j / 2
_ j AU irR. ALIA
FOR PRESS SEPTEMBER 27, 1976
TEXT OF ADDRESS GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE ROY MILNE
LECTURE IN SYDNEY.
It gives me great pleasure to be here to deliver the Roy Milne
Lecture. Tonight I would like to talk about asoects of foreign policy:
the problems and possibilities that the construction of foreign
policy in a democracy poses; the resources that a democracy has
in de-veloping and implementing foreign policy; some of the
Gover :. ent's perspectives on international issues; and the types
of influence that Australia can have in the world.
The basic goals of our foreign policy are quite simply ensuring
the continuance of a vigorously democratic Australia working
effectively towards a world where people have the opportunity
to live in dignity and self-respect.
This, of necessity, must be a world in which the dangers of war
and conflict are diminished and where the international
environment is favourable to these ends.
These foreign policy goals are ambitious ones, their pursuit
will take patience and persistence and require the skillful use
of our nation's resources.
Many people, however, regard democracies as being incapable of
pursuing foreign policy goals effectively.
It is often argued that the advantages democracies have in
domestic affairs are: the responsiveness of democratic political
leaders: the positive influence of democratic public opnion; and
the openness of the political life of democracies; are antithetical
to the achievement of foreign policy goals in a complex
world of sovereign nation states.
Alex de Tocqueville put this view in commenting on the United
States in the early 19th century:
" foreign politics demands scarcely any of those
cualities which are peculiar to a democracy.
They require on the contrary the perfect use
of almost all those in which it is deficient.
SE 2.
' A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate
the details of an important undertaking, persevere in
a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of
serious obstacles.
It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await
their consequences with patience."
Rather more recently, Walter Lippman attributed weaknesses in
democratic foreign policy to public opinion, saying:
" The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has
been wrong at the critical junctures the people have
imposed a veto upon the judgements of informed and
responsible officials."
" they have compelled the governments which usually knew
what would have been wiser. Or was necessary. Or was
more expedient. To be too late with too little, or
too long with too much. Too pacifist in peace and too
bellicose in war. Too neutralist or appeasing in
negotiation or too instransigent."
This is a formidable indictment, even if the people who draw it up
betray a rather aristocratic disdain for the good sense of the
democratic people a preference for decision-making by a select
elite with the best knowledge and true insight on what the
nation-' s best interests are.
His'tcri-ca experience, however, provides a basis for these
observations. Non-democratic leaders do not need to be highly responsive' to
popular demands. Consequently, they are capable of rapid policy
changes to take advantage of emerging opportunities.
They are not constrained to a similar degree by compelling
considerations of public morality.
They are not under the constant scrutiny of independent and
influential mass media.
It cannot be denied that on occasion, democratic governments have
failed to conduct foreign policies in accord with their nation's
best interests.
The nineteen thirties stand out as perhaps the starkest instance of
the failure of democracies in foreign policy.
Manifestly, in this period, the world's democracies failed to
respond adequately to the menace of fascism.
Seeking to appease fascism they succeeded only in increasing its
strength, capacity and appetite.
Their policy of appeasement brought democracy to the brink of
disaster and toppled the world into six years of war.
This failure has often been attributed to the impact of public
opinion on politicians. Faced by depression, and by domestic
conflicts between left and right wing ideologies the democratic
peoples of Europe are said to have turned inward.
Desiring to ignore the reality beyond their borders they
. implicitly threatened democratic leaders with electoral
rejection if they acted to stifle aggression while it was
still weak.
One by one, the milestones towards the second world war
were passed, German rearmament, the impotence of the league
of nations, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, and Munich.
The desire of the people for peace was clear, but the overriding
responsibility of democratic leaders was to make known to their
people, the consequences of inaction.
Instead they avoided responsibility in the attempt to gain a
transient and soon to be shattered popularity.
The failure of the democracies in the 1930s was not the product
of the inability to perceive the many consequences of inaction
the failure was produced by an abnegation of responsibility on
the part of democratic leaders.
