L/ R, fV / 7L7(
AUT ALIA I
PRIME MINISTER k-
FOR MEDIA 1 SEPTEMBER, 1980 ( WASHINGTON T'
2 SEPTEMBER, 1980 ( AUSTRALIAN TIME)
SPEECH TO B'NAI B'RITH INTERNATIONAL
On occasions like this it is customary to begin by saying that one
has been greatly moved by the award in question. In my case I can
say that with absolute, literal truth, for I have been moved some
10,000 miles to be here tonight to receive this medal.
I assure you that the length of the journey is commensurate with
the importance I attach to the occasion not only because' I feel
deeply honoured personally that a body of the stature and prestige
of B'nai B'rith has chosen to give me this award, but because I regard
your decision as a recognition of and tribute to Australia's humanitarian
record. You re~ resent an organisation which has demonstrated the seriousness
of its concern for human dignity and justice over the years. I represent
a country which has done the same thing. I would like to begin by
mentioning briefly two manifestations of that concern in areas which
I know have been at the heart of B" nai B'rith's activities since its
inception one hundred and thirty seven years ago: refugees and opposition
to racialism.
Australia began to take refugees in significant numbers in the 1930s,
with the exodus of jewish people from central Europe. After the Second
World War, Australia continued to do so in response to the vast
displacement of population in Eastern Europe and the creation of regimes
there which many found intolerable. Thousands came from the Soviet Union
and the Baltic States. Overall, in the 35 years since that war we
have taken an average of around 10,000 refugees a year. Now I appreciate
that for Americans, accustomed to think in large numbers, that figure
nay not seem unCuly impressive. However, if I point out that as a
percentage of population it is equivalent to an annual intake of some
150-160,000' by the United States, I am sure you will appreciate its
significance in Australian terms.
In recent years Australia has been taking many more than that average
figure. We have responded to the deliberate creation of a terrible
refugee problem in our own region, one made even more harrowing
by long sea journeys in small and unseaworthy boats which have resulted
in tens of thousands of deaths by drowning. In fact, in per capita
terms we have accepted more refugees from Indo-China for permanent
settlement than has any other country in the world. We have done
this because it is right. But over the years Australia has also benefitted
greatly from it, as the energy and talents of those who have come
to Australia have contributed to the rich diversity and prosperity
of life there. We are a better country for it. / 2
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As for racialism, let me begin by acknowledging that in earlier times
Australian life was seriously marred in this respect. Australians did
pursue a discriminatory policy as far as immigration was concerned,
the so-called " White Australia'!. policy. Australians did discriminate
shamefully against the Aboriginal people in Australia itself. We do
neither any longer.
At the beginning of the 1980s Australia's immigration policy is colour
blind and over a third of our settler arrivals come from Third World
countries. We have moved a long way from being an essentially
Anglo-Saxon-Celtic community to being a truly multi-cultural and
multi-racial one. Within that community, the Aboriginals are today an
important and respected component. It would be idle and wrong to deny
that earlier neglect has left a residue of serious problems. There is no
co-n-lacency about these problems. They are fully recognised and determined
efforts are being made to cope with them. A comprehensive set of policies
covering, among other things, land questions, royalty payment for
mining, low interest loans, and special legal, health and education
services is being implemented. These policies are based on a full
recognition of the fundamental right of Aboriginal Australians to participate
fully in the determination of their own future. They have been devised
in consultation with Aboriginal people and, where possible, are carried
out by Aboriginal people.
in international affairs Australia is fully committed to opposing racialism.
We have opposed' it vehemently and to some effect in South~ rn Africa,
where my Government recently played a significant part within the
framework of the Commonwealth of Nations in resolving the Zimbabwe
crisis. Unlike some others, however, we do not restrict our ' opposition
to racialism to where 4ris fashionable or safe. We do not believe
in being selective on this issue. We oppose it in all its forms and
even when it is practised by the very powerful by the Soviet Union,
for example.
You be interested to know that the Australian Parliament recently
conductedl an enquiry lnzo human rights in the Soviet Union and produced
a comprehensive. repcrt_ o-n the. subject-. To the best of my knowledge,
the Australian Parliament is the only legislature to have produced
such a report. It has subsequently been incorporated into the U. S.
Congressio'nal Record..
