lj> A U STRAL1L
PRIME MINISTER
FOR PRESS 25 JANUARY 1978
ATTACHED IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER SENT TODAY BY THE
PRIME MINISTER, IN RESPONSE TO REGENT CORRESPONDENCE FROM
THE PREMIER OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA.
THE STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH OF THE
PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER MAY BE FOUND IN HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES HANSARD FOR 20th OCTOBER, 1977,
PAGES 2333-2340.
PRIME MINISTER CANBERRA
2 5 JAN 1978
My dear Premier, I have received your letters of 17 and 18
January 1978. At the outset let me say that I welcome your
assurance that your Government will continue to co-operate
with the Commonwealth Government on matters of genuine
security. As you are aware, the functions and activities
of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization
have been the subject of an exhaustive inquiry
by the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security
constituted by Mr Justice Hope. The Royal Commission
made a large number of recommendations directed to improving
the effectiveness of A. S. I. O. and removing deficiencies in
past practices. The Royal Commission found that:
" My basic finding is that Australia needs
and should have a security intelligence
service to investigate and provide intelligence
about threats to the internal security of the
nation."
He also found that there is a need for continued co-operation
between the work at Federal level and the State Police
Forces. The Commonwealth Government endorses this fully.
My Government carefully considered the findings
and recommendations of the Royal Commission and, as I
informed Parliament on 25 October last year ( copy attached),
we have accepted the Royal Commission's basic judgements
and recommendations for a sweeping range of reforms. As I
foreshadowed in that statement, the Attorney-General will
introduce amendments to the A. S. I. O. Act reflecting the
legislative changes the Royal Commission recommended. In
consequence the functions of A. S. I. O. will be clearly and
precisely stated. The legislation will also establish
appeal procedures under which, broadly speaking, persons
who are affected in Commonwealth employment, in immigration,
or in citizenship matters by unfavourable assessments by
A. S. I. O. will be able to appeal to a Tribunal. The Chairman
of the Tribunal will be a Judge. / 2
The collection and maintenance by A. S. I. O. of
appropriate records, the preparation of security assessments
and the utilization of those assessments by Government
authorities have been, as you know, the subject of special
and extensive study by the Royal Commissioner. The Government
has, as I have stated, accepted the Royal Commissioner's
judgements on these matters. I believe that these reforms
will effectively balance the requirements of national security
and the civil rights of individuals. I should add that the
Director-General of Security, Mr Justice A. E. Woodward, has
assured me that he has taken action to give effect to those
recommendations of the Royal Commissioner that concern
improvements in A. S. I. O.' s internal administration and management
and generally to all other recommendations which do not call
for policy decisions by the Government.
The Commonwealth recognises that State Police Force
Special Branches have a variety of functions and are the
responsibility of the States. The Royal Commissioner concluded
that, given appropriate inter-governmental arrangements, it is
both important and quite proper for A. S. I. O. to co-operate with
the Police Forces of the States in respect of matters within its
charter. My Government agrees with this approach and will be
seeking the views of the States about co-operative arrangements
when the legislation has been prepared. You will also reca] ll
that on various occasions I have written to you on aspects of
Commonwealth/ States co-operation dealin for example, with
international terrorism. Commonwealth! tate co-operation on
such matters must of course be bi-partisan in approach.
My Government's objective in this matter, and I am
sure this is also the objective of all State Premiers, is the
preservation of the security of the nation with the minimum
intrusion on the rights and freedoms of individuals. When
the legislation implementing the reforms I have mentioned
above is drafted I shall be communicating with all State Premiers
specifically on this aspect.
I refer to your request concerning the destruction
of some of A. S. I. Q.' s records. The Royal Commission gave
consideration to the principles that should govern the
destruction of records of A. S. I. O. and concluded that only
records that are not, or are not now, of actual or potential
security relevance should be destroyed. The Director-General
is proceeding with the destruction of records according to
those principles. Because this is a matter of interest to all States
I am sending a copy of this letter to the other Premiers.
Yours sincerely,
( Malcolm Fraser)
The Hon. D. A. Dunstan, M. H. A.,
Premier of South Australia,
ADELAIDE S. A. 5000
October 1977 REPRESENTATIVES 2333
ROYAL COMMISSION ON
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
Ministerial Statement
Mr MALCOLM FRASER ( Wannon-Prime
M inistcr)-hy leave-On 21 August 1974 the previous
Government established a Royal Commission
on Intelligence and Security and
appointed the Honourable Mr Justice Hope as
the Royal Commissioner to inquire into and
make recommendations on the intelligence and
security services the nation should have available
to it. The Government has now completed its
consideration of the eight reports presented to it
by the Royal Commissioner.
