PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Hawke, Robert

Period of Service: 11/03/1983 - 20/12/1991
Release Date:
11/10/1985
Release Type:
Interview
Transcript ID:
6761
Document:
00006761.pdf 6 Page(s)
Released by:
  • Hawke, Robert James Lee
TRANSCRIPT INTERVIEW WITH MAX WALSH FOR THE NATIONAL, 11 OCTOBER 1985

A&/
U ST RA L. I A_,
PRIME MINISTER
E 0 E PROOF ONLY
TRANSCRIPT INTERVIEW WITH MAX WALSH FOR THE NATIONAL 11 OCT 1985
WALSH: Prime Minister, the news of the day is President Reagan's
hijacking of the hijackers. what comment does the Prime Minister
of Australia have to offer about this amazing episode?
PM: Well, I'm not acquainted with the detail and all the
background. I make the preliminary point that we condemn the
international terrorism which occurred in the case of the
hijacking of the ship and we regret all that flowed from it.
Max, I would prefer to have a detailed briefing of what has been
involved in the action of the United States before making any
further comments.
WALSH: I can understand that. Now, if I can just turn to local
events and what has dominated Parliament in the last few days and
few weeks. It may seem trivial compared with international
events, but the Bicentennial.
PM: Yes, Max.
WALSH: It was suggested last evening by Senator Richardson, one
of your senior colleagues, that in your Department heads should
roll because of what had happened there, because of the
incompetence displayed by your advisers within the Department.
Will heads roll?
PM: What has happened, Max, is that I, immediately after the
evidence of this very considerable incompetence, told the
Acting Head of the Department, Mr Visbord, that I wanted a
re-arrangement within the Department to ensure that the-handling
of this very important matter of the Bicentennial celebrations
should be put in an order and a competence which not only I as
Prime Minister, but the community could have competence. That
has been put to me this morning. I have approved it. And so, we
will now have a division headed up by an officer in whom I have
very considerable confidence. And I make the point, Max, as I.
did in the Parliament today, that one of the problems in this
whole affair, in a sense is confirmed by the statement of Prime
Minister Fraser on 2 October, is the nature of the relationship
between the Government and an independent public company. Now,
what I have tried to do in the circumstances, having seen the
difficulties, is to create the apparatus within my Department
which will meet the concerns which have become evident to everyone,
and certainly including myself. I wonder Max, if you would
excuse me if I did make this observation, that while of course
there has been gross incompetence which the Department has readily / 2

acknowledged on this matter, it would be less than fair if I
did not make this point, that since I have been Prime Minister
from March of ' 83, the Department of the Prime Minister has,
generally speaking, provided me with excellent and dedicated
service. I think it would be unfair if the impression were left
that as a result of what, certainly in this instance was
considerable incompetence, that that is a general reflection of
the state of the Prime Minister's Department. It is not.
WALSH: But you did use the expression " gross incompetence" and
I wonder, does this restructuring also involve disciplining?
PM: Well, I want to look further, and at a somewhat more
leisurely pace, max, at whether any further implications need to
be involved, but my concern in the immediate sense is to ensure
that the appropriate apparatus is set in place within the
Department to ensure that the Government, through my Department
can properly co-operate with, have a degree of knowledge, and
ensure accountability of the Australian Bicentennial Authority.
Because I want all Australians to know that very much good work
has been done. we are going to have a great year of celebrations
and remembrance in 1988.
WALSH: Now had this occurred, this particular episode occurred
with a junior minister in your Ministry where he was paraded
in the public arena for having OK'ed and approved a payment of
half a million dollars for an inconvenient public servant in the
circumstance which applied to you. I am sure the press would
be howling for ministerial responsibility. Now in your case nobody
imposed ministerial responsibility. Do you think that you would
have applied a particularly harsh standard to a junior minister
who had been exposed to these circumstances?
PM: Well, let me make it quite clear that the basis of your Cieh'oA
is incorrect Max, in the sense that you referred to my approval
of this payment. What is quite clear is that I did not approve
and, in fact, wrote specifically on the advice of my Department
and of the Attorney-General's Department advice given to me'
following the receipt of a letter from Mr Reid on the 28th of
August. I wrote on the 30th of August making it quite clear that
under the law I could not approve, though I must insist Max that
not only could I not approve, I therefore did not approve.
WALSH: Well, what are the aspects of this which has angered you
the most and caused the most public concern was the tax
minimisation arrangement entered into in this large payment. And
the thing that struck me about this as flowing as it does at a
time when you are engaged in eradicating these tax lurk and perks
is this particular lurk which I notice is untouched in Mr Keating's
package. Have you considered that it should be incorporated in it?
PM: Well, I don't know whether it is a question of incorporating
it but I just simply want to say this. That because the Australian
Bicentennial Authority is taking as it must take its own independent
legal advice on this matter. I don't think it's fair to
Dr Armstrong in these circumstances that I should, in a sense,
publicly canvass the issue now as to what may or may not happen.
WALSH: No, I am not suggesting that.