Before leaving thi s question, let me add that we are also concerned
to oppose the debasement of anti-racialism, which some seek to exploit
in a self-serving way by attaching the label of racialism to anything
they oppose. To be more specific, my Government has opposed and
will continue to oppose attempts to characterise Zionism as racialist,
even when this involves us being in a very small minority as far
as UtN \' otin-is ccncerned. There are times when what. you do is more
important than the numbers. Racialism is too vile and serious a matter
to be misus~ d and subordinated to other issues in this way.
Ladies and gentlemen, I know that B'nai B'rith's concern is with
humanitarian issues. I know also that many'. people believe that a
concern with humanitarian issues should be kept separate from political
and strategic matters, that they are somehow incompatible. I sympathise
with the impulses behind that view the religious and humanistic
impulses to look for what unites people rather than what divides them.
/ 13
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It represents a necessary ideal. Yet at the level of practical policy,
1 believe that it is profoundly mistaken. All our experience denies
it. In particular, the experience of the Jewish people in this century
emphatically denies it. Humanitarian problems arise in, and are profoundly
affected by, a political context. A realistic humanitarianism, and
one meant to solve problems and not merely to assuage consciences,
must therefore extend to embrace the great political and strategic
issues of our time.
Before I turn to say something about these issues there is something
which, from past experience, I feel I should explain. I am sometimes
asked, with some surprise implicit in the question, why a geographically
remote, middle-sized country like Australia which faces no imminent
threat is so concerned with such matters. The best way I could answer
Chis question, would be to take the person asking it to an Australian
country town almost any country town and ask him to look atthe
memorial he would find there to the Australians who had died
in the wars of this century. The lists are long. Too many Australians
have died in places remote from their home in Europe, in the Middle
East, in Korea, in South East Asia for us to be unconcerned about
the preservation of world * peace. Their sacrifice not only confers a
right but imposes a duty on an Australian Prime Minister to speak
on these issues.
If 1 may make a more general point, one cannot on the one hand
use the rhetoric of " one world", the " global village", " interdependence",
and on the other proceed to argue that the questions of peace and
war should be left to those immediately involved or to the great powers
alone. The middle-rankini; countries of the world should recognise
that the-/ have a role to play-. It would be an excess of modesty on
their part, indeed it would be a political and moral failing, to assume
that they should be seen but not heard on the great issues.
In the present circumstances, it is not a matter of some exaggerated
and unr-ealistic notion about the extent of the influence an Australian
voice can~ have which m.-oves me to speak. It is rather a belief that
in a Wes5tern world clha= racterised by a great deal of self doubt, division
and illusion, every incremental contribution to the clarifying of issues
and the strengthening-of resolve is valuable. It is in that spirit
that I male My remark:-1s.
We have travelled far this century. Much of the ore has been
grim and harrowing. The First World War, whose brutality and suffering
almost numb the imagination, left ordinary people shocked, dazed,
and longing for an era of peace. They did not get it. 21 years later
in precisely the time required for a new generation of young men
to reach their majority the world was again at war.
Tragically,, that second conflict came about because, in the name of
peace, the very moderate steps necessary to resist aggression in good
time were opposed. Those who sought to maintain the true conditions
for peace were denounced as militarists. As ' a result, millions were
to perish needlessly in the gas chambers of concentration camps
as well as on the battle fields.
By 194~ 5 the essential lesson had been learnt, at least by one generation:
it was realised that the end of the war did not signify the end of
the struggle to maintain peace that there was no end to that struggle.
So the democracies of the world, led by this great and generous country,
girded themselves. to face a new threat from a new tyranny.
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New alignments were forged, new strategies shaped. Leaders of stature
and vision emerged. That effort provided the foundation for a generation
not only of peace but of unprecedented material advancement for the
world. But 35 years have passed. The generation which emerged from the
last war and which understood its lessons is no longer active. Memories
have faded, awareness of danger has receded, determination to uphold,
and explain and expound the values of free societies has diminished.
What then is the s ituation facing us at the beginning of the 1980' s?
The essence of what I have to say can be summed up in two propositions.
First: the single most important fact which faces the world in the
1980s, is the reality of Soviet military power and the implications which
flow from it. Second: the next most important fact is the reluctance
of many in the West to recognise that reality and to respond to it.
