PM Transcripts

Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia

Hawke, Robert

Period of Service: 11/03/1983 - 20/12/1991
Release Date:
15/06/1983
Release Type:
Speech
Transcript ID:
6136
Document:
00006136.pdf 8 Page(s)
Released by:
  • Hawke, Robert James Lee
SPEECH BY THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER THE HON R.J. HAWKE, AC, MP. TO THE WASHINGTON PRESS CLUB WASHINGTON, USA 15 JUNE 1983

ANNEXES lA U ST RAI,
PRIME MINIS TER
SPEECH BY THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER
THE HON R. J. HAWKE, AC, MP, TO THE A
WASHINGTON PRESS CLUB
WASHINGTON, USA
JUNE 1983
I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE NATIONAL
PRESS CLUB IN WASHINGTON, AND THROUGH SUCH A PRESTIGIOUS FORUM AND
THE MEDIA REPRESENTED HERE, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE EsrECIALLY AS THIS
OPPORTUNITY COMES SO EARLY IN THE LIFE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA, ELECTED ON THE FIFTH OF MARCH THI1S YEAR.
2. I DON'T WISH TO PRE-EMPT YOUR QUESTION TIME, BUT IN THESE
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, I SHOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE BRIEFLY AUSTRALIA'S
INTERNATIONAL ROLE, AS MY NEW ADMINISTRATION SEES IT.
3. AS GOOD A STARTING POINT AS ANY, IS THE ELECTION ON THE FIFTH OF
MARCH4 ITSELF, WHEN BY A CONVINCING DECISION, THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA
CHOSE A NEW GOVERNMENT, A NEW LEADERSHIP, AND NEW DIRECTIONS, AFTER
SEVEN YEARS OF THE PREVIOUS CONSERVATIVE ADMINISTRATION.
4. BUT IN DOING SO, THEY DID NOT SEEK OR CHOOSE ANY RADICAL CHANGE
IN THE MAJOR DIRECTIONS OF AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, O. R IN OUR
FUNDAMENTAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ESPECIALLY THE RELATIONSHIP WE
HAVE WITH THE UNITED STATES.
THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ITSELF, DOMINATED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY BY
ECONOMIC ISSUES, WAS NOTABLY FREE OF CONTENTIOUS DEBATE ON MAJOR
ISSUES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE. TO ILLUSTRATE THIS POINT
A1ND MORE IMPORTANTLY, TO ILLUSTRATE THE ESSENTIAL CONTINUITY WHICH
UNDERLIES THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT,, I CAN DO NO BETTER THAN QUOTE
MYSELF, FROM WHAT WE CALL IN AUSTRALIA, ' THE POLICY SPEECH' WHICH
IS THE BASIC DOCUMENT ON WHICH AUSTRALIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS ARE
CONDUCTED. IN THAT SPEECH, I SAID:
' THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY
HAVE TAKEN ON A QUALITY OF BIPARTISANSHIP INCONCEIVABLE BEFORE 1972
BEFORE THE ELECTION OF THE WHITLAM LABOR GOVERNMENT). THE GREAT
QUESTIONS OF AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, WITH
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, INDONESIA, OUR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS W4ITH THE
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, NEW ZEALAND AND JAPAN, AND
OUR CONDUCT ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN QUESTIONS, NOW POSSESS A HIGH DEGREE
OF CONTINUITY, CONSISTENCY, AND CONSENSUS.
6. THAT DECLARATION W4AS ACCEPTED BY THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA AS THE
BASIS OF OUR APPROACH, AND IN TURN, ACCEPTED BY US, AS THE NEWLY
ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA, AS AN INSTRUCTION FROM THE PEOPLE AS
TO TH4E PROPER CONDUCT OF THEIR AFFAIRS IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE
NATTONS OF TIIF WORI

A?.
7. BUT HAVING STRESSED THE CONINUITY WITHIN THE CHANGE, 1 SHQU1j
IMMEDIATELY DEFINE THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF OUR APPROACH WHICH IN TERMS
OF PERSPECTIVES OF TH4E WORLD AS IT REALLY IS, AND PERSPECTIVES OF
AUSTRALIA'S ROLE AND INTERESTS AS THEY REALLY ARE, DO REPRESENT
DISTINCTIVE AND SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR ADMINISTRATION OF
FOREIGN POLICY.