The Royal Commission's Eight Reports
The first report outlines the procedures followed
by the Royal Commission and requires no
further comment. The second report makes
findings and recommendations on security
checking and a security appeals tribunal. The
third report dealing with the machinery for ministerial
and official control, direction and coordination
of Australia's intelligence and security
services was the subject of the statement I
made in the. House on 5 May this year. At that
time, I announced the appointment of a Ministerial
Committee, supported by a Permanent
Heads Committee, to provide a better system for
co-ordinating the intelligence and security
services. I also announced our decision to establish the
Office of National Assessments and legislation to
establish that Office has subsequently been
passed by Parliament. The fourth report
specifically relates to the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation. The fifth and sixth
reports relate to particular specialist intelligence
collection agencies. The seventh report, wvritten
by a consultant to the Commission, is an historical
study of Australian intelligence and security
services. The eighth concerns administrative arrangements
for the storage and custody of the
Royal Commission's records. I will not be commenting
further on these last two reports in this
statement. In accordance with undertakings previously
given to the House, I am tabling those parts of
the Royal Commission's reports which the Royal
Commissioner considered can be made public
without prejudice to national security and announcing
the Government's decisions on them.
The third report was in an abridged form prepared
by the Royal Commissioner and was
tabled on 5 May. I now table the first report-thesecond
report other than Appendices 2-A, 2-C
2334 REPRESENTATIVES 25 October 1977 RylCmiso nScrt
and 2-F, and volumes I and 2 of the fourth
report. For the first time the Parliament and the
people of Australia are being authoritively
informed of fundamental considerations relating
to Australia's national security. For the first time
Parliament and people can read the careful
assessments of an independent judicial authority
who has had full access to all the information
and the time and resources to thoroughly analyse
them. The Royal Commission's Basic Judgments
Mr Speaker, the Government has accepted the
basic judgments of the Royal Commission on
Intellirence and Security and has implemented a
sweeping range of reforms to achieve them. In
essence Mr Justice Hope's basic findings are
these: AUSTRALIA'S NEEDS FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
SERVICES
Australia needs a highly professional system
of intelligence and security services, and this
need is more apparent than ever before.
Australia needs intelligence of quality, timeliness
and relevance.
( 1I) THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY
Such a professional system should include a
security intelligence service to investigate and
provide intelligence about threats to the internal
security of the nation. Australia faces, and has
faced or may face, threats to its internal security
from various types of action to which I shall later
refer. ( 111) CIVIL LIBERTY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY
A balance must be struck between the need to
respond decisively to this threat and the imperative
of preserving Australia's open processes of
debate, discussion and commerce. Mr Justice
Hope has recognised that a balance between the
rights of individual persons and the preservation
of the security of Australia as a nation is no
simple or easy thing to achieve'. ( Fourth Report,
paragraph 10). He concludes, quoting from the
1975 Rockefeller Report on the Central
Intelligence Agency: in the final
analysis, public safety and individual liberty sustain
each other'. ( Fourth Report, paragraph 10).
( IV) PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION AND SECURITY
CHECKING
Australia has classified information which the
Australian Government has a duty to protect in the interests of the nation. These secrets are not
limited to matters of national defence or foreign
policy; they extend to matters relating to national
resources and the national economy; their disclosure
would prejudice Australia's national security.
Thus the security checking of public servants
should continue to be undertaken subject
to a series of basic reforms.
THE NECESSITY FOR SECRECY
The actual activities, programs and priorities
of the intelligence and security services should
not be revealed, as to do so would be to jeopardise
national security.
( VI) COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
The intelligence and security services should
always comply with Commonwealth and State
laws. ( VII) PARLIAMENTARY
RESPONSIBILITY
The intelligence and security agencies should
continue individually to be subject to ministerial
responsibility, and in addition should be
collectively subject to central oversight and coordination
by scnior committees of Ministers and
permanent heads. Considerations of the nation's
interest should prevail over the full range of the
agencies activities, and to this end the Government
and the Opposition should develop a bipartisan
approach to intelligence and security
matters. Australian Security and Intelligence
Organisation
In his fourth report concerning ASIO Mr
Justice Hope's basic finding is that Australia
needs and should have a security intelligence service
to investigate and provide intelligence about
threats to the internal security of the nation.'