Charcteristic of this abnegation, was the behaviour of the
French Premier, Edouard Daladier on his return from negotiating
the Munich Agreement, which sacrificed Czechoslovakia to Hitler.
As his aerozplne landed at Le Bourget Airport, a happy crowd rushed
forward to meet it.
Nctknowirg -nhat the crowd's attitude was, frightened that the
crowd was aemonstrating against the agreement, Daladier hesitated
to alight-
Turning to one of his party, he said of the Agreement:
" It was not brilliant, but I have done all that I could.
How will they receive it?"
When assured that the crowd was welcoming him, he snapped:
" Idiots. They do not know what they applaud."
And he did not tell them. Instead he represented Munich as
a triumph of statesmanship.
These facts show that democracies do have weaknesses in the
implementation of foreign policy.
A partic'-ar type of public mood, conflict dividing society,
a lack f on the part of political leaders, the fear that
they i-_ I be reproved for stating the truth about the international
situ--icn, c.-bine to paralyse democratic foreign policy.
This paralysis is manifest in Stanley Baldwin's statement " supposing
I had g: one o z-he country and said that Germany was rearming and
we r.'. st rea=, does anybody think that this pacific democracy would
have rallied to the cry at that moment? I cannot think of anything
that would . have made the loss of the election from my point of view
more certain.: / 4
We cannot wave history away and assert that our system of
government does not have the potential for failure.
We cannot deny that on occasions democracy has failed everywhere
but in the ultimate test of strength, a test that has been
fraught with greater risks and met at a higher cost because
of the policy failures which precipitated it.
We cannot accept however, that potential weakenesses need
inevitably be translated into actual weaknesses. It is only
pessimism that deems the worst possibilities to be on the
verge of realisation.
Despite the possibility of failure, a willingness to look
reality in the face shows that the diversity of opinion and the
wide distribution of power characteristic of democracies are not
merely compatible with an effective foreign policy, but in the
proper combinations, they are resources of unparalleled potency.
An active and informed public conducting an extensive discussion
and debate of international issues is a prerequisit for the very
for-ulation of a foreign policy which is appropriate to the
time and circumstances a foreign policy which is adaptive and
flexible, and which can respond to events while still retaining
its integrity and purpose.
If foreign policy is to have these attributes the process of
foreign policy formulation cannot be restricted to governments
alone.
This would involve the denial, the unwillingness to use resources
which could improve the quality and depth of our foreign policy.
The complexity of the world and Australia's geographic position
imposes special requirements if the Government's perceptions
of world trends are to be adequately developed by sound information,
a sophisticated and objective process of evaluation.
Governments have considerable resources with which to gather
information about foreign events, about the postures, intentions and
capabilities of other governments, international political and
social tendencies, and the opportunities and risks that exist
in the world.
The Australian Diplomatic Service composed not only of Foreign
Affairs personnel but also personnel from other Departments,
such as Treasury, National Resources and Defence is by any
standards o. e of exceptionally high quality.
It is staffed by people of the highest expertise and motivated by
a sense of duty to Australia's national interest.
The efforts and expertise of our diplomats provide the
foundtions on which the foreign policy perspectives and actions
of successive Australian Governments are based.
The high quality and dedication of Australia's diplomats
does not however mean that other non governmental perspectives
of foreign policy, other interpretations on the world, and how
to best pursue Australia's national interests are redundant.
The-foreign service does not monopOlise the expertise available
in Australia. The public voicing of alternative views, the
existence of different emphasis adds to the possibilities for
an effective foreign policy.
In part, this is because the very organisational structure which
makes the work of the foreign service so indispensable, also
establishes some pressures towards inertia.
Henry Kissinger has put the problem in the following way:.
" It is a paradoxical aspect of modern bureaucracies that
their quest for objectivity and calculability often
leads to impasses which can be overcome only by essentially
arbitrary means."
By " arbitrary . eans" of course he means extra bureaucratic ones,
particularly -he personal diplomacy of which he has been the
twentieth ce=. ury's prime exemplar.
