T' 1] L., I E-1
FO R L1.5 JUNE 1980
A~ r~~: ssT!! E
" UYN ' T) NS T AT 1: 11, 0OF TE 7 L IP E -AL P 10T Y
e meet at a vital timie, not only tLor our Party, bDut
P lso for-our nation. The. hazards conf ronting the freedom
of -peoor and! nations ha ve increased smnce the year bhegan.
The hilstoric~ illy invaluanle-influence of countries in
* tic lpest-to thi'e cause of-iman hryi e gi ne
chiallen. ge. It-J. s a chlallenge wnoc-,-f not fced now~
and. succesfully surmi. ounted., hnas thei potential to* ' J-nv
us at so-ne tim in the future, tevi. ctorie's Ln values
aw Af-r eo hat we seek! for all future g'enecrations of
*-Australlians. It is a bout the nat-i. u re and extent of t!-. at
challense ane the . di-mension of ou r response that I want to
* Snea: t to you today.
s thie !-ari knows, on C'ristm~ as Eve-last year, Soviet
trcoop carr -r ailrcraftr star-ted landin-, t~ au arpot
T o eay s later, 5,000 Soviet troops had ta'e= over '.{ aiul.
? rsc~ tAmin of Afgh-anL-, tar, wa-s ki , lled the rext-daiy.
Dy New Yer' s Ev, 40,. 00 trooo-s -ere fanni. ng out across
A~ chan* Lstan to seize control of iiia-lor to-ns. The new
S o v ie installed presicent of Afghanist-an, -ir Babrak'
aralj,' i cle hi. s-" first appearance on : a-Falbtl television
. screens.,. o. n ' New Year's Tay. To y fiv ant-hl fln
later S~ 5,000 Sovie t troops are locke d in conflict acainst
a ' alanntat ional res', s!-nc canan thiat seems to
navuntc6sgifcn elements of Aga oit. T
ss ay lha.-t-t e S ov. e t Un-, io n is Inc t 2 ar d i; s ac t In b ru tall
nto . to e -, ya r, in ractor-, c. IL Ls merely describe
t. eac s. Thninthe Seco -TTorld. ! par, the na"-zis ie
out t-ho : le male po-nula-t -on oil a Czechoslov-akiLan vil1lage',-
ss o e ~ 0 52C) 0 m en te I 10' ol C Ii 7se d w-! or d r 2 co ile d
in horrocL. Yet n o w it iSr-otdo vd e rovid
b; h-'. y~~ nand. ch. Ir! re az-o survivcd, hat *. lOver
twi. ce iat nL!.--ber werQ iurCdi" cold"-bl) ooC, and' un'er
Russian s-upervision, in the . A-fghlan vi lag-ie of-! erala.
1. icrc a -f already over ahlf : lion refu-ees in ais. n
ocole-2. hve f ouncl con t ions ini: olcrable Lin th-elr
own cr.-1S'ry. ! t iLs feare that thle couldV~ cz.
r! se to one : i. llion. 12 / 3
-2
The-se cra! matic eVe-cits Mada fun laTmnntal : eassessment
oE idl accente-d Th. estcrn and Third .! orld ), rcpti onIS
an assumrt ons conzcern lng securit and deat; perc,-pt on~ s
rn ( a -ssessmcnts z-hvce been co -, fortin, an(. lulti1* nin
t-1e-r e ffcct, but tko some extent have rc~ lected -* J-shicul
tihœ rathler th an hadanalysis..
in a re~ taddress to t'ie Ai--er~ can Society of New!-spaper
~ Ytors -ashLns-on, thie former Aimer;_ can Secretary
of StLate T'r 1{ er ss in-. er, when arnirg-that a danger
igo ed s a de. ' 1 nvi ted, argued that:
T happen to a-ree wi. th President Carter,
that the danger to A-merica is the gravest
of the modern period".
Events in Afghanistan have given us a new example of
the * Soviet Union's commitment to achieving great military
power, pursuit of is ambitions. 1-istory since 1945
conf-r-Ms that, where the Soviet Union perceives the
ot~ otuniy fo an dvane, te concern for peace is
* inst-ani-tly out aside. Rem,-emb-_ er thne invasion of H'ungary:
* n 1.95: thep Berlin IWall in 1961; the Cuban miss Ie crisi. s
in 1952 and the invas'. on of CzechoslovakiLa in 1963.
It was the invasion of Czechoslovak;, ia that
?. res'c'en_ T-rezh,-nev sou,-h-t to justify t-hrough-whatC is no,,,
n ccen as tEhe PBrezhInev doct-rine. W, 7hat is pernicious about
the '. rcz'anev doctrine -1s the imnos iti. on* of.. Soviet: dominilance,
* In thie guise of rcndc1er~ ing ass i. stance.. The, fact is tiat
~ t ; s thie Soviet itself 1Yhi rlci~ des when " assistance"
s toe iven.