( Fourth Report paragraph 657). He stated:
On the basis or what has been submitted or provided
to me, I find that Australia races, and. has faced or m
face, thre~ ats to its internal security . and that AS I0
should invcstigate...
Espionage, which is the covert collection or ( generally
secret) intelligence.
' Active measures' a general expression to cover a variety
or activities by which a power can weaken another power or
strengthen itself vis-a-vis that other power, including
the establishment or'agents ofrinfluence'
the dissemination ol'disinformation'
other rorms ofrclandestine or deceptive action
subversion, which is activity whose purpose is directly or
ultimately, to overthrow constitutional government, and in
the meantime to weaken or to undermine it. Sabotage, which
is the destruction, da. paging or impairment or derence
installations, etc., which would be userul to an enemy or a
foreign power. Royal Commission on Security
Roya COocmtiosiboneorn e19c7u7i ty2R5E PRESENTATIVES 2335
Mr Justice Hope continued:
Two further kinds of activity should be investigated by
ASIO, although they may not always involve a direct attack
on Australia.
Terrorism, which is politically motivated violence, or the
threat of that violence.
The organisation in Australia of, or of assistance for, violent
political activity in foreign countries. ( Fourth Report
paragraph 661).
I will now briefly summarise the royal commissioner's
comments on two of the major areas
of threat-espionage and subversion.
Espionage
Mr Justice Hope rejected the views that some
people had expressed to him that espionage was
not a significant problem in Australia. The royal
commissioner especially warned that I'Australia
must not be so naive as to think that it has some
exemption from clandestine operations or that it
need not take steps to protect itself against them'.
( Fourth Report, paragraph 41 The royal commissioner
stated that this conclusion was substantiated
' by a large amount of intelligence held
by ASlO which cannot be made public'. ( Fourth
Report, paragraph 41 However, in the royal
commissioner's words, there are ' some matters
which can be stated publicly and which l'-that
is the royal commissioner-' regard as supporting
the conclusions I have come to.' ( Fourth Report,
paragraph 40).
The royal commissioner notes the considerable
evidence of espionage against Australia
during the Second World War and the Petrov
Commission's findings that from 1943 until
Petrov's defection, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics intelligence agents had been operating
in Australia. He further says that independently
of the Petrov Commission's findings he
was-these are his word s-' completely satisfied
that the USSR intelligence services were operating
in Australia up to the time of Petrov's defection
and that a number of Australians, some consciously
and some unconsciously did reveal
information about classified material to USSR
intelligence officers or their agents'. ( Fourth
Report, para. 40) He refers to the case of Mr 1. F.
Skripov. Mr Skripov re-opened the Soviet Embassy
in 1959 and was expelled in February
1963 because of his clandestine intelligence
activities. The royal commissioner states that the
numbers of intelligence officers now operating
clandestinely in Australia ' are much larger than
in the 1940' s and 1950' s and are growing'
Again these are his words: ' For exal, th
proportion of USSR intelligence officers represented in that country's diplomatic mission
in Australia is consistent with overseas estimates
of USSR representation in the USA and NATO
countries'. ( Fourth report, paragraph 40) In this
connection, the royal commission quotes an estimate
of Professor Leonard Shapiro, Chairman of
the Institute for the Study of Conflict that
around half of those ( Soviets)
accredited as diplomats to NATO countries are
usually engated in intelligence operations of one
kind or another ( Fourth Report, paragraph
40, footnote 4-18).
Subversion
The royal commissioner states:
The amount of domestic subversive activity in Australia
has varied from time to time. The material before me does
not establish ( hat there is a very large amount at present.
( Fourth Report, paragraph 76).
As against this, the two main communist parties, the Communist
Party of Australia and the Socialist Party of
Australia, have strong influence in some unions.
They exercise a power greatly in excess of that which their
numbers would justify, among other reasons because they
often strongly support the interests of trade unionists and put
their full force behind industrial issues.
At other times, they make use of industrial disputes for
their own political purposes.
The Trotskyists and other left radical groups are active in
academic and political areas and are succeeding in establishing
themselves in many places of influence.
Right radical groups are still active and the basis for extreme
right wing action is certainly not dormant. ( Fourth
Report, paragraph 77).