In the modern international system, personal interventions,
top level . e-. rings between the'representatives of a nation are
unquesto,: ac.. y of particular importance they bring additional
depth i---.. rnational discourse and often give national leaders
a greater * r-erstanding of one another's perspectives and problems.
But these -en alone cannot form foreign policy. Not only is there
a require::. nt for first class official advice beyond this there
must be stable and institutionalised sources of non government
influence on foreign policy.
Only if there are these injections of expertise from the outside
the injections of adrenelin into the perspectives of the
politicians and the foreign service can tendencies towards
over-routinisation, forcing new issues into. old images be overcome.
We all Iike our stereotypes, our established ways of looking at
the world.
They are comfortable and reassuring.
It is through constant stimulus from society that our understanding
of the world can respond to change in ways enabling us to influence
events before the time for exercising such influence passes.
The con-rri_--ions that can be made to Australia's foreign policy
by puibl= i-nvcivement are of great significance the Australian
pecc e i-. creasingly well educated, the issues which face
us are . o . ngqer clear cut, black and white issues if ever they
were and smr-le responses are no longer appropriate to the
international situation.
The importance of the nature and quality of debate in the public
are: a to. a successful foreign policy means that those responsible
for Australian foreign policy are growing in number.
It is worth considering carefully what " responsible" means in this
context. In a Constitutional sense, the responsibility of the government has
not altered. The Government takes the decisions which direct the
instruments of policy, and remains accountable for thosedecisions
to the people.
There is a broader sense of " responsible" however, which extends to
all those who actively contribute to the foreign policy debate.
In this sense, people share a responsibility for the outcome of
the debate because their contribution influences that outcome.
In this wider sense, all of us who take an active role in
discussing the nation's foreign policy have a part of the
respc: sibility for what happens in Australia how successfully
we navigate the shoals and use the opportunities of our
international environment.
This is a responsibility that requires us at all times, to express
our -iews on Australia's policy in a way that will contribute to
an effec-ive role for Australia, and not in a way geared simply
to cause sensation or gaining the approval of some special interest
or grcep.
This is a responsibility which requires the debate to be conducted
in terms of moderation and reason, not as a crusade on behalf of
revealed trut-.
Because it involves the nation's security, the foreign policy
debate is one of democracy's most critical debates.
Because foreign policy often requires a long term perspective
and. deals with events and circumstances that often appear remote and
of litt.. e relevance, it is too easily made the focus oF emotion
rather than reason, and exploited for domestic purposes unrelated
to the nation's needs.
In this process of public discussion, all sections of the community,
the media, political parties, institutions of higher learning, and
the many associations concerned with the examination of international
affairs have important parts to play.
-Inevitably participation involves. costs. The sheer time and
effort it takes to keep up with international events. The
intellectual rigor required to put the facts into an interpretive
fra.-a:.-Cr. And the foreswearing of the emotionally satisfying
partisan response to-events and actions in the interests of
detached even if not bloodless analysis.
The media have a critical role to play in the development of
a dem. ocratic foreign policy.
They are the most potent disseminators of news and the most
widely received evaluator of facts in our society.
Few people have direct experience with foreign affairs their
appreciation of the world, of operative forces in it the actions
of politicians and the consequences of these actions are
received from the mass media.
Politicians and policy makers in turn rely on the press, to sample
public opinion, and to test the substance of the arguments which
journalists and leader writers put forward-,. against their own..
Unlike undemocratic regimes, the Government cannot dictate the
news or the sort of coverage that they think an issue deserves
rather it is up to the judgement of the press to decide what to
print. All this gives the media considerable power although not always
quite as much power as the media thinks it has and a great
responsibility. The role of the media in Australia is particularly important
because of the obvious problems of the time lag in the receipt
of overseas publications reporting and evaluating international
events. How ;. anvy ecple have had the opportunity to read the best newspapers
from cv-erses in time for the impact of their reports and
evalua-ion-s have an immediate impact?
The facts cf geography even in a period of near instantaneous
communrica-ins means that there is a risk of Australia being
isolated from new currents of ' thought and new assessments of
situations.
The result is that there is a danger that Government statements
and perceptions will appear to come out of the blue to the public
and often to the press because the facts the Government is
placing before the people have not previously been given a " run".
