

'PARTNERSHIP IN THE PACIFIC AFTER VIETNAM'

TEXT OF THE SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER, HON. E.G. WHITLAM, Q.C., M.P.
TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, WASHINGTON
THURSDAY, 8th MAY, 1975

It is not quite two years since I last had the honour of addressing this National Press Club. In that time, as practitioners of our respective professions, we have all had to cope with tremendous events and tremendous changes occurring with unexampled speed. It was therefore with some little trepidation that I retrieved the remarks I last made to you to see how they stood the test of time. I find, however, that the very first point I made has been amply confirmed in a way few of us could have guessed in July, 1973. I said then that I was honoured to address representatives of the world's greatest and most free press in the world's greatest and most free democracy, and that the strength of each was the strength of both. If this democracy had been less free the constitutional upheaval of 1974 would not have occurred. If this democracy had been less strong it could scarcely have survived so traumatic an encounter. So in accepting your invitation for a second time, I again pay tribute to the manifest and enduring strength of the democracy of the United States, of which the press is so fundamental a part.

In the wake of the remarkable events in Indo-China, all of us - leaders in my calling, commentators in yours - are in the process of reassessing basic policies and relations. For the United States in particular, this is bound to be a difficult and perhaps a painful process. In that reappraisal the last thing the Government or people of the United States need are sermons and homilies from foreigners. Certainly, you don't need them from an Australian. It is true that I happen to lead a political party which strongly opposed the intervention in Indo-China: It is also true that I am the Prime Minister of a nation which for many years supported the intervention and encouraged the escalation of the war. Whatever recriminations we might have at home, it is no role for an Australian Prime Minister to lecture the United States.

It is, however, very necessary that we should prevent the creation of new myths about what went wrong. And to do that it is necessary to look at past mistakes - mistakes in which both countries shared. The great danger is that in an atmosphere of deep emotion and recrimination engendered by the suddenness of events in Indo-China, we should fasten upon explanations and self-justification and over-simplifications which would ensure a return to, a repetition of, the great mistakes of the past. We have, in particular, to resist the same sort of myths which developed after the revolution in China. Those myths, those distortions of reality, perverted our relations with China for more than a generation. They led directly to the debacle in Indo-China.

We should have no truck with any new variation of the 'stab in the back' theory - that the war in Vietnam was lost not in Saigon but here in Washington. The truth is that the United States did not 'lose' Vietnam, anymore than she 'lost' China. Vietnam was not America's to lose. What was defeated was not the United States and her allies but a policy of foreign intervention which was bound to fail. There was no time in the past thirty years when such a policy could have succeeded. The tragedy for us all, but above all for the people of Indo-China, is that a policy so manifestly doomed from the beginning should have been carried through for so long.

It was never true that the honour and prestige of the United States and her allies were bound up with the survival of the Saigon regime, any more than it was ever true that the honour, or prestige, or security of the United States were bound up with the fate of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

When I spoke to you last I spoke of the 'second opportunity' we had gained because of the moves towards reconciliation with China and with the signing of the Paris Agreement in January, 1973. I said : 'For twenty years I have been appalled at the damage we of the West have done to ourselves and to other peoples by our Western ideological pre-occupations, particularly in South East Asia. We are not going to be readily forgiven for throwing away the chance we had for a settlement in Indo-China in 1954 after Korea, after Geneva. We have now been given a second chance. It must not be thrown away.' Unfortunately my hopes, the hopes of the world, were not fulfilled after January 1973. The gross breaches of the Paris Agreements by both sides - political breaches, military breaches - made it inevitable that the final settlement in Indo-China would be reached by the arbitrament of war.