PM: No, I haven't finished my answer. It limits the extent to
which I want to go to the issue but I would think Max, that our
mutually good friend Paul Keating and his Department may be looking
at this issue in the light of what has happened.
WALSH: Good. That brings me onto tax, of course, and the current
public debate about Mr Keating's proposed package. Well interest
groups are having their say and saying it quite vociferously
in some cases I wonder has anything your attention at this stage
where you say maybe they have got a good case, maybe we should
look a second time at that?
PM: Not to this point Max, I am talking about the broad areas.
I mean I would think within each particular category as we
go to legislation there might be some refinement of a particular
point within the categories of action. But I suppose it is true
Max, that the most vociferous reaction, certainly the one that
seems to be the most covered in the media, is the impact upon
the restaurant industry. Now I must say that speaking for Paul
and myself that we are not persuaded there. It is quite clear,
and neither Paul nor I have sought to avoid the point, that
there may be some sections of the restaurant industry which could
be adversely affected. And people are saying well this is going
to have an adverse employment effect. But what you have got to
do as you know is to look at this in overall terms and there is
no way that the overall employment impact of the total tax package
can be disadvantageous. And the simple fact is that you are looking
at the restaurant, that the time had to come to an end when the
great mass of your viewers, the great mass of ordinary Australians
were subsidising the tax lunches or tax dinners of a privileged
few. That had to come to an end. Now we are now in a week where
the evidence is clear that as a result of our general policies
we are very close to achieving that half a million increase in
jobs since we have come to office. Well ahead of target. Now I
and Paul Keating and this Government are not going to be bringing
in policies which are going to have adverse employment impacts
in the aggregate.
WALSH: No, they mightn't have adverse employment impact in, th" e
aggregate but I just wonder how do you read the political response
to the package?
PM: Well, that is a slightly different question and I am glad
you asked it. I think by any objective analysis you would have to
say that the response has been very favourable and I guess one
way of testing this Max, is to look at the pathetic performance
of the Opposition. I mean we went for a day on the first day back
in Parliament when they didn't ask a question about it. Then they
were obviously in very deep and troubled waters and going much
further because Mr Howard has been repudiated by significant
sections of his Party. The Messner mess, if I can put it that
way, has involved
WALSH: Well what do you refer to there?
PM: Well, his statement of what may have to be done. I mean,
the proposals which are talking about a services tax. His harsh
and punitive move into capital gains far beyond what is in our
package. These things clearly show both repudiation of the Howard
position but it is now not a repudiation because Mr Howard, of
course, is back tracking all over the place from his previously
stated position. And we had the remarkable situation in the

Parliament today Max, where objection was taken to the question
addressed to Mr Keating from our side of the House about the
implications of his package. Mr Sinclair got up and said you can't
really have a question about this. So they are putting a bar
upon themselves asking questions in the House. And it is not
surprising because I think really the situation is this. They
understand that we have brought down a good package. They have
got no real idea of how they can, with any reasonablenesscome
up with an alternative.
WALSH: Right, now if I could turn to what you will be doing in
the next few days. You are going to the commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting and you are ' taking with you a proposal which
involves an Australian initiat' 3Ve in somehow putting together an
internation4 program to bring to the fore our opposition to
South Africa's apartheid policies. What would you hope to come
away from CHOGM with precisely?
PM: Well, Max, I think you will appreciate, I don't want to go
into all the details, but I am more than happy to give you the
outline of our thinking. Essentially what we want to see happen
is this, the South African Government itself coming to an
understanding that the abhorrent apartheid apparatus and policy
must be brought to an end. And that they must move to being
a country of universal suffrage, a free and liberal society.
Now the best way for that to happen Max, is that they should
themselves come to that conclusion and start to make the decisions
necessary to reach that goal. So while, yes we will be talking
about the concept of some effective economic action that maybe
able to be adopted within the international community. In a sense,
more importantly to me is that part of my approach which will
be looking to see if we can get a group of respected international
personalities, respected as far as possible across the
international spectrum, who would address themselves to the issue
of the processe I recognise as I think all reasonable people
do WALSH: Just the processes, you mean the processes
PM: In South Africa of change. I mean it would be quite improper
and quite stupid to suggest that just like that overnight that
South Africa could change. It must address itself to the processes
of change, have a clear stated objective of moving to universal
suffrage and a free and liberal society and then what are the
steps, what are the processes that should be initiated to * achieve
that within a reasonable time. Now I want to see the avoidan'ce
of bloodshed in South Africa. I want to see the various groups%
including the white South African Government trying to co-operate
to bring about this desired objective. And so my total approach
will be concentrating, in a senses much more on that than on the
concept of sanctions.
7' r-

