PRIME MINISTER
TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HON P J KEATING MP
PRESS CONFERENCE, PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, JAKARTA, 18 DECEMBER
1 996
E& OE PROOF COPY
PM. Well this agreement we have signed today, I think, will help set the
environment for the region well into the next century. I said to you earlier
today that Australia was around at the founding of the Indonesian State as we
know it today. We have supported Indonesia against the Dutch at the end of
the Second World War and we were justifiably proud in our role in the
independence movement here in Indonesia.
In the years since, of course, Indonesia has become a much more prosperous
country, there has been a very large increase in wealth, it has been quite
evenly distributed and it has now an economnic significance as well as a social
significance of its size that bears upon the region and on the Asia Pacific in
general. What we have achieved in these last few years is a measure of the
cooperation between us which has begun at foreign policy level, in the
relationship.-between the Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Foreign Minister
Alatas. And in the quite important and more comprehensive relations we are
developing in defence cooperation between our Defence Ministers, in Robert
Ray and his counterpart Mr Sudradjat, and tetvveen our Chiefs of thle Defence
Forces, both of whomn are with us today, and those other operational officers
in both of our services. Also, my colleague the Deputy Prime Minister, of
course, was involved as Minister for Defence back in the 1980s.
So I think we see what we have signed today, which is a historic agreement,
as an extension of the cooperation that we have been able to develop
between us and the fact that we recognise that key point and that is we are
bound together by our geography, by our interest in a peaceful and secure
region, by our quest for income growth and better standards of living, and by
those very happy, shared memories of our history over time.
The relationship has had its problems, but the fundamentals remain sound
and important and that is that much of Australia's future is bound up in the
future of Indonesia and vice versa. And, I think, that President Soeharto has
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shown his capacity to lead and take strategic directions for the benefit of his
nation and for the region. And we have. joined him in this most obviously
before this with APEC, where we have built, I think, a new political
architecture in the Asia Pacific, which includes, of course, North America,
Japan, China, Korea, the countries of ASEAN, and Australia and New
Zealand and, of course, now some more.
This has set up a whole frame of reference we have never had before, neither
of us and, I think, now by recognising that each has a strategic interest in the
other, that is that Australia has a strategic interest in the region and in the
fortunes of this archipelago and that Indonesia has a strategic interest in us,
in Australia, in our continent means that we are acknowledging the force of
our geography and our shared history and the fact that we now live in one of
the most peaceful parts of the world and we have the machinery in place to
keep it that way.
So more than anything else, I think, this agreement is a declaration of trust. It
is a declaration of trust about the strategic intentions of each of us. So rather
than us being privately, if you like, assuaged or comforted by a declaration by
Indonesia about its territorial ambitions, of lack of them, and similar
statements by ourselves to the same point, this cuts through all of that and
gets to the fundamental point that there is a basis of trust between us and
together we can do substantial things together. 200 million people here, or
just on, in Indonesia. Our country, a large continent, rich in resources, strong
in technology, strong basis in education. We are, together, capable of doing
many good things. Not just in our two countries, but in third countries too.
So this is more, I think, simply than an agreement about maintaining security.
But, rather, it is about a declaration of trust between us which then goes
beyond the official family into our communities.
Now I would like to just say that I am very pleased that my colleagues could
join me because each of them were party to our first discussions about this in
the Security Committee of the Cabinet. And where we have seen the
development of the relationship with Indonesia, as a logical extension of the
growth of Australian foreign domestic policy abroad.
I am also delighted that General Oration could be involved in the process as a
former very distinguished Chief of the Defence Force. I think his relationship
with Indonesia, the trust he built up here, the regard in which he is held was
important to Australia and was important in this respect. And that general
direction that he struck years ago is being followed now and developed
further by General John Baker and, before him, Admiral Beaumont. And the
three of these officers General Gration as a former Chief have, I think,
reflected very substantially and well on Australia and on this relationship.
I would like to also thank our Ambassador, Allan Taylor, who carried a lot of
the work at this end with his usual skill and discretion and the fact that he is
held in such regard, in this country, matters mightily to us.
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You have now got the full text of the agreement and you can see what it says.
It has appropriate preambles and agreements on those key points and, I think,
my last thanks but not least is to the Indonesian Government, especially
President Soeharto who has had the imagination and the goodwill to agree to
a proposal such as this and State Secretary Moerdiono who was involved in
the nitty gritty and in some of the detail and never wavered from the strategic
vision that he and the President had.