8. FIRST, WE WILL PURSUE AN INDEPENDENT AND SELF-RESPECTING FOREIGN
POLICY, BASED ON A COOL AND OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT HARDHEADED, IF YOU
LIKE OF AUSTRALIA'S GENUINE NATIONAL INTEREST, BUT AT ALL TIMES,
CONSISTENT WITH AUSTRALIA'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. . WE WILL
ALWAYS SEEK TO RESOLVE ANY DIFFERENCES THAT MAY ARISE WITH OTHER
NATIONS THROUGH CONCILIATORY DIPLOMACY.
9. BUT SHOULD OUR LEGITIMATE NATIONAL INTEREST BE CHALLENGED
WHETHER IN MATTERS OF FOREIGN OR ECONOMIC POLICY OR SHOULD WE
BELIEVE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ARE AT STAKE, WE WILL RESPOND OPENLY,
DIRECTLY, FORTHRIGHTLY.
SECOND, WE WILL PURSUE A REALISTIC AND RELEVANT FOREIGN POLICY,
ONE WHICH RECOGNISES AND ACCEPTS THE CONSTRAINTS ON OUR CAPABILITY
AND THE LIMITATIONS OF OUR INFLUENCE. THAT MEANS, TO BE REALISTIC
AND RELEVANT, THE FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO OUR RELATIONS
WITH OUR NEIGHBOURS OF THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION, AND TO THE MAJOR
INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES WITH WH4ICH WE SHARE SIGNIFICANT
RELATIONSHIPS, ESPECIALLY THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.
11. THIRD, WE WILL PURSUE A FOREIGN POLICY A PP ROPRIATE TO A NATION
WITH NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT ITS CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE GLOBAL EVENTS, AND
NO FALSE NOTIONS OF OUR SELF-IMPORTANCE. ACCORDINGLY, WE RECOGNISE
THAT OUR CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS, IN WAYS
CONSISTENT WITH OUR NATIONAL INTEREST, IS BEST INCREASED THROUGH
PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS. WE SHALL BE FULLY
SUPPORTIVE OF THE ROLE OF SUCH INTERNATIONAL BODIES, UNDER THE
GENERAL AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
12. FOURTH, WE WILL ENDEAVOUR TO DEVELOP A FOREIGN POLICY WHICH
ACCEPTS THE OPPORTUNITIES AS THEY ARISE TO PLAY AN APPROPRIATE PART
IN PROMOTING CO-OPERATION AND RESOLVING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATIONS
AND NEIGHBOURS, ESPECIALLY IN OUR OWN REGION.
13. IF I MAY SAY SO, IN THIS CONTEXT, MAGNUM IN PARVO, MY OWN
BACKGROUND IN THE FIELD OF AUSTRALIAN AND INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS FORMS THE BASIS OF MY STRONG CONVICTIONS OF THE PART THAT
THE PROCESSES OF RECONCILIATION CAN PLAY IN THE RESOLUTION OF,
CONFLICT. THIS IS AN APPROACH I KNOW IS SHARED BY MY FRIEND, THE
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. BUT IN ANY SUCH INITIATIVES AS WE
AUSTRALIANS SHALL BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE, WE WILL BE SEEING THE
WORLD AND OUR REGION AS IT IS, RATHER THAN AS WE MAY WISH IT TO BE.
14. AND FIFTH, OUR FOREIGN POLICY WILL OPERATE WITHIN THE OVERALL
POLICY FRAMEWORK OF OUR NATION, CLOSELY RELATED TO THE CONDUCT OF OUR
DOMESTIC POLICIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO THE MANAGEMENT OF
OUR ECONOMY. IF WE CAN'T DEMONSTRATE A CAPACITY TO MANAGE OUR OWN
NATIONAL AFFAIRS EFFECTIVELY, THEN OUR INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS IS THEREBY DIMINISHED. SO THERE IS INDEED AN
INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PROMPT MEASURES MY GOVERNMENT HAS
TAKEN TOWARDS ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND THE RESTORATION OF
NON-INFLATIONARY ECONOMIC GROWTH, IN ORDER TO PLACE AUSTRALIA IN THE
BEST POSSIBLE POSITION TO BENEFIT FROM THE ANTICIPATED RECOVERY IN
THE WORLD -ECONOMY AND TO SHARE IN THE DYNAMIC GROWTH OF THE WESTERN
PACIFIC REGION TO WhlICll WE flEoJNG THE FASTEST-GROWING ECONOMIC
REGIUN IN THE WORLD.