Yet in the wider sense that second opportunity, that second chance of which I spoke, still remains, the question now is : What are to be our relations and our conduct towards Vietnam - whether there be one Government of Vietnam or two? Are we to treat Vietnam after 1975 as we treated China after 1949? Through fear or frustration, because of our failure to impose the will of the West on Indo-China, are we to treat Vietnam as the new pariah, the new untouchable among nations? No-one supposes that it is going to be a simple or easy task to establish meaningful relations with Vietnam, a Vietnam emerging from thirty years of civil war prolonged and deepened by foreign intervention. It is going to be one of the most difficult tasks for statesmanship, for the countries in Australia's region and for the United States.

Two hundred years ago - on 22 March 1775 - Edmund Burke said : 'Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom'. It was his great speech on conciliation with the American colonies. He was advising another mighty nation which was about to suffer humiliation at the hands of another small band of revolutionaries

- not because that nation was wicked or weak but because it was committed to policies doomed to fail. Magnanimity in the face of failure is much more difficult than magnanimity in victory. The present prosperity of Western Germany and Japan attests America's unparalleled magnanimity in victory. The other, more difficult, response lies ahead - in Indo-China.

This is very much a time for a realistic assessment of our strengths and opportunities - and for a good deal of confidence in those strengths and opportunities. There are those who feel that because American policy suffered a defeat in Vietnam, we should be pessimistic about American policy elsewhere, and ignore American achievements elsewhere. Dangerous and difficult as the Middle East problem undoubtedly is, taxing as it is for Western statesmanship, it should not blind us to the wider stability and security achieved in the world during the past two decades. Who would deny that the world is a safer place today that it was in the aftermath of World War II? Who would deny - remembering Berlin, remembering Greece, remembering Korea, remembering Cuba - that the threats to peace today are less menacing than those posed by the critical flashpoints and monolithic confrontations of a decade or a generation ago? I hope we shall keep a sense of perspective and reality in these matters, keeping in mind the real progress we have made towards a safer world, and not allow ourselves to be panicked or dismayed by lesser problems than those we have surmounted before.

In the specific matter of Vietnam, I am not going to be panicked by an outcome achieved militarily in 1975 which might have come about politically in 1954. I am intent upon reaching a modus vivendi - a meaningful, constructive relationship - with Vietnam in 1975, as we would assuredly have had to do some time between 1954 and 1975, and as with such needless and damaging delay we have done with China.

It is not, however, by focussing exclusively upon Vietnam or even upon Indo-China that we can get the true perspective of our real strengths and opportunities in the region - Australia's opportunities, or America's strengths. There can be no suggestion of wanting to shrug off the events in Indo-China. On the contrary there are great lessons to be learnt. Nonetheless, let's coolly assess both the present and the future.

If we look at the Pacific Basin area what do we find? The most developed and some of the strongest of the dozen or so most significant nations upon or around the four Pacific continents of Asia, Australia, North America and South America, are flourishing democracies. The United States' most important friends in this vast area, countries like Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia and above all, Japan, have never been stronger - stronger in themselves, stronger in their basic friendship towards the United States.

The Asean Nations - Indonesia, The Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore - are working closely and successfully together to promote their common interests in a natural and viable regional grouping. These countries happen to be those cast by the theorists in the role of the dominoes. Not one of them will give any thanks for being cast in such a role. Each of them will work in its own way to accommodate itself to the new political realities in South East Asia. Each recognises that it is primarily its own internal strength and resilience which will safeguard it against external threats. Each recognises that the prime guarantee of national integrity and security lies in developing the forms of Government best suited to itself and ensuring that Government is in tune with national needs and popular aspirations.