I n deed th rezhnev doctrline-vitrtually assertsta,
onee. cutry C hoas becomie Socialist,-assistance will
gi o* -aes ure Iiat it. remains so. But' the i nvi t-ati-ons
to.. I Ttc6rVene, alleaedly to provide assistance, are issued
Lpipy e t eaders. Notwithstanding, the ntblt n
tens'on created by Soviet behaviour, attemnts at detente
Here tCr: oeeu gkhout the 70s. But it so eaeparent
-hIna ci~ Ef detente by the West was not-shared by
*. the cvi. et Union.'..
It Is :. ortant to n pa c' * the parcel of ittcm--labelled
" tnt" n* telast ( cade,' and to dist i~ n uL sh wha t
; as ben, eFicial and SOLund from what was illusory. Whia t
i, 1; ny -' eo! nle failed! to rcalise w. as that the Sovie-t Union.
( I no t accept. that deteonte precluded tChem ro any acti5on
tat-i avnag -* ol thn in thie Th1-i rd -! orld, or in the
worl at arg-e. / 3
st ' o mtCem, ctl trnr' Ia a r ILn c F, La
; turo) nn,.' a UniteC n-cti~ vrheahct oL
s ' rL1., s. ce 1 ne, niavc h-~~ v2 Uni. ori
pur)'( e . cy of un1. r.(! c co t oni can c' O C) t 111 S,,
3c? 1 ~ opCenly seh o Fiurther . tr. 1wi
pluj~ r byr., s ubers i. oT, tCh' ovi s. i. on of r
the 1., se? oL surrogyat-s J. n . An-gola, Etoia o> 1en
Of. cours:?, the most recent and m.-ost brazen eximn, 1e has
beon ij. n A. fS~ iani. stan, whiere -he Soviet army th2 largest
* and1 most po'w. erlul land army thlc w-orld -has been used
* to invadle a dlefenceless ThirdLc \' orlcd cou~ ntry. This Indicates
m ost cl-: harly ' how lon-h! eld Soviet * ambitions can be suddenly
* real2. seewhe an opportun*: Ly pre sent s itself.
For in 14, whIen Hitler macle overtures to Stalin, one
of7 the ) riccs set by Stalin for Russ-an friecndship, was
a recog-n I-Lon by the -; err. 1vns that Sovi-et-" national aspirat Lons
* centre sout~ h or the nat-onalterorofteSvt
* Uni~ on the direction of the Indi-an-Ocean".
In the 1li:; ht of suha sttonthe Sln-aoorc Foreign
* li sl-tr s per~ iaps very. i; iuch on tar:-7t when arr'ued
* rcently thant there vas -no! thLng-sur;-ras Ln,-about thei
\' LL et Sora y into Afgh'anistan.. Rather, he said, w ha t
Was surp) ri's ng: tw. as the " gull. ibillty of non-Communists". S..
V
I Thereo~ v tonof the -rue i iurc of th sta1 itaio
ot i ou b y t11c 1. nv as i or-Q AEC ;, hnni,;. s nC S n
a1n0 ~ rim t :! ulIl Iv As a resl, x
nfva 3 1-on, o A-. 1:; cStU1J~ C C? CL Lf ovvn',
Zt0, Cr ea ti n of-a1 C'n stte
* acloser prox--* r,*-aiv t: . Th n Indian Ocean. resa
access to a It 0r ) at. v3 ba se s for strate7c, ,: ircraj-t
should the USSR. dlesire
an ability to deploy troops+ across the Pa'kistani
bord. 1er
* an inherent abltdpniguo h pye of
** airrat that may be deployed, to provicee tactical
* air support over the Persiann Gulf, the
Arabian Sea, and thIne Eastern h,, alf. of Saud'i Arabia*
* thie inherent ab~ lit--y tEo po v ie a IL m. it e d ai-r
support to the Soviet Inc.,' an OCcean squadron. L
tab;--yVI, n ot only ~ n Sct!") s Aslia, " hut also i--n tle
wri -cnecra-lly, has becen uind! erminc,'. It iLs now~ Up toall
np. i-ons, and all people Ocdi. cntedl to freedor:., to
d-c 1-' ithey can, silngly or coll ectvLy to e' the
., ov t U. n . on any furca--er o-proartunity, w'ehrin *-her
Tbird ! world. or in t-ho world! at lr
~ erettably, the worldi is no lon-er a s i. anv t hocu -hit i t
to ras many wantec' to see-it. Thie Soviet invasLTon
0o f. Af Thistan has s!-ock ed the " est and mnovel rt-o reasses
its a g+ mp t: i o s ab1) out, 1 s ecu rit in( Id det ente. As a resul!-
of thiis, in t11he court of world" o-) in*, on, the Sov:. et invasi. on
of A. fgh-nis tan stands eeci* si. velvw coricle; 7ned. byv ~ r
countries and by the TLhi-rd " 2orld countries.
