PRIME MINISTER
E. O. E. -PROOF ONLY
PRESS CONFERENCE PRIME MINISTER BRUSSELS HILTON,
4 FEBRUARY 1985, 4.30 P. M.
JOURNALIST: Prime Minister there have been some developments
since we left Australia on the question of the KX missile. Is it
still your Government's intention to permit the U. S. to use our
facilities for the tracking or monitoring or whatever of the rnisZ.
I don't think it's appropriate for me to convey Governe. it
decisions in such an important area via the media where I am in
the position that I'm about to go to the United States. Clearly
when I'm in the United States and having discussions not only
with the President but with other administration officials this
is an issue that will be discussed. Not only this issue itself, bi;.
let me make it clear we will be discussing a range of related issues
I'll. be making it very clear to the United States' administration
that the Australian Government is not giving support to the
strategic defence initiative. We'll be putting a firm position
ac my Foreign. Minister, Bill Rayden, haa bcn putting before in
respect of the CTfl. And so there's a range of related issues
that I'll be dealing with in my discussions with the United
States administration. Now I believe it's appropriate that when
I've had those discussions that I'll be available after that t~ o
discuss these matters with you.
JOURNALIST: Prime Minister does that-now mean that the question
of the MX is now hanging.
I don't put it as hanging. .1 put it in these terms, that
we that is when I say we, the then Minister for Defence, Mr
Scholes, and Mr Hayden, the Foreign Minister, and myself when
we considered this matter did not make a decision lightly. We Ware
aware of the considerable importance of the matter. Now the issue
has become a public issue and I have become aware of the extent of.
ffi-llnun nn thtl 111MUC f~ jj7 WhIghl I MnA9rVtjnd Now I'm simpi'
saying that I will be taking those into account. I'll be also,
as I say, discussing this whole range of issues with the United
States administration. And I believe it appropriate, as I hope you
would understand, that it makes more sense that I talk with you
on these matters after I've had those discussions.
JOURNALIST-. Prime Minister, on that point, where does it leave
you when obviously the Left Is against it, the Centre Left is
against it, even some of your own factional support Centre Unity
in Victoria and people within NSW are against it. What can you
talk about with President Reagan in regard to this whole issue and
still leave yourself reasonably flexible in terms of the Australian
population. soI/
Well I obviously have had conveyed to me certain views
within Australia arnd I would be wanting to in terms of informing
myself about the range of Views to wait until I got back to
Australia to have further discussions. But let me say that
I have no apprehension about that. I understand the very
considerable feelings that there are on this issue. I will
go to the United states with a very clear intention as I say
of putting a strong position to the United States administration
on a range of iwsue in which it will be quite clear that the
position of the Australian Government is not at one with that
of the United States administration. I have indicated that in
regard to two matters the SDI and the CTB and it's within
that framework that I will listen to what's said. I'll be
putting particular points of view about those related issues.
And I think it's in the light, of those discussions, which after
all are going to take place in a rolativoly short time, that this
whole matter will be more fruitfully open to discussion both
with you, as representatives of the media, and with those various
interests to which you refer in your question.
JOURNALIST: Would you see it consistent with Australia's
responsibilities under ANZUS and with the U. S. under the alliance
not to go ahead with support for the MX missile decision.
Well, I'mt not going to take that discussion any further
Greg at this point. I mean I'm not going to~ avoid the issue at
the appropriate time. I think it's more appropriate to have that
discussion with you after I've put cQrtain positions in my
* discussions in the United States. I c-an assure you that I will
be open to discussions with you at the appropriate time.
JOURNALIST: Mr Hawke does Friday's statement still stand.
P. K: Which Friday statement are you referring to.
JOURNALIST: Mr Beazley's statement on this matter-
Well I believe he made the Friday~ statement. I think be's
issuing another.
JOURNALISTi Ile's only said some other things that happoad, but
Friday's statement was that approval had been given.
Yes well that is a satement of-fact. Approval had bean
given. That is true. I mean there is nothing that can be said
by me now or at some subsequent stage which changes that fact.
What I'm saying to you is that I'm going to have discussions
in the United States. I'm obviously going to take account of
what's conveyed to me by my colleagues in Australia as well.