There is a further cause for confidence. On the Pacific side of the Asian region, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, Western Samoa and Tonga, and on the Indian Ocean side, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, are all members of the Commonwealth of Nations. I have been meeting their leaders in Jamaica this week. In this remarkable association of nations not one Head of Government is Communist, yet not one Head of Government was plunged into despair because of the events in Indo-China. In our communique issued on Tuesday the nations of the Commonwealth 34 of them, said this: 'Heads of Government welcomed the end of the prolonged conflict in Indo-China, urged countries in a position to do so to contribute to international assistance for the urgent tasks of rehabilitation and reconstruction and looked forward to the new Governments of the region playing their full part in the Community of Nations.' No panic here, no desperation. Yet, as I point out, many nations of the Commonwealth are the very nations who are supposed to be the likely victims of the falling dominoes. The truth is that all of us have great problems of one kind or another yet each of us is basically confident of surmounting those problems in our own way. Nor was there throughout our meeting in Jamaica any disposition to knock the United States, to recriminate against her or to suggest that the United States will not be a good ally or a trustworthy friend. Indeed, with the war in Vietnam over, many nations - and Australia is one - will have even greater confidence in America as an ally, for we know that American resolve, American capacity, American resources will no longer be weakened or dissipated in a fruitless cause.

President Ford was entirely justified in remarking two weeks ago, that because the United States' policy had not succeeded everywhere it should not be assumed it had succeeded nowhere. The policy failed in Indo-China because it was foredoomed to failure. The policy succeeded in Japan and in Europe because it had the necessary ingredients of success - a realistic appreciation of America's own interests of the people of Japan and Western Europe. It failed in Indo-China because the policy there was based neither on America's true interests nor on anything that was possible or relevant as far as the interests or aspirations of the peoples of Indo-China were concerned. But the great aims of American policy can now continue undiminished and undeterred, free of the impediments and distractions and distortions of Indo-China.

The great thrust of that policy rests upon the detente with the Soviet Union and with associating China in a wider detente. Nothing that has happened in Indo-China would warrant the United States being deflected from that great goal. For the essential meaning of detente is simply the prevention of world war, or world nuclear war. It is precisely because this is the highest risk that mankind has ever faced - the destruction of civilisation itself - that this is the highest goal a nation could ever set for itself.

I view with concern and contempt efforts made by some in countries like Australia and the United States to downgrade or denigrate the efforts being made towards detente. No one asserts that the present partial detente really solves the great question of preserving world peace. But to go back now, to retreat from the Agreements and undertakings already reached, however slight, however tentative, is to retreat towards ultimate disaster. I do not assert that detente as it now exists is complete. But I do assert that it must be made complete if any of us are to survive. We can begin by ensuring that regions of the world still largely untouched by great power rivalry continue to remain free of it. In that connection, Australia has lent her voice to the maintenance of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. All of us who support such proposals, all of us who support detente, know that the difficulties in the way of achieving detente are daunting indeed. But certainly, upon our success or failure turns the future of mankind. And it is because of this that the United States remains the true leader of the world and, as much as she used to be, 'the last, best hope of the world'. For it is to the United States that the West chiefly looks for meaningful leadership in that direction. If detente is to succeed, it will continue to require American initiatives, American courage, American leadership.

For many years to come, people like us, Americans, Australians, politicians, journalists, will be examining in arguments, in articles, in speeches, in books what happened in Indo-China. This is as it should be. For so great a disaster, so great a mistake, such great suffering, cannot be easily dismissed or even forgotten. We shall all have to live with it for the rest of our lives. Yet even so, we have to go on to the future. In the two years since I last spoke to you America has undergone a vast domestic, as well as a vast international, catharsis. With those profound traumas behind you, with their bitterness and misery being purged away, what better time to profit by experience and build on the true strengths of American democracy and American idealism? Here is an opportunity - not just for America but for all of us - to end our long preoccupation with military alignments in Asia, our ideological confrontations, our cold war hangups, and open a new chapter in Western co-operation. Let the deeper issues of poverty, overpopulation and mal-distribution of the world's wealth assume their proper importance in our hearts and minds. These are the real problems of Asia. These are the real problems of the world. These, I trust, will be the real concerns of the United States. With your great tradition of moral leadership, your unexampled generosity, your vision, your energy, your sheer zest for accomplishment, you will find new inspiration in this task - a task in which Australia will be a ready and a willing partner.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS - PRIME MINISTER'S ADDRESS TO
THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB on 8TH MAY, 1975

Mr. William Broom, President, National Press Club: Our first question, Mr. Prime Minister. We want to know about your talks with our President Ford. Did you discuss with President Ford a program for Vietnamese reconstruction? From your talks with Congressional leaders in our Congress, did you detect strong unwillingness to fund Vietnamese reconstruction?