In all, I think, an agreement such as this is unusual for the fact that it has
been made outside of any other context as the Five Power Defence
Agreement was made In another context, particularly with Britain withdrawing
from Singapore and the region, in the context of the difficulties then
experienced between Malaysia and Singapore and Indonesia. Australia's
agreement with ANZUS, of course, comning from our long shared cultural links
and our experience together in a number of theatres of war over the century.
This is a contemporary agreement made for contemporary reasons, for the
right reasons, and I think it is something which is going to add strength and
value to both of our countries and that is going to bring a sense of security to
the region that, I think, other members states of the region will share with us.
So in all I feel very honoured to be involved, as I am sure my colleagues do,
and we are very pleased at the reception we have been given in Indonesia
and are very grateful for the hospitality.
J: Mr Keating, you said earlier today that this agreement was delivered on a
pledge you made in 1991. 1 am wondering how it rates, as four years as
Prime Minister tomorrow, obviously it is the biggest achievement of your
Prime Ministership?
PM: Well it is not a matter or rating things, I don't think, Michael. But, rather, that it
was one of the things I said at the time that I thought needed to be done.
That is, not this exactly. But a general rapprochement with Indonesia given
the fact that over the years, the relationship had gone off the boil, principally
because of Timor, forgetting how great a stake Australia had had in
Indonesia's independence. And, can I say, how proud the Labor Party had
been in the growth of the independence movement and its succeS3 and that
seemed to be forgotten. And, yet, the force of our circumstances, our
geography, our shared interest in the region, were the things that promoted
my colleagues continuing interest in it. But we needed to bring it into some
-sort of logical statement about where we stood and, I think, this is what this is.
J: I would like to ask on the Article 3, which says that it could be extended
[ inaudible]. Is this any good if Indonesia is no longer a threat to Australia?
Could you tell us whether there is any threat to this treaty in front of you now,
thank you?
PM:-It says that " the Parties agree to promote in accordance with the policies and
priorities of each mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security
field in areas to be identified by the two Parties". Well, I mean, people have
asked is this a military pact? No, it isn't. It is a security, agreement. It is
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about security and bringing security to the region and that requires an
ongoing assessment by both of us about the way in which the region is
developing and what things are happening and, I think, all of the things we
can see just let's take us the last six weeks the APEC Action Agenda being
adopted in Osaka in fulfilment of the Bogor Declaration, which is one of the
most important, I think, institutional things to happen in this region probably
since the War. I noticed this week that ASEAN, for instance, has decided
now to meet informally annually, very much in the manner of the APEC
Leaders Meeting, to try and keep the process of change moving. All of these
things have got to have a good bearing on security in the region, security in
all of its facets. So this is not about identifying threats, or even preparing a
response to threats, but saying that we need to be alert to what it is that
makes the region more secure and act either singularly or jointly that is act
in concert where we are agreed to upon consultation, which is I think what
the essence of a security agreement should have.
J: Prime Minister, Alexander Downer has put out a statement in Canberra
reporting to reveal a private conversation with your Foreign Minister in which
he alleges the Foreign Minister was concerned about the wording, referring to
adverse challenges, rather than external challenges in the treaty. Could you
respond to that claim, please, and also would you then care to go on and
explain why that wording was used in contradistinction with the Five Power
Agreement?
PM: Well can I just say, I think, that the Foreign Minister is on the record making
mention of this clause and, I think, we would say he is being verballed here by
Mr Downer, who the day before I might remind you said that relations with
Indonesia were at the worst in 13 years. This is the same Mr Downer who is
reported today as saying he may give way to Senator Hill on the Foreign
Affairs portfolio were they to win an election. He gave way on the leadership
of the Liberal Party, he's now giving way on the Shadow Portfolio of Foreign
Policy. To do the nation a real service, he would give away on his
constituency, and let someone serious take it up. If not from our party, from
their's. So,. I don't really think that given his standing, weight, record or the
veracity of his claims that he is worthy of more time than I have given you,
Glenn, on the answer.
J: Could I just ask the same question again what does... ( inaudible) How do
you understand this?
PM: I'm sorry?
J: What do you understand by adverse challenges?
PM: Oh, yes. Well, I was more interested in dealing with Mr Downer than that
point, not to forget the point. And that is that when one, I think, negotiates this
sort of agreement, which is a big change for both countries, and especially,
for Indonesia which has a non-aligned position so obviously and for so long
that some of the phrases which might spring to mind in a country with our
frame of reference, where our language and use of it is known well and for
which we are comfortable in treaties and agreements of this variety, this is not
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necessarily true in Indonesia. And I think language like external threats is
language that conjures up more than Indonesia wishes to state. I don't think it
wants to say it's threatened, or even to seek to identify threats. So, the
expression " adverse challenges" fits nicely with the general conception of the
agreement, but doesn't jar with the agreement requiring of them some
nomination of a threat. So, again, I think because these words don't reflect,
say, words in the Five Power Defence Agreement written in another age and
another time, or in other harder military arrangements we have with, say, the
United States, is not to say they don't adequately reflect the sense of what we
are seeking to do here.
