URANIUMAUSTRALIA'S DECISION STATEMENT BY
THE
PRIME MINISTER
THE RT HON.
MALCOLM FRASER
i COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Uranium-Australia's Decision
Statement by the Right Hon. Malcolm Fraser, M. P.
Prime Mimster
AUSTRALIAN URANIUM POLICY
SINCE the tabling of the Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry's first
report on 11 November 1976, there has been a wide-ranging debate
inside the Parliament and in the public arena. During this time, the Government
has given painstaking consideration to the Ranger Inquiry's valuable
and constructive reports and to all other information available to it on
uranium mining and export. This exhaustive consideration of the issues
and evidence has led the Government to decide that there should be further
development of uranium under strictly controlled conditions.
This decision has been motivated by a high sense of moral responsibility
to all Australians and to the community of nations. It has flowed from
four fundamental considerations:
the need to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation;
the need to supply essential sources of energy to an energy-deficient
world; the need to protect effectively the environment in which mining
development will take place;
the need to ensure that proper provision is made for the welfare
and interests of the Aboriginal people in the Alligator Rivers Region
and of all other people living in the Region and working on the
development projects.
Mr Speaker, before proceeding, I wish to take this opportunity to pay
tribute to the presiding Commissioner of the Ranger Inquiry, Mr Justice
Fox, and to his fellow Commissioners, Mr G. G. Kelleher and Professor
C. B. Kerr. They have had to make recommendations on a complex set
of problems on which there are diverse and strongly held opinions in
the community. They have discharged their commission with wisdom and
sensitivity. Since then I have appointed Mr Justice Fox as adviser to the Government
on nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards matters. He is
overseas and doing invaluable work.
The Ranger Inquiry was, of course, established by the previous
Government. It looked at both the world-wide and the local regional
environmental issues associated with the mining and export of uranium:
the issues of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear safeguards;
the contribution of nuclear power to world energy requirements;
the economic implications of uranium export for Australia.
The Government has examined every recommendation in the Inquiry's
Reports. Only in a few cases have the Government's decisions varied from
the Inquiry's recommendations. Ministers will explain the reasons for
every variation. The Government believes that every variation meets the
Inquiry's request that it should ' just as satisfactorily achieve the same
purposes and satisfy the same principles' as the Inquiry's proposal.
The Government's decision was taken on the basis of the Inquiry's
principal findings and recommendations.
On uranium mining, the Inquiry concluded:
' The hazards of mining and milling uranium, if those activities
are properly regulated and controlled, are not such as to justify a
decision not to develop Australian uranium mines.'
The Government is now satisfied that the environmertal control and
industrial health measures proposed by the Inquiry and accepted by the
Government, will provide proper regulation and control.
On nuclear power reactors, the Inquiry concluded:
' The hazards involved in the ordinary operations of nuclear
power reactors, if those operations are properly regulated and
controlled, are not such as to justify a decision not to mine and sell
Australian uranium.'
This is in accordance with the Government's own view.
On waste disposal from nuclear power stations, the Inquiry concluded:
' While we do not think that the waste situation is at present such
as to justify Australia wholly refusing to export uranium, it is
plain that the situation demands careful watching, and depending
on developments, regular and frequent reassessment.'
The Government is satisfied that the technology exists for the safe
management and ultimate disposal of highly radioactive waste. International
developments will continue to be closely reviewed and Australia
will continue to participate in international studies directed to improve
standards for waste disposal.
On the possibility of nuclear terrorism, the Inquiry concluded:
' In our view, the possibility of nuclear terrorism merits energetic
consideration and action at the international level. We do not
believe that this risk alone constitutes a sufficient reason for Australia
declining to supply uranium. It does, however, provide a further
reason why the export of our uranium, including what is proposed
to be done with it, and where, are matters which the Government
should keep under constant scrutiny and control.'
The Government is satisfied that the specification of standards of
physical security by the International Atomic Energy Agency constitutes
the basis upon which national governments can provide strong protection
against nuclear terrorism.
On A ustralia's international obligations, the Inquiry concluded:
' A total refusal to supply would place Australian in clear breach of
Article IV of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and could adversely
affect its relation to countries which are parties to the
Article IV of the Treaty obliges Australia to co-operate in the production
and usage of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The export by Australia
of uranium under stringent safeguards would give effect to our obligations
under Articles III and IV of the Treaty.
I would remind the House that Australia became a party to the Treaty
and accepted the obligations it imposed, in January 1973, when the
Treaty was ratified by the then Labor Government.