There is a responsibility on the media to report foreign affairs
in a ay a sujects them to adequate and objective analysis
over a period of time.
There is a need for coverage of foreign affairs to be more
systematic and extensive.
The public should be alerted to developing situations in the
internati4al arena as these situations emerge so as to be
able to in an awareness of the factors relevant to the situation
and the in which Australia's interests may be involved.
At this coint should say something about the two apparentlyconflicLz--
g rinciples of the democratic right to know, and the
need for secrecy which effective Government sometimes demands.
Usually the r" dia and the Government are cast as the protaganists
of the two different principles.
The ccntest be-ween the democratic right to know and the sometimes
inevitable demand for secrecy, is softened although not completely
resolved if it is recognised that what is at issue is not a
conflict of absolutes.
Traditionally, the conflict has been seen as being between
journalists' duty to inform the public, and policy-makers who
assert that the public has no right to know about foreign policy.
This is no longer an accurate representation of the situation
if ever it was.
There is a conviction on the part of this Government that public
involvement in policy making is an essential component of effective
foreign policy.
Secrecy is only warranted or justified, where its absence would
compromise what is basically the outcome of an inherently
democratic process.
There are obviously some matters which, for security or operational
reasons, cannot be disclosed until long after the event.
But there can be no hard and fast rule about what falls into
these categories and what falls outside them.
In making a decision on any particular matter, both politicians
and journalists have to use their judgement about what is in the
public interest they will sometimes differ.
This Goverrnent has sought to play its part in stimulating a
public debate on Australia's foreign policy by stating its
view cf Auscralia's place in the world, and some of the problems
Austr-lia i-common with other nations, faces.
Both th: : r-ign Minister and I have pointed to the problems
present-i c-the contemporary international environment.
This environment provides grounds for concern to peoplec who are
willing to look at the world as it is rather than as they would
like it to be.
Without a conception of a desirable future our foreign policy is
rudderless, condemned to an arid pragmatism that permits us
only to respond to events rather than shape them.
Bv asserting that the millenium of peace and security has
. arrived, we compromise, perhaps irremediably any chance of
achieving such a world.
Tensions have not been eliminated from the contemporary
international environment.
Some states have manifested a continuing readiness to pursue
their -n-ersts by the use of force.
The of countries opposed to the freedom and respect
for the in. ci . ual is growing.
Deten-e has not meant the stabilisation of tensions between the
super pcwers.
The internal political and social problems of many countries
have led to uncertainty in their external relations
Problems of energy and raw material supplies present the internatic.
cor. munity w. itn a new set of problems which could add to the
possibilities of conflict and confrontation if ineffectively
handled.
The w-idespread problems of poverty, hunger and disease both
affront human dignity and thrcaten confflict be tween nai-ions.
In ' the course of initiating such a debate, it seems regrettably
almost inevitable, that for a variety of reasons, distortions
will occur. Misperceptions become repeated and -treated as if
they aere fact.
one -reason misperceptions may occur is because technical terms
are . rftsunderstood.
Spec-lits use language in one way, the same terms are
unde-stood diffexrentiy by-people who are not speciailis-Us.
One tierrn which gives rise to such difficulties is " threat".
When. a rtiilitary officer or defence expert uses the term " direc-t
threat", it refers to identifiable forces mobilised for agression.
A state2ment that there is " no direct threat" to Australia does
not -mean that there are no foreseeable problems or dangers in
our n-er-nat~ onal environment.
It inzela ns that there is no country foreseecably prepared to
! aunz an assault on Australia.
v et-in te recent past we have seen the claim that there,: is
1t hrat to Australia now or for the next fifteen
year~:-,. e monean that there are no risks or dange-rs in the
~ ntr:.~ ioalenvironment hat our dle-fence capacity can
be run-i:.; wn without any adverse consequences for our security,
and thnat -to reign policy can largely ignore issues o. security.
Another term which has been a source of serious misunderstanding
i s d e t;-n t
" Detente" orgnlyreferred to certain princip_) les of relations
which it was hoped would lead. to a genuine overcall relaxation
of political and military tensions.
