TRANSCRIPT OF UNEDITED INTERVIEW WITHl JOHN SNOW, ITN TVLONDON
20 JUNE 1989
E & O0EPROOF
SNOWz No-one imagined that Hong Kong would be a
particularly high priority on anyone's agenda, but it is
certainly for the British Government and China, for youyou
have a certain number of dissidents in your Embassy in
Beijing. Do you sense at all that the West is already a bit
inclined to go back on its horror and just get back onto
working terms with the Chinese?
PM: No, its not correctly put, as simply as that. I
believe that and I base this on discussions I have already
had in Paris, and assessments that I am getting from other
parts of the world that what the West is saying is that we
in no way qualify the expressions of abhorrence and
repugnance at what happened on the 4th of June and what is
continuing in terms of creating an atmosphere and the
practice of repression. But there is a view, which I share,
that it would be an act of irresponsibility to the people of
China as well as to the people of the region and the rest of
the world if we were to act simply in a way which would
drive China inwards upon itself. Therefore we have to walk,
in my judgement, this careful line between leaving no
impression with the leadership of China other than that we
totally reject and repudiate what they have done and what
they are doing. But at the same time leaving them with the
knowledge that what the world wants to see is a continuation
of economic reform within China. Now we can't have that
wish that economic reform continue, and adjure from an
involvement in the processes of economic reform. It is my
judgement that economic reform must inevitably carry with it
in some point in the future significant political reform.
That wasn something that was fully understood by my friend
Zhoa Ziyang, with whom I've had lengthy discussions on these
issues going back over several years. And so we, as I say,
have that fine line to walk. It will require delicate
judgement, responsible judgement. I think, as I understand
it, that view that I've expressed will be the view of the
West.
SNOW: You sense then that.... of the Japanese will come
with you in that?
PM; I haven't yet had the opportunity of talking to the
leadership in Japan. I think that they will not,
significantly at least, want to move out of kilter with what
the West will be doing. They of course have significant
economic interests but I don't think it would be in the
interests of Japan to get out in front and take what might
been seen an opportunistic position. I hope that the sort
of balance of considerations that I have outlined will be
the ones which will guide all the nations that have already
interests in any of China.
SNOW: In practical terms, I mean we've already got the West
saying no arms supplies, no sale. But for example if
they came to you wanting grain, would you sell it?
PM: We've got arrangements with them, not only in the area
of grain, but we have existing agreements covering many
sectors of their economy and particularly in areas which
involve the welfare -and they obviously involve the welfare
of ordinary people -grain they can't feed themselves, yet
then it would seem to me that they should be fed it
requires a balance, it requires that where we do continue to
try and involve ourselves in their processes of reform, that
they be in no doubt at all about what we say as to what
they've done politically and where they should go
politically.. SNOW: Now obviously what this has turned up, for the
British Government in particular, is the problem of Hong
Kong and the right to eventual abode here in Britain should
the worst ever happen. Is there any way in which you can
help in this? Do you think that perhaps at the next
commonwealth Prime ministers' meeting in Kuala Lumpur it
would be possible, say, to offer a Commonwealth position
where perhaps a number of countries would come forward
offering rights of abode?
PM: i think we all have some responsibilities in these
areas. We of course are able to speak on this issue with
the cleanest of hands. If you look at the question of the
settlement of refugees from Vietnam, on a per capita basis
Australia has the best record in the world. We've accepted
a 118,000 refugees from Vietnam since 1975, which I repeat,
on a per capita basis is mare than anyone else including the
United States. So we have exhibited a preparedness and a
competence to accept responsibilities in this area. Of
course, the major initial responsibility is with the United
Kingdom. And I think others if the United Kingdom itself,
particularly, adopts a properly compassionate role will
not find itself without friends.
SNOW: Has it, in your view, adopted a properly
compassionate role?
PM: I don't think they've made their final decisions on
this matter. I've only at this point had the opportunity of
having the briefest of discussions when I was met at the
airport by them with Sir Geoffrey Howe. I believe that your
country is in the process of coming to its decision and it
would be presumptuous for me at this stage, before those
decisions have been made, to make judgements.
SNOW: But Mrs Thatcher has made it pretty clear that we
cannot be expected to offer all 3.25 million Hong Kong
people the right of a vote.
PM: I doubt very much whether you will be faced with a
situation where the 3.25 million will be making that
request. SNOW: can I ask you then about Kuala Lumpur?
PM: Of course you can.
SNOW: Clearly Hong Kong will be at issue there, but
PM: I wish you wouldn't keep putting Hong Kong as the
number one issue China is the number one issue, Hong Kong
is a residual of China and so China will certainly be an
issue.
