PRESS, R DO AMND TELEVISION COiNFERENCE GIVE BY THE PRIIE MINISTER,
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE R. G. MENZIES IN CANBERRA
ON SUNDAY, 2. TH1 JUNE, 1962, AT 3 P. M.
QUESTION: PRIME MINISTER: Mr, Menzies, what do you consider were the positive gains
of yeur mission as far as the Comrmon Market negotiations
were concerned?
Separately? The United Kingdom and the United States?
The great advantage in the United Kingdom was, I think,
th have discussions with the Prime Minister and the
other Senior Ministers, and to learn as far as I could
the strength of feeling that might exist; on what lines
it went, and, of course, to remind them quite vigorously
of our own interest in the matter, and the things that we
regarded as important. I was following on on a visit by
Mr. Mc Ewer, in which he had, with great command of all the
details, discussed various commodities very closely and
it wasn't rry business to endeavour to repeat that, because,
quite frankly, I couldn't do it as well. He had been in
the United States for similar reasons. vihat I wanted to
do was to get into the broad a little if I may use that
expression to try to form some political impressions
and some political judgments. I think my broad
impression in the United Kingdom was that it would be a
mistake to think that there is a unanimous mind. There
isn't. Various Ministers have various degrees of emphasis
in their own minds, but I think there is, broadly, a
considerable belief not by any means universally held
that there is political merit in Great Britain going into
Europe political merit from the point of view of
strengthening Europe, of helping to keep Europe outwardlooking
on the problems of the world and that, therefore,
Great Britain inside ur. ope can exercise a degree of
influence in the free world which she could not perhaps
exercise outside Europe. That, broadly, is a view I
think which is pretty broadly held in Great Britain on,
both sides of Parliament. There are large minority
groups, of course, on both sides on that matter. On the
economic aspects of the thing, opinions are quite divided.
There are those who think that economically it is vital
for Great Britain to go into a European free trade area.
I am using that, not in the old sense of the rather
abortive attempt to forn; one earlier, but into the uropear
Economic Community. There are others who think tc
argument there is no better than 50/ 50, and there are
some who believe that Great Britain will encounter some
risks by exposing herself to the custom-free entry of
commodities from Europe. It is not for me to say what
the majority view may be. I thought when I was there a
pretty broad view was fairly expressed by Mr. Gaitskell,
when he said, in an excellent debate in the House of
( bmmons, that he was not prepared to form a judgment of
the value of the propcsed move until he knew what the
price was arid that he himself would suspend his judgment
until these negotiations, which have been gi. ing on with
the Six, clarify themselves to a point where the price
can be reasonably assessed. And that, I would have
thought, represented a not uncommon view in London.
It is an entirely practical approach to the matter.
Against that hsi. tancy of judgment, I think that it is
fair to say th , t there is a considerable volume of opinion
which is impress. d by the political advantages that
I have just referred to. In the case of the United
2.
States, I really. wan-ted. Jo_. find-out, in my own fashion, whether the
United States was, first of all, strongly persuaded, and when I say
the United States I mean the A-dministration whether it was strongly
persuaded of the political value of Great Britain being in Europe,
and, secondly, whether it had a sort of dogma. in its mind against
the Commonwealth special relationship and that it would be disposed
to use pressure to give it fillip and it could to produce a
bargaining result which was unfavourable to us. Now that is what
I wanted to find out. I came to this conclusion after talks with
the President and with all the senior 1d;: iinistrative people concerned
that the approach of the United States is broader than that. I don't
doubt for one moment that the Administration would like to see Great
Britain in Europe. I think that what the President said in a
communique which we issued, and in which he expressed his strong
belief in the importance of the Commonwealth as a source of stability
and strength to the free world, is quite right. was very greatly
impressed by his lively and friendly interest in tne Commnonwealth,
and, indeed, by his knovledge f it, what it stood for. I was also
impressed by this, that he and his I was going to say " Ministers",
I'll use che Australian term he and his Ministers, do not want to
see the price fo-the Commonwealth too high. They recognise that we
have interests. They recognise that, like themselves, we want to
grow, want to develoo our business and want to have the best possible
access to the expanded European Common Market. Indeed, one of the
things that was said to me quite frequently in the course of
discussions was, ' Well., look, after all, if Great Britain goes into
the Common Market, you and w will be outside of it. iTe will both
want to have access to that Market to the best possible extent. We
will both want to have the European Common 1Market trading policies
so as to enable us and you to expand our business. And, therefore,
we have much in common. And, far from being dogmatic about the
matter, they exhibited complete willingness to discuss with us,
commodity by commodity with our experts, ways and means of achieving
that broad result. I thought that was very helpful, and, in
consequence, we arranged that I. Vesterman, who is in London, to go
over and continue, in the light of my own talks, some of these
discussions. Well, in both of those respects, or in all of those
respects, in both of those countries, I thought some usefulness was
achieved by the visit. Don't take me as overplaying this business,
because nobody can tell until the end result comes out.