Tomnany people, however, " detente"; was taken to mean that such
a seciare relaxation had actually taken place that the objective:, s
of policy , ere real achievem-entcz.
M~ isunderstandings of both these terms " threat" and " detente"
have led in the Gover-nment's view to inaccurate assessments
of Australia's international environment.
The Cover-: 7ent believes that it is a serious distortion to see
forei-n -e-Eence policy simply as a response to " throa-ts".
Such'a ~ mu ~ capproach will simply hinder us from responding
effectae> to e complexities of our international environment.
T : nts in my statement of first June. It is a
Pcs_ 7: icn I have r-eiterated since, on a number of occasions.
On jne -First T said: " the contempoorary international situation
is a test ofE the capabilities of i: emocratic leaderships and
democratic pecles. It is an environment with disturbing xt
t'encenzjeis anid shif; ts in balance. This diffuseness and compdexit
is t2C t" / lC
It is the shifting balance of influence in the international
situation which was one of the grounds for ' concern I expressed
at that time.
I said: A nation does not have to face a threat of
imminent invasion before it has grounds for concern at the
international situation.
From our own point of view, the primary concern is an international
environment which could progressively limit the capacities of
Australia, her friends and allies, to advance their interests
and i: eals, which reduces . options,. which almost imperceptibly
weakens the capacity to pursue our interests and advance the
cause of. human dignity."
The position of the Government on the Soviet buildup in the
Indian Ocean and in Europe, has been tasted within this framework.
Our concern has been consistently expressed at the strategic s
significance of a shift in the balance of influence in the vital
north west sector of the ocean.
What we have siad consistently is that we seek balance and
restraint. Let me quote again from the June first statement:
have supported the U. S. development of logistic
facilities at Diego Garcia so that the balance necessary
-or stability in the area can be maintained. We also
s-rcngly support the recent appeal by the United States
ac. iniszzation for restraint so that the balance can now
e aintained at a relatively low level."
This was the view that I reiterated in discussions with
Governmient leaders in Japan, China and the United States.
It was therefore with some surprise that I read in a Sydney
nespaper column a couple of weeks ago that my view of a direct Sov. ie
threat to Australia had received a rebuff from an American admiral
who stated that he did not believe there was a direct threat to
Australia from the U. S. S. R.
My surprise ; was based on the fact that far from rebuffing the
Government, the said admiral in fact was stating an identical
position to ours.
This misperception of the Government's position which I hope
is not widely shared most probably stemmed from the fact that
in the June first statement I expressed concern at the general
growth of œ c-; iet power ( at a time when the military forces of
the west were static or declining.)
I furh-er e:: xcr: ssed concern that some Soviet actions seemed to be
inconsistent with the aim of reducing world tensions.
I stated that" the Soviet Union is engaged in a major political
offe.-. ve, backed by the known presence of force, by training and
by przcagancda."
Now that is indisputably true: the concern I expressed was almost
ide.: tinal to that expressed by the Ministers and Defence Councils
of It is similar to the concerns expressed by Dr Kiissinger
and ! r Carter in the United States.
I sz~ stthat imI statem,, ent of concern attracted the attention
itddin Australia because in recent years we have becOm.-,, e U2 . cCI
to not express ing our views on the m,. ajor facts of world power: w. hich
indisputably ccncern us.
it is a measure of how far: the foreign policy debate in Australia
had lapsed into unreality.
The central facts of importance to our security had becoite
matICters on which wle were accustomed to be silent. Basic questions
of national security h-ad slipped from view.
For some tiate now some of the major contributors to the debate
have thrust from' the centre of their foreign policy concerns
the issue lla-tona. l si~ curity, -and ref used to recognise ' the
critical issues w.. hich arise out of the changing balaice of world
forces. I vould like to supportL this with t-wo extracts from a recent
speech. by t] he Shadow,. 11inister for DefLence. In this speech,
the . iresent Government was criticised for expressing concern
about, 7 th_' e Incre. ase of Soviet power in what he called " distant
~ uro-pn ! I, 000 kilometres away."