SNOW: Well China will be an issue, but of course the
residual issue at the Commonwealth conference is almost
eternally southern Africa. Do you see perhaps..
PM: of course it isn'* t a residual issue -with respect, you
haven't got it right again. South Africa -to the
commonwealth it will never be a residual issue.
SNOW: it's an eternal issue though isn't it?
PM:. Yes, you said eternal, but then you said residual.
SNOW: Either way, an issue. It is going to be South
Africa. Do you think that with the changes in the
leadership in South Africa with the demise of the
Botha government that we're possibly moving into a new era
of unease, maybe we'll even find a greater unity inside the
a unity that may even include Mrs Thatcher?
PM: Let me say this John, I certainly hope that with the
new leadership there that there will be a more responsive
attitude than has been reflected in the intransigent
position that Botha and those around him exhibited. But one
of the great tragedies is where the Commonwealth held out
its hand through the eminent persons group, it was
repudiated and I make the point about that because I don't
think it's been properly understood. That initiative which
was mine, and which was adopted by the Commonwealth, we were
not seeking, as we've put it, to b ' ring South Africa to its
knees, but to bring it to the negotiating table. No-one,
particularly myself, sees any merit in sanctions for the
sake of simply imposing sanctions an instrument to try and
bring South Africa to the negotiating table. I think that
what's happened, since we have in the last few years been
concentrating on this issue, we are getting further evidence
of the impact of the sanctions that have been imposed. The
world by the Governor of the Federal Bank in South
Africa has acknowledged the impact of the sanctions,
particularly in the financial area. I would hope that the
new leadership would firstly understand what we are about.
And essentially what we are about is this as I say, to
bring them to the table, not with a view to eliminating the
white population, white investment, white enterprise in
South Africa. The reality which must be grasped by the new
leadership in South Africa is a simple one and an
irrefutable one. It is that the leadership of the ONC is a
front line status. That leadership still wants to see a
democratic, racially free South Africa within which there is
a continuing effective white presence and certainly
continuing white economic presence because that South Africa
of the future will be the richer if that white presence
continues. But the danger that they are increasingly facing
is this that the younger generation, the blacks. They are
taking a much more militant, aggressive view. They are
questioning their own fathers, their own leaders., saying
" what are you doing". Now, South Africa must grasp this
chance while it exists the attitude that we want you to be
there, we want your presence, we want your involvement
that's the real issue.
SNOW: Let me ask you finally about how you see that meeting
going ahead. You go there as a elder statesman, so does Mrs
Thatcher. It's always said that you're one of the few
people who manage to stand up to her in a meeting and get
her to listen to a different point of view. Can you
characterise how these sessions go and do you think that
this one perhaps will be a less divisive one?
PM: These sessions you have to divide them. There are
the public sessions and then there are the discussions
that we have in the smaller groups. And certainly that's
been true when we have dealt with the issue of South Africa
going back to the Bahamas in 1985 and then to Vancouver in
1987. In terms of the relations in particular with Margaret
Thatcher, it has been quite true that we've had a different
position. I don't question the integrity of Mrs Thatcher's
abhorrence of apartheid. The difference-has been about
means and I think that we have a position and Mrs Thatcher
respects my integrity and intelligence on these issues and
so I hope that in Kuala Lumpur that we will be able, again
from the basis of a mutual respect for one another's
integrity, to examine what's happened since we last met
intelligently to appraise the impact of the action that has
been taken not only by ourselves but by others, including
the United States, and to assess the statements of the
critically important meters within South Africa like the
Reserve Bank and say now does that lead us to the conclusion
that with the continuation or some adjustment of these
pressure we may be able to bring the leadership of South
Africa to the negotiating table. so I think that the
relationship in this regard, particularly between Mrs
Thatcher and myself is one, as I say, of intelligent,
responsible people who share an abhorrence of apatheid and
and what we need to try and get is a convergence on action.
I think one of the things that is going to be significant in
this respect is that in the United States, I think we have
now a position where the administration there has got to
have a closer working relationship with the Congress. we do
have a Congress there which is inclined towards action and
so we may get a greater degree of support from there. I
hope we can develop a more positive attitude on the part of
the Europeans and if we can do that then the Commonwealth
and the rest of the world together should be able to, with
some optimism and what we've got to understand when we
talk about these things is if we look at the world at the
latter part of 1989 and compare it to the world two years
ago, there's been so much much change. There have been
achievements that two. years ago wouldn't have been thought
possible , Namibia, Angola, Afghanistan,
Indo-China. So, we shouldn't go into these things
with asense of pessimism that nothing can be changed.
SNOW: Prime Minister, thank you very much.
FN: Thank you John.
ends