A3.
AND FINALLY AND THIS POINT IS INTEGRAL TO ALL THAT I HAVE JUST
SAID COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH OUR DETERMINATION TO PURSUE FOR
AUSTRALIA A VIGOROUS, INDEPENDENT, REALISTIC AND RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL ROLE AUSTRALIA IS NOT AND CANNOT BE A NON-ALIGNED
NATION. WE ARE NEUTRAL NEITHER IN THOUGHT, NOR ACTION.
16. SPECIFICALLY, WE ARE LINKED WITH THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE
ANZUS TREATY.
17. BUT BEYOND THAT, WE ARE LINKED WITH THE UNITED STATESINDISSOLUBLY
LINKED BY A WHOLE RANGE OF COMMON INTERESTS,
ATTITUDES, ASPIRATIONS, PERCEPTIONS, INSTITUTIONS, TRADITIONS, AND
ASSOCIATIONS IN WAR AND PEACE.
18. UNDER MY GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO FIND, IN
AUSTRALIA, A CO-OPERATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER. WE REGARD OUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE.,
AND WHATEVER DIFFERENCES OF PERCEPTION OR POLICY MAY ARISE FROM TIME
TO TIME AS THEY MUST BETWEEN MATURE AND RESPONSIBLE PARTNERS THIS
BASIC FACT REMAINS THE FOUNDATION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.
19. ALTHOUGH, AS I HAVE SAID, OUR ASSOCIATION IS CLOSE# LONG, DEEP,
AND WIDE-RANGING, IT IS PERHAPS INEVITABLE, AND IN MANY RESPECTS
APPROPRIATE, THAT IT IS THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE WHICH
SHOULD BE THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF ATTENTION.
THE ANZUS TREATY WHICH FORMALISES OUR ALLIANCE# IS NOW OVER
THIRY YEARS OLD. IT WAS CONCEIVED IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND SOUGHT GUARANTEES FROM THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE
POSSIBILITY OF ANY REVIVAL OF A MILITARY THREAT FROM JAPAN.
21. THIS MAY SEEM ALMOST BIZARRE NOW. NEVERTHELESS, HOWEVER MUCH
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES MAY HAVE CHANGED SINCE, AUSTRALIANS ARE IN
NO DOUBT THAT THE ANZUS TREATY SUPPORTS AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY IN
CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND REFLECTS A
COINCIDENCE OF STRATEGIC INTEREST BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED
STATES. THIS COINCIDENCE OF INTEREST PROVIDES THE * BASIS FOR
CO-OPERATION WHICH YIELDS SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS FOR AUSTRALIA'S
DEFENCE EFFORTS AND WHICH, IN RETURN, AFFORDS SUBSTANTIAL BENEFIT TO
THE UNITED STATES. THE BENEFITS ARE MUTUAL AND RECIPROCAL. THE
TREATY PROVISIONS DO NOT DEROGATE FROM AUSTRALIA'S RIGHT OF NATIONAL
DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY. THE RISKS INVOLVED
FOR AUSTRALIA IN RELATION TO THE HOSTING OF THE JOINT DEFENCE
FACILITIES ON OUR SOIL HAVE TO BE BALANCED AGAINST AUSTRALIA'S
INTEREST IN SUPPORTING THE UNITED STATE'S GLOBAL DETERRENT EFFORT
AND HER PRIME CONTRIBUTION TO THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC BALANCE.
22. IN MY TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT, I HAVE REAFFIRMED MY VIEW OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS REACHED IN 1974, WHICH BROUGHT ALL OF
OF THE INSTALLATIONS IN AUSTRALIA UNDER THE JOINT ADMINISTRATION OF
OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND THE NEED FOR US TO BUILD ON IT IN ORDER TO
ENSURE THAT THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS MOVES AHEAD CO-OPERATIVELY AND
EFFECTIVELY, AND TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE AUSTRALIAN SOVEREIGNTY.