I shoulc. d not 7. av thought it possible that an Australian Shadow
Minister wo~ imply so strongly the irrelevance of the European
situa:: t oursecurity.
The co:: en ade on the causes of the Soviet buildup in the
Indi. also require little comment.. lie said:
be credibly argued that it developed asadefensive
response to-t-h e. transfer of -the.. chagos archipelago which includ
Dieco, Garcia from the U. K. to the U. S. for interalia defence
purroses." This breatht'+_ aking suggestion was followed by a rap over the
knuclzles fo tetwo western allies, Great Britain and the
UniJte, d Sta--es" Thol behaving in a that can so easily be
interpretezd as " crude colonialism".
In the leSOceCh, there was a failure to mention, let alone
evaluate, interven-tion of Cuba and the Soviet Union in Angola.
Clearly there is a significant weakness in -the foreign policy debate
when one ot our two mnajor Parties so resolutely refuses to analyse
for itself: -the facts of world power.
I want -t Sa th at I do not wholly blame the Labor Party for the
state f: oreign policy debate over the last few years.
The 3~ f a the reassessment by America of its world
Loo: rii_ o d of uncer. tinty w,. hich inevita-bly ma-_ I:
foreloTn : cl cy az-scussion more difficult.
110: u~ riod is now co:-ting to an end. Since the release
of oL0-: r 0orci. n olicy document last year, and m,, ore particularly
dUfizn this Vzea; r in Government, have sought to stimulate acrain
nat-zonal aizs; o on basic i ssues of foreign policy in a spi ri t
of e.. 2SA
12.
One of the central issues which we must face as a nation and
bring to bear on it both our idealism and realism is the problem
of development in the countries of the third world.
The existence of great differences in economic development between
the industrialised nations and the developing countries has
the capacity to subject the world to great strains and tensions.
The slow progress in nations that aspire to rapid development raises
inev-itably questions as to why others cannot do more to assist.
To these questions are added third world nations' feelings
that they have historic and immediate grievances -against the
developed nations.
These felt grievances are moral, psychological, economic andpolitical.
They have their roots in the colonial past and the memories
of foreign administration, and in the frustrations of-the
gridingly slow economic haul of the post independence
period. They gain sustenance from the belief that the terms of trade
are ir-erently weighted against developing countries in
order bene-fit-he industrialised nations.
m any third world countries are resentful of the manner in which the
U. S. S. R. seeks to expand its influence. The West-ern industrialised
nations, however, are regarded as benefitting disproportionately
from the international economic system within which developing countries
largely operate.
The Soviet Union's tough bargaining in its purchases of raw materials
from the third world is largely ignored. In part, this is because there
i s much less in the way of trade between developing countries and those
nations with centrally planned economies. The common sentiments of
developing countries have produced a sense of solidarity between them.
This at present, focus'ses on demands for a new international economic
order which will achieve a redistribution of wealth and of economic
activitv in favour of the developing countries. There are still wide
differences between the developing countries as to the thrust of a new
interontional order and specific measures envisaged under it. However,
the solidarity of the developing nations has been maintained.
This solidarity is in itself no mean achievement since developing nations
l acking in oil were more seriously harmed by the OPEC oil rises of
S1973/ 74 thn was the West. There is little likelihood that the thrust
of the developing c: untries concerns vis a vis the West will dissipate.
The oroble-s faced by the developing countries, the human misery inherent
i: cohtinuinZ o: over-y, and the interests that industrialised nations
r.-i in asi-s-i-:: ese problems to be overcome are clear. By no measure
the claim_ . attihonast they have acted ' with sufficient
foresight or in assisting the developing nations.
Both the devc-:= i and the developing nations must cooperate in finding
practical solu-. ns to the challenge of economic development.
In this process, we must avoid the spirit of confrontation and recognise
that the f. ates of the world's nations are linked together.
We must foster a much greater understanding of the essential elements
in economic progress, an appreciation of the realities that have to be
faced by all concerned. Australia's approach is based on a recognition
of the aspirations of the developing countries and a willingness to
Scontribute to the building of a stable and equitable international
economic strucure.