Prime Minister: I think it would have been gracious to add that also at the top table among the expatriates and the visitors and the authors is the Deputy Secretary of State and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the part of the region from which I come.

There was some exchange of views between the President and me on these subjects but not lengthy ones. I can appreciate the difficulties there are at this stage in asking the American people to accept greater financial burdens in reconstructing and re-habilitating Vietnam. I stated the Australian Government's attitude - that was my business and I said that in the Australian Government's budget for the financial year which ends this June there had been provision made for reconstruction and re-habilitation in both South and North Vietnam and that I had no doubt there would be provision in the budget which we will be bringing in in August to continue, and in fact to increase, that provision, and preferably we would want reconstruction and re-habilitation to take place through international organisations. Where they have been available, the Australian Government has made contributions to them, not only in the budget but again in the last two months.

Mr. Broom : In what way can Australia and the United States best help in reconstruction and re-habilitation in Vietnam?

Prime Minister : Well, I believe in all these matters one has to consider what are the views of the people of the country itself and preferably, as I said earlier, these should be ascertained through international organisations. There may well be some reluctance, some hesitation, some inhibitions, in the new Government in South Vietnam, or the Government in North Vietnam or the Government in Cambodia having relations with the Australian Government for that matter, or with many other Governments. But through international bodies, one would hope that there could be some such consultation. The areas where we have found in Australia that it was easiest to make arrangements for re-habilitation was in things like water supplies, hospital facilities and public facilities of that character, that is material things which were lacking to a very great extent and in fact had been very largely destroyed. These are things which are of a non-ideological character, they are obviously needed and there are obviously matters in these fields where developed countries, like Australia and the United States, can and I believe should assist.

Mr. Broom: Many in our audience wonder what Australia's policy will be towards Vietnamese refugees. Will Australia honour its signature to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Treaty and admit them?

Prime Minister : And also to the 1967 protocol. We have already, some days ago, approached the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to suggest that he should coordinate an international program to re-settle those Vietnamese who have fled from their country. It is somewhat unfortunate that in the region itself there are very few countries which have signed the '51 convention and the '67 protocol. They include Australia and New Zealand and Fiji, Canada, some countries which still have colonial responsibilities in the area, like Britain and France, and I don't believe such significant countries as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand or Japan.

Mr. Broom: Another question: We wonder how you assess future policies in South Asia and South East Asia of the Communist powers, the Soviet Union, China and the new Communist States of Indo China. Do you foresee any attempt to exploit the current power vacuum in that region and do you see any dangers ahead?

Prime Minister : I am not quite sure what is intended by a power vacuum. What has changed, I suppose, is that over the last two years or more there has been a withdrawal or expulsion of American power on the mainland. American power, of course, in the air and on the sea is immense, the greatest in the world and mobile. But I believe that in using the word 'Communist' we have to realise that there is no monolithic ideology or action by Governments which are totally Communist or predominantly Communist. We have realised for the last fifteen years that the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, while both competing for the crown of being orthodox Communist Governments, would be in very great disagreement on the Communist ideology or the action which it entails or requires. Now, by the same token, I have no less doubt that the principal occupation of any Communist Government around the world, like any other Government around the world, is and must be what it conceives to be the interests of its nation, its own nation. That is, a Communist Government does not cease to be a nationally oriented Government. That is clearly the intention, the practice of the Soviet Government, of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China, and I would guess that it will be the attitude of the new Cambodian Government and of the Government or Governments in Vietnam. It would be, I should imagine, completely unlikely that they would all concert some program in the region. They will be looking after what each of them concedes to be the interests of its own nation. And the Vietnamese Government, or Governments, will have their time very fully occupied in reconstruction, rehabilitation and quite probably reconciliation.