Overall, the Inquiry concluded that the total renunciation of any
intention to supply uranium was undesirable and most unlikely to produce
any worthwhile outcome. On the basis of this conclusion, the Inquiry
submitted that ' the options were either to proceed to supply as soon as
-practicable, or to delay making a decision about supplying for a period of
several years'.
The Inquiry stated that the choice between these two options ' depended
largely on what was deemed to be the best strategy in relation to the matter
of proliferation.' The proliferation of nuclear weapons was, in the Inquiry's
view, the most serious hazard associated with the nuclear power industry.
Responding to this danger within the context of international demands
for energy has been the fundamental basis of the Government's decision.
The Government, having considered the Inquiry's Report and all the other
evidence before it, has decided that the goals of limiting the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, and alleviating the world's energy problems are best
served by Australia agreeing now to the export of uranium.
The Government well appreciates the concern some people feel about
nuclear energy. Sir MacFarlane Burnet summarised these concerns well
when he wrote recently:
' As a biologist I should have preferred that there had never been
developed the military and industrial exploitation of nuclear power.'
But we cannot absolve ourselves from the necessity of making decisions
on nuclear energy by wishing that it had never been developed.
As Sir MacFarlane went on to say:
' I believe that a majority of thoughtful people accept the inevitability
for at least an interim period, of large scale use of nuclear energy
in most parts of the world'.
' Things being as they are, nuclear power generators will be needed foi
the next twenty, or perhaps fifty, years in most of the developed
countries, with Japan and Sweden in particular need.'
The Government has taken its decision with a deep sense of international
responsibility. I venture to say that were it not for that sense of responsibility,
were it not for our wish to strengthen Australia's voice in the moves against
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, were it not for our obligation ' to
I* provide energy to an energy deficient world, we would not have decided to
export uranium. Commercial considerations were not the dominant motive
in our decision. In themselves they would not have been sufficient.
The oil crisis of 1973 precipitated the fundamental recognition that the
world was facing an energy crisis.
While Australia has been insulated from the effects of the oil crisis by
a plentiful supply of energy resources, the dwindling supply of petroleum has
meant that many countries must change over to other sources of energy.
The energy-deficient countries are aiming to conserve energy, to use
existing resources such as coal more effectively, and to develop new energy
sources-including solar, wind, tidal and others. But these sources will
not realistically provide energy on a sufficiently large scale this century.
Nuclear energy is the only readily available alternative most countries
have to meet their essential need for electrical energy in the wake of the
oil crisis. One hundred and eighty-four nuclear power units are in operation in
countries, with a capacity of 88 thousand megawatts of electricity-four
times Australia's total electrical capacity. Many more nuclear power units
are under construction or on order.
Very substantial quantities of uranium are required to fuel them.
It is manifest that:
there is a need for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in a number
of countries poorly endowed with fossil fuels;
there is a world wide growth of the nuclear industry;
there is a widespread concern about whether uranium will be available
to satisfy these needs.
Because of their concern about uranium supplies, some countries are
turning to those nuclear technologies involving reprocessing and the fast
breeder reactor would achieve the more effective use of available
uranium but which would increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.
Australia possesses 20 per cent of the western world's known reserves
of low cost uranium. In this situation we are in a special position of
influence and have a corresponding moral responsibility to maximise
protection against nuclear weapons proliferation by responding to the
needs of many countries for adequate assurances of uranium supplies.
Australia has an obligyation to the rest of the world to provide the
energy resources-the coal, gas and uranium-that will be required to
overcome the energy crisis.
By taking the decision to export uranium, Australia can supply:
energy that will provide jobs;
energy that will heat homes;
energy that will protect standards of living and enable them to be
improved.
By taking the decision to export uranium, Australia can slow the
movement towards the use of plutonium as a nuclear fuel and lessen the
attendant increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation.
By taking the decision to export uranium, Australia's ability to support
more effective safeguards and minimise proliferation risks will be
strengthened. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
There is a mounting international impetus to strengthen barriers to nuclear
weapons proliferation. Increasing international consultation and discussion
is taking place. 4
At the London Economic Summit in May, President Carter proposed
the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation to examine and find the
best solutions to problems with the nuclear fuel cycle. President Carter's
proposal was accepted. International studies will soon commence.
Australia has been invited to participate in the International Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Evaluation and has accepted.
Australia's ability to influence these developments will depend to a
great extent on whether or not it is a major supplier of uranium. Only
as a producer and supplier of uranium can Australia be an effective
force in achieving improved international safeguards and controls.