A consistent theme of the developing countries is improved access to the
markets of developed countries for their products. Australia supports
the need for greater trade liberalism, particularly in processed
and unprocessed primary products which would assist solid economic
development in the developing countries.
Australia rec:-ises the need for increasing assistance to developing
countries in hat avoid, wherever possible, adding to their debt
burden. Her-e -ir-ually all our aid to devel. oping countries ( and all
aid in the : ase of -he least developed nations) is in grant form.
We have lc-. r succored the -idea of commodity agreements to which could
contribute t-reater stability in international commodity trade. As a
major com..-.-cri-y rs;-Ccer and exporter, we recognise the need for
i-. rovement in the conditions of world commodity trade, and have
been disaczointed with past efforts of the international community in
his direction.
a re ac tivey participating in efforts to conclude firm agreements
providing realistic prices which are in the interests of producers
and consumers.
-14-
t The Australian government supports changes in economic policies
affecting thi international economic sstem, which are both practi. cal
and. viable, which serve the interdependent interests of both the
developed and the developing nations. We believe that presertation
of the essential elements of the present economic system continue
to hold the greatest hope for economic progress.
Changes to the international system of the magnitude envisaged in the
new international order proposals, would, however, almost certainly
be counter-productive. Thus for instance: Commodity agreements which
seek to ameliorate short term price fluctuations are one thing, but
attempts to set artificially high prices in OPEC type commodity
arrangements are another. Such arrangements might bring short term
benefits. In the longer run, the short term gains are generally more
than offset by the long term costs attendant on declining demand and
substitution. Similarly, while Australia supports greater market access and has
taken steos in this direction, the impact on domestic industries
must be a critical concern of proposals in this area. Failure to
Sac. knowlecze the structural effects of any changes will only result
in internal industrial and economic disruption, leading to the
re-establishment of protective barriers.
There must -e a sensitivity and responsiveness to the legitimate interests
of the dee.=-.-ing nations, and a commitment to supporting those proposals
tha will istic-al assist the developing nations in the internationa
a-onomic cc::---rity.
Tnhe fostering of the illusion that redistribution of the world's existing
wealth will rescl. e all problems serves no ones interest. Redistribution
has a place in e world's economic agenda but much more important is
soundly based in-ernational economic growth, and most fundamental of all,
the pursuit by developing countries of domestic policies which foster
enterorise and initiative.
If we do not frankly say this, then we and the developing countries,
run the risk of raising unrealistic expectations which would inevitably
be shattered. The frustration this would engender would be gravely
V destabilising both for the governments of the'developing countries, and
for the international system.
The problems which face Australia are not unique; they are problems which
face many countries in the contemporary era. In this environment, one
important way in which a medium power such as Australia can exercise some
beneficial influence, is by the quality of our analysis on international
questions. That quality is significantly a function of the quality of
the foreign poll-y iebate. There is an overriding need to adopt an
attitude of dis._ ssiate analysis to avoid both stridency and an
unwarranted cn-. placency.
Some peo-le eliee t-hat what is required for Australia's foreign policy
is a bicar i-sa aoproach. I think it would be fruitless to aim at a
sterile bic-rtisanshio in which difference in approach and emphasis are
lost by i-zhing foreign policy at the lowest common denominator.
In any case, under present conditions, bipartisanship is not a realistic
possibili-y.
. ha: is d-esirble is that the discussion of foreign policy, of the options
open to Australia, and the different approaches which characterise the
approaches of the two major parties, should be discussed rationally, and
without attempting to distort positions.
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Only if these dif crences are realisticllv. and objectively canvass 2d,
can the Australian public * coma to adecr: ate conclusions and have an
effec~. c-% ee appreciht ion of toe realitieas of internationallife.
What should be souqht is a consensus on the funlamental assumption
of foreign nolicy. The debate will be inost productive if there is
a recocanition of t-he fact and it is a fact that Australians
ovY'erwdheffnl sh~. re values a-nd certain key assumptions about the cul: 2.