EPWAXUU: U: UU AIM
Tuesday, 6 June ( EST
1j.. 4USTRALIA
FOR PRESS 5 JUNE 1978
ADDRESS TO T7iE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSELMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT
Mr. President, this Special Session, under your distinguished
leadership, has already given grounds for hope that a more
realistic and practical approach to disarmament is underway.
It was once thought that if only men of goodwill could come
together and express their common desire for peace, peace
would be achieved almost overnight. It was even thought that
if only we did not speak of the harsh realities of conflict.
our miinds woulO~ become more receptive to peace.
Experience has taught us that nations will not lay down their
arms or abandon their ambitions simply in the name of
idealism. Too often nations seek peace but only on their
own terms. Too often they want settlement but only on
their own terms. Plainly, idealism is not enough. Indeed,
idealism severed from reality is futile and sometimes dangerous.
Too often, the high hopes of past decades have turned to the
ashes of blood of war.
The problems that confront us are of enormous magnitude. The
task of achieving an effective and significant measure of
global disarmarient is daunting.
The spectre that haunts us today is a world armed as it has
never been before. Its inventory of weapons exceeds the total
sum of all weaponry employed in human history. Tragically,
responsible governments throughout the world feel compelled
to spend vast sums on arms. Some countries spend far more
on arms than can be justified for their legitimate defensive
requirements. Once this occurs, the defence apparatus becomes
entrenched as a strong vested interest, and such an integral part
of the national economy, that significantly to reduce it would
cause grave problems of economic and social adjustment.
One fact is certain the forces militating against arms
control are powerful. We -cannot hope to begin to dismantle
the world's military apparatus. unless we address our minds to
the causes which nourish and sustain it: the notion that
increased military spending inevitably provides greater national
security regardless of the objective facts; the narrow self
interest and amtbition which nations can pursue reckless of
the tension and conflict which this may generate; the quest
for national status which still motivates the actions of many
states, attempts to exploit the weaknesses of smaller states; the
attempt to expand a nation's influence over other states, under
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the cloak of ideology regardless of damaging competition
with other powers which results.
Above all, there is the pervasive mistrust and suspicion that
haunts nations and the fear that this creates. The suspicion
and fear which turns nations to increase their armaments
frequently stems from the military policies of others.
A sudden expansion of arms, an unexpected concentration of
military forces, the growth in a country's military capacity
in excess of perceived defence needs all these produce
suspicion and counteraction.
Another potent source of suspicion and fear is economic
insecurity and uncertainty; fear about security of access
to markets or essential sources of supply; unequal world
trading arrangements7 the exclusion of groups, of categories of
nations from fair trade; and poverty and deprivation in
large areas of the world. All these are in themselves a
fertile breeding ground for tension and conflict.
We cannot ignore these historic and present sources of
concern and fear. Our disarmament efforts will come to nothing.
if we do not work to eradicate these economic causes of
discontent. The multilateral trade negotiations this year and the
negotiations over the Common Fund will provide opportunities
to advance our common causes. Failing that, we will have
missed the oppoz-rt-unity to resolve economically based tension
and discord.
The circumstances that fuel the fears and suspicions of nations
and damage their relations are infinite. Together they conspire
to create a lack of confidence in a system of international
security that can regularise the differences among nations
so as to avoid the outbreak or threat of war.
I do not minimise the difficulties that face this Conference.
But it is inconceivable that the world should become so
indifferent to its fate that it does not try to remove the
causes of conflict and to control the production and deployment
of nuclear and conventional arms.
There are so many pressing national needs, so many unrealised
aspirations, that conscience and reason demand that this waste
of resources cease. The significance of this Special Session
is that it recognises that disarmament is a matter for
political leadership, for political will and determination and
common commitment and dedication.
The very fact that the United Nations is assembled for this
Session entitles us to assume that we share a common
determination to bring arms and military spending-under control.
We know that war, the threat of war, anarchy and terrorism
know no frontiers, that no nation, however favourably placed,
can afford to stand aside from the quest for international
peace and security. ./ 3
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This is why Australia takes a most active interest in arms
control and disarmament. Like other middle and sinaller
powers, Australia's fate can be decided by the contest between
the major powers. We place the highest value on our independence,
our territorial integrity, our individuality.
Separately, middle and small powers are in no position to
decide global issues of war or peace. But collectively we
can do much to fcster a climate of international cooperation
and practical control.
Australia believes that the realistic approach to disarmament
lies in the steo by step development of arms control. It is
essential at each step that all who are affected should feel
their secur--:_ c-: is at the very least not weakened.
Other-vaise, zc-': e prospects for effective arms control will be
destroyed. But we should not limit ourselves merely to preserving a
precarious status quo. We must aim at increasing the security
of nations. Concentrating on disarmament techniques and
mechanics is important but it is not enough.