! C jIj cS* on A IWn~ L is O -1" iA
J; 1V: nic. . wz cv' cd>: idr ) r U ~. it Le O1ron
' Defence on 2 .\ irg. 1thsy:.{. wne ht: Tvt
on c C' c nLl Lt o !' 7ac o; or. tie S to u
sp ' Inhf ' s 2 1Z Ln fu r th e r crnuat r i. e s an." Dilh r c! Y
-i a. nt o s L s F orce.
i L a r uecd tt'wv oh i of i2 s -! rliv f or ' Sov . n HlLe c-Tce
S s to0iv 1 a n r e uce isrt the. luence andcl
se2curx. t\ oF teres. Thie Ikiodof this I~ s rar
aa resu) L o f c t ac tht r) s w er e hei.
mad e at deet w the Sov' c: Union, the balance o_ 1
* strateg.; c -ii-atarsihi iy f ted steadily to Thei r
ult-imat-e ad. vanz. tage.
T'hr oug-h the 70s, Soviet mli'taqry spenlinog averagecd between
11 and 13 percent of CGAP, wh-i. le th-Ie. coe. oarable f igure
in the USA has been 5 percent_. Asa result, trained military
manpower, available to Soviet Union, exceeeds that
a -, a1le to the Unted cStates b over 6 milI4on
* SovLet. rudfrcsotnihrtoeo the LISA by nine*
o one: t-hese diiin r uprted by tankcs, m issiles
anO. nrti. llery whi. ch collecti.. ely owtnme teUAb
a factor of two t. 0 one.
TV-tl'i. s coi, oar.;-son on to he NATOP/' Thrsaw Pact milt tary
oa Iance e Fi*. ne thatim the !-arsa.~ Paict ' has a marked superiority
ver "-XTO alli. es. IT hms over 200" d4vi sions. that
* could. P, o: pl d-n-ried, MA TO has about 100. The Wa-Irsaw
. Pact ar-,-ar, en: t includecs 3,000)% tankrs compared with Z" ATO
w C-6 a 1 teover 12,000 Tae !-arsaw Pact f~ orces have
5,000 . com! at planes at tlheirdso4 > AOjs over
I he. 1or A tl-nti c. Treat-Organisation has over thieyes
* repeat2l -w.. Arned of t'he dangers of the unceasing exp
ane p r ove: n n of1 S ov;. ii. 1 i t ary ca ) nailI ti. e's a ncG ur ge d.
the-'%: est to enhzmncc its own ec> ence efforts in res-eonse.
vi. 1975 te.\ 0MntralCouncll expressed concern
at the hLhlevel of m-. litary expendliture by theS'-v et
~ union an(' th cont-inued hc ru. eiL' expansit. on of h
. ii Ltary oe of theC rarsaw-? n., ct on land, air and! sea,
whih theCrunc. I l noted, '. Vf'Icltoreoc
t." th theI avot-.--d dlesire of ~' So'V. et Union to i. inorove
Fast-' West relati. ons.
V hase sentiee-. nts were expressed aaain at the Londlon NIATO
n 1.977 and at the-1. 19.79 and 98 councl
CAI r. ATnn, sters hive clea-rl,; foreseen th po sp2c I" o F
Soivtaie't, rnr~ i i~ ht hreten. n3tnh sta5i. lity of' jhe
m' I-; tnry h-alance ., tr all'leveis conventional, nuclear,
A. e fcus, ' r oss com a ri s o ns of' t his:,
:{ fCdo no' cons . de( rat ion fEcLtoI~ rsar
andr . lttti. ve dij-fFlerences hecenforces on both sides.
7-
WC21S0j. extent of Cl-arin-s bnu . le-uro: becausfe
of S ovi. c s in I le.' anc o c zrn, e A f -anw n ' ins
uu nd er I c2 T. ost ermohrC.: ca I T" Ji r2a I~ ty oft2Or!
to bDe Co:: plA'cCrnt. Ov re. nations o'Ie
retshpn c~ c hal Y' C) f Xfthmstan cris is i i
.2 a c rutic al( et. e r 11 1n Ilt 0 1, o'. Gs eurC t' 0or ( i C C 2s
to c . e.