The Government's policy on nuclear safeguards--announced in this
House on 24 May 1977-which in some instances goes beyond the
Inquiry's recommendations, is directed at reducing the risks of nuclear
weapons proliferation. This policy is stricter and more rigorous than that
adopted to date by any nuclear supplier country. It encompasses the
the requirements the Leader of the Opposition laid down in this House
on 29 March 1977 and indeed it goes beyond them in many respects.
The policy is based on an objective assessment of the conditions
necessary to ensure that the uranium we supply to others for peaceful
purposes is not misused and that our unqualified commitment to the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is put into effect.
We urge the universal adoption of safeguards standards of similarly high
quality. We will vigilantly monitor developments and continue to work
internationally, and with other major suppliers to increase the effectiveness
of international controls and safeguards.
By exporting uranium and standing with the United States and Canada
on the crucial issue of adequate safeguards Australia is contributing to
the application of effective nuclear safeguards and to the avoidance of
the misuse of nuclear materials. We would hope that South Africa, the
other major exporter in the southern hemisphere, can see its way clear
to join in this endeavour.
The joint efforts of Australia, Canada and the United States on the
safeguards issue should not be misunderstood. There is no intention or
desire to form a cartel for the supply of uranium. We want no part of a
uranium OPEC. Our aim is to minimise the risk of nuclear weapons
proliferation. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs will be following me with
a detailed statement on the international implications, including safeguards,
of the Government's decision.
Spent Fuel Reprocessing and Waste Disposal
The issue of the safe and responsible management of the plutonium
and the highly radioactive waste arising from the reprocessing of the spent
fuel is also a matter of concern.
The spent fuel rods leaving the nuclear power reactors now in
commercial operation are highly radioactive but this spent fuel can be. and
is being, safely stored. This is not the key problem. The problems arise
when the spent fuel is reprocessed, and the plutonium is separated from
the highly radioactive fission products.
This poses two difficulties; the safe storage and protection of the
plutonium which is now in a form that lends itself more readily to theft
and diversion to nuclear weapons, and the highly radioactive liquid wastes
which have to be carefully managed before solidification and ultimate
safe and permanent disposal.
The technology for the handling, solidification and safe storage of the
high level radioactive liquids exists. It is now being developed to a
commercial scale. This technology has not hitherto been put into full scale
use as the quantity of commercially produced waste has not warranted
a fully comnmercial process.
Because plutonium is a material suitable for nuclear explosives and
because of the desire to minimise proliferation, the U. S. Government has
placed a moratorium on spent fuel reprocessing and the Australian
Government has reserved its position on reprocessing.
For this reason, the Government's announced safeguards policy
requires prior Australian consent before the spent fuel derived from
Australian uranium may be reprocessed. Some of our major potential
customers would have preferred a more permissive Australian policy
on reprocessing. But we have reserved Australia's position to ensure
that, in relation to the uranium we supply, the potential problems associated
with reprocessing are dealt with. We shall need to be satisfied, for example:
that there is a need to reprocess for legitimate energy purposes;
that interijational controls and safeguards are intensified to ensure
an adequate and effective defence against diversion of plutonium to
I' non-peaceful purposes;
-that there is not excessive stock-piling of plutonium in a way that
could pose future proliferation dangers.
We shall be seeking constructive answers on these questions in the
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, in which Australia shall be
participating, and in discussions with other countries.
Although Australia as a major exporter of uranium will be involved
closely in international studies concerned with reprocessing and the
nuclear fuel cycle there is no intention of Australia storing other countries'
radioactive wastes.
In addition to the compelling non-proliferation and energy considerations
on which the Government's decision is based, it should also be noted that
the mining and export of uranium will enhance Australia's reputation
as a stable and reliable supplier of resources, and bring Australia tangible
I I economic benefits.
Mr Speaker, the Government has faced up to the many complex and
sensitive international issues raised by the worldwide use of uranium.
The Government is convinced that uranium mining and export should
proceed. To do otherwise, would be to: 6
deny Australia an effective voice in strengthening safeguards and
non-proliferation measures;
accelerate moves to the plutonium economy with its proliferation
risks;
abandon the world's energy poor countries, amongst whom are
numbered our major trading partners;
deny Australia significant economic benefits.
I now turn to domestic considerations and the conditions on which
particular projects will be permitted to proceed.
The Inquiry's Second Report dealt specifically with the Ranger Project,
in the context of the single ecosystem of the Alligator Rivers Region in
which the project is located. As the Jabiluka and Koongarra deposits are
also located in the Region, the Inquiry considered them in relationship
to the Region as a whole.