Q. Before you went to London in this room at a Press Conference you
made reference to the political aspect of the Common Market. I am
just wondering whether or not the Queen's visit to Australia may be
related in some way to that.
P. M. Well, I have been reading, only today since I got up, some highlyengaging
theories about the FDyal Visit being associated with the
Common Market. Well, it's picturesque, and I don't want to deny
people the pleasure of their own ideas, but it's quite untrue.
As a aatter of fact, I duscussed with Her Majesty over a year ago the
possibility of a Royal Visit. At that time I had in mind this
year, 1962. At that time, the Common Market discussion hadn't in
any way reached the headlines as it has since. Her Majesty told me
that there were great difficulties about 1962, but she had hopes of
doing it in 1965. But we allowed it to rest there, because I knew
I wo" ld have further opportunities of discussing the details. As a
Inatter of fact, my first discussion with the Queen on the question of
a R! oyal Visit preceded this time any of my discussions on the Common
Market. In my very first t. alk witi her we discussed it. To see in
this some Machiavellian technique by which the Crown is going to
soften the blow for us is, I t. ink, quite unreal. The Queen was -rury
keen on coming here when I discussed it over a year ago. She is
still very keen. Indeed, the one mistake I appear to have made abou'
the matter was that, instead of reserving the announcement of the
Royal Visit until I got home, which I suppose would have been good
politics, I said to the PCalze, " Will, just lot it go when you are
ready," And, of course, I have only realised todo. y that I almost
killed my own 2tory about the colmmiMi uo with Mr. Kennedy. But it
shows how stupid you can boe or I can be, anyway. But, don't think
of this visit by Her Majesty as some rmonouuvre by which she tempers the
wind to the prospectively shorn lamb. Trine two things are not related.
The Queen likes this country and she is looking forward to coning here.
Q. In your discussions with the Queen, was it made clear by you that this
tour should be a very inforlmal. one?
P. M. We agreed about that as I say, it was well over a year ago. My
view on that, and Her ! Majesty shares it, is that if each Royal Visit
becomes a full dress journey State by State, locality by locality,
then it will beco1me pretty tedious and will becomne, inevitably, pretty
rare. You can't go in for that kind of thing very frequently. le
have been trying for soie time now to try to achiive the result of a
special visi'U for a special purpose. Prince Philip has been here
already once for the Olympic ( Imes, a special visit, Princess
, lexandra was here; she didn't go to all the States, the Queen
Mother was here; Prince Philip comes out towards the end of this
Syear to open the Coironwealth Games he'll come to C:. nberra, no
doubt, bit it won't be a Continent-wide tour. On this occasion,
the Queen, I think, would like to visit each State, but not just as a
sort of State visit in which people are arguing about, i4hy don't you
come to our town, because you went tu a-. nothr town last time?"
But perhaps some particular occurrence in a State will attract a
Royal 11sit, ie arc going into that this wee-k to see what can be
worked out. But a visit which is directed to occasions, and not
simply to localities, is the type of visit that I had in mind, and
I know that that is what she would like. And if we can do that, then
I think we may hnvu more visits by numbers of the Royal Family on a
simpler, shortor basis, than we would have if they were all on an
elaborate basis. I think the people of Australia will appreciate
that and ricsponci to it,
Q. It has been suggested that one of the ieribers of the Royal Faiily may
comne out with the Royal couple. Can you corLu-ent on that?