A ga n stL -s o f crucial s i nfic nc e a nd i s vitL
tht it" s lesssons bo learnt ancd apied. I suggestLt1e re
* are six b,-asi; c lessons:
First, ) greater uni. ty and cohesion among' the allies
of the Unlted States JAs essential; and a much
rearier degree of consensus'needs to be developed
among, all those who value national independence.
. Second, we must maintain absolute clarity and
certainty in our ' s: i. nals to the Soviet* Union,
in order that our interests and-the l~ mits of
. our toleran-e are not. mi. sreaci by MNoscow.
. Th . rcl, new levels -of dfence preparedness. must
b latevec! an a ntine in order t-o
th-a t mnajor Western c ountr e s dIo not see th-eir
* interests as be-C: Ln. confi., ned to Eurooe and its
u~~ ediateenvitronmient.
Courth, chainnels of communication miust: be kept
opnt0. W
4 F.. ifth, W.. estern countries must continue to -strive
to~ r arms control agreements wi-th the Sovi. et Union,
but they must so reco,-, nsin-g that th ey can
. only. succeed if thle necesssary political pre-conditions
* They cinnot succeed as long-as the Soviet UJInion
vrs~ sts wi~ th a concer,! t ofL ( Iet entI-e whtcch-alloWs
for the relentless qc-vuao of eaons ind
the: r uin%-. nh!. ted deplo-c: ent in Thnird WJorld'( 1d sputes.
t, !' cten countr s nust attend to srntein
thei lik it iz-rIlcd countr., e-s tter
* parts of the world, WhiLle recog-nis ing, the piartcular
prolei-s and needs o[ SuIch countrit-s.
* Such an annoroach miiust be pursuedI with resolution and
steadIrfastness, over what maIy 62 quilt a Ion,-, period! of
tmre. Elut ' th*! s approachi offers tiao best prospect of a
roa1. Ls't-c a-cccmmo'ati-* on ' qo1s, cho w.,. It offer-s the best
po portun! ty of con'il. nul" igpece The Australian Govcrn;:! ent
h o IC! s C; irMly to thle. view that, tths time,* it is vital
Qtos t ! nd V) t ouLI r 0 ar all. ies. ./ 8 .1
0
The Covern;;, imtn faced in J. ainulv a clhallenge -t'hrit: involved
* n our bt-lateral. p. l > s wihthe Th. v., i Union:
. i area of ou wtnor a or, r ieCn 1s
r t~ area of our c' aEcnce spenrii*.-n;, zenJc ' n e
W~ rte n~ c toour -te-twla~ t ions, on Januar 9,
* the Governu'. ent annou-nced. a nvirof cdecisions Lnr-'-, edC
to b r ing. h to the Soviet Ujnion and its people an
exoresstion of the strongest rpossi4 le opposition to the
-Sovi-et action in Afghani stan.
In th'e area of trade, Australia has acted in concert
wi-th other grain exporting nations in support of the
US action tolii grain sales to the Sovet Union. '-Je
* are a so supportin-the lI.* st of h5. gh% technologyv items
* which N,' orth Ami-, erica, Japan and' 2eter Europe arree s Ii-ouldi
h su~ ecto export control.. ave curta ilecd s cientfc
cultural and hi. gh level official exchiang'es wihthe Sovie-t-
Uni: on. " Je have curta, led t -he operation of Sovi. fishing
projects and cruise snI--s in Australian waters.
In seu to act Ln. concert w., 2th our maj-or allies, t e
-sovern~: ekil had hoped to secure ! Ais-ralia's sunnort for
an Olymp. c Cames boycott. It its a matter oE great regret
thatr thec Execut, ve of tlie AutainOlyrnp-c 17' dceraltton saw
i! th over 60 nations staying. away from the Ca-mes, reprcsenti. ng
thna or half th e w: orld s-oultote world' s re jection
o f S t -behavi. our has been formally re-Lstereed w ith
the S6viet leadership.
P ut u,; hatever. h nature of the s. i~ nal being sent-to tle
Soviet Union, the Austra-li. an La' ' or Pryhsdsu Lfc
itself from-any' cred-I. t--for the c-ollecti. ve drive bei-ng exerted'
by indepenrviently minded count-ries in the edefence ofL
freeedom. Indecd, the ALP fi-ts l: well the critLicisn -nade by
Solzhecni. tsyn that:.
" TeU-ss4m plydeoes not wa,-nt to believe t-' iatthle
t-ie for sacri-fi. ces arr Lved..