ASIO -Functions and Performance
In considering threats such as these Mr Justice
Hope also examined various ways of establishing
a security intelligence service. He concludes that
' The essential conception of ASIO as an
intelligence, and not an executive agency, is right
for our national circumnstances.' ( Fourth Report,
paragraph 660) He notes that ASIO ' maintains
liaison both here and abroad with the internal security
services of several friendly nations' and he
concludes: ' These relationships contribute significantly
to ASIO's overall efficiency'. ( Fourth
Report, paragraph 707) Again those are the
royal commissioner's words.
The royal commissioner was criticial of some
aspects of the past performance of ASlO. The
Government is determined that ASIO's performance
should be beyond reproach. We have
therefore accepied -all of Mr Justice Hope's
major recommendations and we propose to
amend the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act accordingly. The major effect
of those amendments will be to ensure that
ASIO's activities will be expanded to enable it to
Royal Commission on Security
2336 REPRESENTATIVES 25 October 1977 RylCmiso nScrl
investigate and to report on activities which*
threaten Australia's internal security. ASTO will
have a statutory responsibility to advise the
Government about the following:
Espionage
Sabotage Subversion Terrorism Domestic activity related to violence abroad
and what the Royal Commissioner refers to as
, active measures.
Mr Justice Hope has updated ASlO's functions
to enable it to respond to the reality of the
1970' s. The relationship between the Director-
General of Security and the Government will be
defined in accordance with the royal commissioner's
recommendation based on his
finding that, under the existing ASIO Act, there
are legal doubts as to the extent to which the
Minister can give lawful directions to the
Director-General of Security. The Director-
General of Security will be accountable to the
Attorney-General and the Prime Minister.'
The royal commissioner considers that the
legal powers exercisable by ASlO regarding its
collection of intelligence should be clarified and
the responsibility for their supervision and control
identified. Subject to the conditions specified
by the royal commission ASIO may obtain warrants
from the Attorney-General for purposes
relevant to security to facilitate the acquisition of
information about intelligence activities threatening
Australia's security. This is consistent with
the pattern established in other countries with a
Westminster system of government. Mr Justice
Hope said:
The circumstances in which these powers might be exercised
are not frequent. ( Fourth report. para. 139).
For example, in regard to ASIO's use of telephone
taps thejudge comments:
' The number or warrants issued since the enactment or
legislation ( authonising them) has been quite modest. The
intelligence yield has often been extremely valuable'.
( Fourth report, para. 14 1)
In the performance of its statutory responsibilities
ASIO will carefully observe the principles
delineated by the royal commission:
That it operates within the terms of its statute and is
concerned only with matters relevant to security.
That it always complies with the law.
And that it observes standasrds of propriety by not
intruding on the rights and freedom of persons except
to etxhtee ta tt requirements of t he nation's security
justify, and the law allows. ( Fourth report,
para. 786). Honourable members will notice that the royal
commission has made a number of recommendations
regarding the policies and practices to be
followed by the Government and ASIO. The
Government has accepted these: Significant
features of them include: The Leader of the
Opposition shall be kept informed about security
matters and shall have access to the Director-
General and his annual classified report. The
Government will continue the practice of ' no
comment' on allegations about ASIO's activities.
ASIO shall not provide security intelligence in
any form, either directly or indirectly on an attributable
basis or not, to the Press or other
media. As the Commonwealth agency responsible
for the defence and maintenance of
Australia's internal security ASTO is entitled to
the confidence and respect of the nation.
I also refer to five recommendations taken
from Volume III of the fourth report relating to
ASIO's future effectiveness. The Director-
General of Security has advised that these five
paragraphs can be made public without prejudice
to national security. They are:
That the Director-General receive strong support and encouragement
from the Government in his task of improving
thee ecvenessof ASIO.
That ASIO management be active in opening and maintaining
communication with staf~.
That the Government recognise that, in the future, quite
large sums will be needed to improve AS 10' s capacity that
those giving consideration to ASIO's budgetary bids take
into account that past levels of expenditure should not be
taken as a realistic benchmark.
That ASIO ensure that the Government is made aware of
its needs for resources.
That ASIO should receive strong and sympathetic support
from the Public Service Board in improving its personnel
policies. ( Fourth report, Volume IIIl, para. 818-822).
1 have been advised by the Director-General of
Security, Mr Justice Woodward, that he has
taken action to give effect to those recommendations
of the royal commission that concern
improvements in ASIO's internal administration
and management and generally to all other
recommendations which do not call for policy
decisions by the Government.