P. I. Nao, I can't. ve don't know about that yet.
Q. Con you give us some idea of the date of the arrival in Canberra of
the menibers of the Royal Tour. It has been suggested as February
P. M. iell, the intes that I was discussing when I wrs in London have been
altered since, because I think that they decided that they would like
to make it a little earlier, so I no a. uthority on the date. But
the Canberra date the fifty years Canbcrra date is what, March 12th.
Yes. w1ell I would think thAt that would probably be about it. I l
reminded. that the Australian dates will proably be abcut imid-February
to mid-March and that would cover the period of this Canberra event.
Q. Do you know which order the tour will take? Khich order of States?
P. M. On no.
Q. You hLav no idea of those things?
P. MI. Those are the things that now have to be worked out.
Q. iill Her Majesty take part in n opening of Parlianment?
P.! v. Don't ask me any of that. These things have all to be worked on,
vqhether you can have : n ounirg of Parlilament between the middle of
February and the middle ofk i.. arch depunds on many circumstances.
Q. 4ill you announce the a ppointrient of Minister in charge of the Haal
Tcur soon?
PoM., Yes fairly soon If I decide to have one. I mean the method
of running this tour has y:, t to be worked cut, I have had some
rjrelimi-nary discussions btit T wouldn't take i for granted tha
the old technique will Accessarily apply.
Qo In saying that, do you mean that is because the tour will
be more informal than on previous occasions?
P. M Well, no. For other reasons, But I : ill deal with those
when we are in a position to announce what the arrangements
are,
Q. In other words, we should not take for granted that there
will be a Minister in charge?
P. M. No, not for granted. I don't say there won't be, but don't
take it for granted, and don't embarrass the prospective
Ministers by offering them knighthoods in advance.
Qo Will you be in a position soon to announce the name of the
Director of the Royal Visit? Have you anyone in mind at
this stage?
P. M. I have nobody in mind at present, but I have a specification
in mind, that's all. Naturally, we will announce all these
things just as soon as we can, Whether it is in a week's
time or a fortnight, I just don't know.
QO Has any planning at all been undertaken at this stage?
P. Mo Only in a very general way as the result of cables. But
it can't be undertaken in detail till I have a chance of
discussing with my own people here the kind of talks that
I had with the Queen and with the Prince.
Qa How long do you think it will be before you are in a
position to announce at alcast a preliminary itinerary?
PoM, Oh, I would hope oh, an itinerary I don't know. Look,
as soon as I am in a position to announce % what m. rhinury
there is, the general idea, I will do so-Ttihre will be
no ttco: i . Lbuer mysterious abo-n but the order of
events well, that may t-ir-a few weeks to work out.
I don't know.
Qo Coming back to the Common Market, do you now regard it as
inevitaole that Britain will enter the European Common
Market?
PM, No, I don't think that could be regarded as a certainty.
Q. Any particular roeson for that?
P. Mo Well, I think I have, Just after I arrived in London, I
had a talk with Mr. Marshall of New Zealand, and we made
a statement which I thought was fairly commonplace, but
we woke up the next day to find ourselves famous. But
the gist of what we were saying was this There had just
been announced on the very day that I flew in to England,
a tentative agreement between the United Kingdom and the
Six on hard manufactures, as they are classified. And
this agreement amounted to this, that the existing
preferences enjoyed by the Commonwcalth countries into
Great Britain would be phased out by 1970, 1970 being the
date on which the Common Market becomes, under the terms
of the treaty, completely established. They would be
phased out by two stops a'-nd then disappear in 1970. This
has been called " The Procipice Solution" in various quarters,
and that's not a bad description. We felt very strongly
that if that principle was applied down the line to matters
of greater importance to us, such as temperat, foodstuffs,
through all these cormmodities, so that it became the
established practice that the conditions of Great Britain
going into the Coron-Market were that by 1970 all our
( c( ontcL0
P. M.
P. M.
P. oi. preferences, right down the line, disappeared. We felt that
if that happened that would be disastrous and that would give
rise to most violent protests or. the part of the Commonwealth
countries:, An. I am sure i. t would.' If Great Britain, in
the negotiations, can do no better than that. as the
negotiations proc-ad, so that in September, the position is
that the best you c?, n get is the 1970 termination, then,
I for one, think there is great doubt as to whether the
United Kingdom Government would go, or whether the House
of Commons would approve going in. Very great doubt.