* The AL? SC2! 7: S to bongT-~ c to , ha,, rooufp Tp, e ople ; hiion v entreasons
Eor ' oelicvino tlhaU the Soviets do not ; mean what
thev' say: p-coleI w,, ho inv tc2 o thers to ignore wh; at t-he
SoitUin osTeALP F, p rt o f th at b o dy c, people
lhinCch , w;' I Ile . voiciLn-codmaio W the invasion of'
Af-hanistan, opposes virtually eve~ ry move deidt~ o
mah e that condlecna!: [ on efc . e neople who ciaL iC-1that, in
tt hie i-ntI-ceest s oiF dc t entec, must turn a blindI eve. to ' ovi(-t
*. ad-vances is somr~ e alLe geVdly remote or strategically.
S eCn-' sF ca n a r 0n of the rld. 1
9-
Tn~. edsenor Sokei.~ n in Lthe Lal > or Party have
sa In . ur thIe~ C ht CruCr , rt' oF C. s r u*
tat t'. ere ,, as no threat to AuIr2l*, i~ Iro!-n event-s -* n
. AA . s t a n 5s1.5 ,( i) G h . nc tres from t~
C~ tntr."~'~~ ul~ y smis a l Cl ov er
G, 00hc~ L recs fr o A Crl. 1a
A. ndc !-Cl ' 1in-cln unrteae & t:~ os f r as p th-e
hienby a sms eeodr t n Jan uila ry t'isyer
.'( Afgh,-an i s tan) far away from our area of
* nterest and Aust[ rallia is not threatened..
* afterall who would want' Afqhanis tan?"
hiss re nsct of N'eville Char.' ierlain's stateren
in Seotember 133 Hlis response to the naonf
Czechoslovakia w. as that itwas simply:
quarel ina far-away country betenpol
wwhhoofm we n ow no h r is a little
over 1,000 kidoimetres froma London).
_ Rut wha-it tis worse, the Labor Par-y ' has sought to undermine.
ss up P0rt for-tie IJnited' States of Ameri. ca in a calculatedI
-nou l t'he-priority we mnust-, i; ve to frcedom defence.
2rKayen has accuse' President Carcter of electi. on year
DoIi: tics, as if ZMr Cart-cr hiimiself had engineered the
Sovet nvasion.. Presum~ ably, ' he would have an equally
su~ erficLal but different_ 1' ana-tlon for [~ rs Thatchner's
* rcsnonse, since her -ove-rn. cnt has only recently been,
elected. An--Cnaa hre he Tru-_ eau -overnment-has been
Outsoh i:. e. n its sunport of the boycott, that, decision
wae s not ce unti. l after the Canadian election.
In contrnst-to.. M! r llaycien' s Nositilon, as recently as
a31, r Ja. me s -Ca1 .1 a ' a n the Leaer of the British Labor
Party ancl for;: er Pri-ie i: inistc-, slaid:
".( 71e Sove. t UnIon) ha ve raised, by their
own act, ons, grave doubts-. c aso ' how far the-y
w.. ant
IwoulrI f i. ne. hnard to nam2 o Ilea er of any other d: IcocratLc
party w . ci hns been so outs-oZE.-n in his oppositi; on to
an hloycopti s he eair2rof the Austrailia-n L.-) hor
0-jipc'-oro, sLcLalr t
10
17 NTa Z~ e aland as recr-1x 5 ji o'
oc Ln'hoijr ? Pa r'v ar:, wt tlt !-,) e~ 3shu
c onppi r; a3t C-nc~ S
r in spi. t-of: e ' Z c a ]. anr r! andComln.'?
C-wu. s\ s oc iton t'?. VOL;. n ' o o ol
tour ! ealifl! a; io 2LIa:.~ tnc! ng. frcr,
o~ te seare cnnoeists).
Thiis bri-. ngs m-ie to a scerious poi-nt. Australia is ntowI isol a t ed
nf our re-ion. China, japan, Soutlh Hiong, Ton-,
* the Phili. opines, Thaiand, \ Ialays-ta, Sinr-, apore, Inclonesia,
Panua ew Guinea, 1iji and de f acto New Z ealIand w; Ill
not be attending.
In -decidij* ng to attend the Noscow G-ames. Australia is
v~~. rtuially alone in the region in company wtih onlyC~ us
Laos, Cmmnunis'c Vietna-, and! Comr. up.. St 1ort-h : orea. 1
l ave Lo say that I fi-nd-that a shameful and! repugnant
positlon to De. in.
Auistralla, as an i~ ndenendent nation, v?, th an unqualifi'ed
record . n d" efence ofI lbe r I-Y and' th1e righ1-t to be free,)
hais n neced and " houndlen tlutv to s upport o the-r f ree and
ine. eppnclent nat ons. T o to Cio so is to deny our
hiustorv. Moreover, as an ally * oF the USA, Australia has
* a sneChIfic ac! urg-ent necd Zo su~ port the world' s greatest
free -) ow. cr. ooffc these -rouncis stancinn, alo-ne is suiffi__ c~ nt_
f~ or a boycott. 1" oth tog-etheQr represent an overzihenming
ar~ ument to '. i1.' h1ch . it Ls not-too late orteAForeso.