Mr Speaker, I have outlined in broad terms
the nature of our reforms. Further details of the
action being undertaken by the Governmentwhich
are in any event set out as recommendations
in the fourth rep9. rt which I have tabledwill
be given by the Attorney-General ( Senator
Durack), when he introduces amendments to the
ASIO Act. Royal Commission on Security
Roya OCocmtoisbioenorn 1e9c7u7i ty2R5E PRESENTATIVES 2337
Security Checking and Security Appeals
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
carries out security checks for Commonwealth
departments primarily in relation to
Commonwealth employees but also in a limited
way for a range of special cases which the royal
commission refers to as ' immigration cases'. In
the second report, the royal commissioner examines
the need for and basis of this security checking
process. Mr Justice Hope finds that Australia
needs a system of security checks for two main
reasons: The serious nature of the security threat
to Australia-Honourable members may wish to
refer to the second report, paras 12-13 and the
fourth report, paras 34-36-and the fact that, as
the royal commissioner said:
Australia has secrets which the Australian Government
has a duty to protect in the interests of the nation. ( Second
Report, para. 196).
The royal commissioner reported that the security
checking system has not been formally
reviewed since the early 1950s, and found that it
contains a number of faults, including: The existing
security checking categories are too wide.
That is, they strain ASIO's resources unnecessarily
and are objectionable from a civil liberties
viewpoint. There is some confusion about the
nature of the security assessment ASIO provides.
There has been some blurring of the demarcation
between the responsibilities of ASIO and
those of departments and instrumentalities.
There have been deficiencies in the preparation
and content of ASIO's security assessments and
the use of them by departments. In this regard,
Mr Justice Hope observes that security checking
is a complex and difficult task. He said:
ASIO's information, even if accurate, will rarely, if ever,
be cornpete. It can be led into error by the erroneous and
incomplet e' nature of the material on which it makes its
assessments. ( Second report, para. 11) 5).
All investigations and judgments about persons and thei r
actions can involve mistakes. ASIO and its ofuicers are no
exception. ( Second report, para. I 15).
The Government has decided to implement a
number of reforms designed to overcome the
deficiencies in existing arrangements. Principal
amongst these reforms are the following: A Security
Appeals Tribunal will be established.*
Steps will be taken to reduce to the minimum
possible number the people to he security
checked. ASIO's security checking procedures
will be revised and improved. From now on, persons
who are the subject of adverse or qualified
assessments, will be notified of that fact and of
the general nature of the supporting information
except to the extent that in the interests of
national security they cannot be notified in certain
special circumstances contemplated by the royal commission. In such special cases the
Attorney-General as Minister responsible for the
ASIO Act-not the Prime Minister as Mr Justice
Hope proposes-will have to issue a certificate
vetoing notification. Persons having been
notified of an adverse or qualified assessment
will be able to have the assessment impartiailly
examined by the Security Appeals Tribunal.
Mr Speaker, these reforms are designed to
make security checking for Commonwealth employees
more efficient and most importantly, to
reduce as far as possible the intrusion into the
private lives of Commonwcalth employees. I
shall now outline further details of some of these
reforms, and also indicate those instances in
which the Government has, after careful consideration,
modified the royal commissioner's
recommendations. The Security Appeals Tribuinal
The royal commissioner has found:
Without adequate machinery for review of security. assessments
of persons grave and permanent injustices
can occur. ( Second report, para. 200).
He concluded:
ASIO's scrty assments should be subject to an
appeals systemt. ( Second report, para. 115).
The Government agrees with this view. The Security
Appeals Tribunal recommended by the
royal commission will be established to review
adverse or qualified security assessments and any
supporting information provided by ASIO relating
to such assessments.
The royal commission recommended that the
Tribunal's review function should be made
retrospective to the inception of ASIO in 1949.
The Government has given careful consideration
to this proposal but has decided that the matters
Sutbject to the Tribunal's jurisdiction should be
those occurring on or after the date on which the
Tribunal is established. We have been advised
that there would be legal and substantial administrative
problems associated with the royal
commissioner's recommendation. There is no
Commonwealth statutory precedent for a
retrospective grant of a right of appeal against an
administrative decision. The comparable
appeals system established under the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, is expressly
stated to apply to decisions given on or after the
commencement of that Act. However, the
Government has devised certain procedures to
give effect to the 13pirit of the royal commissioner's
recommendation.
