternoon on Friday so that they could start the economic item of the agenda. Then we would take the discussion of point when reached then into the retreat.

And I would hope that we would have got far enough along the track in exposing the issues in the formal by then to mean that once we got to the retreat we would have the opportunity of trying to thrash out the basis of the common ground. And so therefore the answer to a your question is that I think the retreat is very important part.

JOURNALIST: Mr Hawke, just to get a better idea of the time scale involved in this graduated process. Is it that the first range might be brought into place at the end of this year, or early next year. If nothing happens as a result of that when do you then look at the second step?

Woll we haven't got a time table on that, see it would PM: and in a sense counter productive, for be predumptuous, Australia to come along to this meeting and say look here is the exact time table, here's each element of the category, there it is. Rather, what I've tried to do is to have a concept which we believe makes sense, Which matches the realities of the expectations of the Black African States, which meets the roality that we have job of persuasion to do with Britain, and say well here is the concept which includes the graduated steps. As far as we have gone is to say well we think obviously in terms of applying the first category, well you can't be saying twelve months down the track, you have got to be talking about some time in the relevanthmear future.

And say if you haven't got a pos itive response from South Africa by a relatively new time in the future then Category 1 ought to start. Now how the meeting would, if it responds to this broad concept, how it would want to put a timetable on the stages, is really a matter that we should discuss together. I haven't presumed to say well, in three months, stage two, three months stage three.

JOURNALIST: Would the actions in Category One be mandatory or Voluntary?

PM: Well you have got to understand that when you use the word mandatory, you really are using the language of the United Nations, of Chapter 7 of the United Nations. It's not relevant to the Commonwealth position, because if we reach these position of consensus, what we are talking about, then by definition all of them will apply them. So I mean the question of mandatory within the Commonwealth doesn't apply the reach a position of consensus of this is what should be done, then all the Commonwealth countries would go back and reflect by their own actions the decision which they have made here.

JOURNALIST: It would mean nothing without Britain would

pm: Obviously, its basically important to get Britain involved, but law and a I don't believe from the view I've got round, which is a pretty broad range of discussions, I don't believe that the Commonwealth would say well in the absence of Britain the rest of us do nothing. Or do not seek to process this matter further, But as you have heard from all I have said to this point everyone recognises the importance or maximising effectiveness of having Britain in the situation.

JOURNALIST: What would the consequences be for Britain do you think of it doesn't go along with the consensus view of the Commonwealth. What would her standing be, her influence on Commonwealth nations?

PM: I don't think it is helpful to go to that hyporactical. I mean I am not just trying to dodge it because I'm operating on the basis now that all my best endeavours and associations with a number of my colleagues is going to be to try to persuade them to be there and I mean if I talk about, speculate about, what, if she doesn well I don't think it is helpful, I mean I am more than prepared to talk about that in the unhappy eventually that we get to that position. But I would rather leave it till then to talk about it.

JOURNALIST: Putting it a bit differently, if this Meeting doesn't come up with a meaningfull measure on this issue, do you think there is any point in the Commonwealth continuing. Would you become jaundiced about the the Commonwealth?

PM: Well this matter is of such importance to us and clearly to the rost of the Commonwealth that one would have to say that if you wer 't able to get an effect ve decision then it would have to affect you judgement - yes - but I really don't want to go too far down in that because it really the same question in another way. But I repeat if at the end of this against my most fervent hopes, we are in that position I am quite prepared to throw that matter around in discussion with you then, but I don't think it is helpful to do it now.

JOURNALIST: Which leaders have put it to you that they see Australia's role as an intermediaty or bridge?

PM: Well Sonny has spoken to me, Sonny Ramphal him montioned in these terms and in discussions with Brian Mulroney he had indicated that thats been put to him, that that sour role and cortainly in the discussions with Kaunda sees our role as important.

JOURNALIST: You don't feel that that puts pressure on you that you could do without?

pM: M: I'm quite relaxed about it. I mean as you know, long before I've been in the Parliament, both within Australia and internationally with the ILO if has had a make at the discount as for as in play a particular role here to do it. From all the questions you have been putting, I think you realise the importance of it. If Australia can do something well.

JOURNALIST: Having arrived here Mn Hawke and started talking to people do you think its a more important meeting than maybe you envisaged a couple of weeks ago?

PM: No I don't think so, perhaps it dramatises it a bit more in your mind when you hear, you know He ... were You hear the range of leaders, the Gandhi's , Mulroney's, Kaunda's your Mahatir's, when you are talking with them and hear and the intensity of their positions and the pre-eminence which they attach to it, the perhaps dramatises it for you, but I don't think it adds to my understanding of how I knew they thought about it really.

\*\*\*\*\*

ENDS