As far as the Soviet Union is concerned it is necessary always to
bear in mind some basic facts. During the last 50 years, while other
empires have been dismembered at an unprecedented rate, the Soviet
Union has been the only major power which has acquired substantial
territory and surrendered its claim to nothing.
Soviet leaders today, as in the past, describe international-politics
as basically a struggle between what they call " progressive" forces
and the forces of " reaction". They profess support for the " progressive"
forces in their struggle to gain power throughout the world and they
refuse to accept any definition of detente which in any way circumscribes
Soviet participation in that struggle.. " Progressive" forces are, of
course, defined in terms of their-compatibility with the national interest
of the Soviet Union.
Internally, there have been some important changes in the Soviet Union
over recent decades. in -particular the disappearance of mass slave
labour and mass terror stand out and. are to be profoundly welcomed.
But there is still no rule of law, no freedom of opinion or information,
no right to strike, no right to emigrate. And many of us must marvel
at the courage of many thousands of people in Poland in recent days.
There is still an oppressive. and ubiquitous security service which
harrasses cruelly the kind of. dissent which is considered normal in
open societies. Political and economic power is still monopolised by
a self-appointed and self-perpetuating elite. There is still a command
economy, of the kind which other countries only resort to in war-time.
In other words, the basic institutional structure of the country remains
unchanged since Stalin's time.
I spell out these features for one reason only: because they are the
features of % the country which many judge is now the strongest military
power in the world and will, given military lead-times, remain so
for most of the 1980s. It has achieved this status by a massive and
relentless arms build-up over the last two decades, a build-up which
started from what was already a very high base. It was achieved
by giving-arms an absolute priority, even at the enormous expense
of the serious sacrificing of other goals, the achieving of which would
have bettered the lot of its long suffering people.
This is the country we are going to live with in the com ing years.
I believe that doing so is going to be a dangerous business. The
main danger as I. see it stems not from the likelihood that the Soviet
Union will deliberately precipitate a nuclear war or that it will launch
ageneral attack on Western Europe.
The Soviet leaders do not want a war with the West. They recognise
that if it occurs its effects will be devastating for everyone. I believe,
however, that they do want those things the pursuit of which will
greatly increase the risk of war.
The danger is greatest in the chronically unstable regions of the
Third World. It is particularly great in the Middle East racked
as it is by internal conflict, vital as its oil is for the countries
of the world, and adjacent as it is to Soviet military power. The
Soviet Union's combination of nuclear parity with the West and conventional
superiority make it tempting for it to use the latter in the Middle
East. If it does so the possibility of a spill-back of conflict into
Europe will be very great. In other words, the traditional pattern
% a'hrrse vh ave begun in Europe and have then en ' gulfed the rest
of the world may well be reversed. For historical reasons it may be
difficult for those viewing the world from a European perspective to
come to terms with this possibility.
I believe that the danger has been increased by the invasion of
Afghanistan which has driven a Soviet salient into the region. I believe
it will be further increased to the extent that it is possible for the
Soviet Union to misread the situation due to ambiguous or inadequate
signals from the West. I emphasise that point: danger will arise not
only from Soviet power and intentions but from confusion and division
concerning Western policy which could lead to miscalculation on the
Soviet side. For the sa ke of peace it is essential that this be attended
to. It shou-Id be emphasisec-i and clearly understood that what I am talking
about is not merely hypothetical. To a very significant extent it is
already happening: in Angola. and Ethiopia on the African continent,
in the ' Yemen and Afghanistan in the Middle East, and, nearer to
Australia-, in Indo-China where the Soviet Union is subsidising Vietnamese
aggressizn to the tune of $ 3 million a day, and acquiring military
facilities in Vietnam rocr its. trouble.
In the case of AfghaniStan and Cambodia, Soviet policy has demonstrated
yet again that it has a capacity rivalled only by Nazi Germany in
this century for addincg to the sum of human misery by creating great
and tragic flows of refugees.
What of the Western response to this challenge? In terms of population,
in terms of wealth, in terms of knowledge, in terms of technology,
the combined resources of the West far exceed those of the Soviet Union
and its associates. If, therefore, the West finds itself vulnerable
to Soviet power as in some -respects it does it is because of a
failure of--Dpcep~ ion and resolve.