Mr. Broom : President Ford, earlier this week, proclaimed that the United States would reaffirm closer ties with the anti-Communist Governments of South Korea and Taiwan. Is building an anti-Communist alliance a viable policy in the light of recent changes in Asia?

Prime Minister : As I understand the President as having said, and if I understand his attitude after our conversation yesterday, he has resolved to fulfil the obligations of his nation which it has undertaken to other nations, and of course the United States has undertaken obligations, bilateral obligations, to each of the political entities that the questioner mentions. It is not forming any new association or alliance, it is honouring continuing obligations.

Mr. Broom : Your country was the first to recognize the Khmer Rouge Government after the fall of Phnom Penh. Will you protest the atrocities of the new Government which are being revealed today?

Prime Minister : We were not the first to recognize the new Government in Phnom Penh. We were prompt in acknowledging it, but quite obviously, to take one example that should be in the minds of everyone, the French Government acted quite some time before the Australian Government. We do not have any representatives at the moment in Phnom Penh - there are some difficulties of communication with Phnom Penh or with the Head of State, who is still resident in Peking. I have no knowledge, therefore, officially or in any way directly - there are no Australian correspondents either in Phnom Penh - as to what is going on there. If there is any evidence which comes to us directly, of course we will protest. That is, in the event of any atrocities, of course we will protest about them. We have done that in all the countries it has occurred to our knowledge since we came into office.

Mr. Broom : Just one more question on events in your part of the world. How do you believe the question of a nuclear free zone for the Pacific will be resolved, keeping in mind that only one of the ANZUS partners, New Zealand, supports it?

Prime Minister : I understand that the proposal for a nuclear free zone in the Pacific, that is an extension westward of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, might be proposed by New Zealand for the agenda of this year's United Nations. It might come up in the form of discussing the proposal. Now all I would say, my own Government's attitude, is that we place priority on achieving Treaties in the nuclear field to which the nuclear power will subscribe. That is, we believe the first obligation for the nations is to secure the support of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, China, France, to these various Treaties. And we have done what we can to persuade other nations to sign and to ratify such Treaties, in particular, I suppose, the Nuclear

Non Proliferation Treaty. When my Government came in, it very promptly ratified that Treaty and it was encouraging to us that about a week ago West Germany and Italy and the three Benelux countries also signed it as well. We would hope that Japan will do so. We are disappointed that Indonesia has not done so and that India has not done so, but this is the priority that my Government fixes in matters of disarmament. We want Treaties of restraint to which the nuclear powers will subscribe.

Mr. Broom : Now that the United States Congress has approved indemnity, will you approve the use of Australia's ports by United States nuclear warships?

Prime Minister : The use of Australian ports by nuclear powered naval vessels was suspended by the previous Australian Government. It applied to United States and British naval vessels. It has been considered quite recently again, and in particular, in the light of the fact that the Congress has now approved in effect a total indemnity against any adverse effects of the operation of nuclear powered vessels in Australian waters, in any host country. There is another matter which I imagine will next be considered in Australia and that is the environmental aspects which are very largely a responsibility of the State Governments in Australia. We adopted a Federal system from the United States, we imposed it on a British parliamentary system, but it is in a more rudimentary form. So therefore, while in the United States you are used to the co-mingling of powers, so that if any area, such as a port, there are State responsibilities and Federal responsibilities, the Federal ones prevail. In Australia, this is not yet so clear. It is a point of view which I would very much support myself. The Australian naval ports all happen to be very considerable maritime centres. The biggest naval base in Australia, for instance is in the harbour of Sydney, and obviously the State Government would have to be concerned there because the safeguard arrangements are in the hands of the State authorities.