WALSH: It has been suggested that the United Kingdom
Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, is less than enthusiastic about
your proposal.
PM: Well, on the evidence, the British Government does take
a more accommodating view. That is true. The evidence suggests
that. But I am not going to the CHOGM iieeting to have a fight
with Margaret Thatcher. I found at my first meeting in 1983,
that I was able to sanely and rationally discuss and debate
issues with her. There were many issues at which we were at one.
There were others where we had differences of opinion, but that
didn't mean clashes and fights. I will put, on behalf of theA
government and people of Aust ralia, the sort of approach which I
have just suggested, and I hope that through the processes of
rational-discussion and debate and argument, we may be able to
get a common solution.
WALSH: You talk about a common position. That is the way it has
to end up, isn't it? You can't end up with a vote and win just
purely on numbers at CHOGM.
PM: Well, that is not the way it is operated, no.
WALSH: And you wouldn't expect it to on this occasion?
PM: No, I would hope that you would get a situation that it would
be clear that the overwhelming majority of people had the sort of
views that I think we are expressing in a way that do give the
opportunity of support from the overwhelming majority. And that
in those circumstances the British Government would see that we are
not about trying to approach this with economic force and saying,
here let's get a big economic stick with which we can beat the
bejesus out of the South African Regime. I mean, it is going to
be necessary, I believe, given the arowina reactionwithin the
UNited States and Europe of the recognition of the need to think
about economic sanctions, to address our minds to that. But once
Mrs Thatcher and others understand that the much preferred position
is to persuade the South African Government about appropriate
processes, within which let me say this that I would be
emphasising the need to ensure that in such an emergent new South
Africa there should be a strong and real and protected place for the
accumulated experience and capital of white South Africans. I mean,
I think people understand that we are totally constructive in our
approach, because I believe very deeply, Max, that the worst thing
that could happen, as developments go on, for the people of South
Africa, for the black South Africans, would be a situation where
there was a total withdrawal of white capital, of white expertise
and experience, because that would mean a serious decline in
economic standards and capacities and potential for all the people
of South Africa. So part of the sorts of things that have got
to be talked about is how, as you get the political democracy and
enfranchisement, you can at the same time ensure that you don't
have a slide into economic chaos.

WALSH: * This CHOGM initiative, would it be self-contained
within CHOGM or would it be a first step before taking it to
the United Nations?
PM: Well, we have thought about it in terms of a stage, that
the Commonwealth, if it can get a common position, then to be
able to go on within the United Nations framework. The Commonwealth
is a remarkable organisation. It represents an enormous number of
people. It represents a range of countries from the most developed
to the least developed, from the largest to the tiniest Pacific
islands. So it can take to the United Nations a degree of
experience and authority which is unique.
WALSH: Just ' before saying good n'ight, Prime Minister, if I could
just come back to the local scene, to the very local scene,
Nunawading, and the sort of dirty tricks exposed at Nunawading,
especially on the part of your party. Does this leave a bad taste
in your mouth?
PM: I have said unequivocally, when I saw the statement of the
State Secretary that I believe it was a very unwise decision that
was taken by those who were involved. I don't think I can be more
straightforward than that. I think it is a fair enough postscript
to add that people should not be taken by the hypocri'sy of the
Liberals in this. I just ask them to cast their mind back to
December 1982 when Senator Don Chipp had cause to launch the most
stringent attack upon the Liberal Party in Victoria for what ' le
described his words " the filthy trick' of the Liberal Party
in Victoria in attempting to delude the voters of Flinders in the
by-election in December 1982 that the Democrats were supporting
the Liberals. He camne out and attacked them for their filthy
trick in putting out material seeking to mislead. Now that does
not excuse or justify the unwise decision that I believe was taken
within the Labor Party in Victoria in the Nunawading by-election,
but I think it is fair enough to say the Liberals cannot be heard
in this debate, this discussion. They don't come to it with clean
hands. WALSH: Prime Minister, thanks very much. Good evening.
PM: Thanks very much, Max.

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