23. 1 HAVE ALSO PUT IT TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AND FOUND IT
SYMPATHETIC TO THE IDEA, THAT THERE WOULD BE VALUE IN THE TREATY
PARTNERS AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES CARRYING
OUT A JOINT REVIEW OF THE ANZUS TREATY. AS WILL BE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR
FROM ALL I HAVE SAID, MY PURPOSE IN PROPOSING THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT
TO CALL THE TREATY INTO QUESTION BUT TO STRENGTHEN IT AND MAKE SURE
THAT IT IS AS RELEVANT AS POSSIBLE TO CONTEMPORARY CIRCUMSTANCES.

24.. I HAVE AGREED WITH SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION THAT
THIS WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE ANZUS COUNCIL, DUE TO MEET IN
WASHINGTON NEXT MONTH.
THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT TH4AT ANZUS WILL REMAIN THE FUNDAMENTAL
DOCUMENT GOVERNING T14E CONDUCT OF AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC ROLE IN THE
PACIFIC AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN REGIONS.
26. IT IS ON THAT REGION THE REGION IN WHICH DESTINY HAS PLACED
AUSTRALIA FOREVER THAT MY GOVERNMENT WILL FOCUS ITS PRIMARY
ATTENTION IN THE YEARS AHEAD.
27. IN THEIR EFFORTS TO FULFIL THEIR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ASPIRATIONS, THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC WILL
CONTINUE TO FIND A CO-OPERATIVE, SENSITIVE AND SYMPATHETIC NEIGHBOUR
IN AUSTRALIA.
28. THESE NEW NATIONS SHARE WITH AUSTRALIA THE DESIRE TO SEE THE
RESIDUAL COLONIAL SITUATIONS IN THE REGION ENDED IN AN ORDERLY AND
PEACEFUL FASHION.
29. AUSTRALIA IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD IN HAVING AS ITS NEAREST
NEIGHBOUR ITS OWN FORMER COLONY PAPUA NEW GUINEA. WE ACKNOWLEDGE
OUR SPECIAL ASSOCIATIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY. DURING MY CURRENT VISIT
OVERSEAS, I VISITED PORT MORESBY FIRST AND AGREED WITH PRIME MINISTER
SOMARE ON NEW AID ARRANGEMENTS TO HELP PAPUA NEW GUINEA COPE WITH THE
PRESENT GLOBAL RECESSION WITHOUT DESTABLISING ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURES. TO OUR NORTH, THE ASEAN COUNTRIES ARE OF OUTSTANDING IMPORTANCE
TO AUSTRALIA. WE REGARD ASEAN WITH ITS MEMBER NATIONS OF INDONESIA,
THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE AND THAILAND AS AMONG THE MOST
VALUABLE AND VIABLE REGIONAL GROUPINGS IN THE WORLD TODAY. ASEAN
FORMS, WITH THE GIANTS OF CHINA AND JAPAN, TOGETHER WITH SOUTH KOREA
AND HONG KONG, THE WORLD'S FASTEST-GROWING ECONOMIC REGION.
31. AND QUITE APART FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF STRATEGY AND PROXIMITY,
AUSTRALIA'S OWN INTERESTS DEMAND THAT WE ASSOCIATE OURSELVES AS
CLOSELY AS WE CAN WITH THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF THE REGION.
32. THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA IS OF
FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. WE SEEK A BROADER
RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN, BEYOND THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, AS OUR
MAJOR TRADING PARTNER.
33. MY GOVERNMENT WILL BE WORKING CLOSELY WITH JAPAN AND WILL BE
ENCOURAGING THAT COUNTRY TO PLAY A POLITICAL ROLE IN THE REGION MORE
COMMENSURATE WITH HER ECONOMIC POWER. IT HAS OFTEN BEEN ASSERTED
THAT THE JAPANESE ARE GETTING A ' FREE RIDE' IN TERMS OF DEFENCE.