J: Mr Keating, is that a concession on the part of the Australian
negotiators.. ( inaudible)...?
PM: It's not really concessions. I mean, I don't think any of us have seen many of
these things that is, the paragraphs or phrases as concessions. Rather,
you start off from essentially a clean sheet of paper saying. ' look, we want to
say more than we have been saying to one another, we want to say
something that we can do in both of our names for the region, and which can
be made sense of in the region". And what we have is what you have in front
of you. And Indonesia has sensibilities in this, sensitivities in it, as we do.
And the best if you like graft of those, is in the agreement.
J: Mr Keating, you sent a very very top level delegation to Indonesia to sign this
treaty is there any chance of President Soeharto visiting Australia in the
near future?
PM: Well, we're about between now and May next year to have an election in
Australia, and I think he is going to be interested in the outcome of that
election, as we are. And he has a standing invitation to visit Australia, of
course, and he would be well advised by his advisers to think about that in the
context of the next Australian Parliament and Government, and no doubt he
will. But again, there's always been difficulties about him coming to Australia
with vociferous objections to the policies of his Government in Timor, and
that's not to say in some way that I notice there has been some comment
[ that] I have made many visits here, and during this phase, he hasn't made a
visit to Australia. But look at the results. There's APEC sitting there. There is
this agreement sitting there. There's this continuous strengthening of the
bilateral relationship. The Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister
numerous visits here over the periods are all part of the building of this
relationship. And I don't really I mean, I would like to see the President in
Australia, but I don't think he needs to come to prove we have a relationship.
J: Mr Keating, you. .( inaudible). are you looking at other bilateral agreements
similar to this with, say, Malaysia and Singapore?
PM. No. We are doing good and effective things with the Five Power Defence
Agreement collaborative things in the defence field that's becoming more
sophisticated as time goes by, and I think the structure of it suits Singapore,
and suits Malaysia and suits us, suits New Zealand, suits the British.
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J Even if it means closer defence ties With Singapore and Malaysia?
PM:-Well, they're quite close now. ) mean, we're doing joint exercises with them.
The Malaysians are doing... the Singaporeans are doing their flying training
they have got a base, of course, at Pearce in Western Australia. They are
doing their tank training at Shoalwater Bay. We're doing collaborative things
joint exercises with the Malaysians. So I don't think there's anything lacking
there.
J Prime Minister, this agreement seems to be being lauded less loudly in
Indonesia than It Is in Australia. Does that concern you at all? Why do you
think that is?
PM: No. Well, Indonesia is a member of ASEAN, it has it's whole background is
that it is in this perpetual partnership with the countries of the Association of
South East Asian Nations they have just had, again, another summit. And,
you know, there is a protocol about the way in which it acts inl the region,
about its trade relations, about AFTA we're not in that position. So, for
Australia, making a bilateral agreement such as this, with the import it has,
there is an exclusive nature about it that I think there isn't with such an
agreement with Indonesia which lives in these multi-lateral arrangements.
J: So it's not a sign that it's more significant to Australia than it is to Indonesia?
PM: No, I don't think so. And I think you can judge that by the attendance at the
agreement, and at lunch.
J: Mr Keating, whose idea was this notion of a security treaty, and will it
automatically lead to much closer defence ties with Indonesia ties that have
become much more close in recent years?
PM: Well, I think it will. I think it's a signal that the declaration of trust which I
spoke of earlier, is there in print. It's more than implied, it's more than
something which flows from, or is drawn from, or is drawn down from a
continuing -get of collaborative relations in defence and foreign policy. And I
think the fact that it is there unambiguously in this way will mean more will be
done, and it's In a sense a bit of a green light, I think, to our defence forces
that more can be done.
J: Can you indicate in the early stages how you see the agreement manifesting
itself in practical terms over the next 2 3 years, in both countries?
PMV: Well, I think it's a scene-setter, above all else. I mean, it's not only practical,
but symbolic and a scene-setter, and it governs, I think, a whole lot of
responses. You know we now meet as a Ministerial group. We have
Austral ia-Indonesia Ministerial meetings, which go beyond as we have
always had it in foreign policy and defence to the economy, to industry, to
science and technology etc. And I just think all of these things will be given
more impetus, too. What we're doing here is we're putting the mortar in the
bricks of the relationship that's what we're doing.