We must confront -the underlying political and economic
anxieties and suspicions which impel nations to arm themselves.
only if the causes of international tension are removed can
there be any realistic hope of achieving a meaningful and
long-lasting reduction in arms.
A practical ag~ enda for world disarmament should therefore
star't from the premise that it is essential to increase mutual
confidence and trust among nations.
Nuclear Issues
It is accordingly natural that in this Session our main aim is
to agree on a practical and realistic programme of action for
arms control and disarmament. The first focus of this programme
must be on issues of nuclear arms control. The avoidance of
nuclear war is an imperative of mankind.
My Government's position is clear and unequivocal. We oppose
further escalation of the nuclear arms race. Wle oppose the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Even if we could depend on the technology of terror, delicately
balanced between the superpowers, to prevent a nuclear holocaust,
our mutual interdependence and the growing scarcity of essential
resources makes manifest the futility of uncontrolled
expenditures on nuclear weapons.
Spurred by this realisation, nations have commenced the slow
and deliberate process of negotiation to limit the production,
distribution and use of these weapons.
Through this step-by-step process, nuclear and non-nuclear
weapon states alike have come to accept that they have a common
interest in 1lmiting nuclear weaponry and that carefully
negotiated 1Lz'its need not put at risk any nation' s security.
I,
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We now need to build on the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963,
the Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the 1972 SALT
agreementsZ between the United States and the Soviet Union. We
now need to create an environment which further limits nations'
capacity to acquire nuclear weapons indeed, which
removes an,: incentive to possess them.
Progress _ St be made in three inter-related areas. First, the
nuclear wez-ons powers must take effective action to limit and
reduce nuclear arsenals. Second, there must be an end to
nuclear teS-..* ng in all environments. Third, the international
non-profilara-tion system must be strengthened.
We are dea-Li here with difficult and inter-related balances
of national i-nterest. Progress in one area of nuclear arms
control can negated if other essential areas are neglected.
Australia believes that all three objectives are realistic and
attainable.
This special session can give a real impetus towards reaching
a consensus on nuclear armF control by identifying the conditions
that can generate a well-founded confidence between nuclear and
non-nuclear weapons states and between the nuclear weapons states
themselves.
S . A. L. T.
The first'area in which further progress needs to be made is in
the strategic arms limitation talks. SALT's aim to limit and then
reduce the nuclear armaments of the superpowers while preserving
the strategic nuclear balance is in the interests of us all.
Without progress, the prospect of checking the proliferation of
nuclear weapons will be prejudiced, for some states are unwilling
to abandon the option of possessing nuclear weapons until the
superpowers reduce their arsenals. And so long as conventional
weapons are maintained at present levels nuclear weapons form
an essential element of the overall strategic balance.
Against this background, any prospect of instability caused by
one party gaining at the expense of the other would damage the
fundamental premises of co-operation betaeen the United States
and the Soviet Union. It would also gravely impair international
confidence in SALT, and set back the total prospects for nuclear
arms control.
As confidence in these negotiations grows, it will open the door
to reductions in nuclear . arsenals.
We hope that ultimately SALT will open the way for negotiations
involving all'nuclear weapons states.
Nuclear Weapons Testing
SALT must necessarily be a lengthy and continuing negotiating
process.
An urgent and more inmmediately achievable objective is the
cessation of nuclear weapons testing in all environments by
all states. It is to be regretted that we do not yet have a
comprehensive test ban treaty and that even the partial test
ban treaty has yet t-o receive universal support.
At successive general assemblies, Australia has pressed for a
broad consensus = a4ainst all nuclear tests and at last year's
assembly we cs-s-zonsored the first single resolution adopted by
the assembly su-_-= ortiflg a comprehensive test ban.
This was an i: 7zrtant expression of international opinion. It
should not be Lznored. It should now be translated into
concrete measures.
Australia welcomes the current negotiations between the United
States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain on a comprehensive
test ban treaty and looks to their early and successful
conclusion. There can be no question that such an agreement
would be a barrier, both to the expansion of existing nuclear
arsenals and to the further spread of nuclear weapons.
Such a treaty would put any country initiating or continuing
nuclear testing at the risk of isolation and international
censure. Such a treaty would be reinforced by an international
agreement to hL-alt production of fissionable material for nuclear
weapons. We believe this should be the subject of early discussion among
nuclear weapon states and included in the programme of action.
Horizontal Non-Proliferation
The third essential element in nuclear arms control is preventing
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional countries.
This involves the security of us all. Proliferation triggers
further proliferation causing instability and risk for all.
How do we halt the spread of nuclear weapons?