YET NONE OF US CAN IGNORE THE CONSTRAINTS ON JAPAN ARISING FROM
DOMESTIC OPINION, HER POSTWAR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, AND REGIONAL
SENSITIVITIES. NO COUNTRY IS MORE AWARE OF THOSE REGIONAL
SENSITIVITIES THAN AUSTRALIA. WE WILL SEEK, AS SUCCESSIVE AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENTS HAVE DONE, TO ENHANCE AUSTRALIA'S ROLE AND REPUTATION AS
A RELIABLE AND STABLE SUPPLIER OF THE RESOURCE NEEDS OF JAPANESE
INDUSTRY. I

34. AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND Ci: A'S OWN INFLUENCEg IN
THE AFFAIRS OF OUR REGION HAVE ADVANCED POSITIVELY TO A DEGRE THAT
WOULD HAVE DEFIED IMAGINATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 19701S.
RECENTLY, THE PREMIER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC VISITED AUSTRALIA
AND WE HAD ILLUMINATING AND FRANK TALKS WITH HIM.
36. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING FROM THESE TALKS THAT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES
ARE TAKING PLACE IN CHINA IN TERMS OF ITS ECONOMIC PRACTICE, AND,
INDEED, ITS PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH CHANGES WHICH SEEM TO ME TO BE
OF GENUINE IMPORTANCE TO CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND OURS
WITH CHINA. I DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD UNDER-ESTIMATE THE POTENTIAL
WHICH THESE DEVELOPMENTS OFFER FOR AN EVEN MORE CONSTRUCTIVE
RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA.
37. BECAUSE OF CHINA'S POTENTIAL INFLUENCE IN NORTH AND SOUTH EAST
ASIA PARTICULARLY, BUT ALSO IN THE BROADER INTERNATIONAL SCENE, WE
VIEW WITH CONCERN SIGNS OF STRAINS IN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED
STATES. A CO-OPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE TWO GREAT POWERS
WILL HELP EACH TO CONCENTRATE ITS ENERGIES ON THE MORE DIFFICULT AND,
SOMETIMES, DELICATE AREAS OF ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH
OTHER COUNTRIES.
38. OF THESE, NONE REPRESENTS A DEEPER CONTEMPORARY HUMAN TRAGEDY
THAN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA.
39. THIS IS ONE OF THE AREAS IN WHICH MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT AN
AUSTRALIAN INITIATIVE CAN BE OF GENUINE VALUE AND CERTAINLY, WE
BELIEVE WE HAVE A MORAL OBLIGATION TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO ALLEVIATE THE
HUMAN SUFFERING ARISING FROM THAT SITUATION.
THE OBLIGATION WE FEEL AND THE SPECIAL OPPORTUNITY WE BELIEVE WE
HAVE IN THIS MATTER FLOW FROM THE SOUNDNESS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH
CHINA, THE ASEAN MEMBER NATIONS, AS WELL AS, OF COURSE, WITH4 THE
UNITED STATES, AND OUR CAPCITY TO TALK TO VIETNAM A CAPACITY NOT
UNRELATED, I HAVE TO SAY TO THE CONSCIENTIOUS OPPOSITION MY OWN
PARTY ADOPTED, AT CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL COST, THROUGHOUT THE YEARS
OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM.
41. THIS IS A COMBINATION OF FACTORS NOT AVAILABLE TO OTHER
GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONS IN THE REGION.
4i2. SO WE BELIEVE WE WOULD ABDICATE OUR OBLIGATIONS, SHOULD WE FAIL
TO MOVE ON THIS QUESTION. EQUALLY, WE HAVE TO MOVE CIRCUMSPECTLY, IN
ORDER TO ENSURE THAT WE DO NOT FORFEIT THE UNIQUE POSITION WE HOLD.
43. AS TO VIETNAM ITSELF, IT SEEMS TO AUSTRALIA THAT IT IS NEITHER
IN VIETNAM'S INTEREST NOR IN OUR ( UNDERLINE ONE) INTERESTS OR IN
ANYBODY'S INTEREST THAT VIETNAM SHOULD BE ISOLATED FROM THE AFFAIRS
AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE REGION. SUCH REGIONAL ISOLATION COULD ONLY
MEAN EVEN MORE COMPLETE ORIENTATION OF VIETNAM TOWARDS THE SOVIET
BLOC. 44. I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN A POSITIVE REACTION TO OUR
INITIATIVE FROM THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. THE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER, BILL HAYDEN, WILL BE MEETING THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS IN
BANGKOK AT THE END OF THIS MONTH, AND WILL GO FROM THERE TO HANOI.