The Government's decision will clear the way for decisions on the
development of other uranium deposits throughout the Commonwealth,
as well as those in the Alligator Rivers Region.
The Government has decided, that uranium development projects will be
permitted to proceed only if they satisfy certain conditions:
the mining operations must conform with a mandatory ' code of
practice' which the Government shall progressively prescribe;
the requirements of the Environmental Protection ( Impact of
Proposals) Act 1974 must be complied with;
the Government must be satisfied as to the acceptability of the
development on the environment and on the Aboriginal people-the
total level of activity will be taken into account in this regard;
the sale contracts for the uranium produced must conform
with the Government's safeguards policy.
Sequential Development
With respect to the Alligator Rivers Region, the Inquiry envisaged a planned
sequence of development of uranium deposits.
The Government has decided that in view of the complexity of the
further development of each of the projects, it would be impossible properly
to specify the sequence of mining, either as to order or timing.
The Government notes, however, that the requirements it has set down
and the processes of negotiation which must be carried on between the
mining companies and Aboriginal land owners will in fact lead to
any development being of a sequential nature.
The Inquiry was not concerned to examine uranium development
outside the Region. The Government sees no reason at this time to specify
the sequence of uranium projects elsewhere in Australia. But it would
consider any advice on this aspect given to it by the Uranium Advisory
Council and other appropriate bodies.
I Mining and Wiling
The Government has decided to accept all the Inquiry's recommendations
and findings, relating to the mining and milling of uranium.
There shall be a uniform Australian code covering the mining and
milling of uranium. The code will be mandatory and implemented
' I progressively by legislation together with the States and Territories,
commencing with the ' Code of Practice on Radiation Protection in the
Mining and Milling of Radioactive Ores' which has already been prepared
and published by the Department of Health. The code of practice will
be prescribed by Commonwealth legislation, but where State or Terr-itory
legislation has an equal or more stringent code, the Commonwealth
legislation will be held-in reserve and the administration of the code will
be left entirely in the hands of that State or Territory.
This decision, in fact, goes beyond the recommendation of the Inquiry
* and indicates the Government's concern for adequate and effective
control and regulation of uranium operations.
I now turn to the specific recommendations of the Inquiry with regard to
the Alligator Rivers Region.
Environmental Controls
The Government has decided to adopt the recommendations of the
Inquiry relating to environmental controls in the Region.
In making any decision on specific projects in the Alligator Rivers Region,
the Government will be highly conscious of the need to ensure that the total
level of activity in the Region is taken into account.
The Minister for Environment, Housing and Community Development
will elaborate shortly on the means we shall adopt to ensure proper
environmental supervision and co-ordination in the region.
National Parks
The Inquiry made various recommendations concerning a National Park.
The Government has decided to accept the recommendation of the
: 11 Inquiry that a major National Park should be established in the Region
to protect and preserve the natural features, the flora and fauna, the
Aboriginal sacred sites and cave paintings.
The Inquiry recommended that the full extent of the Park should be
declared at one time but acknowledged that the Park might be declared in
II progressive stages, and indicated what the first stage might be.
The Government has decided to declare the Na tional Park in stages.
The area which will be declared first is substantially greater than that
gazetted in 1975 for the Kakadu National Park, and greater than the first
stage suggested by the Inquiry. It includes all the land subject to Aboriginal
II land claims recommended by the Inquiry. 8
The full area recommended by the Inquiry for inclusion in the National
Park, other than that covered by the initial declaration, will be brought
immediately under special control. This control will be exercised, initially,
through the Departments of Aboriginal Affairs, Environment, Housing and
Community Development, National Resources, and the Northern Territory
with the Department of National Resources having the principal role
in relation to exploration and mining. Special arrangements will be
established to ensure proper co-ordination of the activities of the four
Departments in exercising such controls.
There will be no exploration, development or mining, at least for the
time being, within the area initially declared as a National Park.
There will be no exploration, development or mining within the
remaining area, except with the express approval of the Commonwealth
authorities involved.
The Government accepts the recommendation of the Inquiry that the
town should be included in the National Park but should not be
Aboriginal land.
The Government has decided to accept the Inquiry's recommendation
that the Ranger and Pancontinental lease areas should be excluded from the
National Park. On the same basis. the Government has decided that the
Noranda lease area should be excluded. The Government has made these
exclusions without commitment to order or timing of any development.
Because of the Government's requirement that it be satisfied as to the
acceptability of the impact of each development on the environment, a
considerable amount of planning and investigation into the environmental
effects of any development of Noranda's deposit at Koongarra will have
to be undertaken. That deposit has particular environmental problems
because of the sensitivity and fragility of the environment of the area and
the location of the deposit upstream of a major wetlands area.
