Prime minister: Tabling Statement on ASTEC Report on
Australia's Role in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 31 May 1984
For the information of Honourable Members I present the
report by the Australian Science and Technology Council
( ASTEC) on Australia's role in the nuclear fuel cycle.
Mr Speaker, I seek leave to make a statement in respect of
the Report.
Following the Government's examination of policy in relation
to the export of Australian uranium last year, I wrote to
the Chairman of ASTEC, Professor Ralph Slatyer, on 9
November 1983, requesting that ASTEC undertake an inquiry,
under his personal direction, into Australia's role in the
nuclear fuel cycle.
The Inquiry was asked . to examine in particular:
Australia's nuclear safeguards arrangements, giving
particular attention to the effectiveness of the
bllaeraland multilateral agreements, and to the scope
for strengthening tese agreements;
the opportunities for Australia through the conditions
of its involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle to further
advance the cause of nuclear non-proliferation, having
regard to the policies and practices of recipient
countries; and
the adequacy of existing technology for the handling and
disposal of waste products by consuming countries, and
the ways in which Australia can further contribute to
the development of safe disposal methods.
The Council was subsequently requested to include some
consideration of the issues raised by the possible
extraction of thorium for nuclear use from Australian
mineral sands containing the mineral monazite.
The Slatyer Inquiry was an integral part of the Government's
uranium policy decisions announced last November.
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At that time the Government decided that:,
the Roxby Downs Joint Venturers be advised that if
a commercial decision to p~ roceed with the
development of Roxby Downs were to be made by them,
the Government would permit the export of uranium
produced from that mine; and the export of the
uranium would be subject to whatever safeguards
arrangements applied generally 1--o uranium exports
at the time of export;
with the exception of Roxby Downs if commercially
feasible, the Government not permit the development
of any new uraniumn mines;
all future exports of Australia's uranium under
both existing and any future contracts be made
subject to the most stringent supply conditions,
such conditions to be determined by the Government
following an inquiry into Australia's role in the
nuclear fuel cycle.
In setting up the Inquiry, the Government considered il-to
be important that there should be an independent and
objective audit of policies and practices in regard to
Australia's uranium exports to ensure that they contributed
to and strengthened Australia's pursuit of its disarmament
and non-proliferation objectives.
The Government also-gought a scientific assessment of the
adequacy of ways in whic~ countries managed and disposed of
radioactive waste.
ASTEC, as the pre-eminent Council providing independent
advice to the Government on science and technology
questions, was judged best-qualified to perform this role
under the personal direction of Professor Slatyer.
The terms of reference for the Inquiry focused primarily on
the issues of non-proliferation, safeguards and waste
management, both because of their intrinsic importance, and
because they are of particular concern in the community in
relation to Australia's involvement in the nuclear fuel
cycle.
The final Report reflects a broad interpretation of the
terms of reference, and provides a comprehensive
identification of the elements of the fuel cycle and the
issues which they raise for the export of Australian
uranium.
The Report indicates that while the percentage of world
electricity requirements which will be generated by nuclear
means cannot be forecast precisely, no new energy source is
likely to have a significant impact for the next quarter
century. Accordingly the Report notes that the world can bE?
expected to rely largely on coal and nuclear energy,
supplemented by oil, to provide the major part of its
electricity requirments for this period.
This would be-the case even if Australia were not to export
its uranium.
The Report notes that there is no shortage of uranium in the!
world to supply fuel to the nuclear power industry, and
points out that the future development of the nuclear power'
industry will not be dependent on Australian uranium, and
will proceed irrespective of whether or not Australia is a
supplier. The Report suggests that if international tensions are to be
reduced and the prospects of a peaceful global environment
enhanced, the importance of national and international
energy security cannot be overemphasised. It notes tha-t'
disruptions in the supply of resources of any sort have been
a cause of international tension and, through human history,
have led to war.
* The Report points out that countries which do not have
indigenous energy resources are most concerned to ensure
reliability of supplies, and to this end place great
emphasis on diversity ofi'supplies and the political
stability of supplier countries. For this reason many
countries have turned to nuclear energy for electricity
generation out of concern about reliability of oil supplies
both in the short and long-term.