These two perception and resolve are intimately related. On the
one hand, there can be no adequate response to a problem until its
existence is properly recognised and its nature understood. On the
other hand, a failure of resolve and will is likely to lead to
interpretations either optimistic or fatalistic which will either explain.
away the problem or deny the possibility of effective action.
Two years ago at Harvard, Solzhenitsyn spoke of the prevalence in
the West of a self-deluding interpretation of the contemporary world
situation. " It works", he said " as a sort of petrified armour around
people's minds... . it will be broken only by the pitiless crowbar of
events".
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We must hope that Solzhenitsyn is wrong in his conclusion that only
after bitter experience will people see things as they are; but he
is surely right in identifying the capacity for -self-delusion as* a critical
factor in the West today.
Consider, for example, the typical sequence of arguments advanced
against any attempt to focus attention on Soviet imperialism.
First, a strenuous denial that the Soviet Union is in the process of
attempting to achieve, military preponderance accompanied by a claim
that it is merely reacting to the military programmes of. the West.
Second, the assertion that even if the Soviet Union is in the process
of achieving military superiority, this is not politically significant.
Beyond t~ he level of ' sufficiency", it is claimed, military 30% Vef is
meaningless and in any case, i! 3 becoming increasingly irrelevantto
the achieving of foreign policy goals..
Third, the claim that even if military superiority does confer an advantage
there is no need to worry since the Soviet Union is a cautious,
conservative, satisfied state, more fearful than ambitious.
Fourth, the reassurance that even if all preceding arguments turn
out to be false there is still no cause for alarm, for it is well known
that the Soviet Union is so maladroit in its dealing s with the Third
World that anything it tries there is sure to fail. And so, it is argued
the sensible course is to relax and wait for it to fail.
This sequence of arguments with its series of fall-back positions
* constitutes a determined defence in depth against taking anything.,
but an utterly complacent view of Soviet power and intentions. Each
step in the sequence is either false, or a dangerous half truth, or.
involves taking an irresponsible gamble with the peace and security
of the world and of the lives -of men and women.
The Soviet Union is engaged in a quest for superiority in every important
category of weaponry and has already achieved it in many of them.
It is not simply reacting to Western efforts, but on the contrary follows
an undeviating course regardless of fluctuations in Western performance.
The present U. S. Secretary of Defence made the point succinctly when
he observed that, " as our defence budgets have risen, the Soviets
have increased their defence budget. As our defence budgets have.
gone down, their defence budgets have increased again".
Military superiority is translatable into political advantage, especially
when nuclear parity, and consequent nuclear stalemate, is combined
with conventional superiority.
Soviet caution is not based on conservatism but on a rational calculation
of risk and' opportunity. When it is at a disadvantage it is cautious,
but when it enjoys an advantage it acts boldly to capitalise on it
as it did in Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War,
and as it is increasingly doing now in the Third World. To the extent
that the Soviet Union. is motivated by fear, it is, as indeed many
of those who interpret its foreign policy as defensive concede, a paranoid
fear. But the practical manifestations of such a fear are virtually
indistinguishable fromr aggression, in that they cannot be appeased or
assuaged short of conceding global dominance. / 7
7
As to its alleged inability to deal with the Third World, the Soviet
Union has had its failures there, but it has also had its successes,
and recently the latter have predominated. In any case, what kind
of societies would we be if we were prepared to risk our future on
the expected mistakes of an adversary? Surely we value our way of
life, our liberty, too much to accept such a risk.
It cannot be denied that some of the effects of the self-delusion and
confusion I have sought to identify are apparent in the state of the
Western alliance today. NATO, the centrepiece of that alliance, has
been enormously successful, perhaps uniquely successful as a peace-time
alliance. But it is operating today in essentially the same form and
according to the same strategic doctrine as it did when it was founded
years a go, even though there have been profound changes since
then. There have been many such changes: in the economic balance between
the United States and Europe; in the extent of trade between the West
and the East; in European perspectives following the dismemberment
of their empires. All these have important implications and consequences.
But in terms of security, one change stands out: in 1949 when NATO
was founded, the United States had clear nuclear superiority and
virtual immunity from nuclear attack. Now it has neither.
If the Western alliance is to survive, these changes must be reflected
in its form and substance. It must be made consonant with the kinds
of threats which its members face today and with the current distribution
of power and wealth among its members.
The United States, which has shouldered such a heavy burden for
so long, should receive greater support from its now prosperous allies.