I isV~ rdto understand!, thien, h ow the Executi'; e of
tile A~ id7 e: erci. Ln-their inclenendent ih to maa
decis'* 6-h3 have decided to plo-ce tl-iec. r oercci. ved cduty
to the tnternational Olynmpic m~ ovement: above their duty
* to Australia, and to ?-usrlans.
Thie. Crovernr,-er2t-, has always accepted tlie hi-gh priority
-' thr; a: st bie ziven : In our national life to young people
and the r p urs ut of ecel Ien c cn all things, in c 1ud
sno: t. ' 7e il coninme to act unon this priority. ' Lr
advocacy ofE a boycottr repriesrents our support of a hi.-I er
oit T or, -IS t' Svit uan ric'htis act-Ivist andi
Noel Prlizewi . nne r, Andlrei Szikharf has saiLd:
" The broade-st Possible boycott of: the Moscow OlY;. cs
necessary.
" very spectator or a thl. etLe wo comes to the C Iy c s
wll b vjn' ndrect: SLl-nort Lo Soviet 1militarv
polici es"
auhp-rospect. ~ s utnh
1.1
W-~ icvcr hiold ' nL ~ i ; orld has on w. i. ll he rNICe
m~ iorc scc-; iy s~ n. 2a stirviort, oE an C. mi
aco2. I dio no!-o e ce, ra i a
wh i cot'n-rv lke s~ rali can-j d. ~ btIdo 110t mis
tœ L~ r. rr e ie-. c thoe o watto AA~ u s t ra i. a
as hav'jnjrg noj Wec in thei r-orld. Th'e fact i S thla,-
' nve a voicc andi~' canra, a cnrbtontoward! s
2hv olution of a coa,, non sLratery.
klvcer tle past -rL* v? moontc-s, my Ministrirs arid. I have s o u h
-doo : wh:-at could' to-( contributec to-.; areds a stron-er
-Wester-n allianca!, unde-r thc ). eadcrshi'.-n oi': t Unite
tas; anc! w. e I1-ave diSCuIssed witlh courntries in our regilon,
andri in, Europ2, the consequences of Afghanilstan. have
* argruedl the need for closer co-operation and consultation.
Our commron objectives req~ uire that countries whi1ch value
their national independence speak wiLh strength supported
* by aequate defence capab-ili ties.
In thi s* t '~ TeA'e. 1 0 Is ( Jeterrninti. on already e viJ. e nce d
be fore th-nvsono Afgh,' an; istan to modern~ sc and
strength1-en -LLs theatre nuclear weapon systei-m and conventional
forces!-, is important.
For i. ts part, the Uni-ted; States. is p ropos.. n. a real1 increases.
in defence sne ov( er thenx ieyertln
it cummlat-ivelv -o more Ihan 2) 0' a-) ove thle current level.
* The thaIrcl nspe ct o f ou r o n response concerns the d ef-_ n. c e
r. ecl silons an-nounaced -n dIetail byv '; Illen on March
Thseinoveth aising of our ow.. n level of nat1: ional.
defe1nce rnP_. reoeiness; Zncreased efforts in decfence
co-operation with tfr;. endlv nations in our re a nd
t) rac I mesues in support of the UniteStes
ly inthe Indian Ocean area.
Under tie five year defence programme announced -y th e
Cove rn;-en t, t! ere il be an average increase Ln defence
pe 1-uzre of -or annm., in real t-er-s. Total de fence
ee x p cnr! tu r P in 1934-3) S i'. s exeeactec! to reaich albout 37.
of Droose sxc i'r'htt: anr' defenice * xpndliiure i. n.
19PS s exopected' -o shiow. a real increas2 of 5/ above
the 19-79-30 level.
. m r~ rmecalls forf an increase Ln expcnditure on
* capitaL, Lte'n;-s. Siri , ou ca--me to governimcnt, expenditure
on zvta oI ; Le ms Lias r isen f rom 3. 3 of totcal defence
expnc. trei 1975-7r) t-o 91. most 1.6' 1 in 1979-30; and
xtwilr'sc to ovter 2571 by 1.934-85.