Decause, you see, that would present the problem, the
dilemma in its most acute form. You now choose, as from
1970, your special relations with the Commonwealth or your
new relations with Europe. And this is a pretty stark
choice. And I don't know it is anybody's guess but
I would doubt, myself, very strongly, whether under those
circumstances Great Britain would go in. And, indeed, you
have probably seen the communiou's. It refers to the fact
that I said to the President that it would be a grave
misfortune if, after the negotiations, it turned out that
the conditions laid down for Eritain's entry were unacceptable
to Commonwealth countries on the grounds that they damaged
Commonwealth trade and expansion. This, in reality, is
one of the key things I wanted to put to the Amnecan
Administration " If you w. ant to have Groat Britain in
Europe, then don't allow your influence to make the price
an unpayable one" o
But sir, isn't it almost cert-in thtthe Six and America
will seek to make the price reasonable?
I come back, fooling that they probably will. I don't
assume that the Six are goin to play this game too hard.
I happen to believe that what was put to thom first of all
by my colleague, Mr. Mcewen. and then by Dr. Westerman, at
the Brussels conforence has had some effect on their minds.
It certainly has affected some of them. You can't lump
them altogether) because the French view is not necessarily
the some as the Italian view.
Following that up, do you got the impression that America
is willing to lower her tariffs so that we could perhaps sell
more on the Anmerican market, and, on the other side, the
Six and America will agree to some kind of international
agreement on bulk commodities?
The President of the United States has, as you know,
promulgated a law giving him a discretionary power in
relation to tariffs within certain limits in the course of
making trade treaties. He undoubtedly attaches great
importance to this and thinks that, arrmd with the new
powers, it nay be possible to make agreements and arrangements
with the Six then the Seven perhaps which would
tend to encourage trade from outside to inside the Cornrion
Market area, which, of course, would help us. But how
that will work out I don't know. All I know is that the
American Administration attaches importance to it and it
looks as if the Congress will accept it.
Do you think that the terns will be clear by the tine The
Prime Ministers meet in Sept,.-mbr?
I think they'll be clear and unclear, Let me put it this
way. When I went over, one of the reasons I went was that
I was afraid that Juno and July might be the months of
decision and it was better to be there when ninds were being
formed. than to b, there \ whjn minds had been formed.
I'mr not sure now, At that tine, thought that by the
n aa 9
P. M. end of Ju& ly, thie package ,-,-ould be fairly tied up. Flut
( orLtdj now I [ have doubts. Pr3a thr think the negot-iatis nr
be complete Jlhen we mect in Sept. ember
Q. Does that mean
PQWI4eC~ lw~~ i oet et-me sey, what I want to say. I
rather think that the negotiations -4ill not be complete.
I may be wrong, but there w. ill have been a s-tfficient number
of negotiations, on a sufficient number of comm-jodities, to
give us the broad shnape of what is going on. It may be
that tthe September conference will thecrefore de~ al withi
something which is nct complete but wh-ich is suiCficiently
formed to enable us to offer useful opir:. ions.
So you see no need -to postpone the SeDptemter conference?
P. M. I don't think so, no.
Q. ~ Has ' the Eritishi Government given any undertaking to bring
thlese mnatters to tht-e Septemirber conformee for discussion
and decision rather than as a corilete pack.-age?
P. M. 0 h, yes, that is somothing that is completely established.
i wentt o sonme pains to hnave it establishei-d. Alth. oughi
we read about cort,: in matters as agroei-onts9 like the one
on manufactures2 the_ fCact is th-at they are not agreements.
Theyaretenatie a amcnts put i* nto suspo-. nse so to
speak, designed to b-e brough; In toge ther in a package,
nobody being comrmitted and thui Commonwealth countries being
completely uninhibited in wlzat view they m.-ay offer.