First, ASIO has been instructed to undertake a
review in the manner recommended by the royal
commission, of any existing adverse or qualified
Royal Commission on Security
2338 REPRESENTATIVES 25 October 1977 RylCmiso nScrt
assessment of persons currently in the employ of
the Commonwealth. If in the light of that review,
the adverse or qualified assessment is maintained,
the person concerned will be notified,
and will be entitled to appeal to the Tribunal
against the new assessment. Second, the legislation
establishing the Tribunal will allow the
Government to refer to the Tribunal particular
cases of people no longer in the employ of the
Commonwealth. The Government intends to exercise
this discretion in any case in which it
appears a wrong assessment may have been
made in the past. The Security Appeals Tribunal
will be mainly concerned with Commonwealth
employees, except for the ' immigration cases'
about which I shall comment shortly. Thus all
Commonwealth employees, as that term is
broadly defined in paragraph 20 of the second
report, will have appeal rights against adverse or
qualified assessments.
Legislation will be introduced to establish the
Tribunal and, although the Tribunal's findings
will generally be advisory, they will be binding in
those cases the royal commissioner recommends.
The Government has concluded thatithe Tribunal
should have the composition and powers
detailed in Part H of the second report except for
the modifications I have outlined. The procedures
of the Tribunal envisaged by the Royal
Commission will be given further consideration.
In addition, the panel from which the Tribunal
will be constituted will be enlarged to include
more than one former public servant and more
than one former member of the defence force.
Security Checking
The security checking process will be substantially
altered to make it more finely tuned to
national security requirements. In contrast with
existing practice not all public servants or applicants
to the Public Service will be security
checked. From now on, security checking of public
servants will take place only when it can be
reasonably expected that they will require access
to classified security matters or areas. In accordance
with Mr Justice Hope's recommendations,
ASIO's security assessments will vary in accordance
with the level of access required. Far more
extensive investigation will take place, for
example, for persons requiring access to the
highest classification than for those requiring
access to the lowest. All aspects of ASIO ' s security
assessments will be prepared in accordance'
with the royal commissioner's recommendations.
The royal commission recommended that positions
in the Public Service for which security
checking will be required should be publicly designated as such. However, the reports do not
recommend how this could be implemented. The
Government has the matter under consideration.
Immigration Cases
ASlO has provided security checks for the
Commonwealth Government in certain
immigration cases. The term ' immigration cases'
refers to government activity relating to such
matters as visas, entry permits, deportation, citi
zenship and passports. Mr Justice I-ope has recommended
that the reforms regarding security
checking and security a ppeals for Commonwealth
employees be applied to these immigration
cases with some minor modifications of
detail as necessary. ASIO's investigative work in
this area will be directed to protecting th ' e security
of the nation and its assessments will be
closely linked to judgments about any potential
security threat involved. As in all other matters,
ASIO's role will be advisory. Australian citizens
and persons whose continued presence in
Australia is not subject to any limitation imposed
by law will have full appeal rights to the Security
Appeals Tribunal in respect of these immigration
cases. The Government has accepted Mr Justice
Hope's recommendations regarding immigration
cases and the Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs ( Mr MacKellar) will provide
further details regarding their implementation at
a later stage. Compensation
The Royal Commissioner makes a number of
observations about the possible payment of compensation
in relation to wrong security
assessment. He notes that a wrong security assessment may
sometimes cause detriment to the subject of the
assessment, although the detriment flows from
the consquent action of the employer authority.
The Royal Commissioner recommends that
the Security Appeals Tribunal should have
power to report about compensation matters.
However, the Government, having adopted
the recommendation of the Royal Commissioner
that the Tribunal will be solely concerned with
ASIO's assessments, not executive decisions of
government, has decided that compensation
matters will be for the Government to determine,
not the Tribunal.
Australian Secret Intelligence Service
The fifth report is about. the Australian Secret
Intelligence Service, ASIS, an agency of the Australian
Government the existence of which has
not hitherto officially been acknowledged. The
Royal Commission on Security
Roya OCocmtoisbioenro n 1e9c7u7 ity2R5E PRESENTATIVES 2339
Government agrees with Mr Justice Hope's
recommendation that ASIS should be publicly
acknowledged and on his recommendation the
fifth report will not be published as to do so
would Jeopardise national security. The report
has been made available to the Leader of the
Opposition as the royal commissioner recommended.