Again, a difficult and careful process of international negotiations
is required to find ways to stop proliferation while protecting
legitimate interests. We need to create treaty obligations and
with them the world opinion which will effectively deter the
acquisition of such weapons, and prevent nuclear materials being
diverted from peaceful purpos-es.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been the essential first
step towards the achievement of these goals. Whatever its
imperfections, it is the only comprehensive international
instrument directed against proliferation. Adherence to it
represents an essential test of the co. Lnitment of non-nuclear
powers to non-proliferation.
Over one hundred states are now parties to the treaty. I urge
it-s universal acceptance. / 6
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The treaty rests on a three-way bargain, and each element of
the bargain must be honoured, by nuclear weapons powers making
progress towards nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear powers not
acquiring nuclear weapons and all countries co-operating in the
peaceful devel: p nent of nuclear energy under effective safeguards.
At the same tethose states renouncing nuclear weapons need
assurances t:~ this will not jeopardise their security.
There is concer= whether Security Council resolution 255 of
1968 sufficien-ly protects non-nuclear weapon states which are
parties to N. P. T. against threat or use of nuclear weapons.
In Australia'S v; iew, such assurances should be further developed
and strengthened.
We welcome recent undertakings by the nuclear weapons states
relating to the non-use of nuclear weapons. We commend the statement
by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom that his country isI
prepared to take part with other nuclear powers in firm, far--
reaching and permanent assurances to the non-nuclear states.
There is also-a need to assure non-nuclear weapon states of
access to nucl= aar technology for peaceful purposes.
If world energy; requirements are to be met and economic and
social development promoted, nuclear power for peaceful purposes.
is essential. Our challenge is to find ways in which nuclear
energy can be further developed without compromising non-proliferatic
objectives. Australia is closely involved.
First, my Government decided last year to proceed with the further
mining and export of Australian uranium to provide at reasonable
prices supplies of uranium fuel to countries that need them.
Because of our concern for non-proliferation, we have decided
that our uranium exports to non-nuclear weapon states will bE!
limited to those who are parties to the N. P. T. and therefore
comply with requirements set by the International Atomic Energy
Agency and who abide by the terms of special bilateral treaties.
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Second, we are participating actively in the International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Study launched last year.
This study is specifically addressed to the problem of
developing nuclear energy in ways consistent with
non-pr-cliferation objectives. It could result in the
international contr-ol of sensitive elements of the
nuclear fuel c-Ncle.
Australia baliJe-. es that by these actions, we can contribute
to a climate~ cf-confi dence which will foster stable nuclear
trade and c~ srinternational cooperation on nuclear
matters. our basic cc-cern is to assure all nations including those
who are not, czrties to our uranium sales contracts that
our uranium and any material derived from it will be used only
for peaceful purposes. It is better to have confident nuclear
cooperation and trade under effective safeguards than have
these exchanges crippled by suspicion and fear. We look to
the further evolution of cooperative arrangements that are
essential to trust and a safe nuclear world.
Other Areas of Arms Control and Disarmament
Mr. President, while we have made some modest advance with
nuclear arms control, the outcome of efforts to limit
conventional arms-* has beert disappointing. In fact, the
level of conventional armaments continues to escalate.
It is in the building of well founded trust and confidence
that real hope ' Lies of slowing and reversing the growth
of conventional arms levels. We need approaches which,
while limited and specific in scope, are practical, achievable,
and contribute to security at lower levels of armament.
Military Budgets and Development
Mr. President, there have been proposals put forward for
reductions in military budgets. Australia in principle supports
such reductions carried out in ways which would not be
destabilising or create new tensions.
There is the need to overcome the practical problems of
defining and measuring military expenditures and establishing
machinery for verifying compliance with any agreed reductions.
All this requires thorough examination, and my Government has
recently informed the Secretary General that we are willing
to submit our Defence Budget for analysis as part of a pilot
project on military budgets. Any significant reductions in
military budgets could release substantial resources for
, econcnic and social development.
We support the proposal of the Nordic countries that the
Secretary General undertake a major study of all aspects
of the relationship between disarmament and development. / 8
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Regional Arms Control
Australia sees value in regional approaches to arms control.
These can contribute to stability. The ASEAN countries
advocacy of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality has
had impa= ct, and has lessened the possibility of competition for
influence in the region by major powers.
The conceot of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and the current
discussions between the United States and Soviet Union on
mutual military limitations in the Indian Ocean are further
examples of a regional approach.
Any agreements reached between the superpowers must enhance
security provided by existing alliances and arrangements,
otherwise they will have the effect of increasing suspicions and
exacerbating tensions.
Verif ication
Effective verification is needed to piovide the nece~ sary
foundation of confidence on which any arms control or
disararent must rest. Controls without verification would be
meaningless. The precise requirements and means for
verification will depend on the nature and scope of the
agreement in question. But the objectives are clear.