And it's going to be in the light of the discussions that I have
in the United States and in the light of the assessment of what
I hear also from Australia and the discussions that I have with
mny Ministers in Australia that V1l1 be able to speak with you.
FSCi" 4 1
3.
JOURNALIST: Why didn't you also have these discussions before
at the time with your Ministers. Why didn't you take this
matter to Cabinet as you knew it was so important.
Well there is a range of issues for which you have under
our set-up, the Security Committee. This matter was considered
by that Commuittee and reconsidered again. Now the issue has
developed further and the appropriate procesces in the light
of those facts will be followed after the discussions I've had
in the United States.
JOURNALIST) Surely the decisions were made at the time for
harsh political and military reasons. What's changed apart from..
Let me make this point that it was not a decision that
Mr Hayden and Mr Scholes and myself mad* flippantly. I hope
that even those who are expressing most vehemently disagreement
with that decision will accept that the Foreign Minister and
myself and the then Minister for Defence thought about this
issue in the light of the considerations then applying. Now
it makes proper sense that in the light of the current
circumstances that we examine tho docision, that we look at
it in the light of the discussions I have in the United States
and with the people in Australia who are now properly involved
and concerned, And I will follow those processes.
JOURNALIST: What I was going to put to you Prime Minister was
is it not the case that we are presently committed to assiating
the Americans with their MX missile tests and that situation
could well change.
As a result of the decisions that was conveyed to the
Americans that is a fair statement of what the position is.
Now I've made it clear I hope now this is the last time becaus-
I've said it I think three or four times 6lroady that the
matter will be discussed amongst others, where I'll be putting
a very strong-position as I say on certain other related issues#
the matter will be discussed when I'm in thc United Statas. And
then it will be discussed when I get back to Australia. Now
you don't have discussions for tho cako of just hearing words.
It may be that out of those discussions there will be a development
of position. But it's quite inappropriate that bofore I hava
those discussions that I should go any further.
JOURNALIST: If Australia does rescind its approval to co-operate
with the MX tests could any parallel be drawn between that and the
New Zealand refusal to allow port visits by nuclear powered ships.
I believe not.
JOURNALIST: Prime Minister is it possible that you are somewhat
out of step with the feeling in Australia on this gu aion.
FROM 34' 2 313e126Me2.04 20: 48
I think it could be said quite clearly I mean one would
be a fool to say otherwise that the decision that was made
by myself and Mr Scholes and Mr Hayden and confirmed by the
Security Committee, it obviously is the case that that decision
is not in line with the attitude of a number of people. It's
obviously clear.
JOURNALIST: Prime Minister are you indicating that you are
going to be influenced by the feelings in Australia now and
you're going to indicate what the decisions are after you've
seen President Reagan. To what extent are you going to be
influenced by what you discuss with him. is he going to
influence your decision.
No I'm not saying that. As in the original case, no-one
determines the position for this Government from outside of
Australia on this or any other issue. The decision that
was taken by Mr Hayden, Mr Scholes and myself was not determined
externally. It was a sovereign autonomous decision by the
three Ministers concerned and confirmed subsequently by the
Security Committee. My Government is not in the position and
not in the business of having its mind made up for it by any
Government outside of Australia the United States Government,
the United Kingdom Government or any other Government. And it
has not been in that position up until now and it won't be in the
future. JOURNALIST-Is it a case now of you going to the Americans
and suggesting to them that they might like to switch the
tests elsewhere. It's not a matter for me to conduct discussions with
sovereign governments through a news conference and say via th.-
news conference before I meet a head of government, look this
is what I'm going to be talking to you about. I mean that's
never the way I've conducted my business.-I don't intend to
start now.
JOURNALIST: Are you saying the Government isn't bound any more
by the Fraser Government's decision.
Well Mr Hayden and Mr Scholes and myself did not make
the decision in terms of saying that a decision made by a previous
Government of itself bound this Government. It was a factor
that we took into account.