In Australia, we recognise this. In Europe, as America's allies have
recovered and become more powerful they have, rightly, reasserted
themselves politically. But until this reassertion is accompanied hy
the willingness to assumrpe a commensurate responsibility for their own
security which logically follows from it, it will be a source of strain
between the United States and its major allies. Some progress has
been made in this respect in recent years and this ' is to be welcomed.
But the disparity in burden-sharing is still very pronounced.
The United States, in its turn, should recognise that a changing balance
within the alliance requires different modes of action on its part,
including greater attention to continuous policy co-ordination and
consultation. There is an urgent need to develop mechanisms which
will enable the Western alliance to respond quickly to events in a
dangerous and volatile world.
Again, if wp, are to avoid nuclear war there is an imperative need
for the creation of conventional forces capable in themselves of placing
in serious doubt the success of any Soviet conventional attack. It
is not enough to depend on a nuclear deterrent in a world in which
all are vulnerable to nuclear devastation.
Ther e is an equally urgent need for the allies to agree on the ground
rules to be applied for detente: to the relationship between trade
policy and the political and military activity of the Soviet Union;
and also to the relationship of detente in Europe to events elsewhere
in the world. Indeed, high priority should be given to the whole
question of the protection of shared Western interests beyond the geographical
territory of the NATO members, for as I have said it, is
there that the danger is greatest.
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Beyond all this and perhaps most important of all, there is an over-riding
need to articulate the purposes and meaning of the alliance in language
which will revitalise the commitment of ordinary men and women in
Western countries to its cause. That cause is not, in the last resort,
about military arrangements but about the preservation of a way of
life an open, liberal, democratic way of life governed by respect
for law. Whatever the shortcomings of that way of life and we hear
a good deal about them nowadays it is necessary only to compare
it with any. of the cthers which are on offer to realise that it shculd
be supported and defended with zeal and resolution and even by passion
by all who love liberty, It is palpably absurd that its upholders
should ever feel morally or idealogically on the defensive in dealing
with totalitarians or authoritarians.
Currently, there are disturbing signs of a strengthening of neutralistsentiments
in some European countries. This reflects in part the failure
of imagination as somecne has said, those who lack the imagination
of disaster are doomed to be surprised by the world. In part it represents
a fatalistic assumption that nothing can be done, a feeling of helplessness
in the face of events. It is made worse by the current economic problems
confronting the developed industrialised countries.
Whatever its causes, it would be a tragic irony if an alliance which
has held firm for three decades should falter now, when the need
for it is greatest. It is imperative that the leaders of the Western
world and I do not simply mean its political leaders find the
words and the concepts which will fortify their peoples; and that
they themselves act in a way which showrs that they mean those words.
We need to understand that a people without an objective are a people
lost. A people without faith are a people destroyed. A people with-cu:
conviction will not survive. It is liberty which provides the objective,
liberty which allows faith, liberty which sustains conviction.
But liberty is not an inevitable state and there is no law which guarantees
that, once achieved, liberty will survive. Its preservation requires
skill, determination and strength. But first and most important of
all, it requires a knowledge and understanding. by ordinary people
of what is at stake for them: not an abstract concept but a whole
way of life whose survival depends on their commitment to it.
Once less than a lifetime ago it was possible for the voice of
Churchill to bring these truths home to the Western democracies. Now,
in an age that is suspicious of heroes and sceptical in temper, the
task is harder. Leaders of Governments cannot master it without the
support cf' crdinary men and women, their readiness to argue the
case fcr libertv with intelligence and passion.
What is needed in this respect is not novelty and gimmickry but the
reaffirmation of some old truths in language appropriate to our times.
For unfortunately, the realities of international affairs do not change
simply because people find the burden of living with them heavy. 9
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In one of his novels, Saul Bellow has one of his characters comment
on the contemporary craving for novelty. I will end by repeating
his words: " It is sometimes necessary to repeat what all know. All map
makers should place the Mississippi in the same location and
avoid originality. It may be boring but one has to know where
it is. We cannot have the Mississippi flowing towards the
Rockies just for a change."
,' lhat is true for map makers is also true for politicians and peoples.
And what is true for the Mississippi is true for the Elbe and the
Mekong and the Jordan.
Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you again for the honour you have
done me, and for the greater honour you have done my country.
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