Verification must: protect the security of states acceptin g
agreed limitations; provide reasonable confidence that a case
of non-compliance would be quickly detected; deter to the
maximum extent possible any brea~ h of agreed conditions;
provide mechanisms to deal with possible breaches or
circumvention. To the extent that verification can be brought under
international control, that will further increase confidence.
A number of proposals have been put forward to advance the
cause of verification. I particularly note the proposal of
the President of France for the establishment of an
International Satellite Observation Agency. This is an
interesting idea that warrants constructive consideration.
Adequate arrangements for verification are indispensable to
a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In this instance, identifying
small underground tests is the greatest problem.
In view of our geographical position and expertise, Australia
would be well placed to participate in monitoring such a
treaty by seismic means. We would obviously cooperate to
achieve these objectives.
Disarmament Machinery
A major task of this Special Session is to review the
effectiveness of the existing international disarmament machinery.
The present mechanisms have evolved over the years and in the
new situations we face the need to be made both more effective
and more representative. The Special Session should seek to
build on the expertise of existing disarmament bodies.
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In Australia's view, the basic three-tier structure should
be retained: the first Committee of the General Assembly
should remain as a consultative and deliberate forum with
overall responsibility for international disarmament
efforts; the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
should be retained, under this or another name, for
negotiating specific multilateral agreements; and the
United Nations Disarmament Centre should carry out the
Secretariat functions. Each of these bodies needs
modi ficat ion.
In the case of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,
while its basic character should be retained as a compact
but representative negotiating body, with a defined
membership, zotnigto work by consensus, we should seek
five basic cha-nges.
These changes would enable the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament to strengthen its role in the period of
intensified activity which we hope will follow this Session.
First, it should enjoy the full confidence of the international
community including all the nuclear weapons powers. A major
weakness of the C. C. D. has been the absence from its
deliberations of two of these powers. We would like to
see this redressed.
Second, it should have a membership reflecting a wider spread
of geographical, political and security interests. The
C. C. D's structure and membership have been too closely tied to
the European context and a * modest increase in its existing
membership would result in a more representative body.
This could be achieved by including states from outside Europe
which have demonstrated an active interest in arms control
and disarmament questions. For its part, Australia stands
ready to participate in a reformed C. C. D.
Third, while we recognise the special obligations of the nuclear
weapon states, we believe that the C. C. D. or its successor
should not be subject to their overriding will and that some
changes to the existing co-Chairmanship arrangements would
be appropriate.
Fourth, the C. C. D.' s links with the General Assembly should be
strengthened to make it more responsive to a broader
range of views.
Fifth, greater opportunities should exist for non-member states
to participate in working groups and other appropriate meetings.
Many states have considerable expertise in particular areas
of arms control and disarmament which should be used to the
greatest extent possible.
Australia also believes that the United Nations Disarmament
Centre should be strengthened. In addition to its Secretariat
function, it has an important role to play in increasing public
awareness and understanding of arms control and disarmament
questions.
Mr. President, ultimately it is the absolute right of
sovereign governments to defend their peoples. It is the
obligation of sovereign governments to do so. A realistic
disarmament agenda must recognise this simple premise.
National sovereignty is vital to the governments here
assembled.
Nonetheless, in the new world for which we strive, we
must not drive this concept to the excesses of former years.
We are too close to each other to be immune from the effects
of one another's actions.
Rules of proper behaviour do not diminish. They enhance
and expand national sovereignty for they reinforce your
freedom and m'ine.
Mr. President, we cannot conduct our disarma-ment negotiations
in isolation. What we do here is part of a broader international
agenda to reduce the causes of suspicion and tension among
nations, to enhance confidence in the international mechanisms
for the peaceful resolution of disputes between states, to
streng-then mediation, to encourage the Rule of Law between
nations, to abandon aggressive ideology and to outlaw
mban's inhumrani;* ty.
Conclusion Mr. President, many proposals, disarma-ment proposals, could be
implemented immediately, and by so doing, establish the
confidence required for further and more substantial steps
towards disar-mament.
Can we not now achieve a comprehensive ban by all states
on nuclear explosions in all environments, a responsible
second SALT agreement, and a more effective non-proliferation
regime? Relief from the oppressive menace of accidental or intentional
nuclear war should encourage all states to reduce their
dependence on weapons which are conventional but whose
sophistication and expense constantly grows.
Can we not look to justice, to the Rule of Law between states,
to a step-by-step approach which can progressively release
resources for the well-being and advancement of the human
race.
A great many things are within our grasp if we can, by our
actions, earn trust and learn to trust.
When history is written of'our time, will we be known as men
who secured a safe world or ones who failed to understand or
grasp the necessities of our time? 0 00---