JOURNALIST: How did you equate that decision with the Government's
professed policy of not supporting the development of first
strike capacity. r w o .105
FROM 32 2 5130126' 85.82.04 21: 03
FR* OM 32 2 5130126 185.02.04 21105
Well I think if you have a look at the transcriptz of
Mr Beazley's press conference. where the question of first
strike was put to him, you will see an absolutely correct
statement by Mr Beazley that when you talk about first strike
you're not talking about a capacity, you're talking about
an intention. I believe that was a perfectly correct statarnent
by Mr Beazley. Let me make it quite clear by way of obvious
corollary to that statement that if there by any perception on
the part of we three Ministers that there was that " Intention
on the part of the United States which intention is necessary
for it to be a first strike, there simply would not have been
any involvement by my-~ Government with it.
JOURNALISTt Prime Minister are you in a position to say
what influenced your decision at the time. What prompted you
make the decision.
Well let me say that in the statement that has been
made by Mr Beazley there is an indication of the considerations
that here was a position where a previous Govenment had made
a decision as I said in answer, I think it was to Mike, that
of itself is not enough. I mean vie are not saying that because
any previous Government had made a decision our authority or
capacity to consider it ceases. But in the alliance relationship
that we have with the United States and on the assumptions
that we made about the intention of the United States in regard
to the possible use of this capacity, which I emphasise to you,
our assessment was that there was no intention on the part
of the United States to regard this as a first strike weapon then
taking all those things into account we made the decision that
we did. I'm not trying to suggest to you that it was one of
easiest decisions that confronted Ministers involved. We'took
it. Now obviously at this stage and I repeat, I think, for the
fifth time -1 hope it will be sufficient I'm not saying it
by way of criticism, I understand the interest that's involved"
in this subject, but I do hope you'll accept what I've said now,
I've put it-. in good faith but we obviously in our discussions
with the United States on a whole range of related issues we'll
be having further discussions about this matter. And included
within those discussions will be the question of the attitude
in regard to this capacity which has been tested and a whole
range of other considerations. I'll have those discussions
and further discussions when I get back to Australia. But I'll
be prepared to talk with the press at both stages following
my discussions in the United States and obviously when I return
to Australia.
JOURNALIST: Have you been surprised by the extent, breadth and
depth of the reaction.-to this issue in Australia.
0
FROM ' 32 2 5130126 850.4 21 106
0 6.
It's a good question, it's a hard one. I can understand
the concern that people have about trying to have a world which
is going to have the opportunity of simply saying living at peace,
but a world in which there is going to be practical progress
towards producing a position between the superpowers whiare the
concept of deterr-ence which has operated since 1935 to relieve
the world from the horror of nuclear conflict can operate at a
lesser level of armament. I can understand that and I say
unashamedly that while perhaps I don't make as much noise as
some people about this I yield to no-one in my concern and
involvement in that area. Now I understand that the decision.
has generated some concern, I believe unfoundedly, that the decision
of itself represents some diminution or derogation from our
Government's commitments to those high purposes. I simply want
to say through this opportunity to the people of Australia tho
decision that was taken by myself and my two Ministers did not
represent any such diminution. Indeed I think it's a matter of
record that this Government and its Foreign Minister in 1983
and 1984 has pursued vigorously, and I believe demonstrably
effectively in many areas, the concern of this G ' overnment with
those issues. We haven't believed that the decision that was
taken then obviously Mr Hayden and Mr Scholes, but Mr Hayden
particularly who had a continuing responsibility in these other
forums has not believed on behalf of the Government that the
decision that was taken at that time operated in any way to
diminish our commitment to or advocacy for a reduction of the
levels of armaments in the relations between the two maior Dowers.
We have steadfastly pursued in every forum, particularly in the
Committee of Disarmament, processes and strategies calculated
in a variety of ways to try and reduce the level of tension, to
try and get processes which are going to reduce the level of
armaments. We are unqualified, absolutely unqualified in that
commitment. Now I see that some people regard the decition that
was taken as in some sense representing a diminution of that
commitment. All I say to my colleagues and to the Australian
people that that is not a correct assessment. We yield to
no-one in our commitment to pursue within all relevant fora to
pursuit of the reduction of the level of armaments so that we'
can got a more substantial basis for peaceful relations in the
world than a continuing escalation of the level of armaments.
~ ENDS. 6F~ cI