The royal commissioner recommended
' that the Government accept the
continuing need for an Australian Secret
Intelligence Service and that ASIS be retained to
fulfil that role'. He reported that ASIS is a ' singularly
and well run and well managed
a ' gency right in concept for Australian
circumstances'. The main function of ASIS is to
obtain, by such means and subject to such conditions
as are prescribed by the Government,
foreign intelligence for the purpose of the protection
or promotion of Australia or its interests.
The Government has accepted his recommendation
that the Service continue and be responsible
to and under the control of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs. The funding of ASIS has in the
past been secret but, will in future be the subject
of a one-line appropriation like ASIO. ASIS's capacity
to serve Australia's national interest will
continue to depend on its activities being fully
protected by secrecy. The Government wil
therefore adhere strictly to the practice of refusing
to provide details of ASIS's activities nor will
it be prepared to enter into any discussion on the
Service. The Defence Signals Division
The sixth report is about the Defence Signals
Division. On the recommendation of the royal
commission this report will not be made public.
The Defence Signals Division is an organisation
concerned with radio, radar and other electronic
emissions from the standpoint both of the information
and the intelligence that they can provide
and of the security of our own Government communications
and electronic emissions. It is an
agency which serves wide national requirements
in response to national priorities. The royal commissioner
found that there were overriding
advantages to Australia in co-operation with certain
other countries in these matters.
In close conjunction with the defence force
DSD provides a capability which is just as much
an integral and essential part of a modern defence
posture as a capability in air or ground defence
or maritime surveillance. That capability is
a sophisticated one for which long periods of
training and development are required. The
royal commission said that ' the pr~ eservation of
secrecy as to the agency's operations is vital'. This finding is accepted by the present Government.
The royal commission recommended the
retention of DSD, paid tribute to its work and
pointed to ways in which the agency could be
further developed and improved. It stated:
DSD is a very capably managed agency and believed to
be so by most of its staffand others who deal with it.
The Government will pay close attention to the
recommendations of the royal commission. In
recognition of the enhanced status that the royal
commission recommends should be accorded to
the agency it will be restyled as the Defence Signals
Directorate. In discussions of intelligence
matters, this Government will not provide
further information about DSD, nor confirm or
deny speculation or assertion about it.
Conclusion
There are a number of matters particularly
those covered by the fifth and sixth reports and
parts of the fourth report which cannot be made
public. As I mentioned earlier the Royal Commissioner
has made particular recommendations
on publication. All of Mr Justice Hope's reports
have been made available to the Leader of the
Opposition. In respect of ASlO, ASIS and DSD
the Government will maintain its long-standing
practice, endorsed by the royal commission of
not providing information by way of comment,
confirmation or denial, on matters affecting security
or intelligence.
Mr Speaker these reforms, together with the
establishment of the Office of National Assessments
and the system of co-ordination and oversight
of intelligence and security policy announced
in my 5 May statement, are of fundamental
significance to Australia. They are also of
significance in a wider sphere. As Mr Justice
Hope states in his third report:
Australia is, on balance, fortunate to have been able to
develop close intelligence links with some of the major
intelligence agencies in the western world...
Mr Justice Hope's reports underline the significance
of Australia's intelligence and security
relationship with non-communist countries, and
the importance to these countries of high quality
Australian intelligence and security services.
These reforms ensure that Australia's contribution
in this wider sphere will be even more
effective. I believe that honourable members will be
assured by Mr Justice Hope's reports about the
essential and fundamental need for further
action by the Australian Government. He has
brought to his task a perceptive realism with
which he balances the requirements of national
security on the one hand with the requirements
Royal Commission on Security
4 2340 REPRESENTATIVES 25 October 1977
of personal liberty on the other. He has maintained
a standard of excellence in the performance
of his royal commission and in the quality
of the advice he has tendered the Government.
His reports show a clarity of expression and
probity of thought which I am sure all honourable
members will applaud. I commend my predecessor
for the action he has taken in launching
the royal commision and my Government
extends its appreciation to the New South Wales
Government for releasing Mr Justice Hope for
this major, arduous and important task.
I present the following paper:
Royal Commission in Intelligence and Security-Ministerial
Statement, 25 October 1977.
Motion ( by Mr Sinclair) proposed:
That the House take note of the Paper.
Debate ( on motion by Mr E. G. Whillam)
adjourned.