Mr. Broom : We have a lot of questions about your country. How things are going there, you know it is a long way away from us and not too many of us get there. One person wants to know how is the Opera House doing? Do you have any more architecture of that sort going up?

Prime Minister : Fabulously. I hope so.

Mr. Broom : And what are Australia's plans for developing a uranium enrichment industry?

Prime Minister : Australia does not have the knowhow nor, I guess, the capital to develop a uranium enrichment industry.

We have undertaken jointly with Japan a feasibility study to see whether we can get the capital and knowhow to establish such an industry. We have some preliminary negotiations in this respect with the competing European systems, the one developed by West Germany, the Netherlands and Britain, and the other one being developed by France and Italy, and I think Iran is involved in that also. You might not all realise that Australia seems to have about one fifth of the known reserves of uranium in the, shall I say, the West.

Mr. Broom : Do you think that might give an OPEC type power to Australia in the nuclear age?

Prime Minister : If consumers are reasonable, no. Let's face it. The consumers so exploited the employee class and the colonial economies that they provoked organised retaliation. What my country prefers is arrangements between producers and consumers. In respect of renewable resources, crops, we have followed that policy for decades. We would still like to follow it. We regret that other countries no longer seem to wish to do so. In respect of non-renewable resources, minerals, then Australia has been driven into the situation of considering her interests in association with other countries which have similar interests and those associations in which the Australian Government participated, or in which it is contemplating participating, have in general been accepted as reasonable by countries, administrations, like the United States.

Mr. Broom : Several questions about food, of which your country is a great producer. What are your views on world grain stockpiling to prevent a shortage? Do you fear retaliation from world beef importers or exporters because of Australia's beef sales during this time of surplus? What are you doing and what will you do to aid your ailing livestock industry?

Prime Minister : Well, we wish that we could make more beef sales, and I hope you won't think it begrudging of me if I say that the United States has somewhat disappointed us in this respect. I won't say surprised, I will say disappointed. Australia is one of the few countries which exports beef. There are very few. After all, most of the world's population doesn't eat meat. Very few countries indeed can afford to import meat and those that can are those with which Australia has many associations, Western Europe, Japan and the United States, and Australia has supplied all of those markets. Last year, Japan, without any warning, stopped buying meat. The European Economic Community without any warning stopped buying meat and America reduced purchases of meat, and that of course very greatly harmed our meat industry, our cattle industry. We have certain advantages of area and climate which make for economies in meat productions. In those circumstances, we resent the fact that the few customers that there are in the world, the ones upon which we felt we were entitled to depend, completely (most of them) cut off purchases of meat from Australia. In those circumstances, it is not surprising there has been a very great depression in some areas

in Australia and I believe that consumers ought to bear this in mind. If they want cheap meat, regular supplies of it, they must be regular purchasers because it obviously takes some time to produce beasts to the stage where they are to be killed and so on. Now, as regards wheat and other grains, Australia is one of the few countries which produces a surplus. Canada and the United States would be the other significant ones. By contrast to meat, wheat and grains in general are things that everybody in the world consumes and always have and it is easily transported and easily stored and wherever there is a drought or a natural disaster in the world the thing which is easiest to provide to alleviate it is wheat or other grains. We now find in Australia, and no doubt Canada and the United States find it as well, that the developing countries, those that have a population increasing more rapidly than resources, that they are very happy for us to provide wheat on favourable terms, credit terms, and so on, which in effect mean gifts. Now other developed countries, ones which do not have the productivity of the United States and Canada and Australia, are very happy to provide favourable credit terms to developing countries for the purchase of manufactured goods. Developing countries do not need them and do not even want them. But we can never seem to come to some arrangements where developed countries, such as West Germany or Japan, who can well afford to help alleviate the conditions in developing countries or to overcome natural disasters, they don't seem very keen to provide credit to the United States or to Canada, or Australia, to provide their surplus stocks. I should point out that, while Australia is a developed country in the normal context of its economic pattern, its production, its investment, its employment is overwhelmingly in the manufacturing field, secondary industry, yet our overseas trade is still in the pattern of our neighbours or of other developing countries. We depend on the income we get for non-renewable assets like minerals or renewable assets like crops, or to a certain extent meat, and in those circumstances we just cannot afford to be unilaterally benevolent to the rest of the world. Developed countries ought to get together more in this respect. Australia has had a very bad deal from Western Europe and Japan. It has not had too good a deal from the United States as regards meat and, similarly, here we can ally ourselves with the United States. The rest of the developed world does not make it easy for us to use our agricultural productivity for the benefit of people who suffer natural disasters or whose human rate of increase is outpacing the rate of increase of their resources.