. For at'. island contlne-nt si.. cn as Au st ral1i.-, looking-at
two oceanns, maritiJ. mc su~ rve. U~ lance. is of creflt _ mportnnlce.
norde; r to steghnour capab i. l'-ties i. 1L t: heC a J. r
wwo~ L. l d. ouhk-ttb Orl. on surve;. llance ' hours flon,
and increase t1he -num! iir of crews availahl--_ for
1' 2)
aircraft so t'L. L li. e r theseair-'
0.1. be eru'rpc Y arponr anl 2S ' L 7) 1) Ln 2S . C~
Whien launchie c h horzon, range of
ship, tie I. aroon ss?_ 1 as devastating
? zcuacy~. in~ ~~ cev-2sse-zls. AW a rang-e o ZIO
lo-, e!-r cs.
ww il a c cure 735 ta7zCtcal11 L ~ r s
-2 uujog l r a de o, r I aircraft to enable them
to-carry preci~ sion g. ided wear) o ns.
Yor the avv:
' je have decided to acqmire a Eourth F. 71 guided
missile fricgate Fromn the USA, and negotiations
ave already been cormol,) etecd for this, and ord! ers
DlaCed. '. have alread y orderedl one underway repleni; shment
sl-vip to-be built at' Vilc'krs " lock in. Syd'ney, and plan
to orcjter a secondic, also to be built In an Australian
sh11p y ar
Iot tese will provide fuel, oil, stores ancl .: eaDpons
lrships at sea.
eplan to order a further ten Fromantle class
oatrol boats, Ln aeddil-on Ito 15 already on order
* wivich are 1) ein-bLilt--n Cairns.
In. ordr. t o s treng th-en our capa'licies. on land:
U& have constituted1 th~ Third Army Task Force in
Townsville as a ready renqtion force,. capable
of in uport on shortL notice.
Weare ' gigto up-trade the Army's fire-: po!-er
yaccutrincg m ee Uu i 1551nr, calibre long-range weapons
admore mobile anc 1li11-ier 105mm weapons.
in performanc.:, rrr. e anr1 rate OF fire, these
aethe very se . n teclinolocvy.
1.1 D* 1., ln tCo acqju:_-, c some~ 2,000 four-a-mr2 ei ghtt
o Cn t r u cks order, we -irc sekin,.
h. ghproorton local production.
Tn j: st-a-tnlent to t'i Parl* i-un in 7clbrua cy, one of fthe
* Mae 2s,: r;! s Loresl-adotoed ' ur period ofl the fve year
(~ efpfloo2-; rvm ~ nsan ercans*-o from 22, O
in the-str'~ n-, h oV the Arm'y hr~ servc.*
13
ren.' loo'Jd n'n to Sr EoC-r r)( s r, to r r; lY,
., jthe reserv, uLs up to fullSrfl~ by
4hc ! 1i11dc1-i-of0 1981. -ur Lsid ~ t~ h3at~--jc t!' usi enlarge
thenu:~!,: rof A us L ra, 1. an S Uri LnC0 for I. ta'sevc
So thtc: eis a bi. C cr nucleus, an. ayLne uclu
( anc' T swis to st ress vcuo'-er round' l. fulrt~ cr
e xrp a n s. on c o ul ( 12Ctt. 1ra uk. cel. Lc evolt
of s Lrategc p roSseeC Lo S 1S, 0n rcg i n o Lutre pa n s -on
ofL t rrt fi ourc of 3Qfc would. rcs'r te re serve
to thne levoLs at~~ c cy s! tood at-t-e e-ry 7s1
b) e f ore they! 1-7re woun, 1y our Ditcloonns
The-reasons for embar! z ing on t his px-.. ansion can be distilled
* into one simple fact:; which 1-s that, at a time when
international uncertaintes are greater than for many
years, lhe proportion of young Astlin trie Lo
military service is at: Lts sm: allest for thirty years..
The nation must. face th e implicai ons of this situation
* squarely.
It reflects a trendl, whi-7ch if ' allow" ec! to continue, would
* weaken our security. Indeed, i f we di-* d not halt such
a trend, we would ri. ghti'v s ta n condenr.. ned by generati-ons
i~ n the future.