Q. ~ American officials h-e,. c durlng, vour absene have sa:; d the
basis of an agreemient has bc-e n put to our g overnment about
thne U. S, attitude on thlis in-) thl-ree part11s firstly that
the U. S. woulid not withdraw its oppositLionl to a transitional
arag~ letonly for-. pjrjfornce s; secondly, tha t if tChe
Tralde pansion Act is -Lassod, theo U. S. Geovor-. 1-rit would
takk.. o euefreampslCtepO, the wool -tariff, and,
thirdly, th. at thec Govornment would use, its best offices
to pro_-, oto -voild col: 1iModity stabilisation agreemeants,
Has tha-Lt been-
P. M, W! eJT. l i havcon't seeln thi! s cj-_. munication, so I makre no comnment
on it. Onc. or two as'eo-, c Gs of it would surprisu mal.
041, Did you aslx for anly specific quid pro quo from the Amricans
for giving up special ri hts in Britain?
P. M0 I enaged in no detailed argumeint about any coillodity.
That wasn't mry business.
Q. ',; ill Dr. Wst.-rn-an try to negcotiate--any # id pro quo?
I don1 L kew Look, there is nothing more dangerous than
to talk like that, really. I would not talk like that.
When you sit down to negotiate witr-people you don't go
along and say " I qCui1il ntp ro quo, you want this".
Heo will sit down aithi th: m and discuss com~ modity by
comm. odity what is thuij-be; st kind of result we think we
can achiove( satisfactory to t'nem, satisfactory tc) us. If
I eeto sit heore talking aboit any individual coimiiodity,
I ~. o~ dbe destroying thev pros-cts of' suaccess. Arid I
am not going -to. I w'Y intoircsted in Australia.
1Mr. ivinzias, Mr. Macmill1an ; z-. as reportod yesterday to have
told a Conser-vative axo rally thiat L41itnin was dotermiinor
' to join the Common Manrketl dcsriitc_ criticisn, but that the
Govcrnimon~ t recorgni s -i its oblig; ations and ailmeid -to makQ 0 a
arrangements for the Co. mmonwealth' s temporary and
ContcL.) permanent needs. He went on to say that
P. M. Look: What are you reading this TO me for? I did not
hear it. You knowr my attitude on these matters. Years
and years ago when I was a boy I was prepared to comment
on what some man was supposed to have said. I grew out
of that years ago.
Qo Sir, in your discussions with Mr. Macmillan, did the
question of Britain's preferences in the Australian
market arise at all?
P. M. No, not specifically,
Q. The impression seems to be growing that yjur efforts on
behalf of Australia could put you in the position where you
could be used up as a champion by those who are opposed to
Britain entering the Common Market. Could you comment on
the dangers of that?
P. M. I would not agree with that comment at all. I merely
happen to have put as clearly as I could our own views on
these matters, I thought very mildly and, I hope, clearly.
Q. Would you say, sir, that you have the support of any other
Commonwealth countries apart from New Zealand in the general
line of thinking about the strength of the Commonwealth
and so on?
P. Mo I would have thought the views I have been uttering on
this matter would have general acceptance in the Commonwealth.
In fact, I would be surprised to know they
were violently opposed by any British Minister.
Q. While you were away, Mr. Townley has been in Indonesia
and a certain controversy has arisen because he either
wore an Indonesian uniform or somenthing close to it.
Have you any comment to make?
P. M. No comment, No comment at all,
Qo Do you intend to ask him for an explanation?
P. M. No comment.
Qt Did you discuss with the Canadians while in London any
combined Commonwealth attitude?
P. M. I had some valuable discussions with Mr. George Drew, the
Canadian High Commissioner, but it wasn't possible to
have discussions on the political level because of the
Canadian election,
Q. You have no intention, have you, sir, of trying to got
a cohesive Commonwealth attitude to the Common Market?
PM., Wll, if you nean by that, do I intend to set out on some
campaign with other people, no. I am a great believer
in speaking for my own self, and the Government here.
Q. Australia, then, is looking after its own interests?
P. M. We identify our own interests with the interests of the
Commonwealth. I dcline to believe that they are
difer ent. 0 0 / 8s
Qr Vie announcement of ' D Royal. Vi sit scems to have knocked
sugrgesti4-ons th-at 1-he Governor-Gen; e-ral will not be returning3
14. The Governor-General has every intenticrn of returning.
Certai . nly, and I have every intention that, Le should.