Mr. Broom : To carry that discussion just one step further, is there any prospect of an Australia/New Zealand/Canada/United States common market?

Prime Minister : Very little I would think. I don't believe that this is really what is needed in the Pacific. Inevitably any such common market would be regarded as being for the benefit of the manufacturing countries and would be regarded as being to the disadvantage, certainly being no advantage to the developing ones. What we have to realise is two things. That is developing

countries want to see that the price they get for their exports keeps pace with the price they have to pay for their imports and secondly, that there is a steady increase in the processing of their commodities within their own shores. After all, we all know that the developed countries, the manufacturing countries, are prosperous, not just because of the commodities they produce but because of the processing they apply to those commodities. Now the prosperity of developing countries is adversely affected by the fact that they can't depend on the price they get for their commodities and they find it extraordinarily difficult to get the capital, the knowhow, to process a fair proportion of those commodities themselves. And the Pacific, with the exception of the countries you mentioned, is very much a developing area. And the proper way to keep them happy is to make it plain to them so that it is visible and palpable to their populations, that conditions are getting better and during their lifetimes they will be getting better still. And that is not achieved, I suggest, by just having another rich man's club in the Pacific. That is having a common market. That is how it would be regarded. For Australia and New Zealand, Canada and the United States, add in Japan if you like, were to form a common market, then there is no doubt that the rest of the Pacific would think that we were out to take advantage of them. And also I would have to be quite plain with you. There are a very great number of people in Australia, and still more in New Zealand, who would think that such a common market was to the advantage of those companies which are domiciled in the United States.

Mr. Broom : What has been Australia's experience with the TFX or F111 fighter airplane? Did you approve the purchase of that plane?

Prime Minister : We are taking good care of them and Australia has the most formidable air force for thousands of miles around. There is nobody who could approach Australia with hostile intent by sea or air. My party when in Opposition was extremely dubious about the acquisition of the F111, the TFX, and there was good reason for it because we found out that a contract had been made without lawyers' advice on our part. Whatever you say about lawyers, it is at least prudent to have their advice when you are signing a contract for some hundreds of millions of dollars and our predecessors did not take that elementary precaution. The Prime Ministers at the time were all lawyers but they left it to people in the Department of Defence, including a Minister who had been a pharmacist, to sign the contract. Well, there happened to be some flaws in the contract and it took about ten years to get the aircraft. I suppose one would have doubts whether it was necessary to have such sophisticated aircraft in our part of the world. It would seem that it is disproportionately technical but nevertheless I have no doubt whatever that it is a very effective aircraft and while it seems to be more than we need to cope with anybody who is ever likely to approach Australia, yet by the same token, there is no doubt that nobody could afford to approach Australia with hostile intent.

Mr. Broom : What sort of retaliation does your Government plan towards the United States if Harry Hopman becomes the non-playing captain of the American Davis Cup team.

Prime Minister : This is a sore point that you should bring along the most distinguished of Australian expatriates to your hospitable board with me here. We know that Hopman is the best in the world and we don't mind sharing our best with the United States.