A. art o' th-is s aIr ead" y undrlc, ay, i ln n
to or-pnlse reception, trai~ ncn5, ec; ipment, stores and
suror) ort, cabeo corrc.~~ aninraei the reserve
stren-!-i. The Govern;' ent has stressed, that reserve traininq'
requ:._ res not only dcedicated off. i-cers and.. and. woi-men
ho rus -give of th-eir own. time; but also, it requires
an approor. ace cou.~ etby the permann Lo.. e Limel
an Igo tI adequate ec-Li-po ment. and support.
the Go~ e-rnment is d. etcrilned that these provisilons shall
beC ael. a n or k4e r % t-o a thie yo u n r-2c r u. Ls a ma jo r
* advertising cpmpai,-n will be underta! ken. Rlecent Indicat-ions
suc-cst tliat maniy ycoun people are w, Lil in-to coc-. e forward
toserve the -cou~ ntry oy unclcrtalkirv traini-ng in C-h e Army
R~ eserve. A h.-earten. Lng en. ml of this is trevi. 1val
of intrtinuvrs r; mnsh c reflec,-( groWing
creed. t'-on., and. an incr ? ased.! sense of respcnsi.-!-ty in,
* Australi'a's youn-people.. ItL; re-dresents an encouragt.-ng
pe rc-pt ton aa-n d' 2a elcc-c srcnse of aw., areness of thie dangers
n the or. 2sent-4ntcrnat-onia. order.
Te nho: r n! cn t isdte ne o su:) port ; Its ef ence
rnr' 1~ sWithI propecr * Ln119rstructure f'acjilJ.-_ t. 1s.
* Coe:: Vurn Sound' naval b) ase faclitie will he imnorovec!
nordler tZo supemci Opo'. nsand! beeort i ng,
indl later ho:. ic ot~; of-ship,; opera: In:; i. n
the Ind~ lan Ocenn.. ./ 14'
14
to C--rounoc f ac J. lte s furel s tor ag a n-1einon
A o cn air fi. r l: , q-1l be -1 flc o fill
the'. ap he tween Loeart-, oni-h and Dnrrw. ri-1
1P a ar o 1 boat faiiisat Dnrw,, in an-d Cairns are
bigupgraded.
The Grden Islan dckar in jynLes bt~
n~ OdrflS-r inore to support our Eleet and
alwre-fit ., ork. to carried! out ono,. r vessels
VTae ~ IlIi a ms to .4n dockyard, where new destroyers
will be built later in t~ ie decade, will be upgraded
and miodernised.
A* n widened and more secdire defence communications
system is being installed.
Of course, all of this is Tbut part of the % Government's
pro-ratmme of init atives fLor upg-radi1ng Australian defence
capabklit'es. As the programme unfolds, additional dec" Is ons
w~ llobviously be made.
Curs is a total package-. It is supported by the Governmcht's
determinatLo-n to develop a stronger incdustri4l and econo-m*:. e
capac. t-v -i. n the dlecadle aheac!; andt our economic achieve~ rents
0o., th-e last 4' 2 years have mnoved us signi-ficantly in th.-at
At . a timie of increasing international economic pressures,
Australia compares . more than favourably wi; th many of
her mnaj; or trading Partners. This augurs wel o Asrl's
InevitablyV, t is a future of great significance for
our young people, the quality -of whose lives in thl-e years
ahieae depend s so much on the response that we make, as
* a nation, to Lthe challenges confronti* ng us.* Part of our
sucd6essful response involves understanding the challenge;
et Pd ntUi ' y ' ng, th e d ange-cr s an 111-. e th re-a ts. e n0-edl a clIe ar.
* eye for our own obiecti-es a firim Inand in reachrri-our
oals T us-prolai th ri ples that gui de thie
values we defend.
cd! -c2c . en., : ons appear hadaixl Complex, let us lookol to
Our ~ rTe. i5and our o~ je vsin order to c. 2_ ar the
* cours thatwe ust-pur,; ue. 1. ut ; In pursui-ng our prinrci pies
an! values, we must re7-. e: r tha t the Soviet Ualion is
*** also o I& s world; tnat:, ultimatnely, they an' w must
f. ind en of li-vin-to,, he i pac i to rzncure.
Ih2 s e pol Le es cCoo; v' ~ o c hr n 0C n i. S Lf nr
irl 1d.' a 10-a , , I coicerned ! Or > i
Values; cfnceav e ChV -ct; r2
-o Send a cle-Zar 1o 1so. A, l whiose rrrh
'~ eonstrate-_; t'e2 ' noron LWh* ie ju c1c: enn: -0.1:
oldcanno 1> 2~
-i ci of us has a, ronle to play Inl s c n n c that siognal.
2 ch oC us has a com~ i tment to our ow.. n fut-ure. iihot
tChia I c Wnt, our freedom cind, perhiaps, In the end,
its ex.,' stence w 1ll not be sustained.
Th-at, -1s why e a chI -encrntion -utbe prepared to defend
for. -tsell the ri.,, ht to liberty, il-liberty ' and ' nhe pu r s ut
ofc happiness are ta b ra n e ed a nd secured.
14hat ' we. defene s an in' tanl-ce w chextends beyond
the span of a 1l. f et!-me Toc.;' s respors. Liltt isurs
let us fulfill i. t wellI.
b1~ .4 S. VI...