The Inquiry has concluded that Australia, through being a
reliable, long-term supplier of uranium, is in a position to
contribute significantly to international energy security.
Further, the Report brings out that assurance of reliable
long-term supplies of uranium at reasonable prices will also
reduce the motivation for individual countries to seek
greater energy security by carrying out more. steps of the
fuel cycle, particularly reprocessing, within national
boundaries. Against this background the Report concludes that Australia
will best be able to make a significant contribution to
non-proliferation and world peace if it is actively involved
in the nuclear fuel cycle.
By involvement of this kind, the Report argues, Australia
will be able to make a direct contribution to the
development of the civil nuclear fuel cycle in ways that
will increase global energy security, strengthen the
elements of the non-proliferation regime and reduce the
risks of misuse of civil facilities and the diversion of
nuclear materials from civil to military uses.
Without such involvement, global energy security would be
less assured,-and Australia's ability to strengthen the
non-proliferation regime and to influence future
developments in the fuel cycle would be reduced.
The Report expresses the concern that we must all share that
the prevention of nuclear war is of the greatest importance*
to all humanity.
A major component of global efforts to prevent such a war is
prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons,
either by an increase in the size of the arsenals of those
countries which already have such weapons, referred to as
vertical proliferation, or by an increase in the number of
countries with such weapons or which have exploded nuclEar
devices, referred to as horizontal proliferation.
The Report recognises that since nuclear fission not only
provides power for electricity generation but also
constitutes the explosive source of weapons, it is
understandable that there should be widespread public
concern about the degree to which civil nuclear activities
could contribute to the evelovment of nuclear weapons.
In this regard the Inquiry makes a number of points.
Q The great majority of the countries of the world have found
compelling reasons for not building nuclear weapons and have
given a commitment not to do so by becoming members of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. They have also accepted
safeguards on all their nuclear facilities so that their
commitment to non-proliferation can be verified.
The Report points out that if a decision is taken by a'
country to develop nuclear weapons this can be achieved,
provided that the country has sufficient determination and a
reasonable scientific and technological infrastructure. The
absence of a civil nuclear industry would not prevent such a
development, although the procedure would be more difficult.
and slower.
But the Report suggests that, should * a country decide to
embark on a weapons program, it is unlikely to use a civil
power reactor to do so, as this would be inefficient both in
terms of producing weapons usable material and in terms of
electricity generation.
The Report concludes that the task for all countries is to
create an international political climate in which actions
leading to the growth of the arsenals of nuclear weapons
states, and the extension of a nuclear capability to
so-called " threshold" countries, are not taken.
In this regard the Report focuses on the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, as the most important multilateral non-proliferationk
and arms control agreement in existence a view which this
Government strongly supports and will continue to in
multilateral fora, and in our discussions with other nations;
on non-proliferation and arms control matters.
The Report makes a number of recommendations aimed at
strengthening adherance to the treaty.
In particular it notes that continued support by' many
countries will depend upon the fulfilment of the three-way
bargain contained in the treaty.
These involve a pledge by non-nuclear weapon states neither.
to manufacture nor acquire nuclear weapons and to accept
verification of this, a commitment by all parties to pursue
nuclear disarmament, and an undertaking to provide acc,..: s by
members to nuclear items for peaceful purposes. In this
latter regard, the Report refers to the importance of
Article IV of the treaty, which affirms the right of all
countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It
also requires those countries in a position to do so to
contribute to ' the further development of nuclear energy in
member countries.
At a more fundamental level the Report highlights the
necessity-not just of maintaining the non-proliferation
regime, but of demonstrating that the obligations contained
in the Treaty are being met.
In this regard, the significance of the forthcoming 1985 NPT
Review Conference is emphasised as is the need to register
somne positive achievements in the field of disarmament
before the future of the treaty is decided in 1995.
The Government has stressed on a number of occasions and
reaffirms the fundamental importance it attaches to the role!
of the Review Conference to the future of the NPT.