Q, You have spolken about the(, danlgers you see in a " precipice" t
soluti on. If you were facod with sucri c: solution, have
-iou considlered what our policy would be?
P. M. I think that's a mnatter on whiichi you engage in concrete
thin-king when you see the time coming.
9. Sir, would you carae to commnent on Mr. Killen' s proposed
visit London?
P. M, I have no comrment.
Q. ~ Is it quite clear thiat you will be going to the September
confer en ce?
PbMt Well, no, I think it is full of doubts. We might be
kicked out i~ n August, and that would rather put me out of
the running. I ihtstep under a bus. But subject to
those accidents, politic. al arid physical. yes, I intend
to bc there.
Q. Wil ' Mr. McEwen also go?
P. M, i iope so. Thiatls my present intention.
9. Can you give us any lcte,, r information about the ',, lst New
Guinea situation following yorur discussions abroad?
P. M. 1No5 the impression of U Thant, wbvom I saw--in !, ow York, is
that thec parties -11J. 1 resumce their conferenco, under the
chaicmeanShiu of Ambssador Kionkor and if tliat is so,
wol" J. we hcopce so,,, oo d will result.
9. Did yNou discorn anly hardenillog in British or Ame,. rican
attituides to t-uc west New Guinea sit-uation as the result
of paratroope being dropped by Indonesia?
P. M I think1 there'Is breCIi gr, 3atc -esentmnitn both places-against
thei continuedI -se of force, and I have no doubt that that
has boen conve yod by botha adLniri stra Lions.
9. Did you see Lord Giadwyn whe n you weac in London?
P. M. 1NT .
Q On South East Asia in viewTv of the new agreoment with
t'ne new Gov-r-imnt in Laos do you consider that AustraliaTs
coritnitment in Thailand will need to continue?
PIM. I think that would be& rusing it a good deal. It is quite
true t'nat an arrangement has boon made in Laos, but it
remains to be s(. en that -i-t sottlos down in-to some-" thing that
is durable, We all hope, it uill; but theo essence of it
is that the. re should a neutral anrd independent, Laos not
interfered wish by poopl( c from-z cutside. A-nd, as it has
lackled any stability of groveirnment fo.-r some timne for a
long time, I thinkE thant we r all h-, oping that t~ iu now
arrang: cmAc nt will work., If it does , Jork1, and Laos in fact
becomels a proet-ty sce. ttle-d community, thcrn it may be tkiat theL
pot nti-al throat -to Tiha-iland as a SEATO country will
diminishi and th-at, o1 cokirs wl be taken into account,
a. 0 Q 2 00 LU/ i
Oo Coming back to Indonesia, Sir Garfield Ba. rwick will be
there is a few days, I think. Will he indicate quite
plainly to the Indonesians that we also resent their
activities in Dutch New Guinea?
P. M. Well, I've no doubt that he will. He can speak for himself.
I spoke for myself in answer to a question on this matter
in Washington.
Q. One more question on South East Asia, This row between
the Philippines, or what looks like becoming a row, and
Britain, over the future of British North Borneo, which
is more or less pledged to the Federation of Malaysia.
What is going to be the future of SEATO if SEATO partners
are warring among themselves? Have you any comment on
this?
P. M. No. You must work that out for yourself.
Qo Will you be making a statement early in the Budget Session
on your trip abroad?
P. M. Yes.
Qo For a debate?
P. M. Yes.
Q. Mr. Menzies, while you were away, Mr. McEwen asked the
Americans to " get out of our hair" on the issue of
preferendes. After your visit to America, do you think
that they are likely to take a more conciliatory or
constructive attitude towards getting out of our hair?
P. M. Look, I'm not here to be using phrases. One of the
things I was discussing in the United States, and I hope
it will be allowed to remain there, is that we are not
going to argue about words or about dongas or these ideas.
We agree to disagree about those things. What we want to
do is to have some constructive, co-operative discussions
with each other to see what result we can got. And all
that I Lave to say on that matter is, with the authority
of the President, said in the communique. The greatest
disservice that you could do to Australia on this matter
is to take this, which is a useful document, and try to
tear it up by harking back to other arguments, I'm not
going to.