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J ( inaudible)...
P M. Well, we have had discussions for quite a long time, now, about how we ought
to speak about the relationship with Indonesia in an official way, and we have
had discussions about whether there should be a joint declaration of
principles, or perhaps some other form. And we had a discussion in the
security committee, some time I think in 1993, wherein we thought we might
try and do something which was more explicit in the security area. In other
words, something that was more a straight interface between our two
countries, rather than something that in a sense, transcended the societal
questions. And, as a consequence, I took that matter then forward, the
Foreign Minister, the Minister for Defence and I had discussions about what
the parameters of this might be, obviously, our close advisers had discussions
about it. And then I raised the matter with President Soharto in 1994, and we
had then further discussions in which General Gration and my colleague Allan
Gyngell were involved with, and then the President came back to me on the
question in Bali, and we decided to go further. Then there was another
discussion between General Oration and Secretary of State Moerdiono, and
then I had a further discussion with the President at the bilateral meeting I had
In Osaka. Then discussions with my colleagues when I returned and, you
know, the Cabinet since decided that the draft as presented was acceptable
to it, and today we are here.
J: Mr Prime Minister, you just mentioned that it was a declaration of trust?
PM: Yes.
J: Does that mean that there will no longer be suspicions between Australia and
Indonesia?
PM: Well, I think the answer to that is yes. I mean, in all nations you will always
have suspicions, particularly in big nations where there are things in our
history which have rankled us. But by and large, this is an endeavour better,
a statement which makes clear what our strategic intentions are towards one
another, by the Government of Australia, by the Government of Indonesia.
And the general position that Indonesia has taken for so long about it's
position, it's non-aligned position, it's view of other nations and their
sovereignty, and the views that we have taken in the past mean that there ' is
a sort of backdrop within which such settings can be made, as we have in this
agreement. So, I think it will do a lot it is very much a declaratory set of
statements about how we see one another, and the trust that binds them. And
I think it must do a lot to reduce suspicions, in both countries, of both
countries.
J: Can I go back to this question about adverse external challenge could you
clarify the concept of adverse challenge? Does it have any connotation of
Australia being involved in an internal challenge that might occur?
PM: Well, I said that I thought forcefully, and I hope well the moment I first said
something about this. And so too did Foreign Minister Alatas make exactly
the parallel point. So, let me use this opportunity to clear again this
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expression " adverse challenges" does not mean challenges with respect to
the internal affairs of Indonesia, or the internal affairs of Australia. One of the
values of this agreement is that it is an external interface, one to the other,
between both countries. It is not about actually delving into our societies in
any way, which makes it cleaner and therefore, I think, better. Thank you very
much indeed.
ends.
TEL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
ON MAINTAINING SECURITY
THE. GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ( hereafter referred to as the " Parties"),'
DESIRING to strengthen the existing friendship between them;
RECOGNISING their common interest in the peace and stability of the region;
DESIRING to contribute to regional security and stability'in order to ensure
circumstances in which their aspirations can be best realised for the economic
development and prosperity of their own countries and the region;
REAFFIP ING their respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial
integrity of all countries;
REAFFIRMING their commitment to the settlement of all international disputes by
peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and International
law; RECOGNISING that each Party has primary responsibility for its own security;
MINDFUL of the contribution that would be made to their own security and that of the
region by cooperating in the development of effective national capabilities In the defence
field and hence their national resilience and self-reliance;
NOTING that nothing in this Agreement affects in any way the existing international
commitments. of either Party;
THEREFORE AGREE as follows: Article I
The Parties undertake to consult at ministerial level on a regular basis about matters
affecting their common security and to develop such cooperation as would benefit their
own security and that of the region. 18. Dec. 95 16: 36 No. 009 P. 01/ 02
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Article 2
The Panics undertake to consult each other in the case of adverse challenges to either
party or to their common security interests ard, if appropriate, consider measures which
might be taken either individually orjointly and in accordance with the processes of each
Party. Article 3
The Panics agree to promote in accordance with the policies and priorities of each
mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security field in areas to be identified by
the two Partnics. Article 4
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the later notification by either
Oovcrnment of the fulfilment ofIts requirements for entry into force of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WIHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE at Jakarta on the eighteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and
ninety-five in the English and Indonesian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA;
OARETH EVANS
Minister for Foreign Affairs FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA:
ALIALATAS
Minister for Foreign Affairs