Among the Government's more important initiatives in support:
of an effective non-proliferation regime has been our
backing for a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific. The
Report sees this as contributing to the international
non-proliferation regime in a substantial region, as well as;
responding to the fears of small island states in the region
about the future conservation and use of their major
resource, the ocean.
Mr Speaker,
There can be no doubt that the issues of disarmament and
non-proliferation are among the most important of our time.
It is the international community's ability to deal with
them effectively which will determine our future.
It is particularly important that we be clear-sighted in our
thinking on the issues involved.
The Report notes that ' two key arguments have been put
forward opposing Australia's involvement: in the nuclear fuel
cycle. It has, for example, been suggested that the solution to the.
problems of nuclear proliferation is for the world to forgo
C the use of nuclear energy, and for countries such as
Australia to take a lead by withholding supply of uranium.
The Report rejects this suggestion, observing that the use
of nuclear energy is an established fact of life, and that
Australia' s withdrawal would not affect the decisions that
countri-es have made and will make to use nuclear energy.
A second line of argument is that, by supplying uraniumn to
nuclear weapon states, Australia might be freeing up uranium
for use in weapons. The Report also rejects this argument,
drawing attention to the fact that those states already have
adequate supplies of uranium and are not assisted in any way
by the supply of Australian uranium. Pt more bluntly, the
Report concludes that denial of supply to nuclear weapon
states would not affect ih any way their weapons programs.
On the basis of these and other related considerations, the
Report concludes that there are more practical measures that
Q Australia can take to assist the cause of non-proliferation
than by withholding the supply of uranium. Principally
these go to the strengthening of the existing
non-proliferation regimne; proposals made by the Report in
this regard will be addressed by the Government in the near
future. The Report also thoroughly considers the issues involved in
waste management and disposal.
It judges it to be absolutely necessary for countries to
adopt high standards and to ensure that the best practicable
waste disposal technology is employed.
The Report advocates an approach which involves containing
and isolating the source of radioactivity as far as
possible.
The most effective way to put such an approach into practice
is seen to be the confinement of the radioactive wastes in a
stable waste form, and to isolate the waste form from the
environment by additional barriers.
Proven methods are identified for handling waste with low
and intermediate levels of radioactivity. The Report,
however, expresses reservations about the dumping of
radioactive waste in the oceans, noting that, while this may
be a safe prodedure, much further work remains to be done
before any final judgement can be made. In the meantime,
the Report urges Australian support for a continuation of
the present moratorium on ocean dumping.
For high level waste, the Report notes that investigations
in progress, the level of technical knowledge attained, and
the progress of programs of site investigation provide
confidence that safe disposal of high level waste can be
undertaken. The results of theoretical assessments of geological
repositories provide additional confidence that safe
disposal of appropriately packaged waste is possible using
existing technology, provided that the best practicable
technology is used at each stage and that an optimum
geological repository is used.
Under these circumstances, the Report considers that any
return of radioactivity to the biosphere can be held to safe
and acceptable levelg over long periods ( up to one million
years) so that maximum dQ'ses to the most exposed individuals;
would be a small fractioh of natural background levels.
It considers, moreover, that the technology required to
achieve these objectives is available.
The Report notes the contribution which Australia can make
to research and development in the area of waste disposal
and recommends continued involvement in this important work..
Attention is drawn particularly to the potential
significance of the Australian-developed waste form Synroc
and it is recommended that work on Synroc be continued. If
the promise which Synroc appears to hold is demonstrated by
further research, the Report concludes that . its adoption by
other countries should be pursued.
At this stage I should like to thank Professor Slatyer, the
members of the Inquiry and ASTEC staff for the production of
a comprehensive, thoroughly professional Report. It should
become the standard technical reference for those seeking an
understanding of the issues involved in this complex and
critically important subject, on which a range of views are
held within the Australian community and indeed within the
Labor Party.
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my judgment and indeed my hope would be that it will further
enhance the more rational and reasoned distussion of nuclear
issues which has emerged in recent months.
The Government will give careful consideration to the ASTEC
Recommendations, and as decisions are made, Ministers will
advise the Parliament.
I commend the report to the House.