SECRETARY SHULTZ HAS INDICATED TO ME IN THE LAST COUPLE OF DAYS THAT
THEY UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO, WITH THE
BACKING OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES.

A6.
BEYOND REGIONAL PROBLEMS, HOWEVER INTRACTABLE, THERE REMAINS,
LOOMING OVER US ALL, THE SPECTRE OF THE NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST.
46. MY GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE FIELDS OF
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. THIS REFLECTS THE DEEP INTEREST WHICH
AUSTRALIA SHARES WITH ALL COUNTRIES IN BRINGING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE
UNDER TH4E CONTROL OF EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS.
47. BUT WE IN AUSTRALIA, HAVING ACCEPTED THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOSTING OF JOINT DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS,
HAVE A PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE ISSUES AFFECTING THE STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR BALANCE AND, LET ME SAY, AN ENTITLEMENT TO BE HEARD ON SUCH
ISSUES. 48. AUSTRALIANS HAVE BEEN DEEPLY WORRIED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH IN
RECENT YEARS, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT HAVE BECOME A SOURCE OF
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION RATHER
THAN A BASIS FOR POSSIBLE CO-OPERATION AS, INDEED, HAPPENED IN THE
YEARS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CUBAN CRISIS OF 1962. WE UNDERSTAND,
HOWEVER, THAT THE POLITICAL BASIS FOR PROGRESS IN THE ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AREA HAS NOT BEEN GOOD IN RECENT YEARS, AND HAS BEEN
UNDERMINED BY OTHER ASPECTS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SOVIET UNION, NOT LEAST THE ABHORRENT AGGRESSION OF THE
SOVIET IN AFGHANISTAN, AND ITS INTOLERABLE PRESSURE TO SUPPRESS THE
F'_ OWERING OF FREEDOM IN POLAND.
49. WE AUSTRALIANS UNDERSTAND VERY WELL THE PROBLEMS WHICH FACE OPEN
SOCIETIES LIKE OURS IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
BUT, NEVERTHELESS, WE TAKE THE VIEW THAT IT IS BETTER TO
CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET IN DIALOGUE RATHER THAN TO ATTEMPT TO
ISOLATE IT AN IMPOSSIBLE ATTEMPT IN THIS DAY AND AGE.
51. COUNTRIES LIKE OURS, WHICH ATTACH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO THE
AVOIDANCE OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT, CANNOT SENSIBLY TALK ABOUT
INTERNATIONAL PEACE WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO HAVE RATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
WITH THE SOVIET UNION. OUR OWN DEALINGS WITH MOSCOW WILL BE FIRM,
CIRCUMSPECT AND CONSTRUCTIVE.
52. WE WANT TO SEE INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN THE ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT PROCESS STRENGTHENED. WE HOPE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS
UNDER WAY IN S. T. A. R. T. AND I. N. F. WILL LEAD TO A HALT IN THE ARMS
RACE AND A REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS. IT IS TO BE H4OPED THAT THE
SOVIET WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO RECENT AMERICAN INITIATIVES WHICH
HAVE BEEN ADVANCED IN PURSUIT OF THESE OBJECTIVES. WE WISH TO SEE A
REVITALISATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. WE
LOOK TO THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO
AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE AND FULLY VERIFIABLE BAN ON NUCLEAR
TESTING. 53. IN OUR OWN REGION, WE STRONGLY OPPOSE THE CONTINUATION OF FRENCH
NUCLEAR TESTING. WE ARE CURRENTLY TALKING WITH OUR SOUTH PACIFIC
NEIGHBOURS ABOUT PROPOSALS FOR A SOUTH WEST PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE
ZONE. OUR PUPROSE IS TO SEEK TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TESTING, THE STORAGE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE DUMPING OF NUCLEAR WASTE IN THE REGION.
BUT REFERRING BACK TO THE PRIMACY WE ATTACH TO THE ANZUS TREATY, I
MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE CONCEPT OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IS NOT INTENDED
TO PRECLUDE THE PASSAGE OF NUCLEAR POWERED AND ARMED SEA VESSELS OR
AIR TRANSIT IN THE REGION.

A 7.