The Aboriginal People
With regard to the Aboriginal people, the Government has decided to
accept all of the Inquiry's recommendations for the enhancement of their
welfare. The Minister for Aboriginal Affairs will have general responsibility
for the oversight of the impact of development on the Aboriginal population
and co-ordination of measures to moderate that impact.
All the recommendations of the Inquiry on the granting of land to
Aboriginals and the legislative changes to enable Aboriginal land to
become part of a National Park have been accepted.
The Mudginberri and Munmarlary pastoral leases will be purchased
from the present lessees to create an opportunity for Aboriginal land
claims to be made and determined as recommended by the Inquiry.
Aboriginals will have new opportunities to control the use of their
traditional lands and to protect their interests. The Government will
adopt special measures designed to advance the wellbeing of Aboriginals
and Aboriginal interests in the Region. Special efforts will be made to train
them to be rangers in the National Park so that they may care for their
land-the land of their ancestors and so be responsible for the protection
of their sacred sites.
Revenues from Mining
Substantial revenue from royalties on uranium mined in the region'will
be applied to the welfare of Aboriginals in the Northern Territory generally
and not solely to those in local communities affected by the mining
operation or to individuals.
Part of the increased revenues which the Government will derive from
uranium development will be used in substantial additional funding of
solar energy research as part of our National Energy Programme. The
Deputy Prime Minister will speak further on this subject shortly in his
statement. The Memorandum of Understanding
With respect to the Ranger project itself, the Government is most conscious
that the Memorandum of Understanding between the Commonwealth and
the Ranger partners entered into in October 1975 more than three months
after the Ranger Inquiry had been established, would not have been the
Government's preferred approach to mineral development. However, the
Government would not wish to disturb arrangements entered into in good
faith by the companies with the previous Government. We believe, as
a matter of principle, that the repudiation by one Government of contracts
entered into by a previous Government would be quite wrong.
The Government has therefore decided to continue arrangements
existing under the Memorandum of Understanding. As a consequence, the
Government has had to vary the recommendation of the Inquiry of the
exclusion of the Ranger Special Mineral Lease Area from the National Park.
It will be necessary to exclude the entire Ranger Project Area of some
83 square kilometres from the park subject to the adjustment of the southern
boundary to move it further from Aboriginal sacred sites at Mount
Brockman, as recommended by the Inquiry.
For the same reason, the Government is unable to accept the
recommendation of the Inquiry that the Atomic Energy Act not be used
for the granting of an authority to Ranger to mine uranium. The
Government notes that the Inquiry stated that its concerns about the
use of the Atomic Energy Act would be lessened if the proposed
Uranium Advisory Council were established. The Government has
decided to establish the Uranium Advisory Council with the roles
recommended by the Inquiry, and within the portfolio responsibility of
the Minister for National Resources.
It should not be thought that the Commonwealth's participation in
the Memorandum of Understanding will give Ranger an advantage over
other mining companies. We will ensure that Government participation in
the Ranger development will not accord specific marketing advantage to
this project.
The Government agrees in principle with the Inquiry that there should
be a uranium marketing authority which will ensure that the Government
has proper knowledge and oversight of the commercial arrangements
for the sale and export of uranium.
The Deputy Prime Minister will elaborate further on this matter in his
statement.
Regional Management
The Government endorses the Inquiry's view, that the Alligator Rivers
Region should be managed in its totality in conformity with a land use plan.
We look forward to the time when the management of the region, with
its various planned uses, produces an harmonious relationship between the
various activies: mining, tourism, park management and environmental
protection. It is our strong desire that the management of the region should become
not a national but a world-wide model of how forethought and planning,
good management and goodwill can lead to natural resources being
obtained with a minimum of interference to a region's inhabitants and its
environment.
The Government's Position
Mr Speaker, I wish to make the Government's position quite plain.
Uranium mining may now proceed, but only in ways which will
not destroy or spoil the national heritage of the region with its
magnificent scenery and unique ecosystems and which will not harm those
specific areas of the Region considered sacred or of deep significance by
the Aboriginal people.
The export of Australian uranium will decrease the risks of further
proliferation of nuclear weapons and will support and strengthen the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will help to make a safer world.
The advent of Australia as a major supplier of uranium will make
certain that Australia's voice on this most vital problem of international
affairs -nuclear weapons proliferation-will be heard.
Printed by C. J. THOMFsoN, Acting Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra
[Date confirmed]