54. WHILE THE ARMS RACE AND THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR REPRESENT THE
ULTIMATE DANGER TO MANKIND, THESE THINGS ARE NOT THE ONLY SOURCE OF
INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, RIVALRIES AND CONFLICT.
INDEED, THE VERY MAGNITUDE AND POTENTIAL FINALITY OF THE NUCLEAR
THREAT IN OUR PERILOUS AGE TENDS TO OBSCURE THE ONGOING CAUSES OF
TENSION BETWEEN NATIONS IN THEIR ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
56. TU1E WORLD-WIDE RECESSION ITSELF HIAS CONTRIBUTED TO. TENSIONS
BETWEEN THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES AND CREATED NEW PROBLEMS
FOR THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
57. WE OF THE INDUSTRIALISED WEST CAN MAKE OUR MAIN CONTRIBUTION TO
THE RESOLUTION OF SUCH PROBLEMS AS INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND CONSTRAINTS
ON TRADE BY RESTORING ECONOMIC GROWTH TO OUR ECONOMIES. I N
PARTICULAR, IT IS NO WAY OUT OF THE RECESSION FOR ANY OF US T' 0-RESORT
TO COSY BILATERAL DEALS, HIGHER LEVELS OF PROTECTION OR EXPOR Y
SUBSIDIES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF GATT AND WHICH' DI; STORT
THE PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. IN THE LONG-TERM, THAT WOULD
SOLVE NONE OF OUR PROBLEMS, AND CERTAINLY INCREASE THE PROBLEMS OF
THE DEVELOPING NATIONS. IT WILL REDUCE THEIR CAPACITY TO SERVICE
THEIR DEBT AND TO FINANCE THEIR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.
58. AS WITH ALL GREAT CRISES AND ORDEALS, THERE ARE IMPORTANT
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE WORLD RECESSION.
59. AND AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON OF ALL, THIS CRISIS SERVES
POWERFULLY TO REMIND US OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE NATIONS
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF ECONOMIES, THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF SOCI-TI-ES.
I HAVE JUST MENTIONED THE INTERACTION OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE MAJOR
INDUSTRIALISED NATIONS. AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ECONOMIES
OF THE INDUSTRIALISED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPING NATIONS.
BUT IN THE WIDER SENSE, THIS INTERDEPENDENCE EXTENDS FAR BEYOND
ECONOMIC INIERCHANGE.
61. AND WHILE FORMAL TREATIES LIKE ANZUS RECOGNISE STRATEGIC
INTERDEPENDENCE, THE PRINCIPLE EXTENDS BEYOND REGIONAL SECURITY,
IMPORTANT AS THAT IS.
62. WE LIVE IN A WORLD TODAY THAT IS TRULY, IN WENDELL WILKIE'S
PHRASE: '' ONE WORLD''.
63. IT WAS THE GREAT BENJAMIN FRANKLIN WHO SAID AT THE TIME OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:
' WE MUST HANG TOGETHEFR GENTLFMEN OR ASSUREDLY WE WIL L
HANG SEI'ARA rELY'
64. TODAY'S NEED IS FOR A CLEARER RECOGNITION A DECLARATION OF
INTERDEPENDENCE ( UNDERLINE THREE). HOWEVER JEALOUSLY EACH OF US MAY
GUARD OUR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, WE MUST EQUALLY RECOGNISE OUR
INTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE.

AND ULTIMATELY, WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE, HOWEVER DIFFICULT IT MAY
BE, EVEN HOWEVER UNPALATABLE IT MAY BE WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE THAT
INTERDEPENDENCE IS GLOBAL AND UNIVERSAL.
66. AT STAKE, IN THE RECOGNITION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THAT FUNDAMENTAL
FACT, IS NOTHING LESS THAN THE SURVIVAL OF CIVILISATION ITSELF.
67. THIS WILL BE THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA: THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE NATIONS OF OUR REGION. OUR
INTERDEPENDENCE WITH THE GREAT DEMOCRACIES., BUT ULTIMATELY, AND
INESCAPABLY, THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF US ALL ALL NATIONS, ALL PEOPLES
IN THE STARK CHOICE BEFORE US ALL A CHOICE NEVER BEFORE FACED BY
HUMANITY THE CHOICE BETWEEN SURVIVAL